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Introduction 
Carola Richter and Claudia Kozman
Building on extant scholarship about media systems, this chapter 
provides a set of criteria to examine the Arab countries, and by 
doing so, to allow a comparative analysis. Taking into account the 
various issues previous studies have had with such classifications, 
we designed the benchmarks of our analysis to reflect the various 
factors that intertwine to both draw similarities and highlight 
differences in the media among the Arab countries. As such, 
the aim of this chapter is to classify Arab media along a set of 
dimensions in order to better understand the overall systems that 
characterize media in the Arab region.
The Arab world has existed for thousands of years, but it has never 
received as much attention from the international community as it has 
during the last decade, where political unrest has resulted in changes 
to long-standing governing styles. At the heart of such changes were 
the media that played a significant role in supporting or resisting these 
transformations. To better understand how Arab media are situated at 
the intersection of politics, culture, and technology, we turn to media 
systems. Notwithstanding the similarities they share with one another, 
Arab media are not homogeneous. Therefore, to comprehend their 
collective power, we need first to understand their individual potential 
before we grasp their regional breadth. 
Arab media matter globally. They matter because they reflect a range 
of often distinct but specific political approaches and understandings of 
publics and the public sphere. These approaches are potentially shaping 
media practices beyond the Arab world, incorporated by migrant 
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audiences, transnational journalists or globally investing companies. 
They matter because they point us to economic media models that 
go beyond the Western notions of “public” and “private” with strong 
implications for the role media can play in societies. They matter 
because of the ways in which digital and, in particular, social media are 
incorporated in both regimes’ and users’ practices, providing us with an 
insight into the possible effects of digital media technologies on society, 
economy and politics globally. 
With the term “Arab media,” we refer to mass media in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region—a region that comprises more 
than 300 million people in over 20 states stretching from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the borders of Iran. People living in these states are of different 
ethnic origins and adhere to different religions. These states are shaped 
by different forms of governance, ranging from hereditary monarchies 
to federal republics. Some are considered the richest countries in the 
world, whereas others are the poorest. This vast region, which was 
once considered the cradle of humankind, boasting some of the oldest 
reminders of early civilization, has witnessed various historical forces 
that have rendered its current political structure a product of colonial 
dependencies, with some states being on the brink of collapse or 
disintegration. Thus, the “Arab world” is by no means a homogenous 
entity, nor are its media. As such, any attempts at examining it require 
a careful analysis that centers on the historical, political, social, and 
economic peculiarities of the different countries making up the region. 
Given this need to treat the Arab world as an area of varying political and 
cultural structures, the primary unit of our analysis will be the nation-
state. Indeed, there is a common bond of history among the countries 
under investigation in this book, which started with the spread of Islam 
in the 600s, and was amplified by a century-long incorporation of most 
of what is today considered the MENA region into the Ottoman Empire. 
There are also shared experiences of colonialism, subsequent struggles 
for independence and the oftentimes ongoing search for a national 
identity. And, separating it from all other important world regions, 
such as Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, or even Latin America, 
is a unifying language, Arabic, which creates a sense of belonging 
and togetherness—despite the different local dialects, the influence of 
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colonial languages, and the multiplicity of indigenous languages such 
as Kurdish or Tamazight. 
A common language, a shared history, and, often, mutual political 
interests led to the foundation of the Arab League, comprising 22 
countries, in 1945. In the following chapters, we examine 18 of them, 
excluding only Somalia, Mauritania, and the microstates of Djibouti 
and the Comoros, as they belong geographically and culturally to sub-
Saharan Africa. 
One major argument for specifically considering the nation-state 
as our unit of analysis is the historically proven pattern of the non-
simultaneity of the development of Arab media, which continues even 
today. While as early as the nineteenth century, Cairo, Beirut, and 
Baghdad had already established themselves as centers of intellectual 
media production with a lively press landscape, today’s technologically-
advanced Gulf states had no mass media at that time. Structural, 
economic, and political differences are also constitutive today, as can 
be observed, for example, in Internet connectivity, which ranges from 
almost 100% of the population in Kuwait to 22% in Libya (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2018). However, repeating the pattern from 
a century ago, highly mobile Arab journalists and media producers are 
once again driving forward intra-Arab and international exchange and 
media development. Whether the object of discussion is newspapers 
founded in Cairo in the 1800s by Syrian intellectuals from Beirut, a 
Tunisian-moderated talk show at the Al-Arabiya television station in 
the Emirates today, or a Palestinian newspaper in London financed by 
Qatari investors, Arab media must be understood in both their national 
and transnational contexts. This book aims to provide a picture of 
current Arab media systems, building on their past and predicting their 
future. To do so, it relies on new dimensions that create a framework for 
evaluating the media in each of the Arab countries, as they highlight the 
characteristics that render these media systems unique, while placing 
them within the larger Arab systems. 
This introduction provides an overview of Arab media systems, 
putting forward a set of new criteria to examine media in the Arab 
countries and, in doing so, allowing a comparative analysis. The 
development of these criteria is guided by a de-westernizing approach 
that builds on a critical review of extant scholarship about media 
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systems. It thus speaks to an audience of media and communication 
scholars, or students who are interested in expanding their knowledge 
in international and comparative political communication. In addition, 
the emphasis the book puts on the historical and current complexities 
of the Arab region allows for a deeper understanding of the shared yet 
distinct characteristics of Arab media in their political, economic and 
societal contexts. As such, the book is potentially interesting to a broader 
audience of political scientists, media workers, and even politicians or 
NGOs. 
Following the introduction, the subsequent country chapters offer 
a more nuanced understanding of Arab media through the insights of 
authors who are mostly, with the exception of a few experts, natives 
of the countries about which they are writing. It is worth mentioning 
that the task of providing a comprehensive overview of the historical 
formation, current status quo, and future challenges faced by the media 
systems in a short chapter is impossible. We therefore aimed to focus on 
the broader picture, opting to refrain from presenting a plethora of facts 
and figures. 
To sum up the information on individual countries, the conclusion 
identifies common themes gleaned from individual chapters, classifying 
Arab media according to a spectrum that features the specific 
characteristics of media in the Arab region. 
Comparison of Media Systems as an  
Analytical Perspective
We use the term “media system”, although not everyone is content 
with this term (see Jakubowicz, 2010, p. 9). Dennis McQuail (2010) 
has defined media systems as “the actual set of mass media in a given 
national society” (p. 220), which points out the problem of thinking of 
media systems as hermetic, national “containers.” We instead follow 
the notion of systems advanced by Andrew Chadwick (2013), who 
contends that systems should be seen as being constitutive of structure-
actor relationships; thus the term “system may often connote flexibility, 
adaptability, and evolutionary change emerging from the sum of social 
interaction” (p. 16). Building on these concepts and applying such a 
perspective, we will take a closer look at structures that shape practices 
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that, in turn, shape structures in both national and transnational 
contexts. 
Scholars have contended that media systems reflect the historical 
trajectories of a society and the political and legal systems, economic 
system, and social composition of the country in which they are located. 
In this realm, a comparative approach to media systems appears to be 
a useful way to explain different patterns of media governance and 
performance. The past decades of comparative research have revealed 
that this approach has not been driven purely by scholarly motivation but 
has been used as a means to normatively evaluate media systems as free/
unfree or developed/underdeveloped and to draw political conclusions 
from this typology. Beyond their political instrumentalization, these 
typologies can also help researchers to grasp major differences and 
similarities in media organization and performance quickly—but they 
must be established with care. 
However, comparative media system analysis has predominantly 
focused on criteria related to the historical, political, and economic 
aspects, often neglecting the social aspect. One of the few authors to 
consider this latter aspect is John Downing (1996), who proposed 
analyzing media systems according to factors such as political power, 
economic crisis, dramatic social transitions, and small-scale media. 
The field of comparing media systems was first conceptualized via the 
publication of the Four Theories of the Press by Fred Siebert, Theodore 
Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm (1963). In this book, the authors 
identified four types of media system logics according to the media’s 
“chief purpose” (Siebert et al., 1963, p. 7): 1) an authoritarian model in 
which media advance and support the policies of the government and 
are thus strongly controlled by it; 2) a libertarian model in which media 
are meant to inform and entertain and can be owned by whoever has 
the economic means to do so; 3) a social responsibility model in which 
media are also meant to inform and entertain but with the purpose of 
discussing and solving societal conflicts; 4) a Soviet totalitarian model 
in which the chief purpose of the media is to propagate the ideas of the 
ruling party, and the media is therefore almost exclusively state-owned. 
The book, which arose from the investigation Siebert and his 
colleagues conducted at the request of the Hutchins Commission on 
Freedom of the Press, was strongly driven by a Cold War impulse to 
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highlight Western media systems as superior to those influenced by the 
Soviet Union. For instance, while model 1 seems to mark the early state 
of a society, which can be overcome by democratic developments and 
eventually leads to the models 2 or 3, model 4 is seen as deviant and 
undesirable. Perhaps, the most potent criticism of the four theories came 
from media historian John Nerone (1995), who contended that the book 
is essentially one theory with four examples.
Regardless, this typology of what role the media ought to play in 
society and how they are therefore organized has shaped generations 
of scholars. Some have tried to add models (or theories), such as James 
Carey’s (1992) “ritual model”, which depends on shared understandings 
between sender and receiver that help to maintain society; William 
Hachten’s (1981) “revolutionary model”, which emphasizes the 
mobilizing and propaganda role of media; Dennis McQuail’s (1994) 
“developmental model”, in which he referred to media as a contributor 
to positive national development; or James Curran’s (1991) “radical 
democratic model”, in which he proposed that media should be free 
of commercial interests and belong to the people. All of these models 
were clearly based on contemporary perspectives, reflecting the political 
and economic contexts in the particular world regions with which they 
engaged during a particular time. 
Only in 2004 did a book of a truly comparative nature, Comparing 
Media Systems by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, set a new benchmark. 
Limiting their investigation to the 18 media systems of North America 
and Europe, and excluding Eastern Europe, the authors devised three 
types of media-politics relationships: 
1) the liberal model, which is characterized by a market-driven 
understanding of the media, a low structural political parallelism, and 
little external regulation of the media, as is found in the US; 
2) a democratic corporatist model, in which media are considered a 
public good and moderately regulated, as in Sweden; 
3) a polarized pluralist model, in which political parallelism is strong 
and media are often seen as instruments used by either the state, political 
parties, or business tycoons, as we see in Greece. 
This seemingly ready-to-use typology of media systems has drawn 
much attention and been heavily quoted in subsequent studies, but it has 
also been strongly criticized. One of the major criticisms against it is that 
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the ideal types outlined above are too general and not applicable beyond 
the Western hemisphere (Hallin & Mancini, 2012). Both criticisms 
indicate a misunderstanding of Hallin and Mancini’s intentions. The 
authors made it clear from the very beginning that their typology should 
be understood as a possible range of ideal types with many overlaps and 
grey zones in between, implying that none of the countries analyzed in 
their study fitted exactly into any single one of the types. Furthermore, 
the authors never intended to apply these models or types to examples 
outside the Western world. Thus, the polarized pluralist, which has often 
been labeled as some kind of “catchall category” (Voltmer, 2012, p. 225) 
for media systems of the Global South, would have to be reshaped or 
reconceptualised for use as a starting point to look beyond the Western 
world. 
Taking into consideration the above thoughts on Hallin and Mancini’s 
work, and in line with demands raised in the context of the debate on 
de-westernizing communication studies (Waisbord & Mellado, 2014), 
we find it necessary to reflect on the criteria Hallin and Mancini devised 
to form the conceptual base of their three types and their applicability 
to non-Western media systems. These criteria are related to both the 
political and media systems and are integral to each model. With regard 
to the political system, Hallin and Mancini emphasized the importance 
of the political history of a country, i.e. whether it is a consensus or 
majoritarian government, and whether it operates within the context of 
political pluralism. 
With regard to the media system, they emphasized the significance 
of factors such as the development of the newspaper industry, the 
presence of political parallelism in media organizations, and the level 
of professionalization among journalists, as well as the role of the 
state in regulating the media. Thus, their models focussed strongly on 
history, media-politics relationships, legal aspects, and journalistic role 
perception, but ignored many other elements, such as technological and 
social aspects. Perhaps even more importantly, a rather static application 
of the derived criteria to the analysis of a media system misses out 
less explicit and non-codified practices in the realm of media policies. 
Waisbord and Mellado highlight that “de-westernization demands a 
shift in the analytical mindset” (2014, p. 364), in particular with regard 
to the “body of evidence” (p. 364). Still, many scholars have continued 
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to rely on the same limited focus on politics-media relations, such 
as Roger Blum (2014) who built on Hallin and Mancini’s criteria to 
develop a typology for the entire world. He proposed 11 dimensions 
that mirror these very same foci (p. 295). According to Blum, each of 
the dimensions, for example, media freedom or political parallelism, 
can unfold in three ways—liberal, middle, or regulated. As a result, six 
models are possible: the liberal model (represented by the US) at one 
end of the spectrum and the command model (represented by North 
Korea) at the other, with mixed models in between these two poles, such 
as the public service model (represented by Germany), the clientelist 
model (represented by Italy), the shock model (represented by Russia), 
and lastly, the patriot model (represented by Iran). Yet again, the 
applicability and adequacy of these labels—in particular in relation to 
non-Western countries—need to be reviewed. Examining the ubiquitous 
and uncritical use of the media system models brought forth by Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm, as well as by Hallin and Mancini, we conclude 
that such limiting labeling should be avoided in order to give credit 
to the various features of media systems beyond a static analysis of 
media-politics relations. In the following section, we focus on the kinds 
of dimensions and criteria that are particularly helpful in thoroughly 
analyzing Arab media systems. 
Comparative Media Systems in the Arab World:  
The Status Quo
Until recently, there have been only a few attempts to classify Arab 
media systems. What exist are a number of case studies of a single 
Arab country, or comparisons of two states (e.g. El-Richani, 2016; 
Webb, 2015; Kraidy, 2012; Khamis, 2009). Often, these studies refer 
to one of the abovementioned classification systems and speak about 
the “authoritarian” or—to a lesser degree—the “polarized pluralist” 
character of the respective media system. Blum, for instance, analyzed 
three Arab states—Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon—and categorized them 
unsurprisingly in the command model, the patriot model, and the 
clientelist model, respectively. By taking into consideration the typical 
dimensions outlined earlier (history, media-politics relationships, and 
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journalistic performance), only rather general conceptualizations seem 
to be possible. 
For a long time, the only, and probably most widely read, attempt 
to classify Arab media systems has been the work of William Rugh, 
The Arab Press, published as early as 1979, and updated in 2004 under 
the new title of The Arab Mass Media. According to this latest version, 
there are four main models by which Arab media systems may be 
classified. The first is the mobilization press, which represents a model 
stemming from the era of modernization, when republican regimes had 
the vision of awakening and educating their people through strongly 
controlled media. While in 1979 most republics were classified by Rugh 
as corresponding to this model, by 2004, only Syria, pre-2003 Iraq, Libya, 
and Sudan remained in this category. His second model is the loyalist 
press, whose main characteristic is its loyalty to and general support 
of the ruling elites, despite the fact that it consists of private media 
conglomerates. Rugh placed Palestine and all the countries surrounding 
the Persian or Arabian Gulf, with the exception of Kuwait, in this 
category. A third model is the diverse (print) media where media—
or at least the print media sector—are characterized by a plurality of 
political opinions, most often indicating a strong political parallelism 
in the countries that are loosely (or not at all) controlled by a central 
government. Among the countries that Rugh believes to belong to this 
model are Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, and Yemen. The fourth model, 
which Rugh offered in order to reflect changes in many countries at the 
beginning of the 2000s, is the transitional system of (print) media. In 
2004, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia were featured as examples of 
this model because they had introduced privatization measures in the 
media sector that had started to unfold with different yet “unsettled” 
effects (Rugh, 2004, p. 121). Since his book was published, major political 
developments (e.g. the uprisings well known as the “Arab Spring”, and 
their aftermaths), as well as intra-regional and international military 
interventions (e.g. the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the NATO 
mission in Libya in 2011, or the war in Yemen since 2015) over the past 
two decades have shaken up the classifications of certain countries in 
terms of Rugh’s models. The mobilization press model, for instance, 
is slowly vanishing. On the other hand, the loyalist media model 
persists and needs further elaboration. With this model of the media, 
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Rugh has significantly contributed to Arab media system comparisons 
by taking into account the important category of ownership. In most 
previous typologies, from Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1963) to 
Blum (2014), only a simple distinction had been made between state-
owned, public-owned, and privately-owned media. This distinction is 
predicated on an unspoken assessment of state-owned media as “bad” 
(because of government control) and privately-owned media as being 
“good” (because they guarantee pluralism and watchdog attitudes). 
While Rugh did not dig too deeply into the role of ownership, he did 
show, with regard to the loyalist press, that privately-owned media do 
not necessarily equate to independent or free media. Instead, private 
ownership can be used as a means to control media output even more 
effectively. Thus, a critical review of the specific features of the political 
economy of media governance and ownership in the MENA region will 
be very important in our analysis.
Certain other authors have made insightful contributions to further 
differentiate the types of media systems and the dimensions of analysis. 
Examining the early era of satellite television proliferation in the Arab 
world, Mohammad Ayish (2002) put forward a new type of classification 
system, distinguishing three types of patterns of government control 
and media purpose: 1) traditional government-controlled television; 2) 
reformist government-controlled television; and 3) liberal commercial 
television. He took a closer look at which kind of content was being 
processed in the media and asked whether typical “red lines” of 
reporting, such as political, security, and moral concerns, were being 
pushed by journalists in their reporting (Ayish, 2002, p. 141). Similarly, 
and by analyzing news content in 16 Arab countries, Noha Mellor 
(2005) developed her own classification criteria, mainly with regard to 
the content of the news and considering “the commercial purposes that 
these media serve, whether it is to generate as large a profit as possible or 
to contribute to building a new image and hence goodwill for a particular 
country or media outlet” (p. 73). While the purpose or philosophy of 
media and their functions had previously been established as categories 
by Siebert et al. (1963), Mellor’s introduction of content classification 
indeed represented a new and empirical category for analysis. 
Another, still preliminary, attempt to classify Arab media systems 
has come from Mahmoud Galander (2016) in a working paper. He 
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distinguished between four types: 1) the socially focused media 
system, 2) the modernist monarchies media system, 3) the modernist 
republics media system, and 4) the socially liberal media system. Using 
a distinction based on the form of governance (in particular monarchies 
vs. republics)—similar to other typologies—he introduced additional 
dimensions in order to avoid “the inaccurate and—sometimes faulty—
interpretation of politics as the key constituent of media-government 
relationship in the region” (Galander, 2016, p. 3). Galander argued that 
the sociopolitical aspects of public decision-making and organization, 
such as the degree of tribalism or collectivism, along with religious 
fragmentation, need to be considered in the analysis of Arab media. 
According to him, the Gulf states, excluding Kuwait, feature in the 
first type—the socially focused—while modernist monarchies such as 
Kuwait, Morocco, and Jordan have more in common with one another 
and make up the second type. Sudan, Syria, and Algeria belong to 
the modernist republics, while Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, 
and Lebanon belong to the socially liberal category. While, again, the 
allocation of countries to a certain type can only provide a snapshot, 
due to ever-changing dynamics in the MENA region, Galander has 
made us aware of the importance of taking into consideration aspects 
of a country’s social composition—a factor that has been inexcusably 
neglected by many comparative approaches. 
Others analyzing Arab media have not used typologies, but have 
instead either described the different developments of media systems 
by providing contemporary snapshots of country cases (Guaaybess, 
2013), discussed a certain media genre such as television or film in a 
comparative perspective (Sakr, 2007; Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 
2011), or considered specific dimensions of media systems, such as the 
economy or audiences (Hafez, 2008; Della Ratta, Sakr, & Skovgaard-
Petersen, 2015). Reasons for this hesitation to classify Arab media 
systems include the above described heterogeneity in so many of the 
key categories of comparison, the highly dynamic developments in the 
region, which create major ruptures and changes in opposition to the 
persistence of European countries, and the lack of available empirical 
data to permit a solid comparison of multiple categories. 
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Towards a Conceptual Approach to Arab Media 
Systems Comparison
Building on this review of extant scholarship about media systems, this 
section attempts to provide a set of criteria to examine media systems 
of Arab countries, and by doing so, to allow a comparative analysis. 
To achieve our goal, we carefully weighed the different approaches 
outlined above to ensure that the respective dimensions would help 
us grasp both the heterogeneity and commonalities of the media in the 
MENA region. This also led us to consider characteristics that might 
distinguish some or all countries in the region from those specified in 
the typologies in the West. Our investigation led us to analyze the media 
in each country according to the following dimensions: 
1. Historical Developments
All media system classifications consider historical developments, 
because they have strongly shaped the patterns of current media 
structures, production, and consumption. However, different scholars 
have defined “history” differently: Siebert et al. (1963), for example, 
tended to relate history to a specific cultural influence that they tried to 
grasp by looking at certain philosophical writings of the time as reflective 
of a specific mentality, such as “Russian thinking” (p. 7). Blum (2014), 
on the other hand, considered whether the historical development of 
a country had been somewhat linear, or shaped strongly by ruptures. 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) viewed history mainly in relation to the 
introduction of newspapers and the size of their reception by a national 
readership. All Arab countries, however, have experienced strong 
ruptures in their historic development. Therefore, it is not the question 
of whether that needs to be answered here, but rather the question of 
how these countries have dealt with these changes. Arab countries have 
depended on and been strongly influenced by foreign powers; thus a 
closer look at the ways in which their historical development has been 
shaped by transnational influences will emphasize the effect of such 
political trajectories on these media systems. Taking these trajectories 
into consideration may also help to explain political decision-making 
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or societal conceptions of media far more thoroughly than a simple 
reflection on cultural mentalities, as found in Siebert et al. (1963). 
Let us take, for instance, the geographical history of the region. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, hardly any of the Arab countries 
existed in their current forms. Colonial powers (in particular France 
and Great Britain, but also Spain and Italy) strongly determined the 
MENA region’s fate up until the 1960s. Some countries, such as Algeria, 
only gained independence after bloody wars. In the Mashriq—that is, 
the eastern part of the MENA region—and also in Libya, numerous 
ethnically or religiously disparate populations were “thrown” into 
state structures, leading to political and social tensions that remain 
to this day. Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon are prime examples of colonial 
restructuring. On the positive side, the encounters and confrontations 
with European colonizers and the subsequent end of the centuries of 
Ottoman domination in the region triggered many developments in 
the media sector, including the importation of new technologies and 
formats (Skovgaard-Petersen, Harbsmeier, & Simonsen, 1997).
After World War II, the Arab region served as a playing field for the 
new superpowers, the Soviet Union and the US. The contest to determine 
their respective spheres of influence resulted in numerous conflicts and 
proxy wars that repeatedly set back the region’s development. Examples 
of this may be observed in the Arab-Israeli conflict with major wars in 
1948, 1967, and 1973, and many other conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq 
war in the 1980s and the Iraq wars of 1990 and 2003. During these times, 
the superpowers also supported authoritarian rulers who guaranteed 
internal stability and showed loyalty to them, with the aim of maintaining 
a balance of political power during the Cold War (Turner, 2012). The 
main beneficiaries of such political arrangements were hereditary royal 
houses, as seen in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Morocco, as well as nationalist republican 
regimes, which often developed a strong cult of leadership, as seen in 
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Iraq. 
Such historic dependence on Western actors is not the only 
transnational development to consider. Marwan Kraidy (2012) has also 
reminded us of the strong pan-Arab connections. Due to a common 
language, the MENA region has been, and continues to be, a hub of 
mobility for media producers and journalists. Media has been an 
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instrument of both rivalries and coalitions between Arab countries. 
For instance, Egypt’s Nasser targeted Saudi Arabia with his pan-Arab 
ideology in the 1960s via transnational radio production, which was 
in turn a major motivator for the Saudi regime in fostering their own 
infrastructure (Boyd, 1975). 
A major, more recent rupture has been the Arab uprisings—often 
labeled as the “Arab Spring”—which started in 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, with another wave taking place in 
Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq in 2019. In particular, young and 
educated people have taken to the streets and the Internet to revolt 
against authoritarian structures, economic hardships, and social 
exclusion, and to advocate for respecting the dignity of citizens and 
their rights in political decision-making (Howard & Hussain, 2013). 
While in some countries, such as Egypt and Bahrain, authoritarian rule 
has been restored, other countries, such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen, 
witnessed a major disaggregation of state structures. And others still, 
such as Tunisia, Lebanon, Iraq, and Sudan, seem to have succeeded, at 
least partly, in forcing a change of their structures of government. 
As a result, anyone looking into historical developments must also 
consider changing transnational influences and their effects on the 
media market and production in a given country. 
2. Background: Social Composition,  
Languages and Geography
Contextual information on the social composition of a country, with 
regard to gender and age equality and ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
diversity, is often neglected in comparative media system analyses. 
This oversight downplays the importance of such information for 
our understanding of media and culture’s role in their production 
and usage. These social factors raise questions about appropriate 
representation in the public sphere, or question of how, through the 
media, they shape struggles for hegemony over discourse, and thus 
provide fertile ground for social conflicts. Sarah El-Richani (2016), in 
her analysis of the Lebanese media system, introduced “crisis” as a 
salient factor that has been neglected by Hallin and Mancini, and most 
other authors (p. 181). In the case of Lebanon, the crisis stems from a 
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decades-long confessional conflict that influences the media market, 
media governance, and media content. Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
indicated there might be some value to analyzing this aspect more 
closely when they referred to “patterns of conflict and consensus”, and 
discussed whether a polarized or a moderate pluralism shapes party 
politics (pp. 59–61). Blum (2014) similarly referred to a dimension that 
he called “political culture” (p. 295) and considered whether there is a 
polarized or a consensus-oriented political culture of negotiation. But 
the reduction of such complex contextual factors to a single category 
seems to overlook the relevance of any culture as a shared space of 
meaning-making. 
Religion, for example, has become a main driver for conflict along 
distinct understandings of a cultural identity. The Arab world is often 
falsely generalized as “Muslim.” We say falsely because the region is also 
the cradle of Judaism and Christianity, with dozens of denominations, 
such as Orthodox or Coptic Christians, living in several countries. 
The word “Muslim” in itself is not unidimensional; it comprises a 
heterogeneity of groups stemming from the major division in Sunni 
and Shi’ite Muslims, which are themselves distinguished through 
various subdivisions. In particular, Lebanon—but also Iraq, Egypt, and 
Syria—has built a fragile confessional model of representation of these 
diverse groups in its media. Bahrain, where a Sunni minority politically 
dominates a Shi’ite majority, is another example of these divisions. We 
must also not forget the heated debates on religiously inspired Islamic 
groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and their parties, indicating 
that there is no unified interpretation of “Islam” or “Muslim” in the 
region (Nawawy & Elmasry, 2018). 
Ethnicity is a further significant aspect of culture. Substantial numbers 
of Imazighen (or Berber) people in Morocco and Algeria, as well as 
Tuareg in Libya, or Kurds in Iraq and Syria, do not consider themselves 
as being of Arab ethnicity and demand official acknowledgement of 
their own language and traditions (Fischer-Tahir, 2013; Pfeifer, 2015). 
The Kurds’ struggle for recognition is a longstanding campaign that has 
eventually led to autonomy for Kurds in Iraq, and is on the brink of 
achieving the same for Kurds in Syria as well. The secession of South 
Sudan from Sudan in 2011 is yet another case in point that shows the 
possible power of such struggles. Besides the citizens, one should also 
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consider the enormous foreign work force—particularly in the Gulf 
countries—representing different ethnicities and/or religions from 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, among others. Media 
production, as well as media content, is influenced by this cultural 
diversity of languages, religions, and ethnicities. 
There are other factors, such as demographics, to consider. The 
population in the Arab world is very young: 15–41% of the people are 
younger than 15 years of age, with Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine 
having the highest share. These young Arabs are growing up as digital 
natives using mobile phones, the Internet, and digital media, which 
consequently throws the legitimacy of traditional media into question, 
especially if the youth do not feel represented in a restricted media 
environment (Gertel & Hexel, 2018). 
Struggles about gender equality also should not be neglected—
both with regard to physical and content-related representation in the 
media. The spectrum of female appearance in the media ranges from 
extremely popular Lebanese media personalities to the nonexistence of 
anchorwomen on Saudi national television, with the exception of one 
female anchor in 2019, thus reflecting different notions of paternalism 
(Sakr, 2007). In general, women are still a minority among journalists 
and media producers in the MENA region. 
Finally, education, a strong indicator for class differences, needs to 
be considered. While the Arab world has paved its way from a largely 
illiterate region to acceptable rates of around 70–98% of the population 
being literate, there are still strata of society that cannot read and write. 
In Morocco, 31% of the population are still considered to be illiterate. 
Yemen represents the lowest rate of literacy with 66% of its population 
unable to read and write, a situation that is predicted will deteriorate 
even further due to the ongoing war there. In addition, other war-
ravaged countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, will likely continue to 
witness the decline of general education and literacy levels (UNICEF, 
2015). 
These elements of a cultural and social context are constitutive of the 
Arab uprisings and thus intricately connected with other major factors, 
namely the political system, legal framework, and economy, which have 
strongly shaped crises in the region. 
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Another often neglected aspect that shapes media systems is the 
geography and size of a country as well as the size of its population. 
El-Richani (2016) introduced this concept as the “state size” factor (p. 
180). It has implications for the media system that may be observed 
through each of the major dimensions we will go on to discuss. 
With regards to infrastructure and technology, these are of course 
more difficult to implement if, as in Sudan, there is a vast landmass 
to be covered by radio waves and Internet fiber cables, rather than a 
tiny island like Bahrain. As for the political economy of the media, 
it is important that the size of a possible target audience is known. 
Licensing nine national television stations for a population of under 
five million, as is the case in Lebanon, might jeopardize the prospect 
of any meaningful business model for each of the separate stations. 
In the case of the MENA region and the common language it shares, 
this often fosters a transnational pan-Arab orientation, as seen with 
Al-Jazeera, which broadcasts from the tiny emirate of Qatar (Zayani, 
2005). In the European context, where many small states such as 
Belgium, Denmark, or Austria exist, a substantial amount of literature 
has been produced on the “giant neighbor” problem, in which national 
markets become dominated by more potent neighboring countries, as 
seen, for instance, in Germany’s effect on Austria or France’s impact 
on Belgium (Puppis, 2009). These smaller markets often develop 
strategies to avoid being overtaken by their “giant neighbor”, such 
as establishing a quota for national production or—as in the case of 
Denmark, with the help of state subsidies—investing strongly in niche 
markets such as crime series production in order to have a unique 
selling point (Lund & Berg, 2009). The UAE or Jordan’s media cities 
could be seen as embodying such strategies as a result of the diminutive 
size of their markets (Khalil, 2013). Finally, and with regard to the 
political dimension, Kraidy (2012) argued that Al-Jazeera and other 
“transnational media institutions can shape national politics in specific 
countries, in addition to pan-Arab politics” (p. 180). Indeed, Qatar’s 
Al-Jazeera has created conflicts with almost every Arab state due to its 
coverage, and it has been cited as a main reason for the ongoing Saudi-
Qatari diplomatic crisis (Al-Jaber, 2018). Therefore, state size will also 
be considered in our analysis. 
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3. Political System and Legal Framework
The main focus of all media system typologies is the political environment 
behind a given system, which follows the guiding principle of Siebert 
et al. (1963) that media take on the “form and coloration of the social 
and political structure” (p. 1) in which they operate. While the social 
composition of a country is often overlooked as a factor in analyses of its 
media, political structures are always taken into consideration. The kind 
of governing system, the definition of media functions in society, how 
the media are controlled, and the kind of state intervention that regulates 
the media, are all important cornerstones of analyses in all typologies. 
However, the degrees used to measure these categories are often highly 
normative. The “democracy bias” often means that, hybrid regimes 
are seen through the lens of democratization and thus categorized as 
flawed, incomplete, or “transitional” democracies (Levitsky & Way, 
2002), when in fact they are not transitioning anywhere, or at least not 
towards becoming democracies. In fact, acknowledging the broad range 
of political authoritarianisms and the different mechanisms of control 
and regulation could be more helpful than applying abstract ideas and 
norms of democratic governance.
In “How Far Can Media Systems Travel?”, Katrin Voltmer (2012) 
pointed to the fact that the dimensions used by Hallin and Mancini 
might suit comparisons of media systems in established democracies, 
but are not useful in comparisons of those outside the West (pp. 
227–29). Basing our analysis on Voltmer’s argument, we contend that 
the question of whether there is a “high” or “low” degree of state 
intervention in the media system does not adequately explain what 
takes place in Arab media systems. Using the values designed by Hallin 
and Mancini for Western systems would, in almost all cases, lead to 
the diagnosis of a comparatively “high” degree of state intervention, 
or of a “not free” system (as evident in other comparative approaches 
used by such groups as Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, 
etc.). Notwithstanding the importance of the state intervention criterion 
used by Hallin and Mancini, perhaps the more interesting questions are 
how does state intervention manifest, and how can these mechanisms 
be classified, as opposed simply to whether or to which degree they 
exist. Indeed, political scientists have diagnosed the MENA region as 
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a “persistence of authoritarianism” (Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004, 
p. 371), indicating that different and dynamic strategies are employed 
by the incumbents in order to maintain the status quo. Heydemann 
and Reenders even speak of an “authoritarian learning” of regimes 
throughout the region and characterize the resulting strategies as aiming 
“to affect the strategic calculus of citizens, allies, and adversaries, even 
while constantly updating their own probabilities” (2011, p. 649). 
It is therefore important to take a closer look at the objectives of state 
interventions with regard to the media, which precise means are used 
to intervene, and if and how “authoritarian learning” has shaped these 
processes. 
For example, the idea, propagated in the 1950s and 1960s, that mass 
media use has a strong and direct effect on people’s will was ultimately 
internalized by rulers in almost all Arab countries. As a result, regime 
control of the media was and still is ubiquitous. Each ruler has claimed 
to know best what is good for the population and what information 
it should receive, relying on emphatic moral, religious, or security 
arguments. Typically, media outlets were first seen as instruments for the 
education and development of society, but often this instrumentalization 
has resulted in their being degraded to mere propaganda tools (Rugh, 
1979). As a rule, information ministries that granted licenses for all 
types of media and made or reviewed personnel decisions served to 
implement this logic and the associated censorship. While state control 
through ministries of information has declined, other institutions have 
been set up to regulate the media, and these are rarely independent of 
state or government influence, as we can observe in the long struggle 
for independence in Tunisia since 2011 (Farmanfarmaian, 2014). By 
comparing regulation laws and procedures in 11 Arab countries, Zaid 
(2018) came to the conclusion that media regulations “are tools of 
authoritarian upgrading rather than genuine attempts to liberalize the 
broadcast sector and enhance pluralism and diversity” (p. 4415). Indeed, 
the official and internationally well-received abolition of ministries of 
information like those in Jordan or Qatar would, in fact, appear to be a 
form of window-dressing, rather than any real attempt at reform. 
From a European perspective, the litmus test of precisely how 
independent media can be in a given country is the introduction of public 
service media that are intended to serve public interests, represent all 
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sections of society, and are governed independently of the state. Yet, while 
some attempts have been made to foster public service broadcasting in 
the MENA region, none of the “public” television channels in the Arab 
region fulfils these criteria (Dabbous, 2015; Guaaybess, 2013). 
Another objective for strong state intervention can also be detected 
in articulated visions of state-led development that are the result 
of attempts to respond to the forces of economic and technological 
globalization. In particular, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman 
have pushed forward ambitious plans of modernization that link welfare 
and stability for its populations with political control. Since this framing 
of state intervention resonates well with their societies, it has become a 
frequently used tool in the MENA region. 
A further reason for strong state control is the above described crisis 
mode that is a constitutive element of many states in the region. This 
could be due to ongoing conflicts in countries such as Iraq, Libya, or 
Lebanon, or conflicts with other countries as seen in Yemen or Syria. 
Even the frequent claim by incumbent elites of being subject to terrorist 
threats can strongly shape the objectives and means of state intervention 
in the media. The plethora of cybercrime laws that were introduced in 
the past couple of years in most Arab countries are an indicator that 
securitization is a frequent strategy of state intervention in the media. 
Thus, we need to analyze carefully the political context, including 
the (legal) measures taken and the motivations behind them when 
analyzing media systems. 
Finally, we want to note that, as we delve into an analysis of the nature 
of the respective political systems, we will use the term “regime”—in 
accordance with political science terminology—to describe a political 
institution as a set of rules and norms for regulating government–society 
interactions without imposing any specific connotation on the term. 
4. Economy and Ownership Patterns
Categories relating to the economy and ownership of the media have 
frequently been included in media system comparisons. Sparks and 
Splichal (1988) even distinguished between a “commercial” and a 
“paternal” model of media systems, thus indicating the important 
role of the economic approach and respective financial sources. Blum 
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(2014) echoed this in his “funding of media” (p. 295) category, and also 
distinguished between the state and the market. Blum (2014), as well as 
Siebert et al. (1963), went further, differentiating between private and 
public ownership in their consideration of “media ownership”. 
The often implicit and simplified line of argumentation is as follows: 
public ownership equals government influence, which equals state 
control and is thus considered paternalistic, whereas private ownership 
equals a liberal market, which equals commercial approaches and is 
thus considered an example of free media. However, this argument is 
misleading especially when it comes to the Arab countries. 
As a result, a critical examination of the political economy of the 
media is indispensable. Many Arab countries can be considered rent-
seeking economies (Nour, 2016), that is, economies based on revenues 
not generated by the production of goods or services. For example, 
finances might come from the sale of raw materials, such as crude oil (as 
in all Gulf countries, Algeria, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya), from state-owned 
stable sources of income (such as the Suez Canal in Egypt), or from non-
state-owned resources (for instance as remittances of migration), as is 
the case in Morocco, as well as Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria, and other 
countries. Rent-seeking economies are therefore heavily dependent on 
only a few sources of income, and their economies usually have a very 
low degree of diversification. This affects their media systems because 
the limited domestic revenue sources and the resulting distribution of 
wealth could dictate who is powerful enough to own media. Moreover, 
the degree of dependence on such income has an impact on the level 
of taxation (and indeed whether or not taxes are being imposed on the 
population at all), which can ultimately result in popular demands 
for representation in the media. So far, many regimes have rejected 
demands for representation with the claim that without taxes, (media 
and political) representation does not need to be guaranteed (Anderson, 
1987). 
In all MENA countries, the state elites have secured their stakes in 
the relevant economic sectors. Anyone who wants to profit from this 
status quo must be loyal to the ruling elites (Roll, 2013). As a result, in 
most of these countries, patronage networks have frequently emerged, 
focusing on the ruling elites, who consolidate their position of influence 
through their control of political institutions and the economy. In this 
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context, the media are of particular importance, both as economic 
enterprises and political instruments (Richter & Gräf, 2015). For 
example, during the 1990s and 2000s, and mostly due to political or 
economic legitimization crises, several Arab regimes such as Tunisia, 
Morocco, and Egypt introduced “liberalization measures” in the media 
market (Guaaybess, 2013). In the Gulf, particularly in Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE, investment in media was seen as a strategy to diversify 
a rent-based economy. In all these cases, the alleged privatization of 
media has rarely been more than a transfer of ownership to the regime’s 
close associates from among the business elite. “Private” thus should 
not be misunderstood as “independent.” Instead, and in accordance 
with the dictum “divide and rule,” a limited amount of the “privatized” 
media’s critical reporting is accepted, as long as it does not attack the 
cornerstones of the regime’s rule. Other means of securing loyalty 
from “private” media have already been described in detail by Rugh 
(1979), in his chapter on the “loyalist press.” These include guaranteed 
government advertisements and subsidies, or threatened withdrawals 
of newspaper copies. Commercially successful financing models for 
independent press, radio, or television media, on the other hand, are 
rare in the Arab world.
In this context, the often-used category of “political parallelism” is 
given a new twist. Hallin and Mancini (2004) and Blum (2014) made 
it one of their four key categories. The concept of political parallelism 
was first proposed by Seymour-Ure (1974) as “party-press parallelism,” 
which he argues is characterized by close associations between political 
parties and media, thus entailing a culture of journalism that openly 
promotes political parties and their positions. Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) developed this concept further, adapting it to the realities 
of the early twenty-first century in the Western hemisphere and 
disconnecting it from the party-as-organization notion. They argued 
that, in countries with high political parallelism, “media are still 
differentiated politically, [although] they more often are associated not 
with particular parties, but with general political tendencies” (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004, p. 28). However, De Albuquerque (2012) criticized 
the term “political parallelism” as an arbitrary coinage. He emphasized 
that, in order to distinguish between simply politically engaged media 
or media advocacy and “real” political parallelism, one must identify 
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whether there are clear or unclear relationships between actors in the 
media and the political system (De Albuquerque, 2012, p. 93). Taking 
this suggestion seriously, we can see that the political involvement of 
media owners is a major driver of political parallelism. Thus, ownership 
patterns, in addition to the funding of media outlets by political actors, 
are the essential aspects that must be investigated in order to ascertain 
the nature and degree of political parallelism. 
In most Arab countries, political actors are commonly involved in the 
media business, and vice versa. In addition, Kraidy (2012) has pointed 
to the fact that there are transnational structures of political parallelism 
and media instrumentalization (pp. 194–95). He discussed the case 
of Saudi investment in the Lebanese market, which had clear political 
interests behind it. It is also obvious that political actors from Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar finance media in war-torn Libya, in order 
to play out their rivalries and secure zones of influence (Wollenberg & 
Richter, 2020). 
Yet there are also other models of ownership and funding beyond 
these dominant state-funded or loyalist models. Local or community 
media have long been marginalized, but have recently gained ground 
in manifold ways, as evidenced by small local radio stations in Jordan, 
Tunisia, and Libya, or by hyper-local online, or even print, media in Iraq, 
Palestine, and Egypt (Sakr, 2016). The potential for decentralized and 
less costly production via the Internet has been a major driver for new 
forms of media production situated on the border between journalism 
and activism. Often, these media can be categorised as “alternative 
media” (Atton, 2001), i.e. media that are not only organized differently, 
but also aim to disseminate content differently from the mainstream 
media. Nonetheless, the financial sustainability of these models is 
always in question. 
5. Technology and Infrastructure
None of the well-known media system typologies focuses on the role of 
infrastructure and technology. In fact, one of the major criticisms Hallin 
and Mancini faced was their neglect of the Internet as a technological 
and transnational factor (Norris, 2009). Although they acknowledged 
the role of technology as a “force [or] limit of homogenization” (p. 
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251) in their original book in 2004, they did not see it as a particular 
factor to be considered separately, but rather as inherent in social 
practices that shape the market, the professionalization of journalists, or 
political parallelism. Indeed, technology should not be treated in such 
a way as to foster a technological deterministic viewpoint. However, 
it is to be considered as both a specific outcome of and influence on 
social practices, or, as Andrew Chadwick (2013) described it, a driver 
of hybridity. This “notion of a hybrid system,” he argued, “draws 
attention to change and flux, the passing of an older set of cultural 
and institutional norms, and the gradual emergence of new norms” 
(Chadwick, 2013, p. 10). The notion of convergence of media should 
also be considered in this discussion. Convergence refers to both the 
changes of media technologies themselves and the implications for 
how we create, consume and distribute media within these converging 
technologies. The questions of how, when, and why new technologies 
have been included in a media system, and with what effect, are thus 
important factors in the analysis of media systems. 
With regard to the spread of technologies, a strong culture of oral 
communication in the MENA region, which persists due to continued 
widespread illiteracy in some regions, might explain the spectacular 
success of radio and, later, television (Armbrust, 1996; Fahmy, 2011). 
Print media such as newspapers have been consumed by the educated 
elite since their inception, and thus have a limited readership. In contrast 
to broadcasting, they have usually been less strongly regulated by the 
state. Internet-based media now provide a hybridization of oral, visual, 
and written elements. 
To place this in a political context, it is important to ask how and why 
the different regimes did, or did not, upgrade their media technologies. 
Most likely, they were seeking a balance between connection to 
technological modernity, which was important for their own legitimacy, 
and the closest possible control of new media discourses. Modernization 
ideology and the interest of spreading education through technology, 
on the one hand, stood in opposition to the fear of threats to national 
unity or challenges to moral values, on the other hand. These factors 
have undeniably influenced the support of technological advancement 
in the media sector (Abdulla, 2007). 
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The first major advancement in this realm was made during the 
1980s. The 22 states of the Arab League decided to invest in their own 
satellite system called ArabSat (the first satellite was launched in 1985). 
The costs for this project, which at the time totaled around USD 500 
million, were distributed proportionately among the different countries 
according to their financial power: Saudi Arabia therefore paid 36.6%, 
Kuwait 14.5%; Libya 11.2%; Qatar 9.8%; the United Arab Emirates 4.6%; 
Jordan 4.0%; Lebanon 3.8%; Bahrain 2.4%; Syria 2.0%; Iraq 1.9%; Algeria 
1.7%; Yemen 1.6%; Egypt 1.5%; Oman 1.2%; Tunisia 0.7%; Morocco 0.6%; 
Mauritania, Sudan, Palestine and Somalia 0.2% each; and Djibouti 0.1% 
of the costs (ArabSat, 2019). Although ArabSat carried most of the Arab 
national television channels, it was dominated by huge media consortia, 
such as MBC, ART, Orbit, and Rotana, which were backed by Saudi 
investors. Egypt invested in its own system, NileSat (launched in 1998), 
as did the UAE with YahSat (launched in 2011). Qatar, with its Al-Jazeera 
consortium, also started its own system, Es’hailSat (launched in 2014), 
so as to become independent from its rival Saudi Arabia. 
Mobile telephony has been another technology that has leapfrogged 
the poor landline infrastructure in almost all of the Arab world since the 
beginning of the 2000s. As a rule, statistics show that, by 2010, at least 
half of the Arab population had their own mobile phone—albeit with 
strong asymmetries in distribution: the Gulf states were again early and 
strong adopters, while Yemen, Syria, and Palestine came in at a much 
lower level. Mobile phone use is closely connected to the upgrading of 
the Internet infrastructure, since the Internet is overwhelmingly accessed 
through mobile devices (Salem, 2017). Those countries in which the 
Internet had been propagated as a symbol of modernity and education 
had a particularly rapid growth in the number of users. Besides the Gulf 
states, during the 2000s the regimes in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, 
despite their fear of the Internet as a hub for oppositional political 
activism, enlarged their DSL infrastructures and enormously expanded 
access for a large part of the population, with campaigns promoting “A 
computer for every household.” 
However, at that point, the race had only just begun, and given 
the manifold effects of Internet communication on all areas of life 
(even beyond the decidedly political ones), social change seemed 
unstoppable. The networking of formerly marginalized political groups 
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(Kopty, 2018), the challenge to religious and political authorities (Faris, 
2013), new communication spaces for gender discourse (Al-Rawi, 
2014; Antonakis, 2018), and resurgent connections between population 
groups and their relatives in the diaspora (Khamis, 2017) all owe their 
existence to the public spaces created by the new media technologies 
and must consequently be considered in a media system analysis. 
In particular, the convergence of media use and production across 
platforms can stimulate extremely dynamic political and social practices 
in relation to media. On the other hand, the dominance of a few giant 
(Western) technology companies in this convergent media environment 
may also create “algorithmic harms,” as Zeynep Tufekci (2015, p. 207) 
has put it, meaning that there might be a lack of visibility of certain 
strata of society and an information asymmetry due to a digital divide 
and a kind of algorithmic gatekeeping. In addition to taking these 
companies into consideration, one must take into account the ownership 
and control of such an infrastructure in the countries analyzed. The 
proprietorship of Internet service providers and telecommunications 
companies in many cases already resembles the cronyistic ownership 
structures described in the section on political parallelism—with major 
regime-loyal businessmen, such as Egypt’s Naguib Sawiris, being at the 
forefront (Sakr, 2015). This raises the question of what this means for 
the shape of the respective media systems.
Other dimensions that have often been discussed—such as the 
self-perception or professionalization of journalists and the role of 
audiences—will not feature as separate categories in our analysis. We 
do not consider them unimportant, but in not defining them as separate 
categories, we acknowledge that, in a digitally shaped media system, 
the role of journalists can no longer be distinguished so clearly from 
that of audiences (Chadwick, 2013). Furthermore, the question of who 
can talk in the media, and the role that he or she is able to play, is in our 
country cases not a matter of professionalization, but rather one of social 
composition, legal framework, economic realities, and technological 
possibilities of the system. As such, we incorporate the discussion of the 
roles of journalists into these separate categories. 
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Book Structure 
In the following chapters, we provide insights into the different media 
systems in the MENA region. The book is structured according to 
geographic groupings of countries, starting in the east with the Levante 
or Mashriq region, which comprises Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, 
and Iraq, and followed by the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, which 
consists of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and 
Yemen. We then continue with Egypt and Sudan, and end with the 
west of the MENA region, the Maghreb, which includes Libya, Tunisia, 
Algeria, and Morocco. This regional grouping specifically highlights the 
relationships between neighboring countries that often share a common 
(colonial) experience, as in the case of the Levante and the Maghreb. 
Some also face similar challenges, such as the incorporation of ethnic 
minorities, or the response to the post-oil boom era. 
To allow for a systematic comparison of the different media systems, 
each country chapter follows the dimensions outlined above through 
an analysis of the specific characteristics of each media system within 
its political, social, cultural and economic contexts. Adhering to these 
criteria does not overshadow the uniqueness of each media system, but is 
rather an approach that examines the specific features and developments 
of a particular media system, while allowing for comparative analyses 
across the countries. Finally, the conclusion highlights major themes 
that can be identified from the in-depth studies provided in the country 
chapters. 
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1. Lebanon: A Faltering Mesh 
of Political and Commercial 
Interests 
Sarah El-Richani 
The Lebanese media, much like Lebanon itself, are boisterous 
and colorful. The pluralism that characterizes Lebanese society 
is reflected in its Babelesque media. In addition to the gamut of 
voices represented, freedom of expression is generally respected 
with the occasional transgressions. This chapter assesses the state 
of the Lebanese media from its inception to the present day, taking 
stock of the legal and political framework and the challenges 
encountered as well as the prospects for media in Lebanon. 
Background 
Lebanon, which was carved out by colonial powers from its Syrian 
hinterland in 1943, is among the smallest nations in the Arab world 
in terms of size and population. The Mediterranean country of 
approximately five million citizens also comprises a sizeable number 
of Syrian and Palestinian refugees. According to United Nation (UN) 
agencies, there are 910,256 registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon and 
just under 470,000 registered Palestinian refugees who fled to Lebanon 
after the establishment of Israel in 1948. The government, however, 
estimates that 1.5 million Syrian refugees are present in the country 
(UNHCR, 2020), making Lebanon the country with the highest 
number of refugees in relation to its size: 173 per 1,000 inhabitants 
(UNHCR, 2017).
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Another characteristic of Lebanon is its diversity. While it is the only 
country in the Arab world that does not have an official religion, religion 
plays a dominant role in public life. Lebanon has 18 recognized Muslim 
and Christian religious groups, which have been given the prerogative 
over family status affairs. This pluralism is also reflected in parliament 
and political and state offices where positions are divided between the 
Christian and Muslim sects. 
The manner in which this pluralism is organized in Lebanon has 
been contentious and is regarded as one of several factors that spurred 
the Lebanese Civil War, which began in 1975 and lasted approximately 
15 years. The war claimed nearly 120,000 lives and resulted in the mass 
emigration of Lebanese citizens. The Ta’if Accord, which eventually 
brought an end to the war in the early 1990s, rearranged the division 
of power in a more proportional manner and effectively gave Syria 
the role of oversight. Syrian armed forces were already on Lebanese 
soil at the start of the civil war in a failed bid to end the war, and their 
influence on Lebanese political life would grow in strength in the post-
war period. 
Even in the post-war era, the power-sharing system, the weakness 
of the state, and the strength of the political and sectarian groups 
that are often supported by external regional players have made 
governance in this precarious nation a challenge. Additionally, it has 
made competition within each group difficult. The recurring conflicts, 
whether the devastating wars with Israel and the Israeli occupation of 
South Lebanon, which lasted from 1982 to 2000, or internal political, 
security, and economic crises, have further crippled the country, thereby 
impacting its media. 
Indeed, the media reflect the political and social architecture 
of Lebanon. To begin with, most religious and political groups are 
represented on some level of the media system in one form or another. 
This makes the Lebanese media stand out in a region where free 
expression and pluralism are limited. 
 31. Lebanon
Historical Developments
The Lebanese media were pioneers in the region in terms of both 
publishing and broadcasting. The first Arabic newspaper to be published 
by Arabs, Hadikat Al-Akhbar, was launched in 1858 in what today is 
modern Lebanon. This was followed by several other newspapers 
published by the nahda literati. Nahda refers to the cultural renaissance 
that took place in the Levant and Egypt at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Indeed, on the eve of World War I, there were 168 publications 
published in Beirut alone. 
As the Ottoman Empire, dubbed the “sick man of Europe”, faltered, 
its grip over the provinces it controlled tightened before its ultimate 
collapse. As a result, some of these intellectuals and journalists fled to 
the more autonomous Egypt where they would establish prominent 
newspapers. Among these was the renowned Al-Ahram daily, which 
had been established by the Taqla brothers. Other publishers and 
writers, however, opted to stay put and agitate for freedom at a heavy 
cost—death. On 6 May 1916, a cohort of intrepid leaders, including 16 
journalists, was sent to the gallows by the brutal Ottoman Wali Jamal 
Pasha, “the bloodshedder,” in what would later be named Martyrs’ 
Square (El-Richani, 2020). 
Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Lebanon fell 
under French Mandate and witnessed strict controls on free expression. 
Nevertheless, the vibrancy of newspapers born out of individual effort 
would continue. After Lebanon’s declaration of independence from 
France in 1943, the Lebanese press would enjoy even more freedom. In 
fact, their coverage of corruption in the first government was partially 
credited with the 1952 resignation of the republic’s first president, 
Bechara El-Khuri. 
The period between independence and the start of the Lebanese civil 
war in 1975 also witnessed the launch of Lebanese television, which, 
unlike in other countries in the region, began as a private and commercial 
enterprise offering regular programming. In 1959, the Compagnie 
Libanaise de Télévision (CLT) was launched and was followed in 1962 by 
Tele Orient, another commercial broadcaster. Despite the broadcast of 
advertisements, the two channels failed to yield profits. Their financial 
troubles were further exacerbated by the start of the civil war. Therefore, 
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in 1977, the government intervened and bailed them out by merging 
the two companies to form Télé Liban (TL) of which it owned 50% of 
the shares. The remaining private sector shares were later purchased 
by Rafik Hariri, a future Lebanese premier who was later assassinated 
in 2005. Hariri eventually sold his shares in TL to the state and set up a 
privately-owned television station and media empire. 
With the start of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and unlike the Arab 
press which embodied the slogan “no voice rises above the voice of the 
battle,” the diversity of views in Lebanon would remain extant. The 
liberal An-Nahar daily was critical of Egypt’s president and Pan-Arab 
leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, whereas others were more sympathetic to 
the Pan-Arab cause. For instance, the popular and now defunct As-Safir 
published daily Abdel Nasser quotes on the back page throughout the 
decades and labeled itself the “newspaper of Lebanon in the Arab world 
and the paper of the Arab World in Lebanon.”
The polarization of the press, though a welcome manifestation of 
free expression and pluralism, reflected the increased divisions in the 
Lebanese polity and eventually resulted in conflict. In 1975, a number of 
factors caused the rupture including gross inequalities and the regional 
crises afflicting the country, which saw the influx of the Palestinian 
feda’yeen or armed groups into Lebanon. The civil war, which spanned 
nearly 15 years, witnessed the emergence of militia tabloids alongside 
newspapers representing the entire political spectrum. In 1977, an 
amendment to the press law was passed in an effort to stifle the press 
seen by then President Elias Sarkis as inciting strife (Khazaal, 2018, p. 72). 
The amendment was, however, difficult to implement in this Hobbesian 
“war of all against all”. Meanwhile, in the 1980s, pirate television and 
radio stations would emerge challenging the national broadcaster TL, 
which sought to sanitize coverage of the war and further what Khazaal 
(2018) termed “the peace bubble” (p. 68). One of these television 
stations, LBC, managed to attract a wide audience despite its flagrant 
affiliation to the right-wing Christian militia at the time. Following the 
end of the war, the channel severed its links to the disbanded party, 
whose leader was imprisoned. Yet, the channel still remains prominent 
to this day (El-Richani, 2015, pp. 49–50). 
After 1990, during the post-war years, newspapers and media in 
general benefitted from the return of commercial activity despite the 
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limitations on free expression imposed by the Syrian caretakers. Live 
coverage of protests was banned (Rugh, 2004, pp. 202–04), censors 
were implanted in television stations, and journalists were often closely 
monitored. In 2002, MTV, a popular broadcaster was accused of violating 
Article 68 of the electoral law, although even the Minister of Information 
at the time admitted that this was just a pretense and the closure was on 
“purely political” grounds (Kraidy & Khalil, 2009, pp. 129–32). 
The next rupture was the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri along with several other politicians and journalists in 2005. 
This led to major protests and the emergence of the March 8 and March 
14 political camps, with the former consisting of pro-Syria parties and 
groups and the latter of a coalition of parties and politicians who were 
against Syria’s long-standing interference in Lebanon. The massive 
protests and international pressure eventually forced the Syrian troops 
to leave and effectively ended Syrian tutelage over Lebanon. Shortly 
after the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the weakening of Syria’s 
influence in 2005, the decree to close MTV was reversed, and the station 
eventually relaunched in 2009. 
In July 2006, a devastating war between Israel and Lebanon erupted 
causing vast destruction. Rising from the ashes was the Al-Akhbar 
newspaper, which, despite its close links to Hezbollah and the Syrian 
regime, as the coverage of the Syrian civil war would later reveal, offered 
a refreshing and brazen approach to news and a break with protocol 
news. In May 2008, civil unrest flared up between the two polarized 
groups: March 8 and March 14. During this period, the Hariri-affiliated 
Future Media empire, belonging to the March 14 coalition, were forced 
off the air for four days by armed gangs affiliated with the powerful 
March 8 coalition. ‘This is Lebanon. We were not protected, as we should 
have been. And, nothing will or can stop them from doing it again as 
simple as this’, lamented a Future TV executive (El-Richani, 2016, p. 
80). Lebanon today, though politically stable, is in dire economic and 
financial straits that have resulted in the closure of many businesses 
including a series of media outlets such as Future TV and the Al-Safir 
daily. 
6 Arab Media Systems
Political System and Legal Framework 
The Lebanese political system is characterized by power-sharing, which 
for all intents and purposes has rendered the state weak. Political power 
is shared among political and sectarian patrons commonly referred to 
as zu‘ama (or za’im in singular). Denigrated as “les fromagistes” by 
President Fu’ad Chehab, who attempted to strengthen the state during 
his tenure in the late 1950s, this political and sectarian elite is only 
interested in their share of the proverbial pie and has subsequently 
benefitted from the system of patronage and clientelism (AbuKhalil, 
1998, p. 197). As mentioned earlier, the 18 officially recognized religious 
groups are proportionally represented in parliament and government. 
The National Pact, an oral agreement among the independence leaders, 
has traditionally allotted the position of president of the republic to a 
Maronite Christian, the premiership to a Sunni Muslim, and the position 
of speaker of parliament to a Shi’a Muslim. 
Despite this attempt at sharing power among the groups, the strength 
of some zu’ama and parties has resulted in a series of impasses, leaving key 
posts vacant for several years. The current president, Michel Aoun, was 
elected in October 2016, nearly two and a half years after his predecessor 
left office. His predecessor, Michel Suleiman, was elected president also 
after a vacancy in the presidency and after regional players intervened to 
end scuffles that erupted in May 2008 between the two dominant camps 
in Lebanon, March 14 and March 8. The tussle over influence and profit 
also delayed civil servant appointments including the post of director 
of the state television TL and, more importantly, delayed the agreement 
over the electoral law leading to the postponement of parliamentary 
elections, which finally took place in May 2018—nine years after the 
May 2009 elections. Although the postponement of the elections was 
allegedly for security reasons relating to the ongoing Syrian civil war, 
some observers believe it was due to a squabble over the electoral law. 
The formation of the cabinet has also usually been a matter of contention. 
Following the parliamentary elections in May 2018, it took nine months 
to finally establish a council of ministers after much wrangling over 
cabinet portfolios, veto power, and the number of portfolios each party 
and religious group would get. Less than a year later, the prime minister 
would resign in light of an unprecedented economic and financial crisis 
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and rampant protests. After three months of political wrangling, a new 
council of ministers was formed to face the crippling economic crisis, an 
issue further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The government, 
however, resigned in August 2020 following the harrowing explosion in 
the Beirut port that claimed 200 lives and billions of dollars in damages. 
The blast, much like the economic crisis, appears to be a result of 
mismanagement, corruption and criminal negligence. 
In addition to the corruption and clientelism that exist, the size of the 
state, which is small by all measures, has also greatly impacted both the 
political and media system and augmented Lebanon’s financial woes. 
This reality is reflected in the media system to a large extent, characterized 
by a high degree of political parallelism or media partisanship. In terms 
of structural pluralism or media ownership, the political and sectarian 
groups are all, more or less, represented on the level of the media 
system whether by direct ownership or indirect affiliation. While the 
broadcasting licensing system, to be described below, paved the way for 
external pluralism where each religious group or political entity would 
own its own channel, there are a number of successful outlets such as 
LBCI and Al-Jadeed that have been pluralized internally both in terms of 
content and staff. 
Meanwhile, the state broadcaster TL, which also reflects the state 
in terms of its weakness and lackluster output, is unable to compete 
with the privately-owned media. The representative rationing that 
has arguably crippled governance is also practiced within the station 
with sharp political divisions among departments and disagreements, 
leaving the position of director vacant for years on end. This and its 
limited annual budget, which is equivalent to what the popular 
privately-owned television networks spend in a month, have meant that 
any aspirations for the channel to fulfil its promise, serve the public, and 
sow national unity remain naïve at best (Buccianti & El-Richani, 2015, 
pp. 24–26).
Before delving into a discussion of the legal framework, it is worth 
noting that, paradoxically, the level of freedom extant in the country is 
largely due to state weakness rather than liberal laws. The weak state 
cannot always impose its harsh laws, particularly against media outlets 
that are supported by powerful owners or backers. 
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The laws currently on the books include the press law, which dates 
back to 1962 and the audio-visual media law which was passed in 
1994. The press law has remained largely unchanged, save for some 
amendments including the 1977 decree 104, which penalizes journalists 
for offending the president, religious groups, or foreign leaders. The 
press law also proposes sanctions for impersonating a journalist, which 
on paper applies to anyone who is not on the Press Association registry. 
Today, the majority of media practitioners are not enrolled in the Press 
Association’s registry and therefore fall afoul of this article. For this 
reason, it could be regarded as a boon for the media that the laws are 
not strictly observed. Other contentious articles that are rarely enforced 
are articles 16, 20 to 23, and 25 of the Lebanese press laws that stipulate 
the imprisonment of journalists for press offenses such as defamation 
and libel. 
Another contentious law relevant to the print media is decree number 
74 that was issued by President Camille Chamoun in 1953, which states 
that no further political publications other than the 110 extant ones 
can be licensed until the number drops to 25. The decree tasked the 
ineffective Ministry of Information with withdrawing licenses from 
dormant publications. The Ministry, however, never fulfilled this role, 
therefore rendering these licenses assets that could be sold to wealthy 
entrepreneurs who were keen on starting a newspaper. The advent of 
the Internet and the move towards digital publications, however, has 
thoroughly weakened this monopoly on the public sphere and rendered 
the licenses more or less worthless. 
Another oversight duty the Ministry of Information has refrained 
from exercising is its monitoring of the finances of media outlets to 
ensure they remain independent. As the media largely rely on political 
money to sustain themselves, the Ministry’s neglect of this role has 
allowed the media to sustain themselves through financial subsidies 
from philanthropists, politicians, and foreign governments seeking 
to play an influential political role, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, 
the USA, and the like. At the same time, broadcasting is regulated by 
audio-visual media law 382/94, which came about after the civil war 
to organize and regulate the audio-visual sector and effectively end the 
already challenged monopoly of TL over the airwaves. The law stipulated 
the formation of the National Audio-Visual Council (NAVC), which was 
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tasked with approving applications for licensing television stations. The 
NAVC members were selected by parliament and the government in 
equal measure, rendering them politically captive to those parties and the 
politicians who selected them. Licenses were therefore granted to the de 
facto powers and along sectarian lines rather than to worthy applicants. 
For instance, Al-Jadeed TV, owned by an adversary of the then PM Rafik 
Hariri, was forced to shut down after having its application rejected 
for dubious reasons. After four years of litigation, the State Council 
arbitrated in its favor, and Al-Jadeed was granted a license in 2000. 
Meanwhile NBN, often jokingly referred to as the Nabih Berri Network 
in reference to its effective owner, the Speaker of Parliament, received its 
license despite not meeting the requirements. Other licensees included 
the now defunct Future TV owned by the influential Hariri family, Murr 
Television (MTV), owned by the influential Greek Orthodox Al-Murr 
family, and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC), formerly owned 
by the Lebanese Forces militia, whose members were persecuted in the 
post-war period. Later, Hezbollah’s Al-Manar, which began broadcasting 
in 1991, was also granted a license. Meanwhile, Télé Lumière, set up by 
the Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops in Lebanon as a non-
profit television station, continues to broadcast without a license. In 
2006, the Free Patriotic Movement was also granted a license to establish 
OTV following the return of current President Michel Aoun from exile. 
According to one of OTV’s executives, the license would not have been 
granted easily “had there been no political side behind this station” 
(El-Richani, 2016, p. 76).
In addition to licensing, the NAVC was also tasked with monitoring 
broadcast media to ensure they upheld the laws, although this was 
done in an ad hoc fashion. The few instances where they would censure 
a station for violating the law were often at the behest of political actors. 
The Ministry’s task to monitor the finances of television outlets to 
ensure their revenue streams stem from legitimate sources, such as 
advertising and production enterprises, has also been suspended. This 
is evidenced by a cursory look at the media market which is simply 
inadequate to sustain the media outlets extant in Lebanon (El-Richani, 
2016, p. 123). In an interview with the author, the then Minister of 
Information recalled how the NAVC cynically told him not to bother 
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with the laws because of the entanglement of politics and the media 
(El-Richani, 2016, p. 75). 
It is important to note here that this state of affairs does not mean 
that all the media laws have been suspended. On the contrary, issues 
relating to defamation and spreading false news, for example, often 
result in time-consuming litigation. Still, there have been calls by media 
professionals and advocacy groups to modernize the media laws, 
in part because they are outdated and do not take into consideration 
technological advancement and its impact on the media, but also 
because the current laws are difficult to implement with vague articles 
and expressions that run against the spirit of the Lebanese constitution. 
One example is the harsh sanctions for violations of the elusive ideal of 
objectivity, which again has luckily been overlooked. 
Although these initiatives have been discussed by the communications 
committee in parliament, they remain dormant for now and are yet 
to be passed. The advocacy groups that deliberated media rights and 
regulations within organized meetings also know full well that the final 
piece of legislation would also be far from ideal as it would be drafted 
and passed by parliamentarians who have a large stake in the media. 
Until new laws are passed, however, it is important to take stock of the 
de facto situation in Lebanon in addition to that which is de jure. 
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Lebanon is a small state in every sense of the word. This means that, 
particularly in terms of political communication, which has limited 
regional traction and is highly competitive, the market is saturated and 
subscription and circulation rates woefully inadequate to sustain the 
media. Furthermore, the unprecedented economic and financial crisis 
in which the country has found itself since 2019 has also exacerbated 
matters with advertising expenditures being cut by approximately 
70%–90% (Arab Ad, 2020).
Many media outlets have therefore had to rely on political subsidies 
from their political backers, which, as recent closures have revealed, is 
not sustainable, particularly in light of the serious economic problems 
facing the country. In October 2018, An-Nahar issued a blank copy to 
raise the alarm about the financial woes facing the Lebanese media 
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and spur politicians to form a cabinet and confront these challenges. In 
December 2019, the newspaper started a campaign to collect donations 
that would ensure its survival. 
Political parallelism is therefore high with many of the media outlets 
subsidized or owned in part or full by political actors. On the level of 
broadcasting, external pluralism, where each party or religious group 
is represented, is rather high. Alongside the national broadcaster, which 
toes the government line, the Shi’ite power brokers are represented 
by two television stations: NBN is owned by long-serving speaker of 
parliament and a za’im, Nabih Berri, who heads the Amal Movement, 
whereas Hezbollah owns Al-Manar through affiliated shareholders. Also, 
the influential Sunni Hariri family owned Future TV until it shut down 
in 2019. Striking a sectarian balance, MTV is owned by the influential 
Greek Orthodox Al-Murr family, LBCI is owned by the Maronite 
Christian Pierre Daher, and other shareholders have also been licensed. 
After a long legal battle, New TV, which was rebranded as Al-Jadeed and 
is owned by a then-Hariri rival, also obtained its license. The party of the 
current president, the Free Patriotic Movement, also launched its own 
television after its members returned from exile. Finally, the Catholic 
Church also continues to run a non-profit television station Télé Lumière 
(El-Richani, 2013, p. 71). 
The print industry is not much different and also includes a series 
of partisan newspapers, such as Al-Anba’ run by the Progressive 
Socialist Party, Al-Bina’ run by the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, 
and Al-Mustakbal run by Hariri’s Future Movement. Other newspapers 
are supported in part or full by a variety of political shareholders or 
contributors: An-Nahar is owned by several political shareholders, 
including at one point the Hariri family, Al-Akhbar is owned by investors 
close to Hezbollah, and Al-Diyar is owned and run by the eccentric 
publisher Charles Ayoub, who, in 2011, openly wrote an editorial 
about the “gifts” and broken promises he had received from Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, and Hariri, among others (El-Richani, 2016, p. 152). The 
newspapers Al-Liwa’ and El-Sharq are both close to Hariri and Saudi 
Arabia with the latter owned by the head of the editor’s association, 
Awni Al-Kaaki, and his sibling, whereas Al-Liwa’ is owned by the Salam 
family. Other newspapers in the March 14 camp include Al-Jumhouriyya, 
which is owned by the former Minister of Defence Elias Murr, the 
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francophone L’Orient le Jour, which is owned by the wealthy Edde, 
Chouieri, and Pharaon families, and the anglophone The Daily Star, 
founded by prominent journalist Kamel Mroueh but currently owned 
by Hariri associates as well as Qatari associates. The Daily Star decided 
in early 2020 to suspend its print edition and continue only with digital 
distribution. Meanwhile in October 2020, the French daily L’Orient le 
Jour launched its English-language edition L’Orient Today.
Other newspapers include the now defunct, once prominent leftist 
Pan-Arab daily Al-Safir, owned by Talal Salman and funded by a 
variety of regional stakeholders, including the wealthy investor and 
philanthropist Jamal Daniel in 2014. After 42 years of uninterrupted 
publishing, the newspaper folded in 2016. Another newspaper that 
folded in 2018 was the catchall commercial newspaper Al-Balad, owned 
by the Kuwaiti Al-Wataniya company, which, for a number of reasons, 
failed to capture the interests of Lebanese readers. Despite this wave 
of closures, one newspaper, Nida’ Al-Watan, and two recent digital 
platforms, Daraj and Megaphone have emerged in recent years. While 
Nida’ Al-Watan champions the March 14 camp, Daraj and Megaphone are 
independent in so far that they are not linked to parties or officials in the 
country. The two digital platforms, however, both rely on grants from 
European donors, which raises questions about long-term sustainability.
This ownership structure prompted media scholar Nabil Dajani 
(2013) to claim that media freedom in Lebanon is a myth, citing 
restrictions imposed by financiers on the media they support. 
While this may be true to a certain extent, in so far as one rarely 
finds criticism of Saudi Arabia on Hariri-affiliated media or of Iran 
in Hezbollah-affiliated media, critical and strident views about all 
political actors and regional and international players are prevalent 
in the Lebanese media and readily accessible to all.
Nevertheless, following the rise of Rafik Hariri to the premiership 
and the consolidation of ownership over several media outlets, there 
was a serious concern that pluralism might be limited and criticism 
of his policies could be snuffed. The sprawling Hariri conglomerate 
across several industries from banking and contracting to real estate 
and insurance included at one point a considerable media portfolio. The 
Hariri media empire acquired shares in a number of publications, such 
as the liberal An-Nahar and Al-Liwa’, and it also owned entire media 
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outlets, including two television channels, one newspaper, and one radio 
station, Radio Orient. This moguldom has been largely undone by Rafik 
Hariri’s son and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri who is now facing 
financial difficulties (Nötzold, 2015, p. 80). Indeed, Future News satellite 
channel ceased operations in 2012, five years after its launch, followed 
by the closure of Future TV in September 2019, the Future Media empire’s 
flagship, after years of stagnation and unpaid salaries. The Al-Mustakbal 
daily also discontinued its print edition in June 2019, 20 years after its 
launch. 
Meanwhile, LBC, one of the leading television stations in Lebanon, 
also flirted with the idea of conglomeration, and for a period of five years, 
it merged with Saudi Mogul Al-Waleed bin Talal’s Rotana media empire. 
This union, however, ended in acrimony with a series of lawsuits; Rotana 
retained LBCSat, and LBC had to launch a new satellite channel called 
LDC in 2012 (El-Richani, 2015, pp. 52–55).
Undoubtedly, there is a high level of political parallelism in the 
Lebanese media. The politics and media nexus, though sometimes 
lamented, can also be regarded as a boon in that all groups are 
more or less represented and have a platform, whereas attempts at 
mainstreaming might result in the further marginalizing of vulnerable 
communities. On the other hand, it is also worth noting that the most 
successful media outlets, such as LBCI and Al-Jadeed, are internally 
pluralistic and offer solid professional content. These media outlets 
have managed to reach viewers from beyond their traditional built-in 
partisan audiences. While echo chambers certainly exist, highly critical 
views of the Lebanese political and sectarian elites are readily available 
on the level of the media system. 
Technology and Infrastructure
The Lebanese state has a monopoly on the lucrative telecommunications 
sector, which is the highest revenue generator for the government 
(Hodali, 2019). Mobile telecom services are provided by two privately-
owned companies, Alfa and MTC Touch, managed by the Egyptian 
telecom company Orascom Telecom, Media and Technology (OTMT) 
and the Kuwaiti Zain, respectively. According to the statistics by the 
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International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (2019), approximately 
65% of the population subscribe to mobile cellular phone services. 
Despite Lebanon’s pioneering role in terms of publishing and 
broadcasting, embracing the Internet was a slightly slower affair due to 
slow connections offered at exorbitant prices. While DSL Internet was 
launched in Lebanon in 2007, the Internet, which falls entirely under 
the Ministry of Telecommunications and is overseen by the state-owned 
Ogero Company, remained slow for nearly a decade, so much so that 
people referred to it as ontornet (ontor being Arabic for wait). Until 2017, 
Internet speeds were kept low and costs high for a variety of reasons 
including corruption. Allegations of corruption, including the discovery 
of illegal parallel networks, resulted in the sacking of the director of 
Ogero who also occupied a high post in the relevant ministry. In recent 
years, the instalment of 6,000 kilometers of fiber instead of copper cables 
has also helped improve speeds and decrease the digital divide between 
urban and rural areas (Executive (Middle East), 2017). The drop in 
prices following the change of leadership has also increased Internet 
penetration in Lebanon, which, in 2018, was estimated at 78% by the 
ITU.
In a testament to the weakness of state structures, the filtering or 
blocking of websites—though limited in scope—is carried out on 
an ad hoc basis by the Ministry of Telecommunications. Currently, 
there are blocked websites relating to pornography, homosexuality, 
copyright breaches, and gambling. Meanwhile, cybercrimes are usually 
investigated by the Cybercrimes Bureau at the behest of the public 
prosecutor. The Cybercrimes Bureau was established in 2006 “without 
a legislative decree” (Freedom House, 2017). In 2018, there were 38 
summonses for posts written online that resulted in forcing citizens to 
apologize or remove the content, whereas there were 63 reported cases 
in 2019 according to the Muhal Observatory for Free Expression.1
While Internet penetration is on the rise, 99% of Lebanese still 
watch television with 94% believing that it is an important source of 
news (Dennis, Martin, & Hassan, 2019). Nevertheless, due to the rise 
in the use of smartphones to receive news from 76% in 2017 to 92% in 
1  The Muhal Observatory for Freedom of Expression has documented all 2019 cases 
on their website which can be accessed on the following link https://muhal.org/en/
cases/. 
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2018, most media outlets have now established much followed social 
media accounts as well as apps (Dennis et al., 2019). LBC, MTV and 
Al-Jadeed have also introduced paywalls for full access to their online 
content in an attempt to generate more revenue. Meanwhile, content by 
the alternative news platform Megaphone, which began on Facebook, is 
primarily designed to be disseminated on social media platforms and to 
target the ever-growing number of Lebanese people who get their news 
from social media sites. The most popular social media application 
according to a survey is WhatsApp with 92% users, followed by Facebook 
with 78%, YouTube 68%, and Instagram at 45% (Dennis et al., 2019). 
In a bid to raise revenue in October 2019, the council of ministers 
adopted the infamous and now revoked “WhatsApp tax” proposal, which 
intended to levy a monthly USD 6 tax for the use of WhatsApp. This 
led to mass protests across the country with demonstrators displaying 
their anger at the government’s incompetence in dealing with the deep 
economic crisis, eventually leading to its resignation. 
Challenges 
The Lebanese media system currently faces three key challenges. 
Like most media around the world, the heightened fragmentation of 
audiences due to the infinite choices made available via the Internet has 
led to the scattering of “eyeballs” and, therefore, advertising revenue. 
While in terms of political communication and due to political and 
economic crises, there is an unquenchable thirst for local news, the 
saturated market cannot continue as it stands. Staff redundancies, media 
closures, and cost reduction have been regular occurrences over the past 
years. At the same time, political money funneled into media outlets to 
serve political actors in their contentions over the control of Lebanon is 
expected to continue even if that, too, will diminish due to the economic 
strain impacting the country. Still, partisan media may indeed look at 
more cost-effective ways of reaching their built-in audiences. The series 
of media outlets folding and closing, though lamentable in terms of job 
losses, is also an expected byproduct of the marketplace model. Thus, the 
commercially viable media need to orchestrate ways to remain relevant, 
be it by introducing paywalls or investing in enticing programs. 
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Another key challenge facing the Lebanese media is the absence of 
current laws that take stock of technological advancements and the new 
realities created by them. Although the codified laws are currently only 
loosely applied, they still need to be updated to safeguard freedom of 
expression and the rights of journalists and citizens alike. Recently, there 
has been an increase in the number of summonses and arrests made 
against social media users, which clearly indicates the need for a new 
law that addresses the online media and clarifies the job description of 
the Cybercrimes Bureau. 
The third and final challenge relates to the state television, Télé Liban. 
While a public service broadcaster would help to overcome the problems 
of rampant commercialization and unabashed polarization in Lebanon, 
TL in its current form does not and cannot meet those expectations. The 
government will, therefore, need to decide whether it can afford to inject 
the ailing station with more funds and thereby support it, or to cease its 
operations altogether thereby limiting losses. 
Outlook 
As outlined above, the Lebanese media, much like the country itself, 
are in dire straits. As audiences continue to fragment, political 
stakeholders who had traditionally sustained the Lebanese media 
are finding more efficient and effective platforms. Meanwhile, the 
commercially viable channels are struggling to produce content that 
they hope will retain their audiences. While more austerity measures 
in the media are expected, possibly including further closures, it is 
believed that the remaining outlets will continue due to the demand for 
local content. The successful television stations are those that have, to 
some degree, pluralized internally, particularly in terms of content and 
staff composition. It is therefore expected that this pluralism, which is 
a central feature of the Lebanese media, will remain intact. Moreover, 
the ever-diminishing digital divide has also ensured that even the most 
marginal of voices would be able to connect with their audiences to 
varying degrees and in varying ways, such as through social media.
The main concern for the Lebanese media in the coming months and 
years as it grapples with an unprecedented economic crisis, however, 
is not the invisible hand resulting in the closure of non-profitable 
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endeavors, but the visible and forceful hand clamping down on free 
expression. 
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2. Syria: A Fragmented  
Media System
Yazan Badran
The nine-year-long conflict in Syria has had a ruinous impact 
on the country’s social fabric, economic life, and territorial 
integrity. The territorial fragmentation, in particular, has led to 
the dissolution of the tightly controlled information environment 
which existed before the conflict. While the regions that remained 
under the control of the central government reflect, more or less, a 
continuation of the authoritarian logics of the Syrian regime from 
pre-2011, the regions controlled by Kurdish forces and opposition-
linked rebel forces developed radically different, albeit unstable, 
media environments. Additionally, the substantial Syrian refugee 
population in neighboring countries and beyond has given 
impetus to the development of exilic and diasporic media outlets. 
These fundamental changes, and contradictions, in the Syrian 
media landscape will need to be reconciled and negotiated in any 
future settlement of the conflict.
Background
As the Ottoman provinces in the east were redrawn following World War I, 
the modern state of Syria emerged as the largest entity of the former Bilad 
Al-Sham, or Greater Syria. In the interwar period, Syria was placed under 
French occupation in accordance with a League of Nations mandate. Since 
gaining independence from France in 1946, Syria has been at the heart 
of the strategic competition among the surrounding regional hegemons 
(Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel), as well as between the 
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USSR and the US during the Cold War. Being at the forefront of the Arab-
Israeli conflict also meant that investment in the military took priority 
immediately after independence, and that the military establishment 
had an outsized role in Syria’s national politics. The politics of Syria were 
also very much intertwined with and shaped by the ideology of Arab 
nationalism. Indeed, Damascus was the seat of the earliest Arab nationalist 
government (1918–1920), and Syria’s different post-independence regimes 
have been oriented towards Arab nationalism in one way or another. The 
strength of the Arab nationalist ideology notwithstanding, Syria has 
been, since its modern borders emerged, a multiethnic and multireligious 
state. The tension between the dominant ideology among the ruling elite 
and ethno-religious heterogeneity of Syrian society, especially as Arab 
nationalism hardened its ethnolinguistic borders under the Ba’ath Party 
regime, is most visible in the state’s troubled relationship with the sizable 
Kurdish minority in northeastern Syria. The almost two million Syrian 
Kurds, many of whom were stripped of their Syrian citizenship following 
a controversial census in 1962 (Albarazi, 2013), have been the subject of 
sustained state discrimination against their culture and, in particular, 
the Kurdish language for decades (Hassanpour, Skutnabb-Kangas, & 
Chyet, 1996). When the northeastern regions of the country proclaimed 
autonomy following the Syrian conflict, reclaiming the Kurdish language 
and culture was placed at the heart of that political project (Badran & De 
Angelis, 2016). 
Several other factors have had a significant impact on Syria’s politics 
and society throughout its modern history. These factors include the 
urban-rural and class divisions and sectarian and religious differences—
all of which are often overlapping and intermeshed. Syrian politics 
have long been dominated by the landowning urban elites of the large 
cities—Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs—a class that was almost entirely 
made up of Sunni Muslims and, to a much lesser extent, Christians. This 
dominance began to unravel as rural regions became more developed. 
Moreover, while the army was long shunned by the urban Sunni 
elites, it was seen by the peasantry, as well as the religious minorities 
such as Alawites,1 as an opportunity for social mobility and economic 
1  Alawites, a minority sect of Shi’a Islam, represent about 12% of Syria’s population, 
while Sunni Islam is practiced by an estimated 75%. As a syncretic sect, Alawites are 
considered a distinct branch of mainstream Twelver Shi’a Islam practiced in Iran.
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advancement. As the role of the army in the country’s politics expanded, 
so did the fortunes of these groups. The Ba’ath Party’s coup d’état in 1963 
finally ended the dominance of the urban bourgeoisie and brought 
about a new ruling class from the cohorts of the army. Specifically, the 
regime of Hafez Al-Assad (1970–2000), with its reliance on clan and 
family members, mostly of Alawite origin, in key positions in the state 
and the army, established a new structure of elite power in Syria “which 
draws strength simultaneously, but in decreasing intensity, from a tribe, 
a sect-class, and an ecologic-cultural division of the people” (Batatu, 
1981, p. 331).
The popular uprising of 2011, and the subsequent protracted military 
conflict, brought into sharp relief all of these overlapping factors. It also 
reignited the regional and international competition over the future 
and orientation of the Syrian polity. The more direct and immediate 
consequence of the war was the devastating impact it had on Syrian 
society and economy. Syria’s pre-war population, which was estimated 
at 21 million by 2011, has been decimated. By February 2020, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 
more than half have been displaced—with over 5.6 million fleeing to 
neighboring countries, such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and beyond, 
and a further 6.1 million having been internally displaced. Additionally, 
large swathes of the country’s urban infrastructure have been destroyed 
by shelling, aerial bombardment, and clashes, and estimates for the cost 
of post-war reconstruction range from USD 350–400 billion. Finally, the 
Syrian exodus following 2011, coupled with the territorial and political 
disintegration and polarization, fractured the former unitary media 
system in the country and led to a fragmentation in audiences, media, 
and regulatory regimes.
Historical Developments
The earliest attempts to establish a popular press in what is now Syria 
had to contend with the highly restrictive laws of the Ottoman Empire. 
Indeed, since the earliest recorded paper Al-Shahba, published by 
Hashem El-Attar and Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi in Aleppo in 1877, 
the 91 different publications that emerged under the Ottomans were 
subject to “suspension, confiscation, or seizure” according to Dajani and 
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Najjar (2003, p. 303). This highly restricted environment ended with 
the demise of the Ottoman Empire following its defeat in World War 
I. The new political horizon of Arab nationalism, in ascendance since 
before the war, was reflected in the popular press in the tumultuous 
period of self-governance from 1918 until 1920 when France took over 
as the colonial hegemon in Syria and Lebanon. During the period of the 
French Mandate, press regulation came under the direct authority of the 
office of the French High Commissioner of the Levant. The period also 
witnessed the emergence of strong journalistic figures who commanded 
a nationwide audience. For instance, Najib Al-Rayyes, the so-called dean 
of Syrian journalism, was a nationalist writer and newspaper publisher, 
and his paper, Al-Qabas, enjoyed wide readership because of its support 
of Syrian independence. Other important publications included the 
nationalist daily Al-Ayyam, published by Najib Al-Armanazi, and the 
satirical weekly Al-Mudhik Al-Mubki, published by Habib Kahaleh 
(Rafai, 1969). Moreover, the antecedent to Syrian radio was established 
in 1941 by the French authorities with 15 employees and used short- and 
medium-wave transmission. In 1945, the radio stopped broadcasting 
after its Syrian staff resigned in protest of French policies in the country. 
It returned to the air on Independence Day, 17 April 1946, and became a 
full-fledged state broadcaster (Dajani & Najjar, 2003, p. 305).
The period immediately following independence was marked by 
political instability with power changing hands between civilian and 
military regimes. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war resulted in the arrival of 
over 80,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria (Said, 2003). The war also saw 
a series of military setbacks for the newly formed Syrian Army for 
which the officers held the politicians responsible. The social and political 
tensions in the aftermath of the conflict heralded a succession of military 
coups (1949–1954), which resulted in several highly restrictive press 
laws. From 1954–1958, parliamentary democracy was restored and, 
with it, the more liberal Press Law of 1949. These so-called democratic 
years ushered in a golden age of journalism in the country. Public and 
private dailies, weeklies, and specialized periodicals proliferated with a 
minimal censorship regime and a politically competitive environment 
(Martin, 2015; Rugh, 2004). 
The major breaking point in the history of Syrian media came with 
the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party coup d’état on 8 March 1963. One of the 
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first steps taken by the new revolutionary leadership on that day was 
to ban all but three (Ba’ath-affiliated) newspapers, Al-Ba’ath, Al-Wahda, 
and Barada. Legislative decree No. 48 in 1963 took further steps by 
centralizing all legal publishing in one state-owned organization, the 
Al-Wahda Foundation for Printing and Publishing (Dajani & Najjar, 
2003). In 1965, the Journalism Syndicate was brought under the 
government’s authority. By the end of that year, only two national and 
three regional dailies, and a handful of local periodicals, were left, 
all of which were published by the state or Ba’ath Party organs. The 
1963 coup ushered in an era of “mobilization press” where the media’s 
main function was the promotion of the regime’s interests and the 
mobilization of public support (Rugh, 2004). The Ba’ath Party instilled 
a socialist planned economy that promoted nationalization and state 
ownership and control of most of its sectors. It established a de facto 
state monopoly of all media organs, including the press, publishing and 
distribution, radio, television, and audiovisual production sectors that 
remained largely undisturbed until the late 1990s. Furthermore, from 
1962 onward, following a failed coup attempt by Nasserists, Syria was 
placed under the provisions of emergency law (partially modified in 
the mid-2000s and officially lifted in 2011), which gave broad discretion 
to the executive authority and allowed it to bypass the constitution. The 
regime of Hafez Al-Assad invested heavily in state media and towards 
perpetuating a strong cult of personality revolving around Assad and 
his immediate family (Wedeen, 1999). 
The tenets of the Ba’ath Party’s dominance of the economy were 
severely challenged by the economic crisis of the late 1980s, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the US as the global hegemon. 
These developments pushed the regime to take some tentative steps 
towards economic liberalization (infitah) culminating in Law No. 10 of 
1991, which opened some sectors of the economy to private investment. 
In the media sector, this was only realized in the field of audiovisual 
production where private investment, starting in 1988, initiated a 
significant development of the television drama (musalsalat) industry 
(Blecher, 2002). 
The death of Hafez Al-Assad in 2000 and the succession of his son 
Bashar Al-Assad brought a reinvigoration of economic liberalization 
processes. The process of authoritarian upgrading under the regime of 
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Bashar Al-Assad included a considerable opening of Syria’s economy 
to world markets, privatization of state assets, gradual withdrawal of 
state subsidies, shrinking of the public sector, and the growth of a new 
class of businessmen loyal to the regime. Steps were also taken towards 
limited easing of restrictions on freedom of expression, but very little 
in respect to structural political reform (Hinnebusch, 2012). In 2001, 
the government adopted a new publications law that, while still very 
restrictive, opened the door for private ownership of print media. 
Al-Domari, a satirical newspaper, was one of the first to be established 
under the new law in February 2001. However, persistent government 
censorship and economic pressures led to its closure in 2003. Many of 
the licenses for private media went to Al-Assad crony businessmen, 
such as Rami Makhlouf, Mayzar Nizam Al-Din, and Majd Suleiman. 
The Internet also emerged as an important medium during the early 
2000s. Syrian news websites, many of which were also owned by crony 
businessmen, were notable for providing a more open space for the 
discussion of Syrian politics than what was available in traditional 
media (De Angelis, 2011; Brownlee, 2020). 
Political System and Legal Framework
The political and territorial fragmentation brought about by the 
Syrian conflict since 2011 is reflected in the fragmented Syrian media 
environment. This fragmentation has led to the development of parallel 
political economies within the country, in which radically different media 
exist. In particular, we can discern three separate media environments. 
The first comprises regions that have remained under the control of 
the central government (in particular, the coastal regions of Latakia 
and Tartus, the cities of Homs and Hama, and the capital Damascus) 
reflect, more or less, a continuation of the authoritarian logics of the 
Syrian regime from pre-2011 with only limited attempts at upgrading 
and reforming the system. 
A second separate media environment emerged in the regions that 
came under the control of rebel groups characterized by the proliferation 
of completely new small- and medium-sized media initiatives, most of 
which were later to follow the Syrian exodus to neighboring countries 
(Turkey and Lebanon) or further afield to Europe where they have been 
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operating as exilic media. In northeastern Syria, Kurdish forces, led by 
the Democratic Union Party (PYD), established a de facto autonomous 
region—Rojava—with its own largely independent institutional and 
regulatory frameworks and media, which comprises the third media 
environment. 
Starting in 2011, the Syrian regime initiated several legal and 
constitutional reforms in an attempt to placate the protest movement. 
These reforms included abolishing Article 8 of the constitution which 
granted the Ba’ath Party a guaranteed leadership role in the Syrian 
government, as well as abolishing presidential plebiscites in favor 
of elections with multiple candidates. These legal and constitutional 
changes, however, did not fundamentally alter the de facto political 
system in the country, nor address the existing power bases of the 
regime in the state security agencies. The presidential election of 2014, 
dismissed as a sham, resulted in the reelection of Bashar Al-Assad to a 
new term of seven years with a plurality of 88.7% of the vote in a contest 
against two largely unknown candidates. 
As for the media, the most important legislative change came with 
Decree No. 108 of 2011, which replaced preceding legislation as the 
regulatory framework governing the media sector. The law introduced 
several liberalizing provisions, including articles banning monopolies 
in the media sector and facilitating and regulating private investment in 
news agencies and broadcast, print, and Internet-based media (Article 
35). It also included provisions protecting freedom of speech and the 
right to access public information (Article 3), as well as eliminating prior 
censorship of content “if the media does not fail its responsibilities” 
(Article 6). Under the law, the Ministry of Information is responsible 
for evaluating applications, issuing and revoking licenses to private 
media organizations, monitoring the operations of media outlets, and 
issuing accreditation and press credentials to non-Syrian journalists 
who wish to operate in the country (Article 22). The law, however, 
keeps in place the broad restrictions on content that “harms national 
unity,” “incites sectarian or confessional strife,” and “harms state 
symbols,” and all unauthorized content on the armed forces (Article 
12). Notwithstanding their more liberal leanings, these provisions are 
rarely applied in practice, especially articles relating to freedom of 
expression, access to information, and protection of journalists. Access to 
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information is still subject to the whims of regime officials and to broad 
restrictions on the basis of national security. Control and intimidation 
of journalists persists through an arbitrary and broad interpretation of 
Article 12 and the extant penal code, which criminalizes defamation of 
the president, the courts, and the military, as well as through extralegal 
means.2 In addition, while the state of emergency, in place since 1962, 
was officially rescinded with Legislative Decree No. 161 of 2011, many of 
the provisions allowing arbitrary detention were reincorporated in the 
Counterterrorism Laws of 2012. For example, provisions of this new law 
were used to prosecute journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders, 
such as Mazen Darwish and Hussein Ghrer who were charged with 
“publicizing terrorist acts” and “promoting terrorist activities.”
Institutionally, the domestic broadcasting sector remains dominated 
by the state broadcaster: The Organization of Syrian Arab Radio and 
Television (ORTAS) that is an entirely state-owned entity and accountable 
directly to the Council of Ministers. The television section of the entity is 
responsible for three terrestrial and five satellite channels. The satellite 
offerings include channels dedicated to news, entertainment, and 
television dramas, as well as a newly launched religious channel aimed 
at promoting the regime’s narrative within Syrian conservative circles. 
The radio broadcasts are carried on seven dedicated channels, including 
broadcasts over FM, AM, online, and satellite radio. 
As previously noted, the collapse of the regime’s territorial control 
during the Syrian conflict has also provided spaces for new actors to 
emerge within the media environment. The northeastern regions of 
Syria, with substantive Kurdish populations, fell from direct regime 
control in 2012. The area—encompassing parts of the governorates of 
Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Aleppo, and the whole of Hasakah—has remained 
relatively stable and been spared the mass destruction seen in other 
areas that fell from government control. Media activity within the 
region is regulated by the Information Law of 2015 which was passed 
by the autonomous administration’s government. The law contains 
provisions to guarantee freedom of expression and the right to establish 
media organizations. The law also has a general provision guaranteeing 
access to public information with exceptions for national security and 
2  See for example this report from Reporters Without Borders: https://rsf.org/en/
news/harassment-pro-government-journalists-growing-syria
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international relations. The law additionally established the Higher 
Council for Media, which is tasked with regulating the media sector in 
Rojava. The Council’s 15 members are elected by the media professionals, 
outlets, and professional syndicates active in Rojava. It has the right to 
grant and revoke licenses to operate in the region for local and foreign 
media, as well as freelance journalists.
The media scene in Rojava is largely dominated by the autonomous 
administration-owned state media organ Ronahi. The organization runs 
the main satellite television station that broadcasts from the region, 
as well as the main semi-daily print newspaper of the same name. It 
broadcasts mostly in Kurdish, with special programming in Arabic and 
English. Ronahi’s coverage leans heavily in favor of the PYD as the most 
dominant political force in Rojava. At the same time, most other political 
parties publish their own political newspapers, albeit with limited 
distribution. This includes parties affiliated with the Kurdish National 
Council, the main anti-PYD coalition in the region. Furthermore, a 
significant number of media outlets exist that are not officially linked 
to political parties. These media are mostly small community radio 
stations, print magazines, and news websites linked to civil society 
organizations and are dependent on media development aid and the 
limited advertising market for survival. The exception is Arta FM, which 
started as a community radio based in Amouda with support from 
European and US media development organizations and has become 
the largest independent media active in Rojava. This station broadcasts 
over the whole region and runs a sister station in Raqqa aimed at the 
mostly Arab population (Badran & De Angelis, 2016).
Another notable development was the opposition-affiliated 
media activists and collectives that sprang up early on in the protest 
movement in an attempt to circumvent the regime’s control over the 
media sphere. Their work during the early years of the conflict was 
instrumental in providing a different narrative of the events to that 
of the regime’s official version, especially because foreign journalists 
were not allowed access to the country (Halasa, Omareen & Mahfoud, 
2014). As the conflict grew more protracted, and more areas fell out 
of regime control, the early media activism efforts began to coalesce 
into new media outlets, providing a different narrative to that of the 
regime-affiliated media. This development was further empowered 
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by the influx of foreign media development funding and support 
channeled to these actors from Western and regional governments 
and agencies (Della Ratta, 2018). In 2014, there were more than 93 
Syrian media outlets operating inside opposition-controlled areas, 
not counting the official media of oppositional military and political 
groups. This new sphere of media was unified only by its staunch 
anti-regime orientation and was otherwise extremely heterogeneous 
in terms of ideology (from Islamist to staunchly secular leftist) and 
covered a variety of media, including broadcast and online radio 
stations, print and online news journals, magazines, and web-based 
news agencies (Badran & Smets, 2018). 
As the conflict conditions inside Syria worsened, a process of 
consolidation and relocation commenced. Most of these media outlets 
had to move their core editorial and administrative operations to 
neighboring countries (in particular Turkey), while retaining a network 
of reporters inside the country. Since 2016, the structural conditions 
within which these media outlets must operate have become increasingly 
more difficult, in particular with regard to the Turkish policies towards 
Syrians in the country and the shifting priorities in donors’ funding. 
Thus, only the most consolidated of these initiatives remain today. An 
example of these new media initiatives is Enab Baladi, which started in 
2011 as a small pamphlet in the town of Darayya, south of Damascus, 
and has become a major news website and print weekly. Within this 
sphere of oppositional media, we can also include Syria TV, which 
was established in 2018 in Istanbul and is managed and run by Syrian 
media professionals who defected from regime control. The television 
station is part of the Qatar-based Fadaat Media Group, which manages 
other Syrian and regional media outlets such as Zaman Al-Wasl and 
The New Arab. Another important broadcaster is Orient News TV 
which is based in Dubai and owned by Syrian businessman Ghassan 
Aboud. There have also been several attempts to develop sector-wide 
institutions within this media sphere in an attempt to create a credible 
alternative to the regime-controlled media ecosystem. For example, the 
Syrian Journalists Association, based in Paris, was established as an 
independent professional journalists’ union with the aim of offering an 
alternative body to the regime-controlled Syrian Journalists Union. It is 
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now a recognized associate member of the International Federation of 
Journalists. 
Economy and Ownership Patterns 
In the areas controlled by the central government, licensing for private 
media (broadcast and print) remains at the discretion of the Prime 
Minister’s office. This largely means that private media ownership 
is the domain of businessmen loyal to the regime. The largest media 
owner in the country by far was, until fairly recently, Rami Makhlouf, 
the maternal cousin of President Bashar Al-Assad, and one of the 
wealthiest men in Syria. Makhlouf’s spectacular and highly-publicized 
fallout with Al-Assad in mid-2020 leaves a question mark around how 
his media and telecommunications interests (which, alongside the rest 
of his wealth, are currently under state custody) will be distributed. 
Makhlouf, along with Mohammad Hamsho, a businessman close 
to Assad’s brother Maher Al-Assad, controls the only private news 
television station, Sama TV (formerly Addounia TV). Makhlouf also 
owns outright Ninar FM, an entertainment and music radio station, and 
Sham FM, a news radio station in addition to the largest private daily 
newspaper, Al-Watan, and its financial sister weekly, Al-Iqtissadiya. 
Samer Foz, another business tycoon with close links to the Syrian 
regime, owns the entertainment television station Lana TV, and one of 
the largest media production houses, Sama Al-Fan (SAPI). The United 
Group (UG), a media publishing and advertising company, which 
previously published the only other private political daily, Baladna, 
along with an assortment of other entertainment and specialist 
magazines, is owned by Majd Suleiman, the son of Bahjat Suleiman, a 
former director in the state security apparatus and current ambassador 
to Jordan. Other private media outlets, mostly entertainment-focused 
radio stations, are also controlled by the regime-crony businessmen 
nexus.
The Syrian economy has been severely damaged by the ongoing war, 
declining by more than 70% since 2011. This, along with European and 
US sanctions on the Syrian regime and individuals and businesses linked 
to it—both Makhlouf and Foz are on the US Treasury Department’s 
sanctions list—has led to an exodus of Syrian capital to neighboring 
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countries. The UG media conglomerate, for example, moved most of its 
regional operations, which include the weekly classified paper Al-Waseet 
and the Lebanese daily Al-Balad, to the Dubai-based AWI Company. This 
was also the case for Syrian television drama production, a substantial 
sector before the war, which moved much of its productions to other 
countries, such as the UAE, Egypt, and Lebanon. For instance, Foz’s SAPI 
production company, one of the largest television drama producers, 
moved its operations to Dubai. 
The flight of Syrian capital has led to stagnation in media production 
within the country. Additionally, the collapse in the living standards 
of ordinary Syrians, both within and outside the country, has meant 
that the advertisement market for media outlets is extremely limited. 
Syrian media, in all three different spheres, are dependent on outside 
funding for their operations. In the case of regime-oriented media, this 
funding is usually funneled through well-connected, wealthy owners. 
In the case of oppositional and Kurdish media, such as Enab Baladi 
and Arta FM, this funding sometimes comes from European and US 
development aid which is usually more transparent and is managed 
by specialized intermediary media development organizations. Less 
transparent, however, is the direct funding from foreign governments 
to media outlets such as Syria TV (with funds from Qatar) or new 
radio stations in former ISIS territories (with funds from France and 
the US). This lack of sustainable business models for Syrian media 
outlets means they are heavily dependent on their wealthy backers, 
or the priorities and policies of donor bodies and governments. This 
makes for an extremely precarious condition for the organizations and 
the media workers and limits their scope for professionalization or 
institutionalization. 
On the other hand, the emergence of relatively more independent 
new spaces within the oppositional media sphere created novel 
opportunities and avenues for a new generation of Syrian journalists, 
artists, and media makers to establish themselves. These new actors were 
able to benefit from generous funding for professional and technical 
skill building, especially in the early years of the Syrian conflict, as well 
as from the global interest in the Syrian conflict. This is most evident in 
fields such as independent film production. For example, a number of 
new Syrian filmmakers have emerged who have accrued critical acclaim 
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for their work. Indeed, several Syrian-directed documentary films have 
been nominated for Academy Awards in recent years.3 Furthermore, 
several independent production houses and film collectives, such as 
Bidayyat and Abounaddara, have been established since 2011 (Wessels, 
2019).
Technology and Infrastructure
The ongoing military conflict has also had a devastating effect on 
the country’s telecommunications infrastructure, especially in the 
opposition-controlled regions where most of the military operations have 
taken place. Even in government-controlled regions, the infrastructure 
has deteriorated through years of underinvestment, and the frequent 
electricity shortages mean that access to communication services has 
been greatly curtailed. The Syrian Telecommunication Establishment 
(STE) remains the sole regulatory agency tasked with the supervision 
of the telecommunications infrastructure in the country. The STE 
also authorizes private Internet service providers (ISPs) to deliver 
their services inside Syria, but in practice, its authority only extends 
to government-controlled areas. More than 20 different ISPs operate 
within the government-controlled regions of the country. According 
the International Telecommunication Union (based on STE estimates), 
Internet penetration stood at 34% with 7.8 fixed broadband subscriptions 
per 100 inhabitants in 2018, while mobile cellular subscriptions stood 
at 98 per 100 inhabitants. The mobile cellular network is operated 
by two companies, Syriatel, owned by Rami Makhlouf, and MTN 
Syria, a subsidiary of the South African multinational MTN Group 
Ltd. Outside of what was under regime control, however, the extant 
telecommunications infrastructure was largely destroyed and has 
been replaced with ad hoc solutions. Internet connections in this area 
are dependent on either satellite Internet receivers or, as in the border 
regions, cable links with neighboring countries—Turkey in the Idlib and 
Aleppo region and Iraqi Kurdistan in the Kurdish regions.
3  Last Men in Aleppo (2017, directed by Feras Fayyad), Of Fathers and Sons (2018, 
directed by Talal Derki), The Cave (2019, directed by Feras Fayyad), and For Sama 
(2019, directed by Waad Al-Kateab and Edward Watts).
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Despite the aforementioned conditions, it is the Internet-based 
media that have seen the most fundamental changes. The regime’s 
early steps in 2011 to lift the blocking of Facebook and other social media 
websites allowed it to cultivate a strong partisan, loyalist constituency 
that can challenge the opposition’s more established online presence. 
Indeed, social media platforms, in particular Facebook, have become a 
major site of contestation in the ongoing conflict. Facebook penetration in 
Syria climbed from 1% in 2010 to 37% in 2017 (Salem, 2017). Since 2011, 
there has been an explosion of local community media pages—largely 
based on Facebook—that cater to the loyalist communities in regions 
that have remained under government control. This development 
mirrors a similar phenomenon seen in opposition communities, 
especially during the early years of the Syrian conflict. These media are 
often concerned with local development in the city or region and are 
staunchly pro-government, particularly with regard to the Syrian Army 
and the military conflict with armed opposition groups. Nevertheless, 
they also contain some modicum of criticism of government policies, 
in particular with regard to widespread lawlessness, corruption, and 
the deterioration of services (Issa, 2016). As the military conflict winds 
down, there are signs the regime is attempting to bring this section of 
the media in line and to restrict its relative independence. In 2019 alone, 
there were several cases of detention by state security agencies of high-
profile loyalist journalists who had covered the conflict on the side of the 
Syrian regime (e.g., Raif Salamah was arrested and held for more than 
a month in May 2019; Wissam Al-Tayr, a journalist from the Damascus 
Now network, was arrested in December 2018 and released only nine 
months later in August 2019). In terms of the legal framework within 
which these media have to operate, the Cybercrime Law of 2012, which 
regulates information access online, has important implications for their 
operation. The law provides a legal framework for online censorship, 
content, and user monitoring by ISPs who are required to retain records 
of Internet traffic. Moreover, website owners and providers are instructed 
to divulge their names and contact information under the provisions of 
this law.4 




The territorial and political fragmentation brought about by the war since 
2011 has meant that Syrian audiences are now divided across at least 
three different media spheres. Each of these spheres has developed its 
own logics, discourses, and modus operandi. There is very little interaction 
among these different spheres. Only rarely do media outlets acknowledge 
or reference media content from the other segments, and this usually 
comes with accusations of fabrication and bias. Thus, polarization among 
these different spheres is extremely high as they engage in a three-sided 
“war of narratives.” In a sense, this accurately reflects the highly polarized 
political environment, as well as the deep societal divisions that have 
existed since 2011. Such polarization, however, is often manifested in the 
proliferation of hate speech in much of the media content coming from 
Syria.5 Moreover, this polarization is certainly reinforced by the fact that 
journalists from loyalist media cannot operate openly in opposition-held 
regions, and vice versa. Conditions for the work of journalists, especially 
international journalists, are much more favorable in the Kurdish-
controlled regions, but certain restrictions still apply with regard to 
criticism of the PYD and in covering the conflict with ISIS.
The resurgence of the Syrian regime of Bashar Al-Assad and its 
emergence as the victor in the military conflict also means that the 
fundamental rules governing Syria’s media system—at least in the regions 
claimed by the regime—will remain unchanged in the foreseeable future. 
The regime’s control over the media sector leaves very little space for 
dissenting voices within the state-controlled media. Since 2011, oligarchs 
and crony businessmen have further entrenched their control over wide 
sectors of the economy and especially the privately-owned media sector. 
The media conglomerate of Rami Makhlouf includes interests in all sectors 
of the media business, including press, television, and radio, as well as 
media production businesses and telecommunication. Furthermore, there 
has been increasing evidence of the regime reasserting closer control over 
loyalist social media groups and Internet websites that have had, until 
recently, broader margins in their reporting.
5  See for example this report from the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom 
of Expression: https://scm.bz/en/en-studies/hate-speech-and-incitement-to- 
violence-in-syrian-media-research-study
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Outlook
The future of Syria’s media system will be deeply linked to how the later 
stages of the Syrian conflict evolve. It will be one of the fundamental 
elements of negotiations for any future compromise settlement over the 
shape of Syria’s post-war polity. The latest steps of the Syrian regime to 
bring even loyal media that are mildly critical under control can be seen 
as an effort to reassert its legal position as sovereign over the whole of the 
Syrian state and to create a legal framework for any future reintegration 
of other regions that will be favorable for its continuity. Nevertheless, in 
practice, the Syrian regime does not have enough power to assert this 
sovereignty over large swathes of the country that are either under direct 
military control by regional and international actors or their local proxies. 
Furthermore, the emergence of oppositional, exilic, and Kurdish media 
in areas outside of regime control have ushered in fundamental changes 
in terms of the informational environment that Syrians now have access 
to. These new realities will be extremely difficult to simply reverse, and 
any future settlement will have to consider ways to reintegrate them. 
Finally, the sheer number of Syrian refugees who have fled the country, 
around 25% of Syria’s pre-war population, suggests that exilic and 
diasporic media will come to play an increasingly significant role in the 
future. Independent media makers who have developed their skills and 
know-how in Turkey, Lebanon, and Europe over the past years, as well 
as larger media producers who have moved their productions to Dubai 
and Egypt, can be expected to perpetuate this trend.
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3. Palestine: Resilient Media 
Practices for National Liberation
Gretchen King1 
This chapter provides an overview of Palestinian media practices 
in historic Palestine and in the diaspora. Since the printing press 
arrived in the region, the Palestinian people have used media for 
national liberation and self-determination. However, the Israeli 
regime’s ongoing occupation and displacement of the Palestinian 
people produces major challenges for the development and 
sustainability of the media system in Palestine. 
Background 
Historic Palestine is geographically situated between the Jordan River 
and the Mediterranean Sea. Before 1922, when the League of Nations 
imposed the British Mandate that enshrined the Balfour Declaration’s 
Zionist intentions, the region of historic Palestine had been organized 
under the Ottoman administration for four centuries. Under Ottoman 
rule and throughout the British Mandate period, Palestinians organized 
for independence and self-determination. However, in 1947, the United 
Nations General Assembly passed a non-binding vote proposing a 
partition plan for historic Palestine under UN Resolution 181 (II). The 
resolution, opposed by the Palestinians, suggested that Jews, who 
were one-third of the population and only occupied 6% of land, could 
carve out a “Jewish state” on nearly 60% of the land. Immediately after 
1  With research assistance from Ghiwa Haidar Ahmad, Ayman Lezzeik, and Fatima 
Takash.
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the British withdrawal, Zionist militias attacked the largely unarmed 
Palestinians. In 1948 and after ethnically purging more than 700,000 
Palestinians, or half the indigenous population of the land, Israel 
declared itself in control of 78% of historic Palestine. These events are 
known as the Palestinian nakba (or catastrophe). Later, the remainder 
of historic Palestine was divided into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 
annexed by Egypt and Jordan, respectively, until occupied by the Israeli 
military in 1967 after the Six-Day War (Alshaer, 2012, p. 237).
Today, Palestinians make up the world’s largest refugee population, 
despite their right to return to their land in Palestine being officially 
declared by the UN since 1948 (Resolution 194). Approximately 13 
million Palestinians are spread throughout the world with the largest 
population outside of Palestine residing in Jordan and outside of the Arab 
region in Chile (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019). There are 
1.5 million Palestinians residing in the territory of what was declared as 
Israel in 1948, who are also known as the ‘48 Palestinians. Additionally, 
there are 5.4 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (or UNRWA), approximately one-
third of whom reside in refugee camps located inside of Palestine and 
neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Due to war, 
occupation, the blockade of the Gaza Strip, and social and economic 
exclusion, a majority of Palestinian refugees live in poverty (UNRWA, 
2019).
The state of Palestine, recognized by the UN in 1988 (Resolution 
43/177), comprises the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including 
Jerusalem, with a population of nearly five million (Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2019). The official language in Palestine is Arabic. 
The state of Palestine is characterized by its majority Muslim population 
(only 1% are Christian), high youth population (nearly 40% are under 
fifteen years of age), high population density in the Gaza Strip (826 
people per square kilometer), high birth rate (the average family has 
four or more children), high unemployment (more than one-third of 
the labor force), low illiteracy rate (less than 3%), high smart phone use 
(almost 90% of households own one or more), and increasing Internet 
access at home (nearly 75% in West Bank homes and over 50% in Gaza) 
(Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019). 
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Since the declaration of the independent state of Palestine followed 
by the designation of the Palestinian National Authority and the 
Palestinian Legislative Council, the occupation by Israel has become 
further entrenched. The Israeli regime perpetuates the ongoing forced 
displacement of Palestinians through continuous wars and attacks 
waged by the Israeli military that target civilians and infrastructure. This 
includes Israeli airstrikes that leveled the Gaza Strip’s only power plant 
in 2014, disrupting power and cutting off drinking water for millions of 
people. Additionally, the Israeli military closed the Gaza Strip for nearly 
a year in 1996 and today maintains an air, land, and sea blockade that 
makes the area, according to some, the world’s largest “open-air prison.” 
In the West Bank, Israel illegally built an eight-meter-high concrete 
wall around the territory, and the Israeli military maintains hundreds 
of checkpoints and obstacles that prevent Palestinians from accessing 
school, work, healthcare, each other, and the rest of the world. This 
history of colonialism and the worsening occupation of Palestine led the 
UN’s Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (UN-ESCWA) 
to declare that Israel maintains and imposes an “apartheid regime” 
(UN-ESCWA, 2017).
Historical Developments
Media development in Palestine has been distinguished by several 
phases, beginning with the period of the Ottoman administration, 
followed by the British Mandate period, the period after 1948 that saw 
the occupation of Palestine by Israel, and the most recent period that 
included two intifadas, the introduction of a Palestinian state and media 
governance systems, and the ongoing Israeli wars (Omer, 2015). By 
the 1850s, multiple printing presses were operating in Palestine, and 
in 1876, the Ottoman representative in Jerusalem began publishing 
the newspaper Al-Quds Al-Sharif in Turkish and Arabic. When 
constitutional reforms were introduced after the Young Turk Revolution 
in 1908, the first privately-owned newspaper, Al-Quds, was published 
in Arabic. During this time, dozens of newspapers began to circulate, 
and, in spite of censorship and penalties, the press covered politics and 
criticized the Zionist movement as well as Ottoman rule. This included 
Falastin, a newspaper founded in 1911 that was eventually shut down 
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by the Ottomans and later re-opened, continuing today as one of the 
oldest publications in Palestine (Omer, 2015, p. 111). Scholars have 
documented how the first phase of media development in Palestine 
during the Ottoman period contributed to the linking of Palestinian 
journalism with the struggle for national liberation (Najjar, 2005).
Before the end of the First World War, Britain and France divided 
the territories of the defeated Ottoman empire under the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916. The agreement was kept secret from the Palestinians, 
in part because no newspapers were permitted to be published during 
the war (Omer, 2015). During the British Mandate period in which 
Britain occupied and colonized Palestine, newspaper publishing was 
renewed and increased. While the Ottoman laws concerning printing 
and publications were still in effect under British rule, newspapers in 
Palestine began to connect to and disseminate news from around the 
globe through telegraph systems that crisscrossed the British Empire. 
The launch of even more newspapers during the 1920s and 1930s, 
swelling to over 40 publications by 1939 (Najjar, 2005), coincided 
with the growth of the Palestinian National Movement and the direct 
involvement of newspaper editors and journalists in the struggle 
to liberate Palestine, regardless of Britain’s attempts to silence them 
through shutdowns, arrests, or exile (Omer, 2015). 
To better compete with the politicized printed press, British 
authorities initiated the Palestine Broadcasting Service (PBS) as the first 
radio station serving the region. The station went on-air in 1936 through 
studios maintained in Jerusalem with a transmitter and tower located 
in Ramallah. The PBS aired broadcasts in English, Arabic, and Hebrew, 
including programming from the BBC’s Empire Service (Boyd, 1999). 
Soon after, small-scale broadcasting also took to the airwaves as early as 
1938 with radio stations operated by Zionist organizations, such as the 
Irgun, and Palestinians broadcasting on Sawt Al-Falestin (King, 2017). 
During the war of 1948, Zionist forces took over the PBS studios in 
Jerusalem while the Jordanian military claimed the transmitter and 
tower in Ramallah. Subsequently, a studio was added to the equipment 
acquired by Jordan to relaunch PBS as the Hashemite Broadcasting System 
(HBS). The HBS operated from the West Bank under the Jordanian 
Ministry of Information until 1967 when Israel occupied the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank (Boyd, 1999). All broadcasting was banned by the 
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Israeli government in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Somiry-
Batrawi, 2004), leaving Palestinians without a national radio or television 
station until the 1990s.
Jamal (2009) described the period after the nakba of 1948 as a 
“communication vacuum” (p. 40) in which all media came under Israeli 
military censors (p. 62). The vibrant Palestinian newspaper industry was 
displaced and destroyed, with owners and journalists expelled along 
with many Palestinian women who lost their jobs in radio (Somiry-
Batrawi, 2004). The first Palestinian newspaper to continue publishing 
after 1948 was Al-Ittihad, but the publication was closed several times 
by Israeli forces (Jamal, 2009). After the occupation of Gaza and the 
West Bank in 1967, Palestinians attempted to establish new or reopen 
publications, but Israeli forces continued to censor all press and forced 
multiple Palestinian publications to close (Jamal, 2009). However, 
by 1990, more than 40 newspapers were circulating in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (Nossek & Rinnawi, 2003).
Beginning in the 1950s, audiences in historic Palestine had access 
to state radio from the Arab region, and later, Arab state television 
broadcasts began in the 1970s. In addition, Palestinians in exile 
“assembled their media world” (Bishara, 2009, p. 15) by broadcasting 
on other states’ media systems. During this period, Palestinian-
produced broadcast media moved into the transnational sphere. 
Palestinian programming was initially aired from studios provided by 
state-owned radio broadcasters in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, 
and Algeria (Boyd, 1999; Browne, 1975). Later, in 1965, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) acquired its own transmitter and began 
broadcasting programming across the region of Palestine from Syria 
(Browne, 1975). Another station was set up in 1988 in Lebanon, and 
although initially destroyed by Lebanese militias and, later, by Israeli 
airstrikes, the station was rebuilt to broadcast in support of the First 
Intifada (Bookmiller & Bookmiller, 1990). 
During the First Intifada, a youth- and student-led Palestinian 
uprising against the Israeli occupation that began in December 1987 
and lasted until September 1993, the Israeli military imposed dangerous 
conditions for media workers by injuring and killing a number of 
reporters. As a result, international media organizations recruited local 
Palestinians, effectively growing the media and journalism sector in 
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Palestine. This resulted in increasing the number of Palestinian women 
working in media due to the international media relying on their gender 
to overcome “social restrictions” (Somiry-Batrawi, 2004, p. 111). Just 
before the Oslo process granted the state of Palestine the right to use 
broadcasting frequencies, Palestinians could tune into television news 
programming produced by Palestinians in Palestine for the first time. This 
came with the launch of experimental television news programming in 
early 1993 produced by the Institute of Modern Media (IMM) based at 
Al-Quds University. After several successful broadcasts, IMM secured a 
license in 1996 from the Palestinian Ministry of Information for Al-Quds 
Education TV (AETV) (Somiry-Batrawi, 2004). 
After the Six-Day War that Israel waged against Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan in 1967, the First Intifada by Palestinians against the Israeli 
occupation in 1987, and the declaration by the PLO of the independent 
state of Palestine in 1988, the Oslo Accords between the Israeli 
government and the PLO began in 1993. The negotiations immediately 
addressed and resulted in tangible media gains for the Palestinian 
people. This included the allocation of one medium wave and 10 FM 
frequencies granted to the Palestinian Authority (PA), as the designated 
government of the state of Palestine (Boyd, 1999). The PA rushed to 
establish a Ministry of Information to develop media policy and draft 
a press law. These changes allowed, for the first time, the licensing of 
television and radio stations broadcasting from Palestine (Boyd, 1999). 
Immediately following the negotiations, the Palestinian Broadcasting 
Company (PBC) was launched in 1993 as a publicly funded state-owned 
media organization, airing programming that focused on state actors 
and followed government agendas (Sakr, 2007). As part of the PBC, the 
Voice of Palestine, a state-owned radio station, went on-air in July 1994 
and was well-received among Palestinian audiences as it aired popular 
programs such as Good Morning Palestine and a prison radio show that 
connected on-air the families of the detained with their loved ones 
listening from Israeli jails (Boyd, 1999). Voice of Palestine also suspended 
regular programming to provide live coverage of the Second Intifada, 
which began in 2000 and lasted until 2005 (Salama, 2006). 
The launch of Voice of Palestine was followed by that of the newspaper 
Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, which was published with funding from the PA 
(Saraste, 2010). Beginning circulation in November 1994, Al-Hayat 
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Al-Jadida became the first daily newspaper published in Palestine that 
promoted the positions of the PA (Jamal, 2000). By 1996, the PBC television 
station was broadcasting Palestinian-produced television programming 
from a control room located in the PA president’s compound in Gaza 
with the transmission facilities in Ramallah. After the death of the PA 
president Yasser Arafat in 2004, oversight of the station was transferred 
to the Ministry of Information, a move that provided mechanisms for 
public accountability over station budgets and appointments. Soon 
after that, Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council 
elections in 2006, and the acting PA president Mahmoud Abbas from 
Fatah designated that all state media, including the PBC, would be 
under the authority of the president’s office (Sakr, 2007). 
During this time, satellite television was introduced in the state of 
Palestine, and by 2002, 78% of Palestinians had access to it (Rugh, 2004, 
p. 220). The PBC would soon establish the Palestinian Satellite Channel, 
which reached transnational audiences. With the rise of satellite and 
private channels after the Oslo Accords, audiences in Palestine had 
access to national and transnational content from privately-owned 
stations in Palestine that broadcast satellite content from other 
stations, typically without legal authorization (Somiry-Batrawi, 2004). 
Palestinian audiences could tune into programming from hundreds of 
Arabic media channels, but little content was produced by Palestinians. 
However, some satellite channels, such as Al-Jazeera, hired Palestinian 
journalists to work on the ground. Local journalists reporting for 
satellite networks played a crucial role covering the Second Intifada 
and the repeated wars and attacks waged by the Israeli military during 
that time (Saraste, 2010). This coverage not only informed Palestinian 
audiences in the state of Palestine, but also Palestinians in the diaspora 
and audiences across the Arab region.
After the success of Hamas in the 2006 elections, Al-Aqsa TV was 
launched from Gaza as a satellite television channel that complemented 
Hamas’s bi-weekly newspaper Al-Risalah and its radio station Sawt 
Al-Aqsa, which began broadcasting in 2003 (Alshaer, 2012, p. 239). With 
a mandate to serve the Islamic movement in Palestine, the station does 
not air any programming that contravenes Islamic traditions or laws. 
Positioned as independent of Hamas, these various media represent 
the views of the Islamic movement similar to how PBC’s programming 
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represents the views of Fatah. Programming focuses on the activities of 
the Hamas government, criticizes the PA, Fatah, and Israel, and covers 
religion, culture, and politics (Alshaer, 2012, pp. 241–42). After the 
Israeli military destroyed the station and equipment of Al-Aqsa during 
the 2009 war on Gaza, the broadcast studios moved to a secret location, 
and the station is available today throughout the state of Palestine.
Internet-based media from Palestine did not exist before Oslo 
as there was no Internet access due to the widespread effects of the 
Israeli regime’s occupation. In fact, Internet access was illegal until the 
negotiations granted the PA the right to build a telecommunications 
infrastructure. With the expansion of access through privatized 
development, Internet usage among Palestinians quickly became one of 
the highest per capita rates in the region (Tawil-Souri & Aouragh, 2014). 
As a result, Palestinians in Palestine could more easily report on local 
events to a global audience through a growing number of Internet news 
websites based in Palestine and abroad. Both The Palestine Chronicle, 
founded in 1999, and The Electronic Intifada, founded in 2001, operate 
from the United States as non-profit, independent news and opinion 
multimedia websites providing Palestinian perspectives on events in 
Palestine and abroad. The International Middle East Media Center was 
launched from the West Bank in 2008 to provide news produced by 
Palestinians from across Palestine in English and in multimedia formats 
for an international audience. Additionally, the popular Quds News 
Network founded in 2013 provides independent news in Arabic for 
mostly younger Palestinians and in English for global audiences from 
its online and social media platforms, attracting millions of followers.
Political System and Legal Framework
Today WAFA, the official Palestinian news and information agency, 
reports that there are over 50 newspapers printed and published online 
on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis in Palestine, covering a variety 
of topics from politics to entertainment. Publications in Palestine 
today include over 150 magazines that also target children, tourists, 
human rights advocates, and academics. There are currently over 30 
television and radio stations broadcasting in Palestine, airing a variety 
of entertainment and cultural programming, including sports, religion, 
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and music as well as news. According to a recent national survey, the 
majority of audiences 15 years of age or older in the state of Palestine 
watch television daily, followed by one-third of audiences who listen to 
radio and who access the Internet daily. The same survey also reported 
fewer than 10% of audiences surveyed in Palestine reported reading “at 
least one daily [newspaper] yesterday” (Ipsos, 2013, p. 17).
Today, three overlapping policy regimes regulate the media system 
in Palestine: Israeli military rule, various laws enacted by the PA, and 
policies of Hamas for Palestinians residing in the Gaza Strip. In addition, 
the increasing use of social media by Palestinians means that censorship 
policies of social media companies (mostly US-based monopolies) also 
impact online media practices in Palestine. However, beginning in the 
last decades of the Ottoman Empire, laws were used to incriminate 
Palestinian journalists for criticizing imperial figures and policies or to 
even shut down newspapers, as in the case of Falastin (Omer, 2015). 
With the imposition of the British Mandate in Palestine, the new imperial 
authorities’ practices towards media workers did not change. In fact, 
the British maintained the same repressive laws used by the Ottomans, 
adding the discriminatory legal requirement of a university degree for 
any newspaper editor-in-chief (Omer, 2015).
The Israeli government enforces the 1933 Press Ordinance and the 
1945 Emergency Regulations, both continued from the British Mandate 
period, and both are still applied today across historic Palestine, 
meaning that multiple generations of Palestinian media makers living 
in the state of Palestine have experienced sustained military censorship 
(7amleh, 2016). Under these measures, a license from the Israeli military 
is required to publish a newspaper. In occupied Jerusalem, licenses 
for publishing are required from Israel’s Ministry of the Interior. 
Additionally, all content intended for publication must be approved by 
Israeli military censors, who require material to be submitted twice for 
censorship before publication (Nossek & Rinnawi, 2003). According to 
some scholars, this mechanism of prior censorship has resulted in 25% 
of newspaper content being deleted (Najjar, 1992, as cited in Bishara, 
2009). In fact, during the First Intifada, some newspapers had their 
licenses revoked all together by Israel for nearly two months, and some 
journalists were jailed and others deported (Bishara, 2009). The policies 
maintained by the Israeli regime provide Palestinians no “space for 
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freedom of expression or representation” (Jamal, 2009, p. 127). These 
practices impact offline and online media practices in Palestine. 
Under the PA, the Basic Law was enacted and amended in 2003 along 
with the 1995 Press and Publications Law, both of which supplemented 
Israeli military laws that are still in effect. The Basic Law, under the draft 
constitution (revised on 4 May 2003), guarantees freedom of expression 
(Article 37), declares the right to own media and receive information 
(Articles 38 and 40), and provides for a free press (Article 39). However, 
the Press and Publications Law contravenes the Basic Law by relying 
on vague language to describe crimes of the press. The Press and 
Publications Law requires licensing for print media, sets conditions and 
capital requirements for who can own media and act as editor-in-chief, 
and includes vague content restrictions concerning morals and a ban 
on any content that may “harm the national unity” (Article 37). Finally, 
the law sanctions any media violations, and fines and jail time can be 
levied against media workers and organizations (Mendel & Khashan, 
2006). Such restrictions have resulted in rampant self-censorship among 
Palestinian journalists, and there is no independent body to apply these 
regulations because the authority to apply the law is directly in the 
hands of the government (UNESCO, 2014). The Press and Publications 
Law has been used to limit freedom of expression and the press. As 
a result, there have been multiple incidences of the PA closing private 
cable television stations and arresting journalists under the provisions 
of the Press and Publications Law. This includes the jamming of AETV’s 
signal and detention of its director after the station broadcast sessions of 
the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1997 (Jamal, 2000). 
It is worth noting that, after the intimidation of AETV, the Palestinian 
government under President Arafat was pressured to create a 13-member 
committee made up of several ministers and representatives of various 
ministries as well as legal and technical experts to regulate private 
television and radio under the 1995 Press Law. Eventually, the Ministry 
of Information proposed creating an independent body, whose members 
would be appointed based on experience, to regulate media. However, 
the proposed revisions to the broadcast law remained in draft form after 
the 2006 elections crisis, which included Israel’s mass arrest of members 
of the Palestinian government (Sakr, 2007). A new broadcasting law has 
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been drafted, revising many of the concerns raised above, but it has yet 
to be implemented due to the ongoing governance crisis in Palestine.
In 2016, PA president Mahmoud Abbas signed the Declaration 
on Media Freedom in the Arab World and designated 1 August as 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression Day in Palestine (Melhem, 2016). 
However, a year later, the president also signed the Electronic Crimes 
Law that violated the Basic Law provisions that guarantee freedom of 
expression and freedom from censorship. The new law imposed fines 
and imprisonment, raising concerns for Palestinians publishing media 
or communicating online (Fatafta, 2018). Just weeks before signing 
the bill, dozens of popular news websites, including the Quds News 
Network, were blocked by the PA’s Attorney General (Fatafta, 2018). 
Both journalists and activists in the West Bank have been targeted with 
arrests and charged under the new law for posting content online. In the 
Gaza Strip, a similar amendment to Law 3 was passed in 2009 which, in 
intentionally vague terms, criminalized the misuse of technology, which 
could also be used to censor online media practices (Fatafta, 2018).
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Media ownership in Palestine has a varied history of private, political 
party, and state ownership. While non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) under the current regulations are allowed to operate broadcast 
media, there is no distinct category of licensing for community-
owned, non-profit media. With the influence of neo-liberalization 
and privatization underpinning the Oslo Accords process, privately-
owned media increased greatly in Palestine. Private media in Palestine 
are largely sustained by commercial income. However, poverty, high 
unemployment, and economic exclusion impact the media economy and 
create a small advertising market (UNESCO, 2014). State media accept 
commercial sponsorships, but mainly operate on funds granted by the 
government. In the telecommunications sector, the private company 
PALTEL maintains a near monopoly, and as a result, its revenues from 
subscriber fees contribute 10% of the state of Palestine’s economic 
activity, providing 30% of the PA’s annual tax revenues (Tawil-Souri, 
2015).
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In general, the Palestinian Ministry of Information maintains a 
welcoming strategy that “freely issue[s] ‘no objection’ notices or 
‘temporary licenses’” (Sakr, 2007, p. 25) to broadcasting license 
applicants. The practice of granting most licensing requests aims to 
create “facts on the ground” (Sakr, 2007, p. 25) in Palestine to use in 
future negotiations concerning the Israeli occupation. The Ministry also 
believes a plethora of broadcasters are necessary, not only for promoting 
freedom of expression, but also to ensure Palestinian broadcasting 
continues regardless of any Israeli attack on the media system. 
This practice resulted in dozens of stations being on-air, some even 
operating without a license, by the late 1990s. This policy contrasted 
with the majority of Arab media systems at the time that were still 
monopolized by state broadcasters (Sakr, 2007). While the PA licensed 
dozens of privately-owned radio and cable television stations, much of 
the programming offered was related to entertainment and therefore 
sought to monetize audiences. Thus, stations were unstable, opening 
and closing regularly because they were not profitable (Jamal, 2000).
Some privately-owned media in Palestine have sustained their 
organizations through blending social entrepreneurship with 
commercial practices, such as Radio Nisaa FM, launched in 2009, as the 
only commercial radio station and multimedia website for Palestinian 
women that is also run by women. Radio Nisaa receives financial support 
through a mix of corporate sponsorships and advertising as well as 
donations and funds from international organizations, the Ministry of 
Women Affairs in Palestine, and the Palestinian Business Women Forum. 
The prioritization of women in media management and production 
at Radio Nisaa addresses a gender gap in Palestinian media. A study 
released by Women Media and Development (TAM) reported that 
media in Palestine marginalizes women in their participation as media 
workers as well as in their representation in media content. The study 
found that a stereotypical image of women is perpetuated in Palestinian 
media largely due to the fact that media organizations include about 
10% of female employees, and very few of these are in media production 
or management roles (TAM, 2017).
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Technology and Infrastructure 
Where the Oslo Accords granted Palestinians the right to independent 
communication systems, the greatest restriction on the development of 
media technology and infrastructure in Palestine is the Israeli occupation. 
Israel restricts the ability of Palestinian media and telecommunications 
companies to import the technology needed to maintain and modernize 
the media system. The Israeli government also constrains access to 
frequencies for transmitting broadcasts (Jamal, 2000) and restricts 
telecommunications companies to 2 or 3G because of limits imposed 
on spectrum allocation (Fatafta, 2018). The PBC maintains no television 
broadcasting equipment or studios in the Gaza Strip. Field equipment 
is also limited in availability, and as a result, television programming 
largely consists of pre-recorded programs or footage of community 
events. 
Repeated Israeli military aggressions have targeted Palestinian media 
offices, studios, and infrastructure, resulting in millions of dollars in 
damages and, in some cases, closures. In January 2002, during the Second 
Intifada, the Israeli military blew up the 5-storey building that housed 
the Voice of Palestine in Ramallah and destroyed the station’s transmitters. 
Voice of Palestine continued broadcasting from a secret location and over 
privately-owned radio stations but was unable to rebuild its transmitters 
due to a lack of resources (Saraste, 2010). Other Palestinian media 
faced similar destruction at the hands of the Israeli military, such as in 
November 2018 when Israeli air strikes on the Gaza Strip repeatedly 
targeted and eventually leveled the building that housed Al-Aqsa TV. 
As a result of the unending targeting of media infrastructure by the 
Israeli military, Palestinian broadcasters are increasingly moving their 
equipment and operations to covert locations.
With regard to the Internet in Palestine, all connections to the World 
Wide Web flow through Israel, which conducts regular shutdowns and 
destruction of Palestinian-owned telecommunications infrastructure. 
Additionally, advocacy groups such as 7amleh have noted that Israeli 
regime agencies collaborate with private technology companies to censor 
and shut down Palestinian accounts. This includes Israel maintaining 
agreements with several social media companies to remove Palestinian 
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content, including posts on Facebook and content on Google (7amleh, 
2016).
Yet, Internet penetration is very high in Palestine. This is also 
amplified in the spread of social media in Palestine, with one in three 
Palestinians active on various platforms (Fatafta, 2018, p. 8). Palestine 
maintains the largest concentration of Facebook users per capita in the 
Arab region (Tawil-Souri & Aouragh, 2014). Newspapers, television, 
and radio stations in Palestine also connect with the world through the 
Internet. Traditional media not only use the Internet as an extension 
of their media practice, but also as an innovative media tactic to 
connect with audiences worldwide. For example, Radio Free Palestine 
is an international and collaborative 24-hour radio broadcast that 
commemorates the nakba on 15 May. The live programming is hosted 
and shared by stations in Palestine and beyond, which broadcast live 
to audiences online and on FM radio stations across five continents 
(King & Marouf, 2018). These practices indicate that social media and 
the Internet have become tools that Palestinians use to facilitate mass 
communication locally and transnationally.
Challenges 
Throughout the occupation of Palestine, Israeli authorities have censored, 
detained, deported, and killed Palestinian journalists. Actions by the 
PA and Hamas have also shut down Palestinian stations and websites, 
and they have arrested Palestinian journalists who cover oppositional 
politics. However, since 1948 the Israeli regime has repressed media 
freedom in Palestine through various agencies. Regularly, the Israeli 
Press Office refuses to renew the press cards of Palestinian journalists, 
and this limits their ability to travel and work in Palestine. Beyond this, 
mass restrictions on the movement of all Palestinians limit the ability 
of Palestinian journalists to access and cover news events (Saraste, 
2010). In 2018, the violent targeting of media workers in Palestine by the 
Israeli military continued with the murder of two Palestinian journalists 
while they were reporting on news events in the Gaza Strip. After an 
independent investigation, the United Nations and the Committee to 
Protect Journalists reported that Israeli military snipers deliberately shot 
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the two journalists, concluding that the Israeli’s killing of Palestinian 
journalists has become “part of a pattern” (CPJ, 2019).
Recently, Palestinians have been increasingly arrested for social 
media activity by Israel, the PA, and Hamas. The majority of arrests 
have been made by Israeli police forces for “incitement through social 
media” (7amleh, 2016, p. 113), and Palestinians have been sentenced to 
a year or more in prison. For example, Palestinian poet Dareen Tatour 
posted her poem ‘Resist, My People, Resist Them’ on Facebook in 2015 
and was afterwards confined to almost three years of house arrest before 
being sentenced to five months in prison for “incitement” and “support 
for terror” with her post (IMEMC, 2018). Notably, Israeli police have 
applied the charge of inciting violence online only against Palestinians 
(7amleh, 2016). 
The danger facing Palestinian journalists and media workers, the 
criminalization and censorship of Palestinian political communication 
online, and the regular destruction of media infrastructure and the limits 
imposed on technology present major challenges for the development of 
the media system. In addition, the economic sustainability of the media 
system in Palestine is threatened by the PA’s regulatory push towards 
privatization. As a result, the small and impoverished media market is 
saturated with commercial and for-profit interests. Further, there is no 
specific license or funding made available by the Palestinian Ministry 
of Information for non-profit or community-owned media that operate 
with little or no advertising and provide a complement to commercial, 
privately-owned, state-run, and political party-affiliated media in the 
system. However, where NGOs are increasingly participating in the 
facilitation of not-for-profit media production in Palestine, the reliance 
of NGOs on project funding from international sources makes such 
media unsustainable and often limits it to serving the foreign interests 
of donors.
 Outlook
Palestinians in historic Palestine and in the diaspora have always used 
media for national liberation and self-determination. The resilience 
of Palestinian media is complemented by various media tactics that 
continue to defy and circumvent the Israeli occupation. Today, the Israeli 
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regime oppresses the Palestinian people politically, economically, and 
socially with policies that also impoverish the media system in Palestine. 
Therefore, the media economy in Palestine is made unsustainable by 
the Israeli regime’s ongoing occupation of electromagnetic spectrum, 
destruction of infrastructure, sanctions on media technology, and 
attacks on Palestinian media workers and activists. Additionally, the 
governance crisis in Palestine since the 2006 elections has resulted in 
overlapping policies of the regimes that target journalists and political 
speech online further negatively impacting the media system. Yet, 
innovation in media practices, including the creative use of the Internet 
and social media by news websites, traditional media, and media 
activists, is connecting Palestinians in occupied Palestine with the world. 
For Palestinian and non-Palestinian media makers globally, the diaspora 
and transnational media projects in solidarity with the Palestinian 
people provide a rich opportunity to embolden the Palestinian media 
space. The aforementioned IMEMC and Radio Free Palestine are just two 
of many examples of the ways Palestinians in Palestine are connecting 
with media makers and audiences across the globe, through and beyond 
the Internet.
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4. Jordan: Media’s Sustainability 
during Hard Times
 Basim Tweissi 
This article will shed light on the main features of the Jordanian 
media system and how it relates to the political, economic, and 
legal systems. It focuses on the efforts to develop a sustainable 
media industry under difficult circumstances. For many decades, 
Jordan navigated the turbulent waters of the Middle East, the scene 
of devastating regional wars, civil wars, uprisings, and political 
instability, all of which undermined the efforts for political reform 
and the development of a healthy, robust media.
Background
Jordan is strategically located in a region that rarely escapes news 
headlines. Bordered by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Israel, 
it is landlocked with the exception of 26 kilometers on the Red Sea. Its 
89,200 square kilometers are predominantly desert in the south and 
east. Its capital, Amman, is the center of political, cultural, and media 
activities. With limited agriculture and natural resources, it struggles 
economically.
Jordan boasts a rich history within its borders, which were established 
in 1946. Islamic, Byzantine, Roman, and Nabatean monuments and 
archaeological sites stand witness to past civilizations that flourished 
there. The most critical battles of the Arab Revolt in 1916 and 1917, 
which ended the Turkish-Ottoman occupation of the Arab World, were 
fought out on its lands. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire culminated 
in the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France. An outcome 
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of the agreement was the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in 
1921 under the British Mandate.
In 1946, Jordan became a constitutional monarchy called the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan. Following the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the West 
Bank of the River Jordan, including parts of Jerusalem, was annexed, but 
in June 1967, after the second Arab-Israeli war, Israel occupied the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem. In 1988, Jordan relinquished its sovereignty 
over the West Bank to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 
and in 1994, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, ending the state of war 
between the two countries, was signed. Over the decades, however, the 
flight of waves of Palestinians from violence, occupation, and economic 
hardship have altered the demographic structure of Jordan’s population, 
as well as integrating the Palestinian cause into its politics.
Jordan’s geopolitical position has given it strategic and political 
significance as a regional player. It shouldered the responsibility of 
receiving waves of Arab refugees fleeing regional conflicts. In addition 
to the significant influx of Palestinian refugees during the wars of 
1948 and 1967, thousands of Lebanese sought refuge during the mid-
seventies, fleeing the civil war that had erupted in their country. The 
situation was further exacerbated in 1990 when Iraq occupied Kuwait, 
leading to the expulsion or departure of tens of thousands of Palestinian 
and Jordanian guest workers to their country of residence, Jordan. 
More waves were to follow with Iraqis escaping the hardships of the 
UN sanctions and the post-2003 occupation of their country. From 2011, 
a huge number of Syrian refugees streamed over Jordan’s northern 
frontiers as the civil war raged in Syria. More than 1.3 million refugees 
fled to Jordan, of which 640,000 were registered with the UN and settled 
in camps (Department of Statistics, 2015). Thus, in the 55 years since 
independence, Jordan’s population has more than doubled to 10.6 
million today. Non-Jordanians constitute 30% of the total population, 
of whom 15% are Syrians, and the remainder are Palestinians. Young 
people constitute the majority of the population, with 34% being under 
16 years of age.
Jordan’s economy prospered for some decades. However, since 
2010, Jordan’s economy has suffered due to cost of energy, water, poor 
agricultural unemployment, and the burden of hosting Syrian refugees. 
Media have nonetheless flourished and responded to the fast-changing 
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pace of events. The rapid population growth has presented new 
opportunities to the media. 
Jordan adapted to the new circumstances. In 1989, it embarked on 
a program of democratic reform marked by the suspension of martial 
law, the resumption of parliamentary life, and the formation of political 
parties. The democratic transformation made significant strides before 
regressing in the 2000s. Although parliamentary elections continued 
to be held regularly, they were designed in a manner that limited their 
power. Following the 2011 Arab uprisings, known as the Hirak Protests 
in Jordan, the Jordanian government once more undertook a series of 
reforms through the introduction of broad constitutional amendments 
and the establishment of an Independent Electoral Commission and 
Constitutional Court. Historical Developments
The birth of journalism in Jordan coincided with the birth of the state 
more than nine decades ago, when it began to play a significant role in 
the construction of national institutions and the formation of a Jordanian 
identity, by underscoring positive achievements. Currently, the media 
is still undergoing a massive transformation that is proportional to the 
country’s slow political reform.
Historically, the Jordanian media has evolved in three phases: the 
Emirate years from 1921 to 1946, the Kingdom years from 1946 to 1970, 
and the current phase, which can be divided into two periods. The first 
period (from 1970 to 1989) was marked by financial stability and the 
adoption of modern technologies. The second period began in 1989, 
when Jordan underwent a democratic transformation (Al-Moussa, 
1998). 
The first Jordanian newspaper, Al-Haqq Ya’alu, was published in 
1921 in the city of Ma’an. When printing was introduced in 1923, the 
official weekly and sometimes biweekly Al-Sharq Al-Arabi newspaper 
was published. In 1926, the newspaper’s name was changed to The 
Official Gazette of the Government of Trans Jordan. It was later changed again 
to The Official Gazette of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Al-Moussa, 1998, 
p. 261). It is still being published today.
In 1927, several privately-owned newspapers were published: The 
Arab Peninsula, The Arab Echo, and Al-Urdun which ceased printing in 
1982. In the 1930s, there were short-lived attempts to publish newspapers 
and magazines, such as Al-Hikma, Al-Mithaq, and Al-Wafa’a, but none 
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survived (Al-Moussa, 1998, p. 261). During this period, Jordanian 
journalism could be described as unsettled, financially poor, and 
lacking a clear identity. Party-affiliated newspapers began to emerge. 
Their content was predominantly political and literary.
The second phase began in 1946 when Jordan gained independence 
and became a constitutional monarchy. The West Bank of Palestine was 
annexed, and the 1952 constitution was enacted, guaranteeing political 
and civil freedoms and freedom of the press for the first time. This 
phase continued until 1967 when the second Arab-Israeli War broke out, 
resulting in Jordan’s loss of the West Bank. The Palestinian resistance 
movements set up training camps in Jordan, and Israeli fighter jets 
patrolled the skies over Jordan unchallenged. The coverage, content, 
and quality of newspapers representing all political parties improved 
at the beginning of this period and readership was wide. However, in 
1959, there was a marked decline in quality when democracy was put on 
hold. The 1960s were characterized by a polarized political climate in the 
Arab world. Newspapers became more partisan, and the government 
stepped in to micromanage media; some papers were suspended, others 
were banned altogether. With the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s 
charismatic leader—who captivated Arab masses with his message 
of Pan-Arabism supported by his fiery rhetoric, which was widely 
broadcast with his country’s powerful radio transmitters—Jordan’s 
monarchy felt threatened and tried to counter the tide of Nasserism. 
Jordan launched, in 1956, a national radio station from Amman as its 
first national public media outlet, and shared the allocated frequency 
with its then primary radio station, which broadcast its programs from 
Ramallah in the West Bank.
Jordan’s government also felt that Jordanian newspapers published 
in Jerusalem were not helpful in countering Nasserism associated 
with Palestinian patriotism. The government, headed by Premier 
Wasfi Al-Tel, believed that media which advocated Arab nationalist 
movements countenanced Nasserism. Against this backdrop, in 1967, 
the government introduced a new publications law (replacing the 
1955 law) to enable governmental control of newspapers. The law was 
known as “the Merger Law” because several newspapers were forced to 
merge as a result of it. Palestine and Al-Manar merged into the Addustour 
newspaper, which later moved from Jerusalem to Amman, where it is 
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still being published today. Similarly, Al-Difa’a and Al-Jihad merged into 
the Al-Quds newspaper, which is still published in Palestine (Sakkijha, 
1998, p. 45). On 13 May 1971, the government issued a decree for the 
establishment of a cultural institute and a state-owned newspaper 
capable of analyzing the political scene. In due course, the Jordan 
Press Foundation was established and published the Al-Rai newspaper, 
which later became a public shareholding company (Hijazi, Al-Fank, & 
Kharob, 1995, p. 11).
The third phase (1970–1989) was characterized by stability and 
modernization. The government restructured the ownership of 
Jordanian newspapers, turning them into publicly-owned corporations. 
A total of 35% of the shares were retained by the original owners, 25% 
by shareholders, 15% by independent public enterprises (i.e. Jordan’s 
Social Security Corporation and the Postal Savings Fund), 20% by 
traders on the stock market, and 5% by newspaper employees. During 
this period, a new generation of qualified Jordanian journalists emerged, 
raising professional standards, and on the business side, new financially 
and administratively independent corporations emerged. 
In addition, HBS radio underwent further expansion in the 1970s 
and 1980s and began transmissions on different wavelengths and 
frequencies; its short-wave transmissions reached audiences worldwide. 
Today, it boasts five radio stations with different programs, along with 
regional radio stations in Irbid in northern Jordan. In 1968, Jordan TV 
(JTV) was launched as a state-owned station. By the 1970s and 1980s, the 
JTV staff had the know-how and editorial skills needed to be regarded 
as pioneers and helped with the process of setting up other television 
stations in the region. However, they also carried with them the values 
that had been instilled in them, such as the notion that the image of the 
state was paramount.
The fourth phase (1989–present) was characterized by the 
democratic transformation process, in which the Press and Publication 
Law of 1993 was introduced. The new law contributed to the growth of 
media; the number of dailies rose to nine, and weeklies jumped to 32 in 
1995. In 1997, the number of newspapers reached 17; however, following 
amendments to the law, that number dwindled to seven. It was also a 
time in which new media started to emerge. 
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Ammon News, the first news website, was launched in 1997. The 
new broadcasting era that shaped the Arab region from the late 1990s 
onwards was reason enough for Jordan’s parliament to approve the 
Audiovisual Media Law in 2002, thereby ending the government’s 
monopoly over radio and television broadcasting rights. The private 
sector and civil society were granted the right to own and manage radio 
and television stations. 
In 2019, Jordan’s media landscape included 39 licensed satellite 
television channels, representing 16 Jordanian and 23 foreign channels, 
and 40 radio stations, including slide show (a televised form of radio) 
channels. Print outlets numbered 19 (including seven daily, nine weekly, 
and three monthly newspapers). Furthermore, the number of licensed 
news websites and so-called “electronic publications” reached 122. 
Political System and Legal Framework
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy made 
up of three branches—the executive, legislative, and the judiciary—in 
accordance with the 1952 constitution, with ministerial portfolios that 
should reflect the various political and social components of society. 
The constitutional amendment of 2011 protects the freedom of 
the press. Article 15 stipulates: “The State shall guarantee freedom of 
expression and every Jordanian shall be free to express his/her opinion 
in speech, in writing, or visual representation and other forms of 
expression provided that such expression does not violate the law.” The 
amendment also stipulates that “the State shall guarantee the freedom of 
the media and publishing within the limits of the law.” The same article 
states that “newspapers and information media may not be suspended 
nor license thereof revoked except by a court order in accordance with 
the provisions of the law.” However, the ensuing relevant laws have 
limited these freedoms (Shukeir, 2011).
Jordan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in 2006, which states in Article 19 that “everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of expression,” and the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights in 2004, which guarantees the right to information and freedom 
of opinion. Moreover, Jordan is a signatory to the United Nations 
Convention for the Rights of the Child, which ensures a child’s right 
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to freedom of expression, and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EuroMed) agreement between Jordan and the European Union, which 
supports media freedom and the rights stipulated in international 
conventions, and which was signed in 1999 (Shukeir, 2011, pp. 19–26).
Media regulation remained volatile during the democratic 
transformation process, although, since 1989, the Kingdom has moved 
towards a more pluralistic political structure, lifting martial laws and 
guaranteeing freedom of expression through the Press and Publication 
Law No. 10 of 1993 and the multiparty system which was established 
through the Law for Political Parties No. 32 of 1993. Starting these 
reforms required substantial effort because, until that point, media 
management and control were the legacy of the Cold War in a region 
that sought to use the press as a weapon. In the 1970s, William Rugh 
(1979) categorized the Jordanian press as “loyalist” with a heavy 
influence from the government (pp. 25–29). Rugh also described the 
content of Jordanian press as featuring limited diversity, touting the 
government’s point of view, failing to report accountability, and always 
supporting the status quo. He also said that it was slow in responding 
to events (pp. 79–80). Rugh’s findings were still valid a decade later, as 
evidenced in Issam Moussa’s (1989) content analysis of the Al-Rai daily 
newspaper, where he found that international content featured a degree 
of variety, while there was limited coverage of domestic issues, with a 
focus instead on official and domestic political topics (p. 98).
Since the mid-1990s, Jordanian media has seen important positive 
changes: a movement towards pluralism and editorial independence 
driven by a competitive spirit among newspapers (Al-Kilani, 2002). 
Another factor for the improved coverage was the emergence of weeklies, 
which proliferated following the enactment of the Publication Law of 
1993 (Jones, 2002), but eventually decreased in number.
Yet media reforms kept taking one step backward for every step 
forward (Sakr, 2002). In 2001, for example, the government opted 
for the dissolution of the Ministry of Information and reassigned 
some of its roles to other public institutions, such as the Audiovisual 
Commission and the Department of Press and Publications. With these 
steps, Jordan’s media regulation displayed more openness and tolerance 
compared with its neighboring countries (Armijo, 2009). On the other 
hand, growing official dissatisfaction with the media’s performance led 
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to allegations that it was harming Jordan’s image, and consequently, 
the Press and Publication Law was amended five times between 1997 
and 2012. Some of these amendments represented a step forward, while 
others represented a step backwards. For example, daily newspapers 
still needed to be licensed through a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers. 
Moreover, although Jordan is considered the first Arab country to 
enact a law upholding the right to access information (the Access to 
Information Law No. 47 of 2007), the application of this law did not 
result in a noticeable change on the ground. Most surveys showed that 
a lack of access to information was just the first of many challenges to 
improving media professionalism. 
The Internet, on the other hand, was not officially regulated until 
December 2010 when the Court of Cassation, the highest civil judicial 
authority, issued a ruling stating that all websites shall be subject 
to the Press and Publication Law. In 2012, parliament passed new 
amendments to the law that required news websites to register with the 
Jordan Media Commission in order to be licensed to operate.
Despite the positive legislative changes introduced during the last 
decade, progress has been slow and limited. The overlapping laws in 
various parts of the legislation render the media law complex. There 
are 12 effective laws that restrict the freedom of the press within the 24 
bills pertaining to the press and media. Chief among these are: the Penal 
Code, Protection of State Secrets and Documents Law, the State Security 
Court Law, the Press Association Law, Law on the Contempt of Court 
Proceedings, the law governing municipalities, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, and the Public Assemblies Law.
Against the backdrop of the Hirak Protests in 2011, allegations were 
made on social media by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and civil society activists against the authorities, accusing them of 
exploiting poor media professionalism and poor content as a pretext to 
curtail media freedom (Hawatmeh & Pies, 2011). Amendments to the 
Cybercrime Law were proposed by the government using hate speech 
as an excuse and claiming it was spreading on social media networks. 
The draft law is still being debated.
The progress of media freedom since the start of the reform era can 
thus be best described as teetering within the context of other public 
liberties. 1993 was characterized by sweeping political reforms (Freedom 
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House, 1994), and as such is also regarded as a liberal year for the media. 
Similarly, freedom of expression improved during the Hirak Protests but 
has regressed again as a consequence of the war on terrorism, especially 
since 2013. New laws, including the Anti-Terrorism Law, were created, 
and online activities were closely monitored. Further ambiguities in 
the legal framework have hampered the pluralistic development of 
the media: although journalists enjoy the privilege of protection of 
their sources by law, the legal and political systems continue to justify 
practices which do not comply with international media standards 
(UNESCO Office Amman, 2015). In addition, there is the problem of 
the limited independence of the Jordan Media Commission, a regulatory 
body whose head is appointed by the prime minister and charged with 
licensing media channels and services and addressing complaints. The 
commission thus gives the government the final say in licensing radio 
and television channels or newspapers. 
In the meantime, despite a climate of rampant social media abuses 
and distortion of news, the public has expressed concern for media 
independence. Public opinion surveys revealed that respondents 
believe the freedoms of movement, ownership, worship, and belief are 
more protected than the freedom of the press and freedom of expression 
(Center for Strategic Studies, 2011). 
Another problem is that the compulsory membership of journalists 
in the Jordan Press Association is used as a tool of control—only 
those who are members of the association are considered journalists 
and thus protected by the laws. But broadcast or online journalists 
are not included under the umbrella of the Jordan Press Association. 
Membership is restricted to editors and anchors of news bulletins. 
Therefore, some journalists advocate the establishment of multiple 
associations (UNESCO Office Amman, 2015).
Finally, although the Jordan Radio and Television Corporation Law 
describes JTV as a public entity that enjoys administrative and financial 
independence, the reality is different. An evaluation study carried out 
by the UNESCO Office Amman (2015) concluded that JTV tends to act 
as a mouthpiece for the government instead of focusing on its role as a 
public service broadcaster. An important development in this context 
was the Independent Public Service Broadcasting Channel Bylaw of 
2016, which paved the way for setting up Al-Mamlaka TV as a new public 
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service channel. The station, a 24-hour news and information television 
channel, has developed its own editorial policies and uses focus groups 
to shape them. The Board of Directors is appointed by the King, and the 
government has no say in the appointment of its staff in contrast to JTV. 
Al-Mamlaka TV, which is state-funded, faces challenges such as drastic 
cuts in budget support and its dwindling ability to protect its editorial 
mandate in the face of official pressure.
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Jordan’s economy is relatively small and has endemic problems. External 
debt levels constituted 94% of Jordan’s GDP in 2019 and this figure is 
growing due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy. 
Although poor in natural resources, the Kingdom’s human resources, 
competitive investment environment, and openness to world markets 
are major positive attributes. These factors have helped to boost growth 
and expansion of the media industry despite the modest advertising 
expenditure of USD 220 million in 2018, a small proportion of what has 
been spent in neighboring oil-producing countries.
The Audiovisual Media Law of 2002 put an end to the government’s 
monopoly on radio and television ownership. Although the law 
allows both public and private ownership of media, there is no explicit 
reference to the status of ownership of community service media that 
are owned and run by civil society. Despite this lack of regulation, 
community service media have started to make their presence felt, albeit 
on a small scale, since 2005, namely through the initiative AmmanNet, 
which includes Radio Al-Balad. Moreover, public institutions, such as 
universities and municipalities, own ten smaller radio stations which 
serve their local communities.
The government has a stake in various sectors of the media industry 
and owns, along with Jordan Radio and Television (JRTV), the only two 
land-based terrestrial channels, in addition to three satellite channels 
and the national news agency Petra, a public entity. The private sector, 
on the other hand, owns seven satellite channels, including Roya TV, 
Amman TV, and Jo TV, and with the government co-owns two Arabic-
language and one English-language newspaper out of a total of seven. 
The state holds, through its Social Security Corporation, 55% of Al-Rai 
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shares and 33% of Addustour shares, while the balance is held by the 
public. JRTV also owns five public radio stations. The private sector, 
however, owns 25 radio stations. Statistics show that private media 
ownership is expanding, with businessmen owning most media outlets; 
for example, Roya TV is owned by the Al-Sayegh Family, and the Al-Ghad 
newspaper is owned by Mohammad Olayan. 
Article 9 of the Competition Law, which regulates the market 
concentration, stipulates that a written ministerial approval is required 
if 40% of the shares of a media enterprise are to be traded, which reflects 
a reluctance on the part of the government to relinquish control of the 
media (UNESCO Office Amman, 2015).
Since 2011, print media in Jordan have struggled as the economic 
crisis has deepened. The decline of print media is due to the contraction 
of its advertising revenue share. The print media’s failure to adapt to the 
digital publishing technologies is one of the main reasons for this crisis 
(Economic and Social Council, 2018). The two major Arabic dailies, 
Al-Rai and Addustour, began to hemorrhage financially and were forced 
to take drastic cost-cutting measures. In 2011, Addustour had to lay off 
77 of 700 employees, and closed down its weekly English edition. Three 
years later, it adopted further drastic measures, reducing its staff to 320. 
The government had to intervene when the newspaper failed to pay staff 
salaries and committed advertising funds for government legal notices 
as support (Economic and Social Council, 2018). Al-Rai daily, for its 
part, stopped giving annual salary increases to employees as of March 
2011, and reduced the number of columnists it employed from 53 to 
eight. In March 2015, it closed down some of its offices outside the 
capital. Another newspaper, Al-Arab Al-Yawm, also became a casualty of 
the crisis and had to close down completely in 2015.
The fear of a runaway media has slowed down the emergence 
of a professional class of journalists able to produce commercially 
sought-after content. The relaxed implementation of copyright laws 
is also a stifling disincentive. On the other hand, Google and Facebook 
have an unfair competitive advantage since they dominate the limited 
advertising market available to local media. 
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Technology and Infrastructure
Jordan’s media infrastructure is considered adequate compared with 
that of other developing countries. JRTV is one of the biggest Arab media 
corporations with advanced technical capabilities and know-how, which 
were acquired when BBC engineers and production staff assisted with 
setting it up. In the early 1970s, JRTV provided essential engineering and 
production staff to Arabian Gulf countries who set up national television 
and radio stations. JRTV became a national flagship during this period. 
It helped found the Arab States Broadcasting Union and became an 
active member of the European Broadcasting Union. Since 1972, it has 
contributed news coverage from Jordan, and has produced international 
scoops, such as the first pictures of Syrian tanks capturing the Golan 
Heights in October 1973, because it was the only television station at the 
time with access to a satellite ground station. In 2001, Jordan agreed to 
set up a tax-free zone, the Jordan Media City (JMC), to provide regional 
and international broadcasting services, production facilities, satellite 
uplinks, and television channel streaming. An agreement was signed 
with the Arab Media Corporation, which invested USD 15 million with 
its activities to be overseen by the media regulator in accordance with 
the laws of the Jordan Media Authority (UNESCO Office Amman, 2015). 
JMC currently uplinks and turns around 450 television channels and 
provides Jordan’s first commercial television station, Roya TV, with 
studios and transmission facilities (Jordan Media City, 2020). During 
the COVID-19 pandemic, Roya TV encountered state intervention due to 
their broadcast of a video of protesting citizens who had suffered a loss 
of income due to the lockdown. 
Despite the expansion of Internet coverage in Jordan over the last 
decade, the printing and book publishing industry have also seen a 
remarkable development. The number of small printing houses based 
in Amman grew to 439 in 2019. The number of advertising companies 
stood at 384 (Jordan Media Commission, 2019). Similarly, the media 
production industry flourished. Al-Rai and Al-Ghad newspapers 
borrowed heavily to invest in enormous printing plants, in the belief 
that print media would last forever, disregarding the impact of the 
inevitable advance of electronic publishing. As the flow of advertising 
revenue migrated from traditional print media to the new media, there 
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were serious financial shockwaves and massive debts to be reckoned 
with. Since the lockdown in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic 
and the suspension of all print media, the future of Jordan’s print media 
remains in doubt. 
Startups in the field of video production have played an increasingly 
important role in creating a significant change in content and form. An 
example is Kharabeesh, a platform for digital creativity founded in 2007, 
which focuses on entertainment, humor, and satire, and publishes its 
animated cartoons widely on the Internet. 7iber is another example, 
which describes its role as “producing and publishing original 
multimedia journalism and analysis, and providing a platform for critical 
conversation”, and frequently publishes daring videos and investigative 
reports which have caused discomfort and elicited retaliation in the 
form of suspensions by the authorities.
The Internet was introduced to Jordan in the mid-1990s (Shukeir, 
2009). As a result, the telecommunications market grew and became 
more competitive over the following two decades. Three communication 
companies currently dominate the market: Zain, Orange, and Umniah. 
Two of them, Zain and Orange, are international operators, and Umniah 
is Jordanian. Their services encompass ADSL, 3G, and 4G Internet 
access technologies. Fiber-based broadband is also being rolled out in 
the capital and most governorates.
The 3G and WiMAX technologies were introduced in Jordan in 2010. 
At the time, 38% of the population was estimated to have access to the 
Internet. Since then, news websites have begun to grow on the web, 
delivering news at a faster pace than conventional newspapers.
The 2017 statistics show that the spread of computers, smartphones, 
and tablets had increased, and 67% of the population now have access 
to the Internet. A similar rise has occurred in the use of social networks, 
specifically Facebook. The figures also show that 88% of people had 
mobile phone subscriptions in 2018, while 38% of households had a 
computer. 89% of households had Internet access, while 7% of the total 
population subscribed to the WiMAX service (Telecommunications 
Regulatory Commission, 2017).
The digitization of newsrooms in Jordanian newspapers began 
with the advent of ADSL and 2G Internet technologies at the turn of 
the century. In 2006, Ammon News became the first news website to go 
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online, challenged only by conventional dailies and weeklies. By 2019, 
the number of news websites officially registered in Jordan stood at 167 
(Tweissi, 2019). Recent developments in ICT also indicate a stronger 
engagement of local communities, as users are allowed to post their 
comments and feedback on news websites. However, amendments to 
the Press and Publications Law of 2011 stipulate that website owners 
are held personally liable for any opinions published through their 
outlets. The measures were brought about due to the tense climates 
generated by the Hirak Protests and the protests that raged across the 
Arab world. News websites were launched with the specific mission of 
toppling the government with what were regarded as hearsay, rumors, 
and fake news. The choice laid before the government was either chaos 
or closure of websites which could not be held accountable in a court 
of law. Nonetheless, the Internet had already changed Jordan’s media 
landscape, enabling the use of multimedia and ICT, which helped to 
enrich the content produced and consumed (UNESCO Office Amman, 
2015). Additionally, all of Jordan’s six dailies embraced the technology 
and launched online versions with varying degrees of coverage and 
quality.
Challenges
Jordan’s media system reflects a state of “frazzled stability” as any 
progress made has been offset by setbacks and restrictions. Media 
reforms and political reforms are interdependent. Recognizing the 
importance of free, independent, and diverse media on the political 
level will be crucial to pushing the media reform agenda forward. 
Although Jordan went through a prolonged transitional period since 
the launch of political reforms and the return to parliamentary life, the 
reforms undertaken from 1989 to 2019 were lacking. Regional instability, 
on the other hand, still poses the biggest challenge to Jordan’s media 
system, given that Jordan is dependent on the Arab Gulf states support, 
and specifically Saudi Arabia, which opposes the rise of any Arab 
media system that upholds values or a philosophy different from its 
own. Thus, fear of the independent media has generated pressure on the 
government to create laws that have seriously undermined the media’s 
capacity to be the watchdog and guardian of public interest. In all, 22 
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laws have been introduced to curb the freedom and independence of 
the media.
Furthermore, the comparatively modest size of the advertising 
market restricts its expansion and provides little incentive to investors, 
unless they are politically motivated or partisan. While new media offer 
economically viable models, traditional media have failed to follow in 
their footsteps to adapt to new technologies, for which they have paid 
a hefty price. Traditional media outlets have been in regression of late 
and face capacity-building challenges. They have failed to fully embrace 
digital transformation, and many dailies are plagued with acute financial 
difficulties and the mounting costs of paper combined with a recession 
of readership. Unionization is another problem too since it remains 
weak, and Jordan’s Press Association Law does not meet international 
standards.
Codes of conduct are also still new to the media community, while 
previous attempts to appoint a media ombudsman have failed. Efforts 
are also needed to address the gap between journalism schools’ curricula 
and media market needs. Media education is mostly theoretical, with 
little or no field training. Textbooks and teaching methods are outdated. 
Furthermore, the lack of access to information remains a major hurdle 
that impedes the media’s capacity to gain the trust of society, despite 
the fact that Jordan was the first country to adopt a freedom of access to 
information law in 2007.
Outlook 
The degree of media freedom is not likely to change in the next few 
years. However, modest progress might still be realized in the area of 
freedom of speech and the independence of media institutions. Jordan, 
in the meantime, will try to maintain a reasonable level of Internet 
freedom. The government believes that advancing the promising ICT 
sector depends on providing a favorable legal environment, which 
would positively affect digital media platforms and Internet freedom.
In recent years, the government has paid a great deal of attention 
to entrepreneurship and startups. It has also launched digital startup 
accelerators. New media startups that embrace digital technology have 
also begun to surface. These developments provide a vast window of 
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opportunity for the growth of digital media, which will likely have an 
impact on the future of the media in Jordan and in the region.
Public broadcasting also took a positive step by enacting the 
Independent Public Service Broadcasting Channel Bylaw, which 
established Al-Mamlaka news station. Moreover, JRTV has developed 
and begun implementing a series of plans to enhance performance and 
to enforce the public broadcasting standards. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has reversed some of these modest achievements and the fear of what 
is to come has stifled the will of policy makers. Furthermore, recent 
regional developments and the political landscape of Arab-Israeli 
relations has required the media to restrain its reaction to events. This 
move was driven by fear of offending fellow Arab countries who do not 
separate media attitudes from official government stances on an issue. A 
complex series of factors unique to Jordan’s position in the Middle East 
are always in play, hampering and slowing down the development of 
the media, and its ability to break free.
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5. Iraq: Media between 
Democratic Freedom and  
Security Pressures 
Sahar Khalifa Salim
This chapter discusses the historical beginnings of the media in 
Iraq and how it has developed over time under Ottoman control 
and during the British occupation, which was followed by a 
dictatorial rule that has completely restricted the media. Since 
2003, Iraq has entered a democratic era, which has fostered an 
openness and relative freedom in the media. However, because 
of deteriorating security conditions, widespread corruption, and 
the control exerted by political parties and religious movements 
over governance, freedom of the press in Iraq is globally ranked 
among the lowest in the index of press freedom.
Background
Iraq is considered the cradle of civilizations, where the earliest societies 
in the world were established, namely those of Mesopotamia. The most 
important of these were the Babylonian, Sumerian, Akkadian, Assyrian, 
and Chaldean. One of the most important accomplishments of the 
Mesopotamian civilizations was the Sumerians’ invention of writing. 
The first written laws were also issued in Iraq.
Great kingdoms were established in what is now Iraq, and they 
rendered the region an important state. Iraq was an important part 
of the Persian, Greek, and Roman empires. In the seventh century, it 
became an essential and integrated part of the Islamic world. In the 
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eighth century, Iraq contained the capital of the Abbasid State until the 
Ottomans took control of it. It remained under their control until the 
establishment of the new national state during the period of 1914–1918. 
After the First World War, and in light of a growing national awareness, 
the Iraqis enjoyed a kind of freedom, and newspapers tended to discuss 
politically controversial topics, but most of them were short-lived (Bakr, 
1969).
In the twentieth century, the country experienced periods of stability 
and upheaval. The royal era from 1932–1958 is considered the most 
pluralistic one. During this period, many newspapers and magazines 
were issued that called for a free and independent state, and mobilized 
the citizens (Bakr, 1969). After a revolution in 1958, a republic was set 
up. The 1970s witnessed an improvement in the living conditions of 
Iraqis due to the nationalization of Iraq’s oil resources in 1972, which had 
previously been run by a monopoly of foreign companies. In the 1980s, 
the Iraqi-Iranian war affected the economic and political conditions. 
It depleted the country’s resources and created a schism among its 
citizens. The war ended in 1988, but it was followed by Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait, an action that led to another war, a war on Iraq led by the 
US, which began on 17 January 1991. The coalition air raids attacked 
the infrastructure of all the Iraqi cities, which led to total destruction. 
Moreover, three northern cities united to form an autonomous region 
called Kurdistan that has its own language. International military and 
economic sanctions followed due to the losses caused by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. The embargo lasted for nearly 12 years and ended 
on 19 March 2003, when the US and the coalition states launched a war 
against Iraq under the pretext that it had weapons of mass destruction. 
The war ended with the US-led coalition’s defeat of the Iraqi forces and 
the occupation of Iraq on 9 April 2003.
Iraq is a major connecting point between Europe, on the one hand, 
and Southeast Asia and Australia, on the other. The capital, Baghdad, 
is considered an important crossroads in the Middle East. Iraq is 
surrounded by Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and Iran. 
The area of Iraq is nearly 438,446 km2. There are 18 Iraqi governorates. 
The region of Kurdistan consists of three of these: Sulaimaniya, Erbil, 
and Duhok. Although there were neutral areas that separated Iraq 
from Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, in addition to Shat Al-Arab 
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that separated Iraq from Iran, the change in the political system after 
2003 affected Iraqi borders, and some areas were seized by neighboring 
countries such as Kuwait (Khalil, 2018). The population of Iraq amounts 
to more than 38 million. The capital, Baghdad, has the highest population 
with eight million people, representing 21% of the total population of the 
governorates. Nineveh comes second, with 10% of the total population, 
and is followed by Basra, with 8%. Those below 15 years of age represent 
38% of the total population (Iraqi Ministry of Planning, 2018).
The Iraqi people are multiethnic, multilingual and multiconfessional, 
which strongly affects the diversity of its media landscape. Arabs 
and Kurds are the two major nationalities in Iraq. Arabs represent 
the majority of the population with nearly 75–80%, while the Kurds 
represent 12–18%. Other nationalities and ethnic groups represent 5%. 
Arabic and Kurdish are the official languages in Iraq. Arabic, however, 
is considered the primary language because 80% of the population 
speaks it. Kurds live in the northeastern regions, Sulaymaniya, Erbil, 
and Duhok, where they represent the majority. They also represent a 
small percentage of the population in Nineveh, Diyala, and Baghdad. 
Most of the Kurds are Sunnis. The most significant minority in Iraq are 
the Turkmen, who represent the third largest ethnic group. They live 
close to the Kurdish region in the cities of Kirkuk, Diyala, Nineveh, 
and Salahud-Din. The language of the Turkmen (a Turkish dialect) 
and Syriac are official languages in the administrative units where the 
Turkmen or Assyrians represent the majority of the population. There 
are other languages, including Mandean, Sureth, Armenian, and Gypsy, 
which are used by minorities (Al-Husseini, 2008).
Islam is the religion of 95% of the population. Muslims are divided 
into two main denominations, Sunni and Shi’ite, but there are no 
official statistics defining the precise ratio. Christians, Mandeans, and 
Yazidis represent 5%. The Iraqi law acknowledges 14 official Christian 
sects. They are spread over different Iraqi regions, mainly in Baghdad, 
Erbil (in Ankawa), and Mosul (Nineveh plain). Currently, they have 
their own religious and political representation. Before the US-led 
coalition occupation in 2003, they numbered nearly 1.4 million. This 
number, however, has decreseased due to continuous migration and the 
occupation by the Islamic State (ISIS) of Syria and Iraq, which also led 
to the displacement of the Christians. According to the estimations of 
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Christian organizations, between 250,000 and 300,000 Christians remain 
in the area. There are also the Zoroastrians, who had previously lived in 
Kurdistan and who belong to an ancient religion, Zoroastrianism, which 
had disappeared from Iraq, but reappeared after 2015 (Salloom, 2017).
Yazidis represent an ancient religious and ethnic group who lived 
mainly in northern Iraq, and specifically in the Sinjar mountain region 
northeast of Mosul on the Iraq-Syria border. Some of the Yazidis speak 
the Kurdish language, and some of them speak Arabic. During the rule 
of ISIS in this area, tens of thousands of Yazidis fled for their lives, and 
between 2000 and 5500 Yazidis were killed, and around 3000 kidnapped, 
by ISIS (Fidh, 2018).
Historical Developments
The beginnings of media in Iraq occurred with the publication of the first 
official newspaper in Baghdad. The first issue of Al-Zawra’ was published 
in 1869, when Iraq was ruled by the Ottomans. It was established by 
Midhat Pasha, the Ottoman governor in Iraq. Issued in Arabic and 
Turkish, it was the Ottoman province’s official mouthpiece. Soon after, 
Al-Mosul, a weekly newspaper, was issued in Mosul beginning in 1885. 
In 1889, Al-Basra weekly newspaper was first published in Basra. These 
newspapers continued to exist until the British occupation in 1917 after 
the fall of the Ottoman state at the end of World War I (Batti, 1961).
The British occupying forces controlled the press and journalism in 
Iraq. They achieved this by taking control of the public publishing houses 
and buying all of the private ones. They were then used for printing 
newspapers that promoted the consolidation of the British military 
rule. Consequently, all of the newspapers that had been published in 
the Ottoman era were closed, and new ones were established, the most 
famous of which was Al-Awqaf Al-Basriyya, which was followed by a 
two-page newspaper entitled Al-Arab. The content of these newspapers 
supported British policy in Iraq, which aimed to develop closer 
relationships with the Arabs and incite them against the Turks (Batti, 
1985). 
In 1918, Iraq was placed under the League of Nations mandate. 
According to the resolutions of San Remo, Iraq was placed under the 
British administration. Soon after that, the 1920 revolution began against 
 775. Iraq
the British occupation. Journalism was the most effective media used by 
the Iraqis in their political struggle to achieve success in the revolution. 
In that period, newspapers prospered, and several newspapers were 
publishing content and opinions that opposed the British occupation. 
During that period, several political parties were established. These 
parties employed the partisan press to express their ideologies of 
politics and reform. Thus, there was a relatively independent media 
environment at that time (Al-Mashhadani, 2013).
The beginnings of radio broadcasting in Iraq go back to 22 March 
1932, when the Iraqi government conducted the first experimental radio 
broadcast from 8:30–10:30 p.m. On 26 January 1935, the first short-
wave Iraqi radio broadcasting station was established. Its program was 
announced in the official newspapers of that time. It included songs, 
music, and lectures. The official broadcasting of Baghdad Radio started in 
1936. The program included anthems, news, and lectures. That station 
was closed several times, until a new regulation for the Iraqi wireless 
broadcasting was issued in 1937. It was followed in 1938 by the Radio 
Tax Law. After that, daily broadcasting started, but it could hardly be 
heard outside of Iraq. The British Forces that were established in Iraq had 
a positive effect on the development of broadcasting, as they provided 
Iraq with new radio transmitters that allowed them to establish new 
radio stations, such as the Kurdish radio station in Kirkuk in 1952. New 
foreign-language radio stations were also established in 1952 (Al-Rawi, 
1992).
These media developments were followed by the beginning of Iraqi 
television in 1954 when the British BAY Company, while conducting 
an exhibition for manufactured and commercial goods, built a mobile 
television station in the exhibition area in Baghdad. This station started 
broadcasting different programs, including ice skating, music, dancing, 
and singing performances, as well as programs for children. The BAY 
Company ultimately presented the station to the Iraqi government in 
return for a contract to import the required resources for operating 
the station and training its personnel. On 4 January 1956, the first 
experimental broadcast of Baghdad TV was conducted. Its programs 
supported the policy and decisions of the Iraqi government, in addition 
to supporting its objectives and activities. 
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A revolution in July 1958 ended the royal era in Iraq. It marked the 
beginning of the republican rule that also ended the British Forces’ 
existence in Iraq. A wide range of newspapers representing several 
political and ethnic segments of society appeared. Radio and television 
broadcasting improved. In 1963, Baghdad TV witnessed new technical 
developments, especially the introduction of video tapes. In 1967, 
the station’s broadcasting reached all the Iraqi territories. It can be 
considered the first television station in the Middle East. Its programs 
were in Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, and Syriac languages (Radhi, 2010).
In 1968, when the Ba’ath party took over, the media were monopolized 
by the government. A newspaper was established to be the mouthpiece 
of the party, Al-Thawra. In 1975, Iraq witnessed television broadcasting 
in color for the first time. In 1979, Saddam Hussein became ruler in Iraq, 
and during his rule (1979–2003), the media were totally monopolized 
under his control.
The first satellite broadcasting of an Iraqi channel started in Iraq 
with the use of the Internet in 1998. Internet services were not freely 
accessible to everyone. At that time, they were controlled legally by 
the Iraqi government and were subject to high security measures. In 
addition, the infrastructure was not suitable for this service due to the 
international sanctions imposed after Iraq had occupied Kuwait in 
1991. The subscribers amounted to 45,000 out of a total of 24 million 
Iraqis. Most of these subscribers were from official Iraqi institutions, 
and many were rich individuals because the subscription was very 
expensive. The State Company for Internet Services (SCIS), which 
belonged to the Ministry of Communication, managed that service. 
It designed the electronic sites for the Iraqi media, including the Iraqi 
News Agency and a number of the official newspapers. However, some 
electronic newspapers were poorly designed, and they concentrated 
only on essays and studies. On 27 July 2000, the first public Internet 
café was opened, but surfing was limited to the sites allowed by the 
Iraqi government.
The major change that occurred in Iraq and is considered a turning 
point in its political life was the establishment of a new political regime 
after the US-led occupation in 2003. The invasion turned the country 
upside down economically, politically, and socially. The new regime 
dismantled all military institutions and appointed a civilian governor. 
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New political and social institutions were established with a new system 
of election that led to a new governing regime based on a parliamentary 
system. A separation was established between the legislative and 
executive authorities. A new constitution was issued, most of which was 
derived from the Transitional Iraqi State Administration Law of 2004 that 
was set up under the so-called Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
directed by the US-imposed Provisional Governor, Paul Bremer. Its 
articles mainly drew on Western experiences, neglecting Iraqi realities 
on the ground (Ali, 2018).
Because of the war with the US-led coalition that ended with the 
occupation of Iraq in 2003, Iraq has witnessed major and deeply 
pervasive political, security, social, and economic changes. The security 
conditions deteriorated dramatically after the order of Provisional 
Governor Bremer, which dismantled the public security institutions, the 
first of which was the Iraqi army. That order led to sectarian fighting that 
ultimately resulted in the deterioration of almost all public and health 
services. These consequences further led to a large brain drain due to 
assassinations, threats, and extortions, where significant numbers of 
qualified Iraqis left the country. 
In 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a terrorist 
organization, occupied three major Iraqi governorates—Mosul, Anbar, 
and Salahud-Din—and declared it to be an “Islamic state”. It recruited 
militants from various countries all over the world to fight with it. A 
war against ISIS ensued, involving many international and regional 
powers until ISIS as an occupying entity was declared defeated in 
Iraq at the end of 2017. Still, during the fighting whole cities were 
destroyed and have not yet been rebuilt, and many people were killed 
or displaced. 
After 2015, the economic condition of Iraq also deteriorated due 
to the decline in international oil prices, as well as pervasive political, 
economic, and administrative corruption in most of its public institutions 
(Transparency International, 2018). That corruption, nevertheless, has 
continued after oil prices have risen again. Moreover, according to the 
latest report issued by Transparency International in 2018, Iraq scored 
only 18 out of 100 points, ranking 168 out of 180 states, thus indicating 
an extremely high level of corruption.
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Political System and Legal Framework
With the US-led occupation in 2003, a new political system was 
established in Iraq. The authoritarian regime of the dictator Saddam 
Hussein, who had ruled for 35 years, collapsed. The characteristics of 
the new Iraqi political system were enshrined in the articles of the Iraqi 
Republic’s Constitution of 2005, namely, Articles 1, 5, 6, and 47. Article 
1 states that “the Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and 
fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, 
representative, parliamentary, and democratic.”
After 2003, Iraq gained the freedom to establish political parties and 
gatherings. While for decades there had only been one party allowed, 
in the parliamentary elections of 2018, almost 204 parties, entities, and 
political movements were registered (Independent High Electoral 
Commission of Iraq, 2017). The governing regime has also been renewed 
as Iraq has become a parliamentary democratic federal republic, a 
system of pluralism. The executive authority is executed by the prime 
minister as the chairman of the cabinet. There is also a president for the 
republic. The legislative authority is handled by the Iraqi parliament.
After 2003, the relationship between the political system and the 
media changed. At that time, the Provisional Governor immediately 
ordered all the media institutions to be dismantled and their staffs 
dismissed. He issued Order No. 6 in June 2003 to establish the Iraqi 
Media Network (IMN) as a replacement for the dismantled Ministry 
of Information. Orders No. 65 and 66 were drafted and issued in March 
2004 to provide a suitable legal basis to organize the Iraqi media. In the 
introduction for Order No. 65, the National Communications and Media 
Commission was established to be responsible for granting licenses, 
organizing the telecommunications services, broadcasting, transmitting, 
and organizing information services and Iraqi media. Order No. 66 
directed the establishment of the Iraqi Commission for Broadcasting 
and Transmitting Services.
The CPA initially hoped to establish the IMN as a copy of the BBC 
model, with the aim for it to become an independent professional and 
transparent commission. This model, however, was diverted from its 
independent path when the IMN started to adopt the government’s 
positions. This occurred because the President of the IMN was appointed 
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by the government or the governing party, and its board was appointed 
according to a sectarian quota. The public media, which Bremer had 
tried to set up to follow the BBC model, quickly turned into a state 
media organ par excellence. The current IMN has its own budget which 
is formulated by parliament. It is also financed by advertisements, 
programs, and artistic works it produces, sells, and broadcasts. The 
IMN comprises three television channels—Al-Iraqiyya, IMN News, IMN 
Sports—, three radio stations—Republic of Iraq, Furqan, and Iraqiyya 
Radio—, a Media Training Institute, and the Al-Sabah newspaper and 
Al-Shabaka magazine. The IMN employs more than 3,000 individuals. 
All the previous constitutions from 1925, 1958, 1964, 1968, and 1970 
notably included texts about freedom of expression and the press, 
although they were bound by a group of written laws. For instance, 
the Publications Law No. 206 of 1968 allowed the authorities to impose 
their sponsorship on all newspapers, magazines, and books, which 
required previous approval. There was also the modified Iraqi Penal 
Law No. 111 of 1969, which included more than 30 criminal defamation 
articles. According to this law, the penalty for expressing or publishing 
one’s opinions may amount to capital punishment, life or temporary 
imprisonment, confiscation of movable and immovable property, etc.
Also, after 2003, several laws were issued to regulate the media in 
Iraq, such as Order No. 14, which was issued by the CPA. It defined 
limitations to the freedom of expression. For instance, the third section 
of this order states, under Detection of Prohibited Activities, that 
“the administrator may authorize on-site inspections of Iraqi media 
organizations’ work without notice, in order to ascertain compliance 
with this order and to seize any prohibited materials and any production 
equipment and seal off any operating premises.” In accordance with 
Order No. 65, the National Commission of Communication and Media 
was established to regulate radio broadcasting and to grant licenses for 
broadcasting. Notably, the order also granted the freedom to establish 
newspapers without the need for licenses by any entity; thus, anyone in 
Iraq could publish a newspaper (Al-Sarraj, 2017).
Nevertheless, the previous laws that restricted the freedom of the 
press, or posed dangers for that freedom in Iraq, are still valid in the 
judicial system. These laws subject journalists to arrest and excessive 
fines, especially in the present articles, such as those known as the 
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Defamation Articles in Law No. 111 of the Iraqi Penal Law of 1969. 
The latest law is the Rights of Journalists Law, issued in 2011, whose 
provisions include a number of contradictions with reality, and which 
allows for muzzling and politicization of the media.
Governmental or official institutions, especially the Media 
and Communication Commission, issued orders to temporarily restrict 
freedom of opinion and the media, especially during the large-scale 
protests in 2019. For instance, the letter issued by the Media and 
Communication Commission at the end of 2018 was addressed to all 
the press institutions in Iraq and informed them of the necessity to stop 
any abuses of national and religious symbols.
Some satellite channels were closed down, such as the Baghdadiya, 
Al-Babiliya, and Qatari Al-Jazeera channels in Iraq. The websites of the 
Qatari owned Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, and the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat 
newspapers, and a number of news agencies were blocked due to their 
criticisms of the performance of the Iraqi government.
Beyond the laws, there are security factors on the ground which affect 
the media more strongly. While doing their job, especially when covering 
demonstrations, protests, or acts of violence, journalists are exposed to 
security threats such as harassment and attack. According to a report 
issued by the Defending Freedom of Press in Iraq Society, 231 journalists 
were subjected to 207 acts of harassment during the period from 3 May 
2018 to 3 May 2019. These included five arrests, 17 detainments, 30 
assaults, various preventions and hindrances of coverage by government 
officials or their bodyguards, and nine armed attacks on journalists and 
media institutions. Some of these violations were against civil activists 
and political analysts; furthermore, a group of journalists was detained 
for criticizing the government (Sadoon & Tariq, 2019).
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Nearly 95% of the finances included in the state’s general budget for 
the Iraqi economy depend on Iraqi crude oil revenues. The budget thus 
depends on how high or low oil prices are. Consequently, this affects 
the individual and national income. With the increase in oil exports in 
the period from 2004–2014, and the availability of enormous financial 
resources, many newspapers and media institutions became active. 
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They employed many journalists; however, they were often run by 
unqualified administrations and had no sustainable business plans.
Governmental subsidies offered to the media are limited to only the 
official IMN media. Most of the media in Iraq are financed by parties, 
political and religious movements, state officials, and businessmen, 
in addition to foreign entities which come from Arab, regional, or 
neighboring states, such as Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The economic 
crisis hit Iraq in 2015 hard and heavily affected most media institutions. 
Several daily newspapers and some satellite television stations were 
forced to close down because of bankruptcy. Some others were forced 
to change from print publications to digital websites. Other groups 
downsized their staffs or reduced the number of publications.
With the beginning of the economic crisis in 2015, many international 
organizations and entities stopped supporting the media. The private 
sector, moreover, deteriorated, and there was a total dependency on 
importation. Consequently, local advertisements for products weakened. 
In addition, the state stopped encouraging investors to advertise. Thus, 
the media lost a major source of income. This crisis was also reflected 
in the journalistic content: it was employed as propaganda for powerful 
entities in the government and those political parties that financed the 
media. This has also affected the media genres that are currently being 
invested in. 
At this point, there is no print medium with effective and wide 
circulation that can continue to exist solely on its revenues. Yet, there are 
some papers that have continued to be published despite the economic 
crises and bad security conditions that have affected Iraq since 2003. The 
Al-Sabah newspaper, which is financed by the state and which is the 
leading newspaper in Iraq, publishes fewer than 6,000 copies. There are 
other papers that publish from 1000–4000 copies. As for radio stations, 
their broadcast range is limited to the major cities, and they are ineffective 
in reaching the wider Iraqi community. In addition, most of them are 
financed by political and religious parties and movements. However, 
there is a significant number of nearly 55 satellite television channels 
with wide circulation inside Iraq. Yet, each channel has its own segment 
of viewers because they follow specific political and religious parties 
and movements, and thus they promote specific perspectives through 
ethnic and confessional lenses. Since 2003, Internet service has become 
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available to all citizens. Consequently, electronic sites have become 
widespread. Most traditional Iraqi media have their own websites on 
the Internet. Moreover, social media sites, such as Facebook, YouTube, 
Instagram, and Twitter, have become widespread.
Ownership of Iraqi media can be divided into three types: public, 
private, and partisan. The public type is in fact controlled by the Iraqi 
government because the IMN is financed by the Iraqi parliament, and 
the government indirectly mandates the written policy decisions of 
the media controlled by this network. Private and individually owned 
channels, such as the very popular Al-Sharqiya, which is owned by 
the pressman Sa’ad Al-Bazzaz, Huna Baghdad, which is owned by the 
businessman Fadhil Al-Dabbas, Ur, which is owned by the businessman 
Ma’mool Al-Samarra’i, and Al-Sumariyya, which is owned by a Lebanese 
businessman, as well as the Al-Mashriq newspaper, represent their 
owners. 
Freedom given to their employees, therefore, is restricted by the 
policies and orientations of their editors-in-chief and owners. The 
third type, the partisan, is the most common in the Iraqi media. Here, 
parties or political individuals own the media institutions. Partisan 
media are omnipresent, and they are generously financed. Such media, 
however, are known for giving editorial directions to their employees 
and publishing propaganda for the party or entity that owns them. In 
Iraq, there are 204 registered parties and political entities, and many of 
them have their own media. Everyone working at such an outlet has to 
abide by the written policy specified by the president of their network, 
who represents either a party or a political entity. The employees work 
in line with the written policies derived from the political orientations 
of these parties.
There are nearly 15 satellite channels owned by Shi’ite parties and 
entities, whereas Sunni parties or influential individuals own nearly 11 
channels. For example, influential members of Shi’ite parties, such as 
the Islamic Dawa Party, own satellite channels, including Afaq, which is 
owned by ex-prime minister Noori Al-Maliki, Al-Masar which is owned 
by Abdul-Kareem Al-Inizi, and Al-Rasid which is owned by ex-prime 
minister Haydar Al-Abadi. There are also the satellite television 
channels including Al-Furat, owned by the Hikma Movement, and 
Al-Ghadeer, Biladi, Al-Na’eem, Al-Ahd, Al-Nujaba’, Al-Ittijah, and Asia. 
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All these satellite television channels represent political orientations 
close to Shi’ite interest groups in Iraq. A distinction between these 
satellite channels can be made according to affiliation, ownership and 
financing, and according to their discourses that closely correspond to 
the discourses of the influential parties behind them (Al-Ruwashdi et 
al., 2010; Iraqi Media House, 2015). There are, moreover, the satellite 
television channels Karbala, owned by the Shi’ite Endowment, Al-Salam, 
owned by the Shi’ite religious man Husayn Al-Sadr, Ahl Al-Bayt, owned 
by Shi’ite religious authority Hadi Al-Mudarrisi, and Al-Wala’, owned 
by the Popular Mobilization Forces.
TV channels that reflect a Sunni partisan orientation in Iraq are, for 
example, the satellite television channels Baghdad, owned by the Islamic 
party, Al-Fallooja, owned by the businessman and politician Khamees 
Al-Khanjar, head of the Arab Project, Dijla, owned by the Al-Hal 
movement headed by Jamal Al-Karbooli, and Al-Rasheed, owned by the 
businessman and politician Sa’ad Asim Al-Janabi.
There are, moreover, satellite television channels, such as Al-Hadath, 
owned by the religious man Abdul-Lateef Al-Hmayyim, who also 
supervises Diwan, which is owned by the Sunni Endowment, and 
Al-Rafidayn, which is owned by the Muslim Scholars Commission that 
opposes the Iraqi government.
In the region of Kurdistan, the Kurds own some other channels 
which work separately from the local Iraqi media because of their 
preference for the Kurdish language which is used in this region, unlike 
in the other Iraqi governorates. They are, however, no different from 
the other Iraqi media with regards to the freedom they are permitted. 
Influential Kurdish parties in Kurdistan own these media, and they are 
the ones who decide on their content, which most often identifies with 
their political ideologies and orientations. There are Kurdish satellite 
television channels, such as NRT, owned by Shiswar Abdul-Wahid—
head of the New Generation Movement in Kurdistan—, Zagros, owned 
by the Kurdish Democratic Party, Ruwudaw, owned by Masood Barazani, 
and Al-Mishraq, owned by the Feili Kurds.
Furthermore, there are many radio stations that belong to these 
satellite television channels, are promoted by them, and are owned by 
the same owners. As for newspapers, they are the least popular medium, 
although they follow the orientations of the institutions that own them. 
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For instance, Al-Sabah newspaper and Al-Shabaka magazine belong to the 
public IMN; Al-Zaman newspaper is owned by the Al-Zaman Institution, 
which also owns the Al-Sharqiya satellite television channel. There are 
also other newspapers that are owned by political and religious parties 
and movements.
Technology and Infrastructure
As for technology, Iraq is still lagging behind compared with international 
standards. This can be attributed to several factors, including wars, 
political conflicts, and economic crises. Iraq is also lagging behind in 
comparison to other Arab states regarding the use of technology in its 
public institutions. The technology used is basically limited to various 
routine procedures.
According to a study conducted by Akamai, which is an institution 
specializing in the Internet, Internet services in Iraq are poor and very 
expensive (NRT, 2019). Internet speed in Iraq is only 0.75 megabytes 
per second. Yet, the demand is high—there were more than 19 million 
Internet subscribers in 2019, which is half of the population. They 
mostly use social media sites to access information, news, and analysis. 
Iraq does not have a state company for communications to control 
cyberspace in the country, so it is a largely unregulated and free space. 
At the end of 2019, however, and responding to massive anti-government 
protests in Baghdad and the southern provinces, the government cut 
off Internet connections completely to prevent the demonstrators from 
communicating with each other. 
At the same time, the state also does not invest in infrastructure. 
In Iraq, there are three mobile communication companies, Zain, Asia 
Cell, and Korek Telecom, all of which are private companies, some with 
stakeholders from abroad. Mobile phone penetration is quite high, with 
95% of the population subscribing to mobile phones. 
The semiofficial media, such as the IMN, which owns television 
channels, radio stations, and newspapers, are technologically developed 
because they are sufficiently financed by the state. Some of the other 
media, which are owned either by parties, religious and political 
individuals, or businessmen, have developed technology and modern 
programs, while others work with comparably more modest capabilities. 
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Some media, moreover, have modern studios and cameras with HD 
broadcasting, sites on social media, and digital applications on smart 
phones.
Traditional techniques are still used in Iraqi media. These include 
more basic technology and working methods. Press coverage still employs 
traditional methods with audio and digital camera videos, while 3D 
technology is not in use. Drones and cloud computing, which are usually 
used to cover events in dangerous or critical areas, are also not used.
In covering the news, satellite television channels use traditional 
audio and video techniques with digital cameras, film cameras, editing, 
and photography programs. Modern techniques of virtual studios in 
news broadcasting, however, are employed by only one channel in Iraq, 
namely Al-Furat, which is owned by the National Hikma Movement 
headed by Ammar Al-Hakeem.
Progress is slow in the use of modern technologies in the media. 
This is because they are expensive, especially the virtual studios and the 
use of artificial intelligence for editing and presenting. In most of these 
media, the financing resources are weak.
Challenges
In Iraq, the political conflict among the parties and political and 
religious blocs, which is covertly motivated by Shi’ite-Sunni and 
Arab-Kurdish conflicts to acquire power, represents the main obstacle 
to the progress and sustainability of the media. This conflict hinders 
the media’s professionalism and neutrality in in enhancing democracy 
and the values of coexisting, diversity, cultural and religious pluralism. 
This is negatively reflected in the content of these media, most of which 
have started to support and follow specific political ideologies or serve 
individual political or religious interests so that they have become arenas 
for political accusations, political overthrow, and incitement during 
sectarian crises. Most of the political entities have adopted media owned 
or financed by themselves as propaganda to promote their ideologies 
at the expense of free journalism. Thus, journalists cannot deviate from 
the policy adopted by their own institution for fear of losing their jobs. 
In addition, in Iraq, the capital is monopolized by the political and 
religious parties, which restricts the wider development of the media.
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Yet the most severe challenge that hinders freedom of the media in 
Iraq is the state of security conditions. There are terrorist groups and 
organizations, such as ISIS, which have succeeded in occupying three 
major Iraqi governorates. Due to the deterioration of security conditions 
after 2003, journalists were killed simply for being present in fighting 
areas. After 2017 and the liberation of the cities, journalists faced further 
challenges, namely harassment, arrest and physical attack by security 
forces and militias in Iraq. Some political entities have tried to restrict 
freedom of expression because journalists covered demonstrations and 
protests against bad services and pervasive corruption, for instance in 
Basra and some other Iraqi cities. Thus, there are not enough guarantees 
for journalists to work free from political pressures. The legislative and 
executive authorities are unable to protect journalists. The constitutional 
articles are not enough to protect freedom of expression, unless followed 
by executable legislation.
Outlook
With the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, the propaganda and 
media wars that surround Iraq—whether those between the USA and 
Iran and between Israel and Arab states, or those in Yemen or Syria—
keep the Iraqi media controlled by political powers that direct the Iraqi 
authorities. Consequently, the media remain politicized and not neutral. 
Many of their arguments do not reflect the Iraqi people’s suffering. 
These media cannot progress until they are freed of the politicians’ 
control, and until the media are allowed to serve the public. The media 
have to be neutral to play an active and effective role in uncovering 
corruption and establishing the concepts dedicated to freedom. The 
rights of journalists must be guaranteed by law, and these laws need 
to be implemented. The professional administration of these media 
should be encouraged. Access to information needs to be guaranteed. 
The IMN and its media institutions must be freed from government 
control in order to realistically serve the public. This can be achieved 
by encouraging advertising, and requiring those companies investing in 
Iraq to advertise in the Iraqi media. Moreover, the local media inside the 
cities need to be better supported in order to be viable media alternatives 
capable of representing these cities and local regions.
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6. Saudi Arabia: From National 
Media to Global Player
Marwan M. Kraidy
A combination of geopolitics, religion, and economics have shaped 
the media of Saudi Arabia. The country’s media structure began 
as a national broadcasting system in the 1960s, alongside a well-
established privately-owned Arabic-language press, and had by 
the 1990s evolved into a regional system of Arabic- and English-
language outlets. This made Saudi Arabia the media superpower 
of the Middle East. The ascent of Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman in the 2010s ushered in an era of direct control of both 
news and entertainment media. As a result, Saudi government 
influence over Arab media has grown more expansive and more 
direct. The desire to clamp down on dissent globally led to the 
disastrous killing of Jamal Khashoggi and the resulting global 
uproar has affected the stature of Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, 
Saudi Arabia’s media face multiple challenges, including the 
difficult-to-control, burgeoning digital media environment, and 
the tensions arising between the kingdom’s political and economic 
priorities.
Background
Located in West Asia, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupies most of 
the Arabian Peninsula. The modern kingdom was founded in 1932 by 
King Abdulaziz Al-Sa’ud, known as Ibn Sa’ud. Because Saudi Arabia 
is a large country bordering other smaller states, including Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen, and located across 
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waterways from several other states, its geography grants it dominance 
in neighborly relations. Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, 
Saudi Arabia has been locked in a battle with Iran for geopolitical 
influence over the Middle East, in which ideology and religion play an 
important role, with Saudi Arabia being a conservative monarchy and 
the cradle of Sunni Islam, and Iran being a revolutionary republic and 
the center of gravity of Shi’a Islam.
If geography appears to predestine Saudi Arabia for regional influence, 
geology provides the decisive elements of economic and geopolitical 
power that extend far beyond Saudi Arabia’s borders: hydrocarbons and 
other minerals. With arable land making up 1.5% of the territory, and 
irrigated land a mere 16,300 square kilometers, agriculture is a relatively 
small contributor to the Saudi economy. However, the Saudi land is rich 
in hydrocarbons and minerals, chiefly natural gas, petroleum, iron ore, 
and gold. The abundance of underground mineral wealth has, since the 
1930s, made Saudi Arabia one of the leading economies of the world, 
and provided it with geopolitical tools that have made it a great power 
in the Middle East, and the broader Islamic world. Mineral wealth is 
also the bloodline for Saudi’s national media sector and its regional and 
global extensions.
Religion is another source of Saudi transnational power. Long before 
the discovery of oil, gas, and minerals, another force shaped the rise 
of Saudi statehood, society, and culture: Islam. Saudi Arabia is the 
birthplace of Islam, the world’s second largest religion, with nearly two 
billion adherents across the globe, and remains closely associated with 
the religion. Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities central to Islamic 
history and Muslim identity, are located in Saudi territory, and millions 
of Muslims visit every year to perform the hajj, or pilgrimage, that is 
one of the pillars of their religion. Not only is Islam closely associated 
with Saudi Arabia, it is also foundational to the rise of the modern 
Saudi state, based on a politico-clerical regime. Saudi Arabia is the only 
country in the world to be named after a single family, the Al-Sa’uds, 
who forged a historical power-sharing agreement with the Al-Shaykh 
family. According to this ruling quid pro quo, the Al-Sa’uds have full 
power over domestic politics, defense, and security, and foreign policy, 
whereas the Al-Shaykhs control religious and educational institutions.
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A combination of geography and demographics poses a national 
cohesion problem for Saudi rulers. Because of Saudi Arabia’s large area, 
the country has a low population density of 15 inhabitants per square 
kilometer (Trading Economics, 2019). The population retains strong 
local and tribal identities; thus, ever since Ibn Sa’ud decided to establish 
a wireless network in the 1920s, Saudi rulers have regarded national 
media, particularly television, as a crucial instrument for creating and 
sustaining feelings of national belonging. In this context, it is important 
to recall that Saudi Arabia hosts a large community of (mostly Asian) 
foreign workers who, by some estimates, fill two thirds of all jobs in 
the kingdom. Since 2017, authorities have imposed taxes and labor 
restrictions on foreign workers, cutting their number by 20% from 2017 
to 2019 (AsiaNews, 2019). Moreover, the country is a desert kingdom 
with only a few major cities connected by thoroughfares. Most of the 
population is concentrated in the middle of the Arabian Peninsula, in 
and around the metropolitan areas of Dhammam to the east, the capital, 
Riyadh, in the center, and the Mecca-Medina area to the west. 
Saudi Arabia’s history, as well as its media, has been shaped by 
geography, geology, and religion—the desert, oil, and Islam. In such a 
large, tribally fractured, and sparsely inhabited country, where mass 
communication historically plays a vital role in maintaining national 
identity, Islam is the connective belief system—the software—and 
the media system is the hardware that keeps Saudi Arabia cohesive. 
“Cohesion” is a relative term in this context, because the Saudi ruling 
bargain monopolizes power in the hands of Sunni Muslims, making the 
sizeable Shi’a minority (estimated at 15% to 25% of a total population of 
approximately 34 million) into second-class citizens. In fact, the Saudi 
version of Islam, known as wahhabiyya, is puritanical and excludes Shi’a 
Muslims and others who do not follow stringent Sunni-Salafi tenets. As 
such, a strict version of Sunni Islam is at the heart of Saudi nationalism 
and cultural identity. When one considers that media technologies, by 
exposing societies to foreign ideas and images, tend to be harbingers 
of cultural shifts and social change, and that wahhabiyya insists on a 
pure Sunni Islam unadulterated by alien values, it is not surprising that 
Saudi media have since the beginning been a battleground between 
modernization and change, on the one hand, and doctrinal purity and 
social homogeneity, on the other. Moreover, the rise of Crown Prince 
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Mohammed bin Salman in 2017, and his firm grip on all aspects of 
Saudi life, suggests a new authoritarian consolidation of power with the 
Al-Sa’ud.
Historical Developments
The beginning of Saudi media can be traced to 1908, when Lebanese, 
Syrian, and Turkish journalists operated the country’s first newspapers 
in the Western province of Hijaz, the site of Islam’s holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina (Rugh, 1980). Newspapers were critical of political leaders 
in the first three decades of the twentieth century, but when Ibn Sa’ud 
founded the kingdom in 1932, the press came under the sway of the 
Al-Sa’ud ruling family and turned its focus away from politics and 
towards poetry and literature. Since that time, newspapers have reflected 
the importance of royally dictated public consensus. As Saudi Arabia 
experienced the first oil boom and ensuing modernization of the state 
in the 1950s, newspapers prospered and grew more outspoken again, 
especially in Jeddah, the commercial center, and the most socially liberal 
city in the kingdom. The government cracked down in the late 1950s, 
shutting down the most critical dailies and merging others (Kraidy, 
2010). 
The so-called “Faisal Era,” named after Ibn Sa’ud’s son Faisal 
who ruled as the Saudi monarch from 1964 to 1975, is a significant 
historical period in the development of Saudi media, and ironically, 
Faisal’s assassination was at least partly inspired by his introduction 
of television to Saudi Arabia (Kraidy, 2009). The reason lies in its 
coupling of expansion with repression. In 1962, Saudi Arabia had no 
magazines and only three newspapers, with a combined distribution of 
25,000 copies (Rugh, 1980). In the 1960s, after several journalists were 
banned from writing in the country, the press grew more quiescent. In 
the 1970s, according to the Ministry of Information, the “common goal” 
of the government and the press was to develop the country, so Saudi 
journalists were “called upon” to write in support of that objective 
(Rugh, 1980, p. 85). With rising literacy rates and a growing economy, 
by 1976, Saudi Arabia had seven Arabic-, and two English-language, 
dailies (Rugh, 1980). 
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The siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by radical militants in 
1979 led the royal family to consolidate its grip on the media, and 
prompted further repression of the press in the 1980s. Official Saudi 
media did not announce the incident on the day it occurred, and the 
government jammed the signal of Radio Monte Carlo Middle East, then a 
widely followed news source in the kingdom (Boyd, 2001). Later, Saudi 
television carried a speech by Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, Minister of 
the Interior, and showed footage of rebels who had been taken prisoner. 
In July 1981, a royal decree announced a new Higher Media Council 
and put Saudi media and information policy under the control of the 
Minister of the Interior (Boyd, 2001). Today, the Saudi press consists of 
more than a dozen daily newspapers, mostly concentrated in the capital 
Riyadh, which is home to Al-Riyadh, Al-Sharq, and Al-Jazeera, and in the 
Red Sea city of Jeddah, which hosts Okaz and the two English-language 
dailies, Arab News and Saudi Gazette.
Wireless and radio communications emerged from the nation-
building imperative. In the mid-1920s, as Ibn Sa’ud was consolidating 
his grip over what would become the Saudi kingdom, he considered 
wireless communication crucial for his ability to control his growing 
dominion, so he commissioned the construction of radio facilities. The 
country’s archconservative clerics expressed fierce opposition to wireless 
technology, fearing it would subvert religion. To persuade them that 
wireless communication would actually propagate God’s word, the king 
had Qur’anic verses read aloud and transmitted between Riyadh and 
Mecca in both directions (Boyd, 1999, p. 145). Ibn Sa‘ud, who believed 
that media and communications were central to the modernization 
of the desert kingdom, would go on to cunningly negotiate with the 
clerics every time a new media technology came on the scene. Ibn Sa’ud 
introduced radio into Saudi Arabia in May 1949, and installed his son 
Faisal as supervisor of the new station (Boyd, 1999, pp. 145–46).
Saudi authorities first tested a national television broadcasting 
service on 17 July 1965. Before then, the two television stations operating 
in the country were not Saudi: One, AJL-TV, had been run by the US Air 
Force since 1955 (Boyd, 1999), and another had been operated by the 
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) since 1957 (Rugh, 1980). 
The state-run Al-Saudiyya (Saudi Channel One) was originally launched 
in 1963 as the flagship Arabic-language channel, and it switched from 
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black-and-white to color in 1976. The English-language Saudi Channel 2 
went on the air in 1983 (Kraidy, 2013). By 1975, Saudi television reached 
1.5 million viewers (out of a population of around seven million) 
(Kraidy, 2013). 
In 1991, as the Gulf War roared on, viewers in Saudi Arabia who 
had access to hotels tuned in to CNN, while Saudi soldiers on the front 
were exposed to both Saddam Hussein’s propaganda and Egyptian 
government messaging through the Egypt Satellite Channel (Kraidy, 
2010). In response, Saudi rulers allowed close family members and 
business associates to launch MBC from London in 1991, inaugurating 
the Arab satellite “revolution” (Kraidy & Khalil, 2009).
The mid-2000s witnessed important developments in Saudi media, 
particularly television. Since the beginning of satellite television in the 
early 1990s and the demonstrated success of channels such as Qatar’s 
Al-Jazeera in news and Lebanon’s Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation in 
entertainment, a recurrent preoccupation of Saudi officials has been 
to reform Saudi television to win back Saudi viewers from non-Saudi 
broadcasters. This entailed a “modernization” drive for Saudi television, 
resulting in the 2003 launch of Al-Arabiya, a pan-Arab news channel 
owned by the MBC Group and based in Dubai, and the 2004 launch of 
Al-Ekhbariyya, a Saudi national round-the-clock news channel (Kraidy, 
2013), in the wake of terrorist attacks in the kingdom. As in the 1980s, 
changes in television policy reflected the government’s desire to be able 
to provide coverage at a time of crisis. 
In 2018, spurred by Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s focus on 
media and entertainment in his Vision 2030 strategic framework, Saudi 
Arabia launched a new channel, SBC, both the acronym and the name 
of one channel within the Saudi Broadcasting Corporation, which was 
designed to “lure young viewers and project a modern image beyond 
the kingdom’s borders” (Sanjar & Harissi, 2018). Daoud Al-Sherian, 
a renowned Saudi columnist and talk show host on Al-Arabiya, was 
recruited to head the new channel. He made it clear that the channel’s 
objective was to fulfill components of Vision 2030, most notably to 
“complement the changes seen in the kingdom in the artistic, cultural 
and entertainment spheres” (Sanjar & Harissi, 2018). SBC was developed 
as the entertainment flagship channel to be added to a religious channel, 
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an educational channel, and the news channel Al-Ekhbariyya, all under 
the aegis of the Saudi Broadcasting Corporation.
Political System and Legal Framework
The foundations for the current regulatory framework for Saudi media 
were established by Faisal, who became the king in 1964, and expanded 
Saudi media and regulatory institutions. These included the Ministry 
of Information in 1962 (renamed as the Ministry of Culture and 
Information in 2003, and as the Ministry of Media in 2018), a new 
Press Code in 1964, and the Saudi News Agency in 1971. However, 
these official institutions have never been the only forces shaping media 
policy. When they feel sidestepped by the royal family, Saudi clerics 
feel empowered enough to make public statements about the television 
industry (Kraidy, 2009). Every year during Ramadan, the holy month 
and most important season for the media market, several Saudi clerics 
are vocally critical of television programs that do not adhere to their 
strict standards (Kraidy & Khalil, 2009). 
As such, the Saudi religious establishment constitutes an influential 
media policy institution that counteracts the “liberal” tendencies of 
media owners, journalists, and intellectuals, resulting in culture wars 
between the two camps. In exchange for their political support after the 
siege of the Great Mosque, clerics were allowed to severely limit the role 
of women in Saudi media. Their voices clamored for censorship in the 
name of religious morality during culture wars about literature, reality 
television, music video, and, more recently, social media.
Even with a clerical establishment capable of influencing media 
policy on social issues, Saudi media follow directives from the Ministry 
of Media on all political issues. The Ministry “works in an active role by 
identifying and preserving the Saudi identity, spreading Islamic values 
in the Saudi citizen’s life, expressing the achievements of Saudi Arabia... 
[and contributing] to raise... awareness” (Ministry of Media, 2019). The 
Minister of Media, like other cabinet members, is appointed by royal 
decree. Among the Ministry’s tasks, as laid out on its website, is the 
assurance that the media are a “strategic tool” that enables the kingdom 
to “deal with media attacks from abroad” and to “generate national 
belonging” domestically (Ministry of Media, 2019).
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Television outlets are run by the Saudi Broadcasting Authority, whose 
head reports to the Ministry of Media. Relevant laws and regulations 
include the Regulation for the Protection of the Rights of Authors, or 
copyright law, the Regulation for Press Institutions, or the press law, 
the Regulation of Publications and Publishing, and the masterplan 
Media Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in addition to various 
regulations concerning legal implementation.
Since Saudi media, particularly television, is intricately connected 
with the larger pan-Arab media system, Saudi Arabia has actively 
tried to influence the transnational Arab political and regulatory 
environment. This was clearest when in 2008 Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
advocated the so-called Arab Satellite Television Charter, prompted by 
televised attacks on Saudi leaders during the 2006 war between Israel 
and Hezbollah, mainly by the Al-Manar TV channel, and the rise of 
pro-Muslim Brotherhood channels, such as Hamas’s Al-Aqsa TV, which 
made the Egyptian government feel threatened. On 12 February 2008, in 
an emergency meeting of Arab Information Ministers in Cairo, the charter 
was officially adopted. Covering news, talk shows, entertainment, and 
sports, the charter gave Arab governments instruments to penalize satellite 
channels for criticizing leaders, harming the “national reputation,” and 
disseminating morally undesirable content (Kraidy & Khalil, 2009).
After a decade of more or less business as usual, the Saudi media 
sector was poised for radical change once Mohammed bin Salman was 
named Crown Prince and quickly set out to develop Saudi Vision 2030. In 
that ambitious plan to wean the Saudi economy off of fossil fuels, media 
and entertainment figured prominently, but as instruments for economic 
growth and social pacification, and not as platforms of free expression. 
Indeed, in October 2018, the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi walked 
into the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul to take care of some paperwork, and 
there he was brutally murdered. What followed was one of the biggest 
global media events of 2018. The Saudi government first denied any 
knowledge of what had transpired, but then admitted that Khashoggi 
died by accident in a fist fight, after Turkish intelligence agents leaked 
information to the media that Saudi agents dispatched from Riyadh had 
killed Khashoggi inside the consulate. Finally, in September 2019, Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman took “full responsibility” for the death, because 
“it happened under my watch,” on a US television news show (Maxouris, 
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2019). The Saudi government has an unfortunate history of tracking, 
kidnapping, or liquidating dissident journalists and exiled princes 
worldwide, but for the US political elite, killing a journalist working for 
a US newspaper of record such as The Washington Post crossed a red line. 
This shocking killing has had a chilling effect on Saudi journalists.
Economy and Ownership Patterns
A peculiar political economy rules Saudi media. As an absolute monarchy, 
Saudi Arabia’s media hew closely to the editorial line set by the palace. 
The royal family’s grip on the media has shifted over the decades, but 
under King Salman and his son Crown Prince Mohammed, political 
autocracy has hardened, and the country’s media have become little 
more than platforms for Saudi domestic and foreign policy. Historically, 
royal princes have also been media owners, sometimes indirectly, by 
association with non-royal businessmen, but often through direct 
ownership of newspapers and television channels. As such, Saudi public 
discourse, including those media outlets that express the viewpoints of 
various princes, has generally reflected a consensual view of the royal 
family. This changed drastically with the elevation of Mohammed bin 
Salman to the position of Crown Prince and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia. 
Under his leadership, Saudi politics has undergone a radical narrowing 
of the margins of discourse, and Saudi media ownership has become 
increasingly consolidated in the Crown Prince’s hands.
After this consolidation, the Saudi state is now the dominant media 
owner in the country, and whatever media the royal family does not 
own, it controls—the Saudi royal family is the Saudi state. The Saudi 
government owns and operates all terrestrial and satellite television 
channels based on Saudi territory. The state-run Broadcasting Service 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (BSKSA) is in charge of all television 
activities, and private television channels are prohibited from satellite 
broadcasting from Saudi soil unless they are fully controlled by the 
government, or partially owned by royal princes. Though the media 
ownership patterns of Saudi companies operating on Saudi soil remain 
rigid, the ownership of transnational Saudi media, such as MBC, Rotana, 
and ART, typically based outside of Saudi territory, initially reflected 
100 Arab Media Systems
a shift from government ownership to government-controlled private 
ownership.
Recent changes notwithstanding, private Saudi media ownership is a 
well-established phenomenon. In 1975, the Saudi brothers Hisham and 
Mohammed Ali Hafez launched the Arab world’s first English-language 
daily, Arab News. The sons of a Jeddah publisher, the two brothers would 
go on to establish the Saudi Research and Marketing Company as one of 
the largest Arab media conglomerates (Loqman, 1997). In late 1975, the 
Lebanese Civil War forced the Lebanese publisher Kamel Muruwwah 
to shut down the respected Beirut-based English-language newspaper 
Daily Star, leaving in its wake a group of unemployed journalists and 
editors experienced in publishing an English-language daily in the 
Middle East. Arab News recruited the group led by Jihad Al-Khazen 
(Lebling, 2005), who edited Arab News before going on to lead the two 
major Saudi-owned, London-based pan-Arab papers, Asharq Al-Awsat 
and Al-Hayat. 
As always, the creation of Saudi media initiatives and institutions was 
driven by geopolitical threats. The Saudis stepped into the transnational 
realm as a reaction to external threats, starting with the media war against 
Egypt in the 1960s, and developed a formidable transnational media 
capacity through various companies that it controlled or influenced. An 
effective media system was also needed internally because inhabitants of 
the Eastern Province were watching television from Kuwait, Iran, Qatar, 
and the UAE (Rugh, 1980). These two factors—economics and security, 
the latter including rhetorical and military conflicts—continue to this 
day to shape the Saudi involvement in the pan-Arab media system, and 
most likely drove Mohammed bin Salman’s inclusion of media moguls 
in his 2017 “economic purge” of the Saudi elite.
On 5 November 2017, authorities arrested dozens of the kingdom’s 
royal, political, and business elite. In a series of choreographed moves, 
security forces sequestered members of the elite for various charges of 
corruption. Among the detainees were media moguls Prince Al-Waleed 
bin Talal (Rotana), Saleh Kamel (ART), and Walid Al-Ibrahim (MBC), 
three men who have shaped Saudi media and the Arab satellite 
boom (Kraidy, 2015). This move by the Crown Prince, who is himself 
considered a media mogul since his family owns one of the largest 
Arab media conglomerates, Saudi Research and Marketing Company, 
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thus increased his control. As a result, contemporary Saudi rulers are 
increasingly exerting direct media control, politically and economically, 
in news and entertainment. Entertainment is central to the Crown 
Prince’s Vision 2030 strategic framework. In 2016, a royal decree created 
the new General Entertainment Authority, and in 2017, the Public 
Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia announced that USD 2.7 billion had 
been earmarked for entertainment media. By putting pressure on the 
media moguls mentioned above, the Crown Prince is gaining financial 
leverage over some of Saudi Arabia’s richest men, thereby concentrating 
an astonishing amount of Arab media power in his own hands, and 
positioning himself to control a nascent entertainment sector that is 
poised to grow explosively in the near future.
Technology and Infrastructure
A comprehensive media and telecommunications infrastructure was 
essential to transform a tribally fractured and geographically dispersed 
population into a national community ruled by the House of Sa’ud. This 
became all the more important when inhabitants of the Eastern Province 
started receiving television signals from Kuwait and Iran, and later from 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (Rugh, 1980). During the Gulf War 
in the early 1990s, inroads made by CNN and, later in the decade, by 
Al-Jazeera, spurred continuous infrastructural developments in Saudi 
Arabia.
Founded in 1926 as the Post, Telegraphs and Telephones Directorate 
by King Abdulaziz, who was conscious of the centrality of post and 
telecommunications for state building, “and the necessity of using 
modern inventions in this sector to link the vast and remote areas of 
the kingdom with each other,” the Saudi Ministry of Communications 
and Information Technology has undergone several makeovers and 
name changes, and currently focuses on “Empowering Digital Saudi” 
(Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 2019b). 
Much of the kingdom’s current telecommunications infrastructure 
that hosts most Saudi digital activity took shape in the mid-2000s, 
particularly in 2006 and 2007. The year 2006 was a watershed for the 
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology: it (1) 
launched a national 3G mobile telephone service, (2) restructured 
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national Internet service provision, moving it from King Abdulaziz City 
for Science and Technology and placing it under the authority of the 
Communications and Information Technology Commission, and (3) 
finalized the Anti-Cyber Crime Law, and got it approved. The following 
year, 2007, saw (1) the adoption of the First National Communications 
and Information Technology Plan, (2) the approval of a National 
Spectrum Plan, and (3) the establishment of the Universal Service Fund, 
dedicated to financing information infrastructure that connects remote 
rural areas to the kingdom’s national grid (Ministry of Communications 
and Information Technology, 2019b). Since Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman ascended to the effective leadership of the country, the Ministry has 
focused on “Empowering Digital Saudi,” as its motto claims on its official 
website, by organizing events and workshops to develop Saudi citizens’ 
digital skills and instructing all Saudi companies and public services to 
do the same, as stipulated in the Framework to Empower Digital Skills of 
Saudi Youth, released in October 2019 (Ministry of Communications and 
Information Technology, 2019a).
The Saudi political economy of mobile telephony is a state-private 
hybrid. The leading operator, Saudi Telecommunications Corporation (STC), 
is 70% state-owned and 30% privately-owned, and the second-, third- 
and fourth-largest companies (respectively, Mobily, Zain, and Bravo) 
feature owners or majority shareholders who are close to the Saudi, 
Kuwaiti, or UAE government. Though they are generally considered 
as Gulf-based, rather than strictly national companies, they have had 
global holdings since at least 2013, when STC operated in Turkey and 
Indonesia in addition to Bahrain and Kuwait (Rasooldeen, 2013).
Contemporary Saudi Arabia has some of the highest connectivity 
and social media use rates in the world. According to the latest available 
report by the Saudi Communications and Information Technology 
Commission, fixed broadband service penetration is 33.6%, while mobile 
broadband penetration is 93.5%, and Internet services penetration is 
82% (Communications and Information Technology Commission, 
2017). However, if all modalities of connectivity are taken into account, 
mobile and Internet penetration approached 100% in 2018, according 
to the General Authority for Statistics (Mubasher, 2019). Saudi Arabia 
also has a high penetration of social media. As of October 2019, Saudi 
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Arabia had more than ten million Twitter users, roughly one-third of the 
population (Statista, 2019).
Saudi Arabia indirectly controls one of the most valuable media and 
information infrastructures in the Middle East: ArabSat and its network 
of satellites. The Arab Satellite Organization was founded in 1976 by the 
21 member-states of the Arab League. Reflecting the outsize Saudi role 
in bankrolling ArabSat’s expensive infrastructure, the organization was 
headquartered in Riyadh, the Saudi capital (Kraidy & Khalil, 2009). One 
of the largest satellite operators in the world and the Arab world’s leader 
in that domain, ArabSat owns and operates six satellites that carry more 
than 500 television channels, 200 radio channels, several pay-television 
networks and more than 95 high definition channels and services.
In the 2000s, in order to make Saudi television the first choice for the 
Saudi viewer, Saudi media officials initiated a reform of media policy 
directed at invigorating programming, upgrading infrastructure and 
facilities, and training personnel. In 2007, a systematic modernization 
of Saudi television, the first since its founding in the 1960s, was guided 
by a committee of experts at the Ministry of Culture and Information. 
Officials took advantage of the hajj to introduce several innovations, 
including live news reporting, more exciting graphics, and new logos 
(Al-Khulayfy, 2007; Hawari, 2008). On-air presenters were instructed 
to be more informal, and live shots from iconic sites in the kingdom 
were shown (Al-Khulayfy, 2007). Ten new programs were introduced, 
including the very first program on Saudi state television that 
integrated viewer participation (Kraidy, 2013). Reforms continued to 
be implemented in 2009, when the Ministry announced it would build 
production and transmission facilities in all regions of the country, move 
all television transmission to high definition, gradually introduce digital 
broadcasting for terrestrial television, and create a broadcasting archive 
(Al-Khulayfy, 2007). There was a defined goal to “establish local media 
that serve all the regions of the country” (Al-Hamady, 2009). Funds 
were disbursed to set up radio and television production infrastructure 
in every province of the country (Kraidy, 2013). Existing channels got a 
face-lift: the logos and technical capacities of Saudi Channels 1 and 2, and 
Al-Ekhbariyya, were upgraded.
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Challenges 
The Saudi media system faces several challenges. First, the development 
of Saudi media institutions has followed a clearly reactive historical 
pattern. The 1979 siege of the Great Mosque in Mecca by radical armed 
Islamists led to a consolidation of the royal family’s grip on the press 
and widespread repression in the 1980s. MBC was allowed to begin 
pan-Arab satellite broadcasting from London in 1991 to provide a 
Saudi-controlled alternative to CNN’s coverage of the first Gulf War. 
Al-Arabiya went on air in 2003 as a direct competitor to Al-Jazeera, and 
was tasked with fending off the Qatari channel’s attacks on Saudi 
Arabia in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, and their global 
repercussions. Al-Ekhbariyya was launched in 2004 for the government to 
be able to control, or at least contribute to, the news narrative following 
terrorist attacks inside the kingdom. Thus, the current phase, where 
an increasingly large share of Saudi national and transnational media 
is coming under the personal control, directly or indirectly, of Crown 
Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is the culmination of a half-century 
trend of consolidation and repression.
Second, media consolidation with growing authoritarianism, coupled 
with a desire to grow the economy based on the growth of the digital and 
entertainment sectors will create politico-economic tensions that media 
institutions and workers will feel most acutely. This will most likely lead 
to ever more media concentration under the direct control of the royal 
family, and make media that is nominally privately-owned increasingly 
beholden to political power. It remains to be seen whether the Khashoggi 
scandal will lead to decreased harassment of Saudi journalists and 
dissidents in the long term, but in the short term, international reactions 
have not had a tangible, positive impact on the rulers’ behavior.
Third, the advent of globally networked digital media will continue 
to pose a challenge to royal family control. The rise of global streaming 
platforms, such as Netflix, and the wide popularity of social media 
platforms, such as Twitter, in the kingdom will continue to challenge 
official Saudi narratives. The Saudi government has tremendous economic 
tools to stave off these challenges, and it could invest in these platforms 
so as to be able to influence their policies, but the negative turn that 
Saudi economic growth took in 2019 may ultimately limit their capacity 
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to counter information they cannot control. Social media also have the 
potential to fuel culture wars between conservatives and liberals, and to 
increase political polarization in the kingdom.
Outlook
As a result of the dynamics discussed above, the prospects for qualitative 
progress in Saudi Arabian media are dim, and the likelihood that the 
autonomy of Saudi media institutions will increase is low for the short 
to medium term. The Saudi media, paralyzed by direct government 
control, are heading towards more of the same in the foreseeable future. 
In their struggle for a different political system, and whether pushing 
for a more liberal or a more Islamist government, dissidents are likely 
to take advantage of emerging digital platforms that can be accessed 
inside and outside of Saudi Arabia. Despite this, the rise of digitization 
has not shaken the foundations of the system, since it has never been an 
entirely market-based system to begin with, but rather a system with 
strong dependency on princes, and in recent years, princes close to 
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
The new policy has focused on expanding entertainment venues, 
from cinema theaters to concert halls. For a while this may placate 
youths and liberals, many of whom have thrown their lot in with the 
Crown Prince, whom they see as a potent counterweight to conservative 
forces. However, it is too early to conclude whether this model combining 
political authoritarianism, social freedom, and economic concentration 
will move the country towards developing a more inclusive polity. 
The situation that Saudi media outlets find themselves in appears to 
offer limited opportunities for change outside of the space created and 
controlled by the rulers.
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7. United Arab Emirates: Media 
for Sustainable Development
Mohammad Ayish
Since the formation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971, 
media have been key forces of socioeconomic development and 
nation building. During the almost 50 years of the UAE’s post-
independence history, the UAE media and communications 
sector has been entrusted by the state with supporting the nation’s 
political orientations, promoting economic growth, fostering 
national identity, and strengthening international cooperation. 
But, while huge investments in this sector have indeed turned 
the UAE into a global media hub that boasts world-class 
infrastructure and human talent, an updated media regulation, 
the Emiratization of the communications sector, and a smooth 
transition into the digital mediascape remain major challenges to 
address.
Background
The UAE is a federation of seven emirates situated in Southwest Asia, 
bordered on the north and northwest by the Arabian Gulf and on the 
east by the Indian Ocean. The UAE Federation, comprising the Emirates 
of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al-Khaimah, Umm Al-Quwwain, 
Fujairah, and Ajman, occupies an area of 83,000 square kilometers. 
Founded in 1971 by the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan and 
other Emirati leaders of the time, the UAE Federation replaced the old 
association of the Trucial States with Britain, which, for decades, had 
defined colonial geopolitics in that part of the world. By mid-2019, the 
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UAE population was estimated at 9.7 million inhabitants, and about 1.2 
million of them were UAE nationals, while the remaining 7.5 million 
was composed of foreign expatriates from around 200 nationalities 
attracted to the country initially by the discovery of oil, and later by 
a booming diversified economy. While Arabic is the official language 
of the UAE, English is the number one international language 
spoken alongside other languages by the country’s large expatriate 
communities. Islam is the official religion of the UAE, but members of 
other denominations, such as Christianity and Hinduism, are granted 
full freedom to practice their faiths. In 2016, the UAE established a 
Ministry of Tolerance, and 2019 was officially declared as the “Year of 
Tolerance” to emphasize the country’s commitment to international 
and intercultural coexistence and diversity.
While the UAE hereditary monarchical system may be described 
as politically conservative, the country’s socioeconomic and cultural 
policies, as defined by free market practices, the empowerment 
of women, world-class education, and inclusive international and 
intercultural engagements, have been hailed as highly progressive. 
The UAE political system, as defined by the country’s constitution, 
guarantees all UAE citizens equal rights and opportunities, safety and 
security, and social justice. Article 45 of the constitution identifies five 
federal authorities: the Federal Supreme Council, the President and the 
Vice President of the UAE, the Cabinet, the Federal National Council, 
and the Federal Judiciary. The UAE Supreme Council, chaired by a 
UAE President and composed of rulers of six emirates, is the highest 
policymaking body while the Federal National Council (parliament) 
serves numerous oversight and legislative functions. In 2010, the UAE 
government launched UAE Vision 2021, which set the key themes for 
the country’s social and economic development, calling for a shift to a 
diversified and knowledge-based economy. The UAE National Agenda, 
resulting from Vision 2021, incorporates a set of national indicators, 
including a cohesive society and preserved identity, competitive 
knowledge economy, world-class healthcare, first-rate education system, 
sustainable environment and infrastructure, a safe public, and fair 
judiciary (Vision 2021, 2019). At the local level, each emirate has its own 
functions and socioeconomic development agendas that are aligned 
with federal policies and strategies. Local policies and institutions 
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cover areas such as socioeconomic development, media, culture, urban 
planning, industry, services, and education, while national defense and 
foreign relations are an exclusive concern of the federal government.
As the second largest economy in the Arab World (after Saudi 
Arabia), the UAE pursues a knowledge-based strategy that has won 
significant international recognition. In 2018, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) forecast the UAE’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) 
would grow 4.7% to AED 1.673 trillion (USD 455.8 billion) in 2019, 
which is close when compared with the actual GDP figure of AED 
1.589 trillion (USD 429.45 billion) in that year (WAM, 2019). Though 
the UAE economy has traditionally been driven by oil and gas exports, 
the country’s economic diversification strategy has effected significant 
shifts in the economy. The UAE per capita income was put at around 
USD 43,000 in 2018. In early 2017, 70% of the UAE’s GDP was derived 
from non-oil sectors, such as extractive industries (29.50%), wholesale 
and retail trade (11.70%), financial and insurance activities (8.60%), and 
construction and building (8.40%) (UAE Government, 2018a). 
Historical Developments
While some scholars trace the history of media in the UAE back to 
rudimentary publications in the late 1920s and mid-1930s, the real 
history of that sector began only in the post-Federation years (Tabour, 
2000). The rise of the UAE in 1971 as a sovereign state marked a 
comprehensive process of socioeconomic development, driven by both 
the discovery of oil and the promise of a knowledge-based economy. 
The former Ministry of Information and Culture was established in 1971 
to oversee information and communication activities in the country. In 
those formative years, the press, bolstered by expanding nationwide 
education and literacy strategies, was driven by a developmental 
approach to socioeconomic transitions. The launch of numerous Arabic-
speaking publications across the country underscored the belief at the 
time in the power of the press to effectively communicate official views 
and positions on national development to growing local and expatriate 
populations. On 19 October 1970, Al-Khaleej newspaper was launched 
in Sharjah by brothers Taryam and Abdalla Omran. Al-Khaleej’s critical 
approach to British policies in the region at the time led to its closure in 
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1972, and it did not resume publication until 5 April 1980. On 22 April 
1972, Al-Ittihad (formerly Al-Ittihad Al-Dhibyanieh) changed its format to 
a daily publication with the declared aim of promoting the principles 
and values of the emerging Federation (Nouwais, 1984). Al-Bayan 
daily newspaper was launched on 10 May 1980 as a Dubai government 
publication with a focus on economic and business news. English 
language newspapers that appeared in the UAE during the first three 
decades of the Federation included Khaleej Times (1978) and Gulf News 
(1979). The UAE national news agency, WAM, was launched in 1976 as 
the official voice for the UAE government, providing news services in 
several languages. Among other things, the first two decades of the UAE 
Federation also witnessed the institution of Federal Law (15) in 1980, 
commonly known as the Press and Publications Law, to regulate media 
functions across the country.
During the UAE’s early years, broadcasting became an important 
facet of the emerging media landscape, with numerous radio and 
television stations carrying news and current affairs, entertainment, 
cultural and religious programs, and sports and talk shows on matters 
of interest to local communities in Arabic and in other languages. While 
some of those services were broadcasting to a pan-Arab audience on 
short-wave, most radio operations were using medium-wave and later 
FM transmissions to reach local audiences. Radio stations included 
specialized broadcasters, such as Qur’an Radio, Folklore Radio, and 
Classical Music Radio, in addition to Western-style radio stations drawing 
on live talk shows and music programs. The Abu Dhabi-based radio 
stations were operating as part of the former Ministry of Information and 
Culture, while other radio services were affiliated with local emirates’ 
information departments. Television was first introduced to the UAE in 
August 1969 in black and white from Abu Dhabi. In 1972, Dubai had 
its first channel, followed some years later by the launch of Channel 33, 
a foreign program channel that, along with Abu Dhabi’s 2nd Channel, 
was transmitting to the large UAE expatriate community with English-
language programming. In 1989, Sharjah launched its own channel 
with mostly cultural and religious programming (Boyd, 1999). In those 
years, some programs such as news, cultural shows, and entertainment, 
were locally produced, while the bulk of the content was imported from 
Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan (Boyd, 1999).
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The 1990s was a watershed decade for UAE media development, with 
the country’s media landscape going through major transitions induced 
by the digital revolution and liberal-market policies. It was during the 
period of 1990–2020 that the UAE’s media scene experienced major 
restructuring, new expansions, key regulatory changes, entrepreneurial 
media free zones, diverse players, and far more importantly, more 
advanced digital and networked technological infrastructures. In the 
early 1990s, the UAE joined other Arab states in embracing satellite 
television broadcasting, and by 2001, it had its first media free zones, in 
which different regulatory frameworks are enforced. 
Political System and Legal Framework
When viewed through Rugh’s (2004) Arab media typologies, the UAE 
media system seems to have features of the loyalist press model, in 
which communications operate in alignment with state orientations 
within broader national socioeconomic strategies. Indeed, media 
are meant to serve as a powerful voice of national identity and 
government orientation, but they are also seen as vehicles for education, 
entertainment, and cultural expression. 
UAE-based media are subject to numerous legal and ethical regulatory 
frameworks, ranging from the 1980 Press and Publications Law to the 
2018 Electronic Media Regulation, and from the Journalists Association’s 
Code of Ethics to free zone policies and guidelines. Generally speaking, 
UAE media regulations seek to ensure media practices’ alignment with 
the country’s political, social, cultural, and economic strategies and 
agenda. Among other things, these regulations address potential abuses 
on a political level, such as disrespect for the state, national symbols, and 
the country’s heritage and values, and incitement to sectarian violence 
and hatred, but also on an individual level, with regard to the invasion of 
privacy and intrusion on copyright. They also tackle potential violations 
entailing harm to the country’s economy, children, women, and other 
social groups, especially those involving cyberbullying, extortion, and 
stalking. The common feature defining the regulations is a strong sense 
of social responsibility and a profound belief in media contributions to 
economic prosperity, social welfare, and cultural fulfillment by those 
making the rules. Generally speaking, UAE media regulations have 
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been highly responsive to national, regional, and international political, 
social, economic, and cultural developments relating to society and 
the state. The 1980s Press and Publications Law (Federal Law No. 15) 
that applies to the conventional press and media forms has prompted 
calls for further updates and enhancement to reflect expansions and 
changing roles within the UAE communications scene. The law reflects 
the regulatory spirit of the second half of the twentieth century, when 
nations of the Global South were going through postcolonial phases of 
development that required cohesive media attitudes towards nation-
building. It regulates printing and publishing activities in the UAE, 
applying only to traditional media, such as newspapers, magazines, 
book publishing, and film. It basically prescribes guidelines for materials 
prohibited from publication, and penalties imposed on individual and 
institutional violators. Federal Law No. 7 of 2002 on Copyrights and 
Related Rights protects all original works in the areas of literature, arts, or 
science, regardless of their description, form of expression, significance, 
or purpose. Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 on Combatting Cybercrimes, 
and its amendment by Federal Law No. 12 of 2016, address online 
communications issues relating to national security, privacy, public 
morality, financial communications, and others (Gibbs, 2019). 
Secondary media regulations in the UAE cover a variety of functions 
related to advertising and electronic communications. In 2018, the UAE 
National Media Council began to implement a new regulation for all 
electronic and digital media activities on the mainland and in free zones. 
Electronic media activities addressed by the system include sites used 
to trade, present, and sell print, video, and audio materials, electronic 
publishing activities and on-call printing, and specialized websites such 
as the electronic advertisements, news sites, and any electronic activity 
that the council deems appropriate to be included in that category 
(National Media Council, 2018). One of the controversial aspects of the 
new rules relates to licensing social media influencers who make profit 
out of online branding and marketing activities. The National Media 
Council Chairman’s Decision No. 20 of 2010 concerning media content 
standards is another secondary piece of regulation that emphasized 
content compliance with articles of the 1980 Press and Publications Law 
in both conventional and digital contexts. An updated regulation, in the 
form of an official advertising guide, was introduced by the National 
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Media Council in October 2018 to clarify standards for the advertising 
industry in the UAE and to protect the public from marketing promotions 
that do not conform to applicable standards. The document specifies the 
terms of licensing for advertising activities by individuals, companies, 
and institutions. 
Media free zones across the UAE have been subject to special 
regulations. Dubai Technology and Free Zone Authority (DTFZA) 
does licensing and content regulation for hundreds of media and 
communications services based in Dubai Media City. Issued in 2001, 
DTFZA regulations cover a range of areas relating to registration, shares, 
management, and administration. The Abu Dhabi-based twofour54 
Media Zone Authority Content Code sets out the editorial standards 
which must be maintained by entities established in the Abu Dhabi 
media free zone (twofour54) in the areas of publishing, broadcasting, 
and/or communication with the public. The Content Code requires 
compliance with generally accepted standards regarding the social, 
cultural, moral, and religious values that apply in the UAE. It prohibits 
the transmission of offensive content, including sexually explicit and 
violent content, unless it is generally appropriate due to its artistic or 
creative merit, beneficial to society, and factually accurate. The Dubai 
Internet & Media Free Zone (TECOM) Codes of Guidance require 
publishers and broadcasters to be mindful of and to take into account 
the prevailing social and religious customs of the UAE and the Middle 
East, and the Islamic religion generally. Examples of violations would 
include ridiculing religious practices and conventions, and promoting 
sectarian divisions in society.
Media in the UAE are also expected to comply with ethical 
standards established by the UAE Journalists Association (UAEJA), an 
independent professional body for UAE-based journalists and media 
practitioners whose members in April 2019 came to include digital media 
professionals with a minimum of one year of experience. The UAEJA 
is classified as a non-profit organization whose finances derive from 
membership fees, state subsidies, public donations, and other sources. 
UAEJA’s code of ethics calls for respect of the truth and the right of the 
public to have access to true and accurate information. It also promotes 
values of journalistic freedom and professional integrity in news work. 
According to the UAEJA’s code, a journalist is expected to serve as a 
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voice of “fair and neutral comments and criticism” (UAE Journalists 
Association, 2018). It also emphasizes accuracy in news reporting and 
editing, while maintaining fairness and objectivity towards all sides 
involved. A key value stressed by the code is privacy, where Article (8) 
states that:
“Respecting privacy is a main principle in the profession, and journalists 
should respect the privacy of individuals and not expose it by publishing 
anything without the consent of those individuals. If personal conduct 
clashes with public interest, such conduct may be covered without 
violating the personal rights of uninvolved individuals” (UAE Journalists 
Association, 2018). 
While there are no cases of journalists being sanctioned by the UAEJA, 
the Association’s General Assembly may look into complaints from 
members regarding possible ethical or professional violations.
UAE media development has been supported by key professional and 
institutional structures to sustain a steady professional and commercial 
growth of media industries. An example is Dubai Press Club, whose 
mission includes promoting dialogue and exchange between Arab and 
international media, recognizing excellence in journalism, developing 
the skills and capabilities of journalists, and providing in-depth analysis 
of trends and developments in Arab media. Dubai Press Club publishes 
the Arab Media Outlook report and organizes the Arab Media Forum 
which annually brings together leading Arab and international media 
leaders to discuss important issues of concern to media practitioners and 
institutions. Dubai Press Club also oversees the Arab Journalism Award, 
designed to motivate creativity in journalism in the region across different 
genres. The Sharjah Press Club, launched in 2016, seeks to enhance 
journalists’ skills and promote national and international networking 
among media professionals. The Sharjah International Government 
Communication Center offers a government communication award 
and organizes the International Government Communication Forum. 
The UAE media ecosystem also includes a wide range of university 
media education programs that offer degrees in journalism, advertising, 
public relations, digital marketing communications, media studies, 
multimedia, and new media and broadcasting.
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Economy and Ownership Patterns
In the UAE, media also serve as key pillars of the country’s progress 
towards a sustainable knowledge economy through enhancing content 
creation in conventional and digital formats and supporting public 
engagement in the knowledge sector. While national state media 
function as government communication outlets, private media (both 
on-shore and off-shore) operate according to commercial standards. 
Hundreds of media companies, digital start-ups, advertising and PR 
agencies, digital marketing firms, and publishing companies employ 
thousands of people in the different areas of communications at five 
media free zones across the country. 
The UAE adopts a free-market economy with credible state 
welfare components. This feature has been reflected in the country’s 
national communications system, where state-sponsored/subsidized 
media operate alongside profit-making ones. At the local level, 
media organizations, such as the Abu Dhabi Media Company, Dubai 
Media Incorporated, and Sharjah Media Corporation, function as 
local government-subsidized operations that also receive revenue 
through commercial sources such as advertising, subscriptions and 
sponsorships. Unlike traditional state-supported media organizations 
that offer protocol-oriented content and rigid formats across the MENA 
region, UAE state-subsidized media harness the latest technologies and 
provide audiences with high-quality content in news, public affairs, and 
entertainment. Whether originating from local production or from Arab 
or international television imports, broadcast content in the UAE, such 
as documentaries, reality TV, drama, and talk shows, maintain high 
standards in production. Many of these television shows are broadcast 
with commercials for local and multinational companies catering to a 
regional MENA market. Some of the channels such as Dubai TV use 
artificial intelligence in their operations relating to augmented reality, 
news verification, and communication with audiences.
By mid-2019, the UAE’s on-shore media outlets included 23 
television channels, 30 radio stations, 15 newspapers, five magazines 
and nine website portals. On-shore media services, such as the Al-Khaleej 
newspaper, Al-Sayegh Media, Dubai Media Incorporated, Abu Dhabi 
Media Company, Sharjah Media Corporation, and Ajman Radio Four, 
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reflect mixed patterns of ownership that include government-owned 
media, state-subsidized media, and private media. On the off-shore 
side of the media landscape, five media free zones host hundreds of 
international television channels, newspapers, radio stations, online 
news portals, PR agencies, advertising firms, film production houses, 
publishing houses, and digital communications companies with full 
private ownership zones: Dubai Media City, Dubai Studio City, Abu 
Dhabi twofour54, Sharjah Media City (SHAMS), and Fujairah Creative 
City. By June 2019, there were about 1,500 companies with over 25,000 
workers of 142 nationalities operating from Dubai Media City, which 
was launched in January 2001. twofour54 aims to cultivate Abu Dhabi’s 
media free zone and provide products and services to attract local, 
regional, and international media businesses to Abu Dhabi. SHAMS, 
Sharjah’s media free zone, was launched in 2017 to attract small to 
medium enterprises (SMEs), entrepreneurs, and companies to start 
and grow their businesses in a creative Free Zone Hub in Sharjah. 
International media organizations such as CNN International, Bloomberg, 
Reuters, Middle East Broadcasting Center Network, Sky News Arabia, 
Al-Arabiya TV, and many others carry out their operations from UAE 
media free zones, attracted by its unique business opportunities. Dubai 
Media City, for example, offers media investors 100% foreign ownership, 
full repatriation of profits and capital, no personal, income, or corporate 
taxes (50-year exemption), exemption from customs duties for goods 
and services, world-class infrastructure to help support the growth of 
the cluster, and a 24-hour visa service. 
Media convergence, which is defined as the blending of multiple 
media forms into one platform for the purpose of delivering a dynamic 
experience (Dwyer, 2010), is one common feature shared by UAE’s 
on-shore and off-shore media. Ayish (2003) noted that the UAE was 
one of the earliest countries in the MENA region to apply convergence 
standards to its national media system. Operating with substantive 
state subsidies and advertising revenue, both Abu Dhabi Media and 
Dubai Media Incorporated stand out as examples of technological 
convergence, where media organizations serve as umbrellas for multiple 
communications functions and channels, generating wide-ranging 
content. Under Abu Dhabi Media there are four major publications: 
the Al-Ittihad newspaper, Zahrat Al-Khaleej magazine, Majid children’s 
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magazine, and National Geographic Al-Arabiya magazine. Television 
channels include Al-Emarat TV, Abu Dhabi TV, Abu Dhabi Sports 1, Abu 
Dhabi Sports 2, Yas, Majid TV, National Geographic Abu Dhabi, and Abu 
Dhabi Drama. Radio stations include Qur’an Kareem, Emarat FM, Abu 
Dhabi FM, Star FM, Abu Dhabi Classic FM, Radio Mirchi, Radio 1, and 
Radio 2. Digital media platforms include Ana Zahra, Zayed Digital TV, 
and Mohtawa. In addition, Dubai Media Incorporated is an umbrella 
organization housing a range of publications, radio stations, television 
channels, and digital services, which includes five television channels, 
two newspapers, five radio stations, two online outlets, and two printing 
and distribution services. In 2019, Dubai was declared the media 
capital of the Arab World in recognition of its role as a regional and 
global media center. The Sharjah Media Corporation also houses four 
television channels, four radio stations, and one online news service. 
UAE-based media free zones also apply convergence practices as they 
operate in highly advanced networked and digital communications 
infrastructures. 
Though the global financial crisis seemed to have cast shadows 
on commercial profits in the private media sector, communications 
companies, beefed up by a notable rise in entrepreneurial start-ups, 
have continued to provide communication services to corporate and 
government clients. Data from 2016 show that television ad expenditure 
in the UAE was estimated at USD 14 million, but was expected to 
experience some decline in the following years. Television has the 
highest weekly reach in the UAE across all ages. Among millennials, the 
second most frequently-used medium is the Internet, and for consumers 
aged 35 or older, it is the radio (Statista, 2016). Emirates 24/7 reported 
that the UAE topped Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in 
terms of advertising in the first quarter of 2017, with the equivalent 
of around USD 400,000, accounting for 44% of total GCC advertising 
spending. The UAE is followed in second place by Saudi Arabia with 
USD 220 million, then by Kuwait with 191 million, Qatar with 70 million, 
the Sultanate of Oman with 35 million, and Bahrain with 29 million, 
respectively (Emirates 24/7, 2017).
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Technology and Infrastructure
Media and communications in the UAE have evolved within the country’s 
vision of technology as a key agent of positive social change. The UAE 
is one of only a few countries in the region with declared sustainable 
technology adoption and development strategies pertaining to space, 
artificial intelligence, and the fourth industrial revolution (4IR). The 
UAE was globally ranked second in 2018 on the Telecommunications 
Infrastructure Index and eighth on the UN E-Government Development 
Index Report (Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority, 2019). In 
the country’s duopolistic Internet and telephony market, the two telecom 
companies, Etisalat and du, provide a range of data, telephony, and cable 
television services to individuals and businesses. The International 
Telecommunication Union’s (2018) statistics show that the UAE 
experienced exponential growth in mobile subscriptions, from 1.4 million 
in 2000 and 11 million in 2010 to 20 million in 2018. Internet subscription 
also experienced similar leaps, from 24% in 2000 and 68% in 2010 to 95% 
in 2017. In 2017, the UAE government launched the UAE Strategy for 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution to strengthen the nation’s position as 
a global industrial hub, and to increase its contribution to the national 
economy by means of advancing innovation and future technologies. 
The UAE Strategy for the Fourth Industrial Revolution focuses on 
a number of key fields, embracing innovative education, adoption of 
intelligent and personal genomic medicine and robotic healthcare, and 
research in nanotechnology. The 4IR strategy also aims to achieve future 
security of water and food supplies by using bioengineering sciences and 
advanced renewable energy technologies, to enhance economic security 
by adopting digital economy and blockchain technologies in financial 
transactions and service, to optimize the utilization of satellite data in 
planning future cities, and to establish advanced defense industries by 
developing national capacities in the field of robotics and autonomous 
vehicle technologies (UAE Government, 2018b). In addition, the UAE 
has been the only country to establish a Ministry of State for Artificial 
Intelligence, which has evolved into the Artificial Intelligence Strategy 
2031 “to enable the country to become a fast adopter of emerging AI 
technologies across government, as well as to attract top AI talent to 
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experiment with new technologies and work in a sophisticated, secure 
ecosystem to solve complex problems” (UAE Government, 2019). 
Although the UAE media’s relationships with the public continue to 
be under-investigated, a survey commissioned by the National Media 
Council (Al Bayan, 2017) on public trust of media outlets showed that 
mobile phones accounted for 97% of respondents’ information sources, 
while traditional television accounted for 83%, newspapers 14%, home 
Internet service 76%, car radio 63%, and subscription television 27%. The 
results also showed that 42% of respondents use social media and the 
Internet to obtain information. While respondents’ trust in newspaper 
coverage of local, national, and international events ranged from 12% 
to 26%, the range for television was from 29% to 43%, and for social 
media, it ranged from 25% to 51%. Facebook and Twitter stood out as the 
main sources of information for respondents on local events and issues, 
according to the survey. The public trust index developed by the study 
generated a score of 63% for reliance on local media, 86.3% for confidence 
in the most recently followed type of media, 93.4% for professional and 
ethical evaluation of practitioners, 78.7% for opinion and news analyses, 
and 69.6% for specialized media coverage. The overall trust index was 
80.4% for all categories. A MENA media use study by Northwestern 
University in Qatar (2018) noted heavy UAE user engagement with 
new media to access news, play video games, and listen to podcasts, 
especially via mobile devices. 
Challenges 
It is clear that the UAE media present a unique case of a technological 
ecosystem marked by a strong sense of social responsibility, amicable 
state relations, significant technological innovation, mixed state-
subsidized and commercial sustenance, and profound intercultural 
engagement. As elsewhere, the UAE media have challenges to address 
and opportunities on which to capitalize. The UAE public trust in 
media study (Al Bayan, 2017) identified UAE media challenges as 
including, among other things, incompetent practitioners, insufficient 
focus on regional issues, news credibility and transparency, an absence 
of Emirati media personalities, and a lack of discussion about issues 
relating to Emirati youth. The representation of UAE nationals in the 
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communications workforce has also been a controversial issue on the 
country’s media development agenda. It is widely believed that, in 
order for UAE media to truly reflect UAE national identity and cultural 
heritage, a credible component of professional Emirati communicators is 
critically needed. Though there have been some National Media Council 
initiatives to integrate more Emiratis into the media market, more has 
yet to be done in this area. Factors impeding UAE nationals’ integration 
into the media sector have ranged from lacking material incentives to 
competition from a burgeoning government communication sector that 
has lured a huge number of local talents with attractive employment 
packages. Over the years, the UAE has seen the rise of prominent media 
leaders and journalists, including Ibrahim Al-Abed (co-founder of the 
UAE News Agency), Abdul Hamid Ahmad (Gulf News Editor-in-Chief), 
Mohammed Al-Hammadi (Chair of the Journalists’ Association), the 
late Habib El-Sayyegh, former Chair of the Arab Writers Union, and 
Aysha Sultan (columnist), who have all served as successful role models 
in their professional communities. 
Another challenge faced by the UAE media sector is related to the 
outdated Federal Law (15) of 1980 that was enacted at a time when 
print media dominated the national communications landscape. The 
growing irrelevance of the law in respect to the emerging UAE digital 
and networked communications transitions has attracted much attention 
at official and media levels, with more voices calling for updates to the 
legislation to reflect the changing face of UAE media in the early part of the 
twenty-first century. At the Fifth Emirati Media Forum, held in May 2019, 
participants echoed the need to update the legislation by adding new 
provisions that reflect the huge transitions experienced by UAE media 
over the past four decades (El Emarat Al Yawm, 2019). The current law 
addresses media as print publications (newspapers and books), while 
visual media are addressed as film with a focus on ownership, imports, 
printing presses, distribution, and banned content. It is true that the UAE 
has initiated cybercrime laws (2012) and an electronic media regulation 
(2018) to address potential abuses online. But the emerging features of 
the country’s journalism, as marked by mobile and online engagement, 
dictate the development of a new legislation that fully accounts for 
those transitions. It is widely believed that draft changes to Federal Law 
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(15) are awaiting the right political, national, and regional moments to 
be officially endorsed.
A third challenge facing UAE media is the declining finances of 
conventional media operations, as induced by global financial crises and 
regional conflicts. As the UAE online and networked communications 
experience greater expansions in technological sophistication, audience 
consumption, and global reach, conventional media stay on the losing 
end of the proposition. State subsidies are clearly keeping government 
print and broadcast media afloat, but the threat to the physical 
structures, distribution methods, and consumption patterns remains 
highly existential. To deal with this challenge, all UAE newspapers and 
broadcast outlets have launched their own online versions with a wide 
range of multimedia features that reflect the unique nature of virtual 
communications. Websites for television services post previously-
broadcast shows online with full user access. Live audio and video 
streaming services have become standard features of the emerging 
online landscape. Newspaper websites show increasing levels of 
audience engagement as evident in social analytics relating to users’ 
views, likes, sharing, and comments. All UAE media have also harnessed 
social media platforms to expand their reach and enhance engagement 
with Arab and global audiences. The online migration trend has been 
generally represented by the rise of fully dedicated online news services 
catering to local and regional audiences, such as UAE-24, alain_4u, 
Sharjah-24, Mohtawa, and Dubai Post. 
Outlook 
Media in the UAE have much to gain from the country’s economic 
development, cultural diversity, and technological innovations. A robust 
economy would certainly provide sustainability for media industries, 
while demographic diversity would enhance cultural pluralism in the 
country’s public sphere. In addition, further technological innovation 
would help media keep a strong competitive edge and foster engagement 
with local and international audiences, while quality media education 
would provide the media industry with young talent highly conscious 
of digital market dynamics. However, for UAE media to maintain 
their function as voices of national identity and tools for information, 
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education, and marketing, much has to be done with respect to the 
regulatory environment. The clear duality in the country’s political 
conservatism and its progressive social and cultural policies needs to 
be addressed through incremental media transitions into more open 
and participatory governance options. The UAE media have been at 
the forefront of advocating womens’ empowerment, human tolerance, 
and cultural diversity, but have taken a backstage position on critical 
conversations in the public sphere. New legal frameworks that 
enable media to accommodate greater political diversity and genuine 
engagement are indispensable for creating and sustaining economic, 
cultural, and technological momentum. As the UAE announced its 
preparations for the next 50 years, the development of the media 
sector, as informed by increasing regional competition and domestic 
indigenous representation in the public sphere, has been placed high on 
the nation’s agenda.
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8. Qatar: A Small Country with a 
Global Outlook1
Ehab Galal
The State of Qatar is a new, small, and extremely rich country, 
ruled by the Al-Thani family and with a population of which 
a majority are non-Qatari nationals. It is also a country mostly 
known for the satellite channel Al-Jazeera. This cocktail of small 
size, royal rule, and money is crucial for understanding the 
media landscape in Qatar, which in basic terms must be divided 
between the national media and the global satellite consortium 
of Al-Jazeera. Despite their different audiences, both media types 
are used and managed to consolidate and strengthen the rule and 
influence of Qatar and the Al-Thani family. 
Background
Qatar is a peninsula of 11,500 square kilometers, located on the east coast 
of the Arabian Peninsula. Surrounded by the Arabian Gulf to the north, 
east, and west, the coastline makes up most of the country’s borders 
in addition to its southern border with Saudi Arabia. The country has 
been an independent state since 1971, when Great Britain renounced 
the protectorate of Qatar that had existed since the First World War. 
Previously, the country had been part of the Ottoman Empire for 
about 400 years. However, the local power has been in the hands of the 
1 The research for this article formed part of the research project Mediatized Diaspora 
(MEDIASP)—Contentious Politics among Arab Media Users in Europe, which is 
financed by the Independent Research Fund Denmark (funding ID: 8018–00038B).
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Al-Thani family since the mid-1800s, and when Great Britain decided 
to withdraw, negotiating with several Gulf countries, Qatar—together 
with Bahrain—insisted on independence instead of becoming part of a 
union of smaller Gulf emirates. Thus, while the UAE became the union 
of seven emirates, Great Britain handed over the sovereign power to the 
Al-Thani family in 1971 to form the independent state of Qatar. Sheikh 
Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani has been the Emir of Qatar since 2013 after 
he replaced his father, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, who ruled 
from 1995 until his abdication. 
As in other Gulf countries, the majority of inhabitants are non-
nationals. Out of a population of 2.8 million people in Qatar, only about 
12% are Qatari. While the total number of people fluctuates because of 
seasonal work, the fact that the number of men is almost three times 
the number of women further reflects the country’s large foreign labor 
force, which is employed by the oil and gas, construction, and related 
industries. The majority of labor immigrants are from Southeast Asia 
with smaller numbers from Arab countries, mainly Palestine, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Egypt. The official language is Arabic, but due to its oil 
and gas industry, its huge non-Qatari and non-Arab population, and 
the country’s attempt to play a role in the international scene, English 
is a widely used second language. 
Islam is the official religion of Qatar, and the national law is based 
on secular principles as well as Shar’ia law. Because of the high number 
of immigrants, other religions also exist. Statistics from 2010 estimate 
that 67.7% of the population are Muslims, 13.8% are Christians, 13.8% 
are Hindus, and 3.1% are Buddhists, whereas the rest belong to other 
religions or are unaffiliated (Pew Research Center, 2012). Most Qataris are 
Sunni Muslims who follow the Wahhabism tradition, while from 5% to 
15% are Shi’a Muslims. Qatar allows non-Muslims to worship in specially 
designated locations, but they are not allowed to proselytize. Public 
worship is restricted, and religious groups have to formally register. 
Once a poor British protectorate with its main income coming 
from pearling, Qatar became an affluent state with oil and natural gas 
resources after gaining independence. Although the oil production took 
off in the 1950s, and the high oil prices in the 1970s changed Qatar’s 
economy significantly, it was the natural gas that, according to the latest 
Human Development Index figures by UNDP, placed Qatar as the richest 
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country in the world measured by gross national income per capita in 
2018. Today, Qatar is the largest exporter of natural gas accounting for 
a third of the world trade. Due to its wealth, there is no income tax, and 
the state heavily supports Qatari nationals financially. 
When leaving its protectorates in the Gulf, Great Britain also left 
border conflicts to be resolved by the countries themselves. For Qatar, 
there were two conflicts to solve: one with Saudi Arabia about the Khafo 
area and one with Bahrain about the Zabaarah area. While the latter 
was resolved in 2001, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly claimed its right 
to the Khafo area. This border conflict has recurred as soon as other 
conflicts in the area have broken out, and in 1992, the two countries also 
went through a short-term armed conflict. In this continuous conflict 
with Saudi Arabia, Qatar realized it was falling behind when it came 
to media coverage. The Saudis had strong media that were available 
outside Saudi Arabia, while media in Qatar were weak. It was on this 
premise that Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani founded the satellite 
television channel Al-Jazeera in 1996. However, he also initiated and 
facilitated international involvement including more active participation 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council (Al-Hawik, 2013). Both Al-Jazeera and 
Qatar’s international involvement would later cause new conflicts. 
Historical Developments
The media development in Qatar can be divided into three periods. 
In the first period, which extended from 1961 to 1995, the media were 
a tool for nation-building, while the second period from 1995 to 2011 
was characterized by liberalization. Starting in 2011, the third period 
expanded Qatar’s use of and investments in media as part of its soft 
power policy, which referred to a country’s reliance on “resources of 
culture, values, and policies” (Nye, 2008, p. 94).
Operating in a young nation, the media in the first period came to 
serve as a channel for communicating national and political imaginaries. 
To ensure that these imaginaries were in accordance with the ideas of 
the ruling family, the media were either owned or subsidized by the 
state. The first radio was Mosque Radio, which started broadcasting 
in the beginning of the 1960s. Also, in 1961, the print media were 
established, and the state launched an official gazette announcing new 
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laws and decrees. The development of both radio and press sped up as 
the country moved closer to independence. On 25 June 1968, the state-
run Qatar Broadcasting Service started transmission, and Mosque Radio 
continued transmitting for only a few months after that point. In 1969, 
Qatar Radio joined the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) under the 
Arab League. Starting with five hours daily transmission in 1968, Qatar 
Radio gradually increased the hours of transmission, reaching 13 hours 
in 1969, 19 hours in 1982, and 24 hours on 27 June 2003 (Al-Mua’ssasah 
Al-Qatariya lili’laam, 2018). In 1971, transmission in English followed, 
Urdu in 1980, and French in 1983 (Al-Jaber, 2012, p. 56). In 1992, Qur’an 
Radio was established with programs on the Qur’an and Hadith, Islamic 
science, and debate of modern issues. From its inception until today, 
the role of radio has been to communicate the identity and heritage of 
Qatar. Consequently, around 85% of the programs are locally produced. 
The rest are imported programs that include documentaries, religious 
programs, songs, and plays (Al-Mua’ssasah Al-Qatariya lili’laam, 2018). 
Compared with other Arab countries, the print media emerged in 
Qatar rather late. The reasons were the lack of printing presses and 
high illiteracy, among others (Mellor, Ayish, Dajani, & Rinnawi, 2011, 
p. 53). Starting in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the state launched a 
number of magazines covering different issues. In the 1970s, the transfer 
of professional foreign workers, among them journalists, to the new, 
rich Qatar, established a basis for setting up professional media. In 1969, 
Al-Mash’al magazine, which focused on oil and energy, was released 
together with Al-Doha magazine, which focused on culture and arts 
and was issued by the newly established Department of Information. In 
1970, Education magazine was published by the Ministry of Education. In 
1977, the sports magazine Al-Saqr was issued by the Ministry of Defense, 
and in 1980, the monthly Al-Umma began publication, which focused on 
Islamic matters and was issued by the Presidency of Shar’ia Courts and 
Religious Affairs in the State of Qatar. In 1986, the state decided to close 
down all the Qatari state’s magazines as a result of declining oil prices. 
In addition to the state press, the private press also appeared in 
the 1970s. Though media outlets were entitled to be private, the state 
ensured their loyalty by providing financial support to local newspapers 
until the early 1990s, when the funding was suspended. The first private 
magazines were Al-Urooba and Gulf News, launched in 1970. The latter 
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was an English-language magazine that was published twice a month. 
In 1972, the Al-Arab newspaper started publishing as the first political 
daily, and in 1974, Al-‘Ahd became the first political weekly. The first 
women’s magazine, Mijalit Al-Johara, and the first sports newspaper, 
Al-Dawri, both appeared in 1977. Al-Arab was closed in 1996 after the 
death of its founder Abdullah Hussein Nema when the heirs sold the 
license of the newspaper, which did not reappear until 2007. 
As for television broadcasting, Qatar TV began broadcasting in black 
and white in 1970 and color in 1974. Starting with a few hours in Arabic, 
it extended its transmission to nine daily hours when introducing color 
television. Similar to other Arab countries, a foreign language channel 
was soon introduced. Channel 2 in English started broadcasting in 1982 
with programs on culture, sports, and entertainment, including those of 
foreign production (Al-Jaber, 2012, p. 58). 
The second period of media development was initiated in 1995 
when the new Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, introduced 
his reform program. Due to new freedom from interference by the 
government, international newspapers such as The New York Times, Time 
Magazine, The Financial Times and Al-Quds Al-Arabi became available 
in Qatar (Al-Jaber, 2012, pp. 49–50). Also, Qatari media appeared 
nationally, for example, with Al-Watan newspaper which offered more 
critical coverage of national issues in Qatar, and transnationally with the 
launch of Al-Jazeera. 
Qatar opened up to the world and this was the beginning of a third 
period starting in 2011, when Qatar expanded the Al-Jazeera network by 
launching several new international channels, allowed private television 
in Qatar, and increasingly backed and/or financed media based in or 
outside Qatar. Strongly induced by the Arab uprisings, Al-Jazeera now 
openly supported Arab oppositions such as the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and the Islamist opposition in Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, and Libya. 
Thus, during the Libyan Civil War in 2011, Libya Al-Ahrar TV, a Libyan 
television channel, started broadcasting by satellite from Doha. Its focus 
was Libya’s revolution and its political future. In 2012, the first private 
television channel Al-Rayyan TV was launched to specifically target the 
Qatari community. Its support for the Qatar National Vision 2030 and 
emphasis on Qatari history and tradition illustrates its loyalty towards 
the regime. In 2016, it launched its second channel. Another example 
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is the Qatari online and print newspaper Al-Araby Al-Jadeed and the 
Al-Araby television network, both based in London (Roberts, 2014). This 
multidirectional media strategy reflects Qatar’s soft power policy, which 
includes the support of not only Islamist oppositions but also liberal 
voices, such as the Egyptians Alaa Al-Aswany, Iman Nour, and others, 
who continuously have been allowed speaking time at Al-Jazeera. 
A study of media use from 2010 to 2012 showed that Qataris still 
preferred daily newspapers as a source of local news in contrast to 
expatriates that increasingly preferred online media (Meeds, 2015). As 
of 2019, Qatar had four daily newspapers in Arabic: Al-Arab, established 
in 1972, Al-Raya (1979), Al-Sharq (1987), and Al-Watan (1995), and three 
in English: Gulf Times (1978), Peninsula (1996), and Qatar Tribune (2006). 
All papers are pro-government with regular headlines about and links to 
the ruling family and offer little criticism of domestic or foreign policy. 
With regard to television, the population in Qatar prefer different types of 
programming. Whereas Qatari nationals and Arab expats primarily watch 
television programming on free television (72% and 64%, respectively), 
Asian and Western expats prefer to watch subscription television (44% and 
57%). The reason is probably that subscription television offers another 
kind of programming that is more attractive to non-Arabs (Meeds, 2015). 
Political System and Legal Framework
The political system in Qatar is based on the acknowledgement of the 
Emir’s sovereign authority. The Emir is not only the head of state, but 
also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The power is based on 
the separation of the legislative powers held by the Al-Shura Council, 
the executive powers headed by the Emir, and the juridical powers 
in the hands of the courts. Political parties are not permitted, and the 
only elections for direct representation are for the Central Municipal 
Council that has 29 elected members and an advisory role (Freedom 
House, 2019). The council was founded in the 1950s, but free elections 
took place for the first time in 1999. In that election, women were able 
to participate for the first time, both as voters and candidates. On the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ English website, the election is highlighted 
as “a historic event” that “represented the first steps of the country 
towards democracy in its civil sense,” also highlighting the new role 
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of women (Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Qatar, 2019). As such, the 
elections are still used as a showcase for the democratic intentions of the 
country. In 2003, a referendum took place giving the Qataris the right 
to vote for the country’s first constitution. This happened, however, 
without mobilizing the citizens or fostering any wider public discussion 
(Al-Hawik, 2013, pp. 236–37).
When Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani came to power through a 
coup removing his father from the throne in June 1995, he inherited an 
autocratic country built on tribal structure. His ambition was to build a 
civil society by introducing a number of legal reforms, including more 
freedom for national media. Looking closely, however, it appears that 
he, and later his son, had endorsed a policy that carefully navigated 
a balance between transformation and status quo or, in other words, 
between liberalization and control. 
Qatar’s first official censorship law was issued in 1979 with the aim 
to regulate and control the press, publishing houses, bookstores, artistic 
production, and advertising agencies. Based on the law, many non-
Qatari newspapers and books were forbidden to be imported because 
they were not in accordance with the government’s political, economic, 
or religious perspectives adopted as the basis for nation-building. The 
responsibility of regulating media, particularly radio and television, 
has been ceded to different institutions. Starting with the Media 
Department that was established in 1969, the Ministry of Information 
followed in 1974, which later became the Ministry of Information and 
Culture in 1990 (Al-Mua’ssasah Al-Qatariya lili’laam, 2018). In 1998, the 
new Emir abolished the Ministry as the controlling body of all media 
activities, including media censorship, thereby sending a strong signal 
of his wish to create freer media. As an alternative, the National Council 
for Culture, Arts and Heritage and the Qatar General Broadcasting 
and Television Corporation were founded as independent bodies to 
promote free public debate. In 2009, the Qatar Media Corporation was 
established as the official broadcasting authority for the state of Qatar. 
It carries on its dual role of pursuing the newest updates of media and 
technology while “maintaining and enforcing broadcast standards and 
content guidelines and developing programming that promotes Qatar’s 
interests” (Government of Qatar, 2020).
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In the new constitution from 2003, Article 48 states: “Freedom of 
the press, printing and publication shall be guaranteed in accordance 
to the law.” According to Anas (2012–2013), the old press law from 
1979 continued to be in force, even after Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa 
Al-Thani announced his visions for a new Qatar, as no other law was 
drafted before 2011. By referring to the 1979 law, it was possible to 
practice censorship of both domestic and foreign publications, as well 
as broadcast media, “for religious, political, and sexual content prior to 
distribution” (Anas, 2012–2013, p. 37). Furthermore, according to Anas, 
similar to cases in other Arab countries, one could be prosecuted for 
criticizing the government, the ruling family, or Islam. Although the 
Advisory Council had drafted a new press law in 2011, it had still not 
been approved by the Emir in 2016. The law was particularly intended 
to protect journalists against prosecution, while regulating the online 
media (Freedom House, 2019). Finally, in September 2018, a new 
draft law was approved by the government to regulate and organize 
the circulation of publications, publishing, media activities, and arts. 
In the Qatari daily Gulf Times, this law was presented as an answer to 
the technological development and protection of freedom of opinion, 
freedom of expression, and human rights. It abolishes prison sentences 
for publishing with reference to freedom of expression, but it also 
incorporates the publications and Publishing Law of 1979 and the Decree 
Law of 1993 on regulating the practice of advertising, public relations, 
artistic production, and artistic works. The freedom of journalists is 
assured, but the law also emphasizes the general obligation to abide by 
the code of ethics of the press (Gulf Times, 2019). Importantly, other laws 
such as the anti-terrorism legislation and the cybercrime law also restrict 
media and freedom of expression. The cybercrime law criminalizes the 
distribution of “false news” the violation of “social values or principles” 
online behavior that threatens state security, and online defamation. 
Violation may lead to either imprisonment or huge fines (Freedom 
House, 2019). 
This development of press and media freedom is two-sided. On 
one hand, a number of reforms have been introduced to strengthen the 
presence of free media in Qatar. On the other hand, restrictions by the 
state are still more the rule than the exception, although they might have 
become more subtle. The many changes of laws and bodies involved in 
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managing media reflect the ambivalent policies that the Qatari regime 
adopts when simultaneously promoting freedom and restricting access 
to power. The overall result of this media climate is that most outlets 
adopt a government-friendly approach and perform considerable self-
censorship (Freedom House, 2019).
The most famous result of the attempts of liberalization was 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani’s establishment of Al-Jazeera TV 
in 1996. In contrast to the national media that work to strengthen the 
Qatari regime within the national framework, Al-Jazeera was directed 
towards a transnational audience and enhancing the position of Qatar 
transnationally. The channel quickly became a tool to amplify the 
influence and visibility of a small country, becoming an instrument for 
Qatar’s soft power strategy. 
Excursus: Al-Jazeera
Al-Jazeera TV, later known as Al-Jazeera Arabic, has become the most 
influential Arab television station internationally. The local presence of 
its correspondents during the US-led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and later the Arab uprisings, has especially made the coverage of the 
station into a reference for international media. The network is viewed 
as an exception, both in Qatar and the Arab world, due to its critical 
outlook and global reach. From the beginning, it was organized as a 
private satellite television station, regardless of being established and 
financed by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Al-Jazeera became an 
element in his strategy of reaching out globally to constitute a new and 
stronger position of the country, while at the same time promoting new 
ideas of Arab democracy and critical thinking. Internationally, the Emir 
tried to create better relations with a number of countries such as Israel 
and Iran, and Qatar came to act as a mediator in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Sudan, Eritrea, and Pakistan (Miles, 2010). 
Since its establishment, Al-Jazeera has grown gradually from a small 
studio in a small Arab capital to a large transnational network of various 
thematic television channels that offers a multi-channel, multi-platform, 
and multilingual package addressing a global audience. It has offices 
around the world as well as online platforms. Al-Jazeera Mubasher/
Live was launched in 2005 and transmits live events and debates on 
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current issues 24/7. Al-Jazeera English was launched as a news channel 
on 15 November 2006. In 2011, Al-Jazeera Balkan started transmitting 
international news from its headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misr covered the Egyptian uprisings 
in the period from 2011 to 2013, when the President Morsi, aligned with 
the Muslim Brotherhood, was removed from power. In the period from 
2013 to 2016, Al-Jazeera America was offering the Americans a perspective 
on the Middle East while prioritizing American news with the ambition 
to create a mix between CNN America and CNN International. Also 
in 2013, Al-Jazeera Sport was rebranded under the name beIN Sports. 
In addition to its many news channels, the network added Al-Jazeera 
Children’s Channel (2005) and Al-Jazeera Documentary (2007). In 2014, the 
Al-Jazeera media network launched the online news site Al-Jazeera Turk 
in Turkish. The aim was later to establish a television channel, Al-Jazeera 
Turk, in Turkey. This never became a reality, because the online version 
did not succeed and was shut down in 2017.
Al-Jazeera has its own training center and a media research institute. 
The staff is international, comprising journalists educated in Western 
countries, and has a broad network of correspondents worldwide. 
Similar to CNN and BBC, Al-Jazeera Arabic transmits around the clock, 
but the programs are more varied, combining news coverage with 
political and cultural programming. From the very start, the network 
adopted a confrontational style, addressing issues considered taboo in 
the Arab world, thereby indirectly challenging Arab national media’s 
ability to control the coverage of a story. However, it has been criticized 
for its uncritical coverage of Qatar’s ruling family. 
In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, Al-Jazeera Arabic started to 
become an important player in the coverage of conflicts inside and 
outside of the Arab world, where its strength—and vulnerability—have 
been its physical presence in conflict areas. The channel’s critical coverage 
of global conflict has since then stirred up controversy and conflict 
inside and outside of the Arab world. Its unpopularity among Arab 
regimes has triggered several attempts to restrict the channel by closing 
down Al-Jazeera’s local or regional offices periodically or permanently. 
In particular, Al-Jazeera’s coverage of and presence in the epicenter of 
global conflicts, including the American invasion of Afghanistan in the 
wake of 9/11, the Gulf Wars, and the Arab uprisings, have triggered 
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such responses. In any conflict it has covered, the network has been 
accused of being biased and has therefore been given numerous and 
often contradictory labels such as pro-Iraqi, pro-Israeli, pro-American, 
pro-Taliban, etc. (Sakr, 2006). During the Arab uprisings of 2010–2011, 
the channel played a significant role by providing the Arab and global 
audiences with live coverage of street protests, while clearly siding with 
the protesters against dictatorships. This univocal positioning once 
again made Qatar unpopular among Arab regimes.
Economy and Ownership Patterns
In Qatar, there is a tendency for the media to be either state-owned, 
owned by prominent members of the ruling family and/or government, 
or by businessmen with close connections to the ruling elite. Thus, all 
radio stations in Qatar are government-owned, whereas the Al-Raya 
and Gulf Times newspapers are owned by a private company led by a 
board that includes the oil minister, a former senior official, and several 
prominent businessmen. The Al-Watan newspaper, launched after the 
Emir’s abolishment of censorship in 1995, introduced a more critical 
approach to local issues, but was owned by the foreign minister in 
association with a leading businessperson (Rugh, 2004). The paper 
adopted a relatively critical policy, which got it into trouble vis-à-vis 
with a number of ministries and institutions, and a court case was 
initiated against its editor Ahmad Ali (KUNA, 2001). Also, both existing 
Al-Sharq and Peninsula newspapers were owned or co-owned by the 
Qatari foreign minister (Rugh, 2004). 
A characteristic of the third period, starting in 2011, has been the 
investment in media in all forms as part of Qatar’s soft power policy and 
a strategic direction in its relationships with regional and international 
allies and enemies. Most of Qatar’s new media ventures are, however, 
based outside Qatar, perhaps to avoid any escalation of conflict with 
its neighboring countries or to be relieved from the pressure they 
exert in the region. Whereas Qatar TV is state-owned, Al-Rayyan TV 
was launched in 2012 by Al-Rayyan Media and Marketing Company 
that also had produced programs for Qatar TV. The Libya Al-Ahrar 
TV is mostly funded by Libyan expatriate businessmen, while Qatar 
provides facilities and technical staff through Al-Rayyan TV. A 
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Qatari-owned private holding company, Fadaat Media, owns Al-Araby 
TV and the Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, but both were initiated by 
Azmi Bishara. Bishara is a prominent Christian Israeli Palestinian, 
who is a secularist and pan-Arabist. He is the chairman of Fadaat Media 
and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed network, also functions as advisor to the Emir, 
and is the director of the Doha Institute (Roberts, 2014). Fadaat Media 
also owns Syria TV, a satellite channel that has been broadcasting 
from Istanbul. Over concern that the diversity of digital media outlets 
has been limited, there are allegations that they are being financed 
by Qatari media companies, but it is difficult to get a confirmation of 
exact ownership. Furthermore, in 2017, a media city was established in 
Doha in order to make Qatar attractive to international and regional 
media outlets. To further this effort, the city advertises that it offers the 
newest technologies and provides no editorial limits except for a code 
of ethics.
Regarding Al-Jazeera’s funding, the intention from the outset was 
transferring it to pure private financing after five years of operation. 
While part of its financing comes from advertising, it is rather unclear 
how it is financed today, with no doubt that Qatar still supports the 
channel and its offspring financially. In 2014, beIN Sports was separated 
from Al-Jazeera and now operates 60 channels across 34 countries. In 
2016, it also bought Turkey’s largest pay-television operator, Digitürk, 
profiting from the rapid growth of pay-television in the Middle East 
(Oxford Business Group, 2018). 
Regionally, Qatar is one of the biggest spenders on advertising. 
Newspapers are the most important platform, with online channels 
being a new platform. Advertisers have changed over time, not the least 
due to lower oil and gas revenues, but the state remains the dominant 
advertiser and spends “on advertising for major projects, such as 
infrastructure improvements and initiatives under the framework of 
Qatar Vision 2030” (Oxford Business Group, 2018).
Technology and Infrastructure
With the access to satellite technology, Qatar followed the trend 
practiced by other Arab countries and transformed its ground television 
station to satellite television in 1998, transmitting via the satellites 
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ArabSat, NileSat, and Hot Bird. In 1993, Qataris already had access 
to 31 satellite channels via the Qatari cable system network known 
as Qatar Cablevision (QCV), challenging the monopoly of Qatar TV 
by offering channels such CNN, BBC, Fox Sports, and Arab satellite 
channels (Miles, 2013, p. 43). With the rapidly increasing number of 
Arab satellite channels, Qatar TV in 2000 changed the format of the 
channel in response to the growing competition. It changed its logo, 
style of programs, intervals, and announcements, and new young faces 
appeared on the screen. Despite the competition from outside, Qatar 
TV is still popular among viewers in Qatar, whereas many Qataris feel 
alienated by Al-Jazeera, according to Miles (2013, pp. 44–45). The Qatari 
satellite company Es’hailSat launched the country’s first satellite in 2013 
to support beIN Sports and the Al-Jazeera network. In 2018, it launched 
its second satellite and began offering commercial services in the region. 
In the telecommunications realm, the only provider of Internet in Qatar 
is the government-owned Qatar Public Telecommunications Corporation 
(Q-Tel). Owning the entire IT infrastructure, it provides a list of banned 
websites and blocks material that is deemed as being against Qatari 
values. An example is Doha News, which was blocked in November 2016. 
As a private initiative, it had developed from a Twitter account, then a 
Tumblr blog, to a popular English-language website that was not afraid 
of criticizing Qatari politics. In the end, the owners sold Doha News to 
a foreign company due to problems with getting licensed (Napieralski, 
2018). When raising a case, the authorities typically warn the local 
journalists, while non-Qataris employed by Qatari media outlets risk 
being deported or imprisoned. 
With regard to Internet use, a six-country (Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) study by Northwestern 
University in Qatar found that Qataris are “among the most digitally 
connected citizens in the Arab Region” (Dennis, Martin & Wood, 2017). 
According to this study, 95% of the population has access to the Internet, 
and they spend 60% more time online than the populations from the 
other five Arab countries of the survey. They also found that, while 
the most popular social networks are Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, and 
Instagram, the users in Qatar spend less time playing video games or 
using Facebook in comparison with the other five countries. Instead, they 
use the Internet to watch news, comedy, sport, and religious/spiritual 
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programs online. The study also showed that watching television online, 
either by streaming or download, is practiced by a third of Internet users 
in Qatar. Arab expats seem to especially prefer this option. The Internet 
appears to have become the most preferred form of media for users who 
are interested in political news (Meeds, 2015).
Challenges
Qatar’s transnational media expansion has created a major source of 
conflict in recent years. In 2014, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt, 
the only non-member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), accused 
Qatar of supporting or financing terrorist groups in Egypt and Yemen. 
As a result, Qatar entered into a deal with the Gulf states not to support 
hostile media that function as a platform for opposition groups in other 
countries in the region. Later, another deal followed where Bahrain, 
UAE, and Qatar agreed to support the stability in Egypt and to prevent 
Al-Jazeera from working as a platform for opposition groups. These 
agreements seemed to have postponed the conflict from escalating after 
it broke out in 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain demanded 
that Qatar close down Al-Jazeera. The new Emir, Tamim bin Hamad 
Al-Thani, refused. This led Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and UAE to 
break off all diplomatic relations with Qatar in June 2017. Shortly after, 
Yemen, the Maldives, Mauritania, and Senegal also severed their relations 
with Qatar. Jointly, the countries would later present 13 demands that 
had to be met before contact could be resumed. Among these demands 
were to minimize contact with Iran and associated groups (a not very 
subtle reference to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza), to shut 
down the Turkish military base in Qatar, to stop financing terrorism, to 
stop all relations with terrorist organizations and individuals, and to 
shut down Al-Jazeera. Qatar rejected all accusations, demanded proof of 
the allegations, and refused to close down Al-Jazeera with reference to 
the need for freedom of the press (Naheem, 2017). This incident clearly 
illustrates how media are used to legitimize a political conflict, which in 
this case, according to Naheem (2017), has been a media war between 
UAE and Qatar. The conflict also underlines how Al-Jazeera plays a 
particular role as a transnational tool of Qatar’s foreign policy. Where 
local national media in Qatar risk repercussions should they forget 
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their loyalty towards the Qatari rulers, the same rulers use Al-Jazeera to 
position themselves within a conflictive international political field with 
no intention of restricting their activities.
Outlook 
In the young nation of Qatar, with its history of around 50 years of 
national media, media play a key role in the construction of a modern 
Qatari state. Whereas the national media are restricted by regulations 
that assure their loyalty to the Qatari nation and its conservative values, 
the investments in and/or support of transnational media, including 
Al-Jazeera, play the role of strengthening the sovereignty—and more 
liberal values—of Qatar in an Arab region haunted by conflict. By 
concentrating media ownership among the ruling family and loyal 
businesspeople and setting up restrictions for obtaining media licenses, 
the Qatari rulers manage to control the national narrative and their own 
power. To control the international responses to Al-Jazeera appears more 
of a challenge, but until now, the Qatari rulers have not given in to threats 
and demands from outside. Two key issues will be crucial to the future 
media landscape of Qatar. One is how the continuous struggle with other 
Arab countries concerning Al-Jazeera evolves. As a small country, Qatar 
is dependent on international collaboration, and therefore, one likely 
scenario is that the countries will find a compromise where Al-Jazeera 
moderates the critique of other Arab regimes or turns its attention to 
other countries. However, if political changes in neighboring countries, 
such as Saudi Arabia, do in fact occur, Qatar may need to find new allies, 
which potentially could strengthen the role of Al-Jazeera. Another key 
issue concerns the advancement of new technologies wherein Qatar has 
invested heavily. This applies to technology itself but also to investments 
in Arab and English online news media globally, which have particularly 
provided Qatar with new platforms for influencing Arab perceptions of 
national and regional politics and identities. Although it is difficult to 
predict the future, Qatar will still be a small country with a majority of 
non-Qatari inhabitants, which makes it essential for the rulers to protect 
and control the symbolic (and physical) borders internally as well as 
externally. 
142 Arab Media Systems
References
Al-Hawik, H. (2013). The Arab News satellites between two globalizations [in 
Arabic]. Beirut: Al-Maaref Forum.
Al-Jaber, K. (2012). Audiences’ perceptions of news media services in three Arab 
countries (doctoral thesis). University of Leicester.
Al-Mu‘assasah al-Qatariya lili’laam [Qatar Media Corporation] (2018). Qatar 
Radio: Golden Jubilee 1968–2018 [in Arabic]. http://www.qmc.qa/
Anas, O. (2012–2013). The changing profile of media in the Arab State. Global 
Media Journal–Arabian Edition, 2(1–2), 28–46.
Dennis, E. E., Martin, J. D., & Wood, R. (2017). Media use in the Middle East, 2017: 
A six-nation survey. http://www.mideastmedia.org/survey/2017/
Freedom House (2019). Country report: Qatar. https://freedomhouse.org/
country/qatar/freedom-world/2019
Government of Qatar (2020). Media. https://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/
topics/Culture+Arts+and+Media/Media 
Gulf Times (2019, February 6). Qatar consolidates freedom of media with draft law. 
https://www.gulf-times.com/story/621369/Qatar-consolidates-freedom-of- 
media-with-draft-law 
KUNA (2001). Qatari newspapers request police protection since the al-Watan 
newspaper incident last June [in Arabic]. https://www.kuna.net.kw/
ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=1186747&language=ar 
Meeds, R. (2015). Changing roles of traditional and online media as trusted 
news sources in Qatar and their relationships with perceived important 
issues and interest in politics. Journal of Middle East Media, 11, 34–61. https://
doi.org/10.12816/0023481 
Mellor, N., Ayish, M., Dajani, N., & Rinnawi, K. (2011). Arab media: Globalization 
and emerging media industries. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Miles, H. (2010). Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV news challenged the world. London: 
Abacus.
——. (2013). The other face of Qatari TV broadcasting. In T. Guaaybess (Ed.), 
National broadcasting and state policy in Arab countries (pp. 42–48). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137301932_4 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Qatar (2019). Political system. https://www.mofa.
gov.qa/en/qatar/political-system/general-information 
Naheem, M. A. (2017). The dramatic rift and crisis between Qatar and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) of June 2017. International Journal of Disclosure 
and Governance, 14(4), 265–77. 
 1438. Qatar
Napieralski, M. (2018). The rise and fall of Doha News. Qatarexpats. https://
medium.com/qatarexpats/the-rise-and-fall-of-doha-news-d191130f417c
Nye, J. S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1), 94–109. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0002716207311699 
Oxford Business Group (2018). Qatar maintains strong standing in regional and 
international media markets. https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/
tuned-country-maintains-strong-standing-both-regional-and-international-
markets
Pew Research Center (2012). Table: Religious composition by country. https://assets.
pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2012/12/globalReligion-
tables.pdf
Roberts, D. (2014). Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or 
preference? Middle East Policy, 21(3), 84–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/
mepo.12084 
Rugh, W. A. (2004). Arab mass media: Newspapers, radio, and television in Arab 
politics. Westport: Praeger.
Sakr, N. (2006). Challenger or lackey? The politics of news on Al-Jazeera. In D. 
K. Thussu (Ed.), Media on the move: Global flow and contra-flow (pp. 104–18). 
London, New York: Routledge. 

9. Bahrain: Media-Assisted 
Authoritarianism
Marc Owen Jones
The media ecosystem in Bahrain has primarily been shaped 
by the security interests of the ruling family and its formal 
and informal protectors, initially the British, and following 
Independence in 1971, Saudi Arabia and the United States. From 
its inception just before the Second World War, to the Uprising of 
2011, television, radio, and the local press have been leveraged as 
a means of distributing state propaganda and public relations. 
Technological change has been embraced, but only to the extent 
to which it facilitates Bahrain’s neoliberal development as a 
commercial ICT hub. The rise of citizen journalism, social media, 
and de-spatialized technologies has prompted some resistance to 
this top-down media-assisted authoritarianism, but the regime 
has adapted to instrumentalize these new technologies as tools 
of surveillance. 
Background
Bahrain is a small archipelago of 33 islands in the Persian Gulf. Within 
this archipelago, Bahrain Island is the most populous and the largest, 
forming around 83% of Bahrain’s total landmass of around 780 square 
kilometers. Bahrain is situated off the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia 
and connected by the King Fahd Sea Causeway, which terminates in 
the Saudi city of Khobar. Its other immediate nearby neighbors include 
Qatar, to the east of Bahrain, and Iran to the north. 
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Arabic is the official language, but English and Persian are widely 
spoken by Bahraini citizens. Although Bahrain is small, it is densely 
populated with about 1.6 million people, of whom around 800,000 
are non-Bahrainis (Information and eGovernment Authority, 2020). 
Like most Gulf states, large segments of the non-native population are 
workers from South Asia and the Philippines. As such, many other 
languages are commonly spoken, including Malayalam, Tagalog, Urdu, 
and Hindi. The majority of the native population are Muslims, broadly 
divided into Sunni Muslims and Shi’a Muslims. However, this sectarian 
simplification belies the fact that Bahrain’s Muslim communities are 
characterized by diversity, both in terms of schools of thought and 
political opinions. 
Bahrain is a nominal partial democracy, with an elected lower house 
and an appointed upper house. Bahrain has a constitution, although 
any amendments must be ratified by two-thirds of the lower house and 
appointed upper house, rendering change highly improbable. However, 
the ruler, King Hamad bin Salman Al-Khalifa, has the ability to rule by 
decree. 
Like most Gulf states, Bahrain’s political system has been defined in 
a number of ways, from a liberal autocracy, to a low-quality democracy, 
to an authoritarian regime (Jones, 2016). While the country is often 
characterized as a Sunni minority ruling over a Shi’a majority, this 
places too much emphasis on religious ideology. To clearly understand 
the current media system in Bahrain, one must consider that the media 
function in what has been called by some a kleptocratic autocracy. In this 
system, the ruling Al-Khalifa family monopolizes the country’s material 
resources so that the institutions of state, including the media, function 
to prevent the occurrence of regime change which would otherwise alter 
the disbursement of this wealth to a broader segment of the population, 
most of whom have historically been Shi’a. 
Tribal rule has profoundly influenced the media system in Bahrain. 
The Al-Khalifa family conquered Bahrain in the late 1700s and has 
since dominated positions of government. Initially, it subjugated the 
indigenous baḥārna population of mostly Shi’a Arabs to a form of feudal 
rule. This population was often subject to brutal oppression by the 
Al-Khalifas and their tribal allies. However, Bahrain’s small size has 
meant that the Al-Khalifa regime has always derived much of its power 
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and legitimacy from external sources. In the 1800s, the British signed 
a series of peace treaties with the Al-Khalifas and other ruling tribes 
across the Gulf. The overarching consequence of these treaties was that 
the British would thereafter protect the ruling tribes of the Arabian 
littoral as long as the tribes prevented piracy on British shipping. 
Issues of domestic politics were generally overlooked by the British, 
although this began to change in the 1920s. Reforms imposed by the 
British designed to mitigate oppression of the baḥārna also resulted in 
consolidating the power of the ruling family. As far as the British were 
concerned, the Al-Khalifas supported British interests in the region, and 
were useful allies, despite the political costs. 
Indeed, one of the most salient characteristics of Bahrain is its 
dependence on outside actors for legitimacy and support (Khalaf, 
1998), which has had a profound role on the securitization of the media. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, two significant uprisings demanded 
increased citizens’ participation in the political system. This further 
enforced the protectiveness of the Al-Khalifa-dominated institutions of 
the state, particularly those that were seen as a mobilizing force, such as 
the media.
Following independence from Britain in 1971, Bahrain increasingly 
turned to Saudi Arabia and the US for the support once offered by 
the British. Growing hostility from Saudi and the US administration 
towards Iran, especially after the 1979 revolution, brought a reversion to 
past practices of oppressing the local Shi’a population. This was not just 
the baḥārna, but also the Ajam, the Persian-speaking Bahraini citizens 
who originally came from Iran and settled in Bahrain. Growing Saudi 
influence and paranoia about Shi’a/Iranian expansionism resulted in the 
securitization of Bahrain’s Shi’a community. Within this system, Shi’ites 
became second-class citizens, often prevented from entering positions 
of high office, whether in the government, media, or the military. This 
repression was one of the triggers for the 1990s intifada (uprising), 
where thousands of Bahrainis mobilized to demand political reform. 
In 2002, Bahrain’s King Hamad pushed forward the National Action 
Charter, a series of political reforms that created nominal democratic 
institutions. While this saw some media liberalization, it was short-lived. 
In 2011, thousands of Bahrainis took to the streets, demanding further 
political reform. They were, however, brutally repressed. Since then, the 
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ruling family has not simply sought to contain the opposition, but to 
instrumentalize the media—both state-owned and privately-owned—
in order to execute their divide and rule strategies that serve to keep 
Bahraini society segmented and stratified in order to better control it. 
Historical Developments
The growth of media in Bahrain in its modern form can be traced back to 
the 1930s when newspapers arrived in Bahrain under much suspicion. 
The British adviser Charles Belgrave, who was in Bahrain from 1926 and 
1956, was responsible for formative media policy. His dislike of Arabic 
newspapers criticizing British imperialism in Bahrain and the Gulf 
resulted in a rather hostile environment for fledgling press outlets. As 
such, visas were required for all journalists in Bahrain. Belgrave became 
the de facto embedded foreign correspondent in Bahrain, writing English-
language articles for The Times, and ensuring international news about 
the country was generally positive. 
The first local newspaper, Jaridat Al-Bahrain, opened in 1939 and was 
designed primarily as a vehicle for British war propaganda. The Bahrain 
Broadcasting Station was also launched in 1940 and broadcast as far as 
East Asia. Like Jaridat Al-Bahrain, its primary purpose was to broadcast 
war propaganda and counter Germany’s anti-British propaganda being 
disseminated across the Middle East from Radio Berlin. Given their 
limited purpose and scope, both Jaridat Al-Bahrain and the Bahrain 
Broadcasting Station closed down by the end of the Second World War in 
1945 (Al-Rumaihi, 2002). 
In 1950, the weekly paper, Voice of Bahrain, began publication. The 
years 1953–1956 also saw a blossoming of more critical media, defining 
the first true epoch of printed media in Bahrain. Newspapers such as 
Al-Qafila, Al-Watan, Al-Shula, and Al-Mizan were widely circulated in 
Bahrain. It was a time of growing Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism. 
Due to their nationalist leanings, which provoked the Al-Khalifa regime 
and their British protectors, all of these newspapers were closed by 1956, 
leading to years of press stagnation. One editor, Abdulrahman Al-Bakir, 
was even deported to the British territory of St. Helena for his alleged 
role in plotting to overthrow the regime. Following anti-imperialist 
and prodemocratic unrest in the 1950s, the government reacted by 
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introducing draconian press policies (Jones, 2020). Fear of another 
media renaissance that might offer support to other social movements 
led to stringent controls on publishing and broadcasting.
After 1956, the British kept tabs on any left-leaning publications, 
until they eventually decided that the lack of media was actually a 
problem. From the British perspective, it was held that the media 
should exist to promote the achievements and reforms initiated by 
the Bahraini government. Once again, the media in Bahrain were 
reimagined primarily for public relations and propaganda purposes. 
For this reason, the Bahrain PR Office was initially headed by a 
British officer, who ensured that all published material met with British 
approval. The mentality was that a response was needed to counter the 
propaganda pouring out of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and later in the 1970s and 
1980s, Iran. The British felt they could stave off unrest by reassuring the 
people about the modernization of Bahrain (Jones, 2020). Primarily, 
they believed they could convince Bahrainis that modernization under 
the Al-Khalifa regime was better than the alternatives in any other 
Arab republics.
Tentative steps by the government to liberalize the political system 
post-independence drove a number of media reforms. From 1976 to 
1989, a total of 12 weekly, quarterly, daily, and monthly newspapers 
and magazines were created. Some of these were trade magazines for 
the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) or the Bahrain Medical 
Association. However, the most prominent of these perhaps were 
Bahrain’s daily newspapers, Al-Ayam, Akhbar Al-Khaleej, and the English-
language the Gulf Daily News, the circulations of which reached 21,565, 
22,000, and 9812 respectively in 2002 (Al-Rumaihi, 2002).
While Bahrain Radio reopened in 1955, it did so under tight 
restrictions, broadcasting mostly entertainment. This again reflected 
regime paranoia about propaganda. It was only in the 1960s that the 
quality of programming started to improve. An English service, Radio 
Bahrain, was introduced in 1977 to cater to Bahrain’s blossoming non-
Arabic speaking community. By 1991, Bahrain Radio had extended its 
broadcasting to 24 hours. As with many stations, it is now possible to 
listen to Bahrain Radio online, theoretically giving its audience unlimited 
reach.
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Television broadcasting in Bahrain began in 1973 to coincide with 
the creation of Bahrain’s National Assembly. This fledgling move 
towards representative democracy was one of many instances that 
showed that autocracy was loosening politically and, consequently, in 
the media sphere. Indeed, Bahrain was one of the few Gulf countries 
to license the creation of news broadcasting to the American company 
RTV International. This was short-lived, however, reflecting the rising 
ascendency of the conservative prime minister Khalifa bin Salman 
Al-Khalifa. Along with the dissolution of the short-lived National 
Assembly in 1975, Bahrain TV (BTV) was brought under the Ministry of 
Information, ostensibly due to RTV’s financial difficulties and rumored 
connection with the CIA (Al-Rumaihi, 2002). 
As one of the first countries in the Gulf to undergo modernization, 
Bahrain was often technically ahead of the curve. It was the first country 
in the Gulf to broadcast in full color in 1977 when it started broadcasting 
news from Europe. By 1986, Bahrain TV had both an Arabic channel 
(Channel 4) and an English-language channel (Channel 55). By 1994, 
BTV was broadcasting about 540 hours per week across five channels 
(Al-Rumaihi, 2002). Yet, the content was often considered too parochial 
and unappealing to Bahrain’s mixed demographic. While the media 
environment had tried to exclude foreign news over which there was 
little editorial control, efforts at internationalization sped up in the 1990s. 
This was partly driven by the 1991 Gulf War and public demand for 
information (Al-Rumaihi, 2002). Bahrain was also the earliest adopter 
of ArabSat in the Gulf. In the 1990s, Bahrainis were receiving via satellite 
content from CNN, Egypt, and the pan-Arab MBC, among others. 
In the 1990s, Bahraini politics were defined by the intifada, where 
people once again took to the streets to demand reforms from the 
government. The media environment mirrored this, with its tight 
government hold on newspapers and television. Human rights 
organizations also reported multiple instances of trial by media, where 
political prisoners were paraded in front of national papers before trial, 
prejudicing their right to a fair hearing. Indeed, the role of state media 
in underscoring repressive policy, especially during times of crisis, 
was clear. Upon the death of Bahrain’s ruler Shaykh Isa bin Salman 
Al-Khalifa in 1999, his son Hamad bin Salman Al-Khalifa came to power. 
After making himself king, Hamad introduced steps towards political 
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liberalization, including the superficial relaxing of rules around media 
outlets. 
Political System and Legal Framework
As with most authoritarian states, and despite Bahrain’s nominal 
democratic institutions, political control over state media is largely 
centralized under the Al-Khalifa-appointed government. This is 
increasingly evident in a stifling legal framework that seeks to strictly 
govern the behavior of publishers and journalists, imposing heavy fines 
for those who contravene the Press Law. The formalization of media 
laws began in the middle of the twentieth century. The democratic 
movement of the 1950s and the strikes of 1965 prompted the authorities 
to abandon any notion of progressive media reform. The shutting 
down of Bahrain’s budding press in 1956 was crystallized firmly in 
1965 with the introduction of the Press Law, which set the tone for 
all future media restrictions in Bahrain. Criticism of the ruler or his 
family was, and remains, outlawed, as was any news that criticized 
allied countries or harmed Bahrain’s economy. Any form of published 
material, from newspapers to pamphlets, was subject to the Press Law. 
The law expanded an existing law prohibiting the performance of plays, 
public concerts, or recitals without permission. Both the media and any 
avenues of cultural production were, and remain, closely monitored. 
Books and videos imported into Bahrain were often checked to see if 
they contained information critical of Bahrain.
Successive rulers of Bahrain have demonstrated hostility towards 
and suspicion of any media (Jones, 2020). Examples abound. During 
the election of newly formed labor committees in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the government instructed the media to keep coverage of the elections 
to a minimum. By 1985, the Ministry of Information’s control of the 
media had exceeded that which was stipulated in the Press Laws, and 
a culture of self-censorship had emerged. The existence of this media 
culture of self-censorship was backed up by tough fines and potential 
prison sentences which were firmly embedded in law. This culture of 
censorship remains in place today. Following King Hamad’s National 
Action Charter in 2001, a new era of relative press freedom was heralded 
in. As with independence in 1971, King Hamad sought to create a 
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clear break from the past and ostensibly bring in a new era of political 
and social reform. The newly launched Bahraini constitution of 2002 
guaranteed, albeit in a heavily caveated fashion, freedom of the press 
under Article 23. However, prior to the formation of the parliament, 
the government exploited this opportunity to pass a series of statutory 
decrees limiting certain freedoms, including the new Press Law of 2002. 
Like its predecessor, this Press Law prevents criticism of the king, the 
regime, Islam, and other Arab and Muslim countries, among other 
things (ARTICLE 19 & Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy, 
2016).
Despite this restrictive environment, the reforms saw the launch of 
Al-Wasat newspaper in September 2002, one of Bahrain’s only opposition-
leaning legal daily newspapers. Founded by Mansour Al-Jamri, Al-Wasat 
published op-eds by members of the Bahraini political opposition and 
was one of the only non-loyalist papers in Bahrain, along with the short-
lived Al-Waqt, a leftist-nationalist-leaning paper published from 2006 to 
2010. Founded by Khawla Mattar, Al-Waqt was the first newspaper in 
Bahrain to have a woman as editor-in-chief (Mattar & Seikaly, 2012). It 
included articles by political exiles, such as Abdulhadi Khalaf, who was 
briefly a Bahraini MP in 1973 but was then expelled for political activism. 
However, Al-Waqt closed following reported financial difficulties. In 2009, 
both Al-Waqt and Al-Wasat had estimated circulations of around 20,000 
and 30,000, respectively (Fanack, 2016). While their criticism was at times 
quieted, they often called out government repression, investigating, for 
example, political gerrymandering that discriminated against the Shi’a 
population.
However, the relative media pluralization that followed the reforms 
of 2001 was short-lived. Saudi-led fear about Shi’a empowerment after 
the fall of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003 once again prompted a sectarian 
and security-orientated contingent of hardline members of the ruling 
family to influence media policy. Former US Ambassador to Bahrain, 
William Monroe, noted that “royal court elements” had a “direct hand 
in a scathing press campaign launched by Arabic daily Al-Watan against 
NDI, the National Democratic Institute, other NGOs, and even the US 
Embassy” (Monroe, 2006). Al-Watan itself was known for its close ties to 
the royal court. At times, this level of personalistic influence by the likes 
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of the Prime Minister and other elements of the royal court indicated the 
extent of the Al-Khalifas’ overreach in media affairs.
In 2006, Shaykh Ahmed Atayatalla Al-Khalifa, a conservative and 
influential member of the ruling family, reportedly established two 
media watch committees under the auspices of his office to intimidate 
journalists and editors into not writing articles that were deemed 
anti-regime. Shaykh Atayatalla’s interference signified the influence 
of elements of a ruling Al-Khalifa core in controlling press freedom 
despite superficial institutional and constitutional safeguards. Like most 
political crises, the 2011 uprising that began on 14 February generated 
further securitization and coordination of media in Bahrain. The general 
harassment and intimidation of local journalists escalated sharply during 
the 2011 uprising. Bahrain was listed by Reporters Without Borders as 
one of the ten most dangerous places for journalists in the world after 
two journalists were killed and a number were detained and tortured 
(Bassiouni, Rodley, Al-Awadhi, Kirsch, & Arsanjani, 2011). In early 
2011, Al-Wasat was targeted by pro-government thugs who attacked the 
company’s printing press. The newspaper was eventually suspended 
on 2 April 2011, after the government used a raft of legal arguments to 
quash it. It was permanently shut down on 4 June 2017, signaling the 
end of any critical newspapers in Bahrain. 
After the reforms of 2001, the government attempted to create the 
illusion of political distance from the media, turning the Ministry of 
Information into the Information Affairs Authority (IAA). Initially, this 
was headed by ruling family member Fawaz bin Mohammed bin Khalifa 
Al-Khalifa, and later Sameera Rajab. After the 2011 uprising, however, 
the IAA was subsumed under the Ministry of Information Affairs 
(MIA), which was created in 2014. The Ministry’s role is to set policy 
and legislation and to oversee the media sector and its activities as well 
as to represent the “media sector before the Cabinet and the legislative 
authority” (Ministry of Information Affairs, 2020). The IAA remains 
the executive body for the media sector in Bahrain. It is tasked with 
operating official state media outlets, namely Bahrain Radio, Bahrain 
TV, and the official state news agency. The IAA also implements the 
policies issued by the MIA. 
The Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry Report of 2011 
stated that the media in Bahrain had been highly partisan during the 
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2011 uprising and that journalists, medical staff, and others in the state-
controlled media had been defamed for their support of political reform 
(Bassiouni et al., 2011). As a result, the government set up the High 
Authority for Media and Communication (HAMC). The MIA describes 
the HAMC as an entity that proposes rules and regulations necessary 
to “upgrade the professions of media and communication” (Ministry 
of Information Affairs, 2020). It is also tasked with setting standards 
for “monitoring media and advertising content in different media 
and communication outlets.” While the MIA claims that the HAMC 
is independent, its management is appointed by the government 
(Universal Periodic Review, 2017a). The ombudsman has not abated the 
authoritarian trajectory of media regulation in Bahrain. For example, 
in July 2016, the MIA issued Edict 68/2016, which requires newspaper 
outlets to obtain an annual license for disseminating printed or 
electronic content. It also forbids newspapers to livestream or produce 
videos longer than two minutes (Universal Periodic Review, 2017b). 
In general, the online media environment in Bahrain is so oppressive 
that people have been jailed for simply retweeting criticism of the king 
(Amnesty International, 2017). More insidiously, the Ministry of the 
Interior announced that anyone who even followed on Twitter the critics 
of government would be held legally accountable (Ministry of Interior, 
2019). Thus, the aim again has been to dismantle the independent non-
state social media news and information networks that formed after 
2011. 
The uprising prompted Saudi Arabia to ask Bahrain for cooperation 
among its media agencies to adopt strategies to counter what it stated 
were efforts by foreign agencies (most likely Iran and Lebanon’s 
Hezbollah Party) to attack the reputation and stability of Bahrain. Saudi 
and the Al-Khalifas’ fear of Shi’a empowerment in Bahrain, as well as 
historically rooted sectarianism, has compounded the obstacles to the 
development of media plurality in Bahrain. Even prior to 2011, the 
government had refused to issue newspaper and television licenses to 
predominantly Shi’a opposition groups such as Al-Wefaq. Consequently, 
in 2015, the Bahraini authorities quickly pulled the plug on Saudi Prince 
Al-Waleed bin Talal Al-Sa’ud’s television channel Al-Arab within 24 
hours of its first broadcast, reportedly because it aired an interview 
with a senior member of the Shi’a opposition group Al-Wefaq. This 
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reflected the government’s desire to not give the Shi’a any type of 
political platform. Indeed, the country’s Shi’a have long complained 
of marginalization not only in participatory politics but also in the 
country’s media and cultural production in general. As one Bahraini 
merchant once told The Washington Post, “if you switch on the T.V., there 
is not a single program that refers to us, our history, our folklore, our 
geography. We are nothing” (Lawson, 2004). 
Economy and Ownership Patterns
In addition to the lack of sovereignty and the growth of Saudi overrule, 
the privileges afforded to the ruling family by oil revenues have 
incentivized continued control over positions of authority. A devolved 
media structure and relaxation of ownership would fly in the face of 
long-held beliefs that a pluralistic media may generate criticism of 
government that could lead to revolution. At the same time, the need for 
direct foreign investment has driven the government to put emphasis 
on projecting an image of “business-friendly Bahrain” (Khalaf, 2013). 
In order to successfully project this image, the government has seized 
control of the ability to dominate messaging about Bahrain. As such, 
ownership is tightly controlled by the state, even if it is permitted 
privately. The strictures of the Bahraini Press Law ensure that only 
those of a sound reputation can own a media outlet. This is a means 
of ensuring government control of their patrons in the media both in 
theory and in practice.
Historically, there has been nominal private ownership of newspapers. 
For the period of 1962 to 1976, Bahrain’s publications can be grouped 
into three categories: those owned privately by Bahrainis, those owned 
by the government, and non-Bahraini publications regularly read 
in Bahrain (Nakhleh, 2011). These included Al-Adwa, Sada Al-Usbu, 
the Gulf Weekly Mirror (English), Al-Mujtama’ Al-Jadid, and Al-Haya 
Tijariyya. Given Bahrain’s small size, the average circulation of these 
publications ranged from 2,500 to 3,500. Nakhleh’s (2011) analysis of 
these publications concluded that none were critical of the government. 
Ideologically speaking, Al-Adwa and Sada Al-Usbu were considered by 
Nakhleh to be “moderate.” 
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The two dominant Arabic language papers in Bahrain from 1976 
to 1989 were Al-Ayam and Akhbar Al-Khaleej, both of which are still 
operating today. While Al-Ayam is owned by the eponymous Al-Ayam 
Press, Akhbar Al-Khaleej Press owns both Akhbar Al-Khaleej and its 
sister English-language paper the Gulf Daily News. As well as extensive 
government oversight, the circulation of Bahrain’s press during the 
1960s and 1970s was also stymied to some degree by illiteracy levels.
By 2011, six of Bahrain’s seven daily newspapers were owned by pro-
government Bahrainis or those affiliated with the royal family (Project on 
a Middle East Democracy, 2012). This, of course, has resulted in a lack 
of editorial diversity. Indeed, one archaic regulation of Bahrain’s Press 
Law is that those who run a newspaper should be of “good character.” 
Such subjective terminology essentially means that only those approved 
by the Al-Khalifa dominated ministry will be granted such a position. 
With the closing down of Al-Wasat in Bahrain, a significant number of 
Bahrain’s most circulated English and Arabic language papers, including 
the Gulf Daily News, Al-Ayam, and Akhbar Al-Khaleej, are owned by only 
two companies. While these are privately-owned, they are still subject to 
the state’s tight control. 
Al-Watan is more vociferously pro-government and nationalist. Set 
up in 2005, it has a mostly Salafist board and is heavily influenced by 
Saudi Arabia. By 2009, Al-Watan had an estimated circulation of around 
30,000 copies (Fanack, 2016). Its columns have generally reflected 
Sunni political opinion in Bahrain, especially after 2011 where it took 
an anti-opposition, rather than entirely loyalist, stance. When Saudi 
forces entered Bahrain in 2011 to put down the uprising, the Salafi 
Islamist political party, Al-Asala, took out an advertisement on the 
front page welcoming the Saudi forces (Monroe, 2012). The Minister of 
Information, Sameera Rajab, often writes a column in Al-Watan. Thus, 
ownership in Bahrain is largely irrelevant in the domestic press sector as 
it is so tightly controlled by the government.
Bahrain’s television market is relatively small. The five main terrestrial 
channels are operated by the Bahrain Radio and Television Corporation 
(BRTC). In 2007, Bahrain’s first privately-owned television channel, Atlas 
Travel & Culture, was launched. It was owned by businessman Jamil Wafa 
(Toumi, 2007). Pay-television and direct-to-consumer (DTH) are more 
popular than free-to-air (FTA) channels, with Orbit Showtime Network 
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(OSN) being one of the major players. While most radio stations are also 
state-owned, private channels such as the South Asian Hindi station and 
Your FM also operate (Dubai Press Club, 2018). 
Technology and Infrastructure 
While Bahrain’s media are politically regressive, Bahrain has been an 
early adopter of technological change. It was one of the first Middle 
Eastern countries to launch the Internet in 1995, the first country in 
the Middle East to install a mainframe computer (1962), and the first 
to install a satellite station (1969). It was also one of the first countries 
to have commercially available 5G networks in 2019. Bahrain’s small 
size and limited oil supplies have encouraged it to diversify into other 
sectors extremely quickly. It has had limited success with this, briefly 
becoming a regional banking hub following the civil war in Lebanon. 
While the 2011 uprising damaged this status, Bahrain is turning towards 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) to attract foreign 
direct investments through a partially deregulated economy, at least by 
Gulf standards. 
Today, the Bahraini government, through the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority, is pushing forward the Fourth National 
Telecommunications Plans (NTP4), which seeks to improve Bahrain’s 
communication and technology infrastructure for the country’s 
2030 Vision—a comprehensive economic plan for Bahrain. Bahrain’s 
Economic Development Board has been keen to promote the fact that 
Bahrain offers 100% foreign ownership, unrestricted VoIP calls (e.g., 
Skype), and a free trade agreement with the US that offers “highly 
credible” intellectual property legislation. Above all, Bahrain asserts 
that it offers the most liberal ICT market in the Middle East, with the 
most robust infrastructure. As with many other Gulf countries, Bahrain 
is keen to project itself as open for business with regards to its media 
and digital infrastructure, as long as these will not deployed to criticize 
Bahrain’s government policies. 
Bahrain’s relatively substantial wealth and small size have facilitated 
the rollout of a comprehensive Internet infrastructure. Internet 
penetration is extremely high, with 96% of households and 100% of 
businesses able to access broadband. By 2018, broadband subscriptions 
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had reached 2.16 million, representing a penetration rate of around 
144%. A significant proportion of these were mobile subscriptions. In 
the same year, there were approximately 81 licensed operators in the 
telecommunications sector. Mobile phone penetration rates are currently 
around 133%. However, the majority of telecom sector revenue is held by 
three companies: Batelco, which is Bahrain’s state-owned operator, Viva 
Bahrain, and Zain Bahrain (Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, 
2018). As part of NTP4, Bahrain is rolling out a national fiber-based 
network to support ultrafast broadband. 
The high penetration of mobile technology has resulted in Bahrain 
having a high take up of social media. From 2010 to 2014, Bahrain had 
from 500,000 to 600,000 Facebook users, of whom the majority (around 
68%) were male. By March 2014, Bahrain had about 62,200 Twitter users. 
There was, however, more gender parity with Twitter, with 44% of users 
estimated to be women (Salem, 2017). Despite the affordances of these 
new platforms, which allow for citizen journalism and emerging forms 
of media expression, the authorities have cracked down heavily on 
those choosing to criticize the government or institutions of state. Social 
media are highly monitored and have been weaponized as a tool of state 
surveillance (Jones, 2013, 2020). Web censorship has been centralized, 
with Internet service providers instructed to install specific web filtering 
software to block specific websites. The encrypted messaging app 
Telegram has also been blocked. 
Despite the blocking of websites, citizens are still able to use 
mainstream social media platforms to produce critical content. The 
years from 2011 to 2013 saw the proliferation of citizen journalism 
and revolutionary cultural production—all disseminated via YouTube, 
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. This marked a shift from traditional 
online criticism of politics, which mainly centered around messaging 
boards such as Online Bahrain (Jones, 2017). However, those caught 
engaging in such activities were and continue to be harshly punished.
The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority oversees much of the 
communication infrastructure in Bahrain. It is also highly responsive to 
the state security apparatus. The chairman of the board of directors is 
a member of the ruling family, while the board also includes a major 
general from the Ministry of the Interior. The government has the 
ability to localize Internet curfews during times of political unrest and 
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did so for the village of Duraz for over 100 days starting in June 2016, 
switching off certain 3G and 4G cell towers between 7 p.m. and 1 a.m. 
every evening. This allows the government to strictly enforce repressive 
measures, making the need for wide-scale, nation-wide information 
control less necessary.
Challenges
Bahrain’s media system is very much reflective of its authoritarian 
ecosystem. With most ministries dominated by members of the ruling 
family and no substantive democratic representation, it is unlikely 
that Bahrain’s media system will ever be considered free, pluralistic, 
or critical, so long as the current political system remains in place. 
Tentative attempts at media pluralization have generally been short-
lived, tempered by political crises that provoke reactionary measures 
by the government. Given Bahrain’s regular political crises that tend 
to flare up every two decades, it is unlikely any liberalization will be 
sustained. Nonetheless, Bahrain’s media environment is considerably 
more pluralistic than it was. Socially liberal ideas are generally tolerated, 
yet platforms for political demands are controlled. As such, availability 
and demand for on-demand streaming services such as Netflix have 
skyrocketed. 
Politically, Bahrain’s’ dependency on Saudi Arabia is also a large 
contributing factor to the lack of media dynamism in the country. It 
was Saudi displeasure that was the likely reason for the cancelling of 
the television channel Al-Arab. Despite the political reforms going on 
in Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), a free media is 
a long way off. As such, any media reforms that emerge in Bahrain are 
always going to be hampered by MBS’s desire to maintain control of the 
media’s portrayal of the region. Indeed, it was the rise of MBS that was 
credited with the fact that Qatar’s Al-Jazeera, one of the Arab world’s 
most popular broadcasters, was blocked in Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi, 
and Egypt after the aforementioned countries severed political ties with 
Qatar in 2017. 
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Outlook
It is expected that Khalifa bin Salman, the country’s prime minister and 
driver of some of Bahrain’s most conservative policies, will eventually 
step down or become unable to continue to exert influence. If significant 
political influence shifts to his technical successor, Crown Prince Salman 
bin Hamad, who is widely seen as more progressive, it is possible that 
there may be a step change in the constitutional makeup of Bahrain, and 
the inclusivity of the media. However, this will be defined ultimately by 
external (Saudi) influence.
Most state-funded and private media companies have made efforts 
to migrate or have a heavy digital presence across social media and 
through websites. It is unlikely that state media will ever be fully 
subsumed or replaced by external media content, digital or otherwise. 
While Bahrainis consume lots of content from abroad, such as through 
Netflix, the government will likely retain its official news outlets for the 
purpose of propaganda, PR, and crisis communication. The suspension 
of Al-Jazeera highlights the regime’s willingness and ability to block 
content it deems to be threatening or not in line with its political outlook. 
Social media sites, while monitored, are likely to remain popular. 
However, Bahrain’s economic need to project an image of neoliberal 
modernity necessitates the embrace of modern communication 
technology. Failure to do this would be harmful to the economy. As long 
as the government maintains the ability to guide, control, and monitor 
people’s consumption of media, the actual availability of platforms, 
websites, and news content will likely continue to flourish. 
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10. Kuwait: From “Hollywood 
of the Gulf” to Social Media 
Diwaniyas
Fatima Alsalem
The media in Kuwait is relatively free and includes a wide variety 
of platforms expressing disparate views in a unique, competitive 
culture. The press in Kuwait has always been privately-owned by 
influential elites, allowing for wide range of opinion expression, 
but it has been limited to some degree by censorship and media 
laws. Nevertheless, the press exerts a strong influence on public 
opinion. Private broadcast media emerged in 2004 when the state 
ban was removed. Although private television and radio stations 
enjoy a fair amount of freedom in Kuwait, especially when 
compared with other Gulf states, they are subject to government 
laws and regulations. 
Background
Kuwait is one of the smallest countries in the Middle East, located 
adjacent to the northwest corner of the Arabian Gulf, with an area 
of 17,818 square kilometers. The country shares borders with Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia and enjoys a significant and important commercial 
status in the region due to its strategic location, natural passage to the 
northeast corner of the Arabian Peninsula, and, of course, its vast oil 
resources. The country has a desert-like climate, and a population of 
4.1 million, including approximately 30% Kuwaiti citizens and 70% 
non-Kuwaiti nationals (World Population Review, 2019). Although 
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English is widely spoken, the official language of Kuwait is Arabic. The 
population is 85% Muslim, with Protestant and Catholic Christians, 
Hindu and other religions combined to account for the remaining 15%. 
At 96%, the literacy rate in Kuwait is one of the highest in the world 
due to the government’s expenditure on education and the country’s 
free educational system. Kuwait can be viewed as the most democratic 
country in the Gulf region. Compared with other Gulf countries, it 
has a thriving democratic society with a democratic government. It 
is a constitutional hereditary monarchy ruled by descendants of the 
Al-Sabah family. Nonetheless, the legislative branch is democratically 
elected by Kuwaiti males and females over 21 years of age. Women 
gained the right to participate in elections and vote in 2006. Since 
women received the right to vote, almost all Kuwaitis vote; only military 
personnel are excluded.
Kuwait had been, for many centuries, an independent sheikhdom 
living on trade, fishing, and pearl harvesting. In the early eighteenth 
century, tribes such as Al-Utub and Al-Sabah fled to Kuwait from the 
Arabian Peninsula, away from danger and dispute with other tribes. 
After they had settled in the town of Kuwait, the small town developed 
into a commercial hub and began to thrive because of its location 
overlooking the head of the Arabian Gulf. This led Kuwait to become 
one of the most prosperous countries in the region. The Al-Utub and 
Al-Sabah tribes voted for Sabah bin Jaber Al-Sabah as their leader, or 
“governor,” in 1762. Although Kuwait has been ruled by 15 different 
rulers since its establishment by the Al-Sabah family, Sheikh Mubarak 
Al-Sabah (1896–1915) is seen as the founder of the modern Kuwaiti 
state. After being threatened with occupation by the Ottoman Empire, 
Mubarak Al-Sabah signed an agreement with the British, and Kuwait 
became a British protectorate from 1899 to 1961. 
After the discovery of oil and the beginning of its export in the 
middle of the twentieth century, Kuwait City and its villages witnessed 
a great urban renaissance. In addition, the country experienced a period 
of stability and prosperity driven by the oil resources and its liberal 
atmosphere. This was a turning point in the history of Kuwait. By 1952, 
the country had become the largest oil exporter in the Gulf, and this 
attracted many foreign workers to the state.
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In 1961, Kuwait declared its independence from Britain and called 
for elections for a constituent assembly, tasking it with drafting a new 
constitution (Salem, 2007). The assembly, however, was not the first 
of its kind in Kuwait. The democratic experience before Kuwait’s 
independence had major influences on the significant changes in 
its social and political life. The first elected legislative council was 
established in June 1938—with 150 voting members from elite 
families—for the purpose of advising the ruler on such matters as the 
creation of the economic and educational systems and the taxation 
system as well as the drafting of the first constitution. Kuwait is specific 
in the Arab region because of the participatory style of governing 
between the ruling family and the people, and it was among the first 
to draft a constitution and form an elected parliament, which it did 
in 1962. Although the constitution limited some legislative powers, it 
guaranteed civil liberties, such as equality, freedom of expression, and 
freedom of the press. 
After independence, the government supported a democratic 
constitution that granted significant power to the legislative branch 
(Kuwait National Assembly, 2019). Its constitution and the elected 
parliament set Kuwait apart as a political model and has inspired 
many countries in the Gulf and beyond to take similar measures (Asiri, 
2007). The participatory political system in Kuwait strengthened 
people’s political orientation and their interest in politics. This is 
reflected in the growing number of registered voters, a relatively 
high voter turnout, and the advanced nature of Kuwaiti elections’ 
advertising campaigns.
There are several sociocultural, political, and economic factors 
that have influenced Kuwaiti citizens to become more politically 
active compared with those in many Arab nations. First, there are the 
sociocultural factors related to the country’s original organization, which 
was based on tribal and Bedouin families. The tribal system enhanced 
political participation early in the country’s establishment when the 
three main power factors in the country (politics, business trading, sea 
trading) were divided among the leaders of the three main tribes. This 
suggests that the idea of participatory governance was embedded early 
in Kuwait’s history. 
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Historical Developments
Kuwait enjoys a more outspoken and critical media environment 
than most other nations in the Arab world. There is unrestricted news 
accessibility in Kuwait, with a large amount of media freedom that ranks 
the country as a “partly free” press system and the only Gulf country 
represented in this category (Freedom House, 2019). Thus, Kuwait’s 
media may be described as one of the most open media systems in the 
Middle East due to its diversity and early emergence. In particular, from 
the 1960s through the 1980s, Kuwaiti media became one of the most 
developed and influential media systems in the Middle East.
Yet, the Kuwaiti press was established rather late compared with the 
emergence of the first Arab newspaper in Egypt in the early nineteenth 
century. The Kuwaiti press began not as a government tool but as 
private endeavors (Al-Rasheed & Chenoufi, 2008). In February 1928, 
Abdulaziz Al-Rasheed published the first Kuwaiti magazine, Majalat 
Al-Kuwait. Although it did not last long and closed down after two years 
of publication, a new newspaper was published in 1947 by the House of 
Kuwait (student union) in Cairo, under the name of Al-Bitha. Al-Bitha 
played a prominent cultural role for the Kuwaiti students in Cairo as 
it covered news from the country and gave students the opportunity 
to express their viewpoints on political and social affairs. Al-Arabi 
magazine, one of the leading cultural magazines in the region, was 
established in December 1958 when the Kuwaiti government decided 
to publish a magazine concerned with Arab cultural affairs. Since its 
initial publication, Al-Arabi magazine has been keen to discuss Arab 
and international developments and cultural issues. The magazine has 
been a pioneer publication for leading Arab writers, poets, intellectual 
elites, and scholars, including Taha Hussain, Abbas Al-Akkad, Najib 
Mahfouz, Nizar Al-Qabbani, Abdel Hadi Tazi, Ihsan Abbas, Youssef 
Idris, Salah Abdel Sabour, Jaber Asfour, Farouk Shousha, and others. 
Since the publication of the first issue more than 50 years ago, Al-Arabi 
has become a cultural Arab symbol and has succeeded in introducing a 
new form of cultural magazine.
During World War II, only a few people in Kuwait owned radio 
devices, yet Kuwaitis used to gather in diwaniyas (cultural halls) to tune 
in to radio stations such as the BBC, Radio Cairo, and Radio Baghdad. 
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Inspired by this experience, Mubarak Al-Mayal, who served in the 
military, suggested using an old radio transmission device owned by 
the Ministry of Interior and the Kuwaiti military to set up a new radio 
station with the help of a Pakistani technician, Mohammed Khan 
(Al-Enezi, 2015).
“This is Kuwait” were the first words broadcast on-air, spoken by 
Mubarak Al-Mayal to announce the establishment of Kuwaiti radio on 
12 May 1951. Since then, Kuwait has taken serious steps to develop the 
station and introduce more diversified programs, while also extending 
the transmission time. In the 1960s, radio played a vital role in Kuwaiti 
lives during the period of independence. Radio has also played a 
leading role in guiding Kuwaiti public opinion, spreading the spirit 
of patriotism and national pride, for example, during Iraq’s threats to 
Kuwait’s independence in the 1960s. 
Television emerged in 1951 and was privately-owned by a local 
Radio Corporation of America (RCA) television dealer who wanted to 
promote television set sales. Later, the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah 
Al-Salem Al-Sabah, bought the television transmission from RCA to 
bring it under government control. Official broadcasting started on 15 
November 1961, and Kuwait TV became one of the earliest television 
stations broadcasting in the Arab world after the emergence of television 
in Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt and was the first and only broadcast 
operator in the Gulf region.
The Ministry of Information continued to develop Kuwait TV and 
bought the first outdoor shooting cameras and equipment in the region. 
The cameras attracted many Arab artists to Kuwait to shoot their music 
videos. This made the archive of Kuwait TV one of the most substantial 
visual libraries in the region. 
Initially, Kuwait TV broadcast its programs in black and white for 
four hours a day until mid-March of 1974. In 1974, color broadcasting 
began, followed by the grand opening of the new television building in 
the Ministry of Information complex in February 1979. 
At that time, television sets were costly, and citizens who were able 
to afford them shared their viewing with family and neighbors. Kuwaiti 
families who owned television sets used to have home cinema style 
gatherings where neighbors and friends gathered to watch shows and 
television series. 
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Kuwait TV soon became the leading broadcaster in the Gulf and 
many of its programs and soap operas were broadcast abroad. Since 
its emergence, Kuwait TV has been considered one of the best and has 
competed with Egyptian television, which was considered the leader 
at that time. During the 1970s and 1980s Kuwait TV produced the top 
dramas and shows in the region. At that time, most of the Gulf states did 
not have the infrastructure necessary for television broadcasting; thus, 
the Kuwaiti government opened a branch of Kuwait TV in the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), sending content and programs daily by air for 
UAE viewers. The leadership role of Kuwait television was not limited to 
helping other GCC countries establish their television. It also produced 
television dramas (soap operas) that aired in all Arab countries. The 
1980s marked Kuwaiti drama’s golden age, and Kuwait was named 
“Hollywood of the Gulf” due to the international popularity of its soap 
operas and theatre. This led many Gulf and Arab actors and performers 
to settle in Kuwait to establish their professional careers. 
The state took serious steps to improve the media technically 
and financially. However, the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s and, in 
particular, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war in 1990–
1991, resulted in an economic crisis which affected media development 
in Kuwait. Iraq bombed the Ministry of Information building as soon 
as it occupied Kuwait in an attempt to control the media and obscure 
the reality of what was happening. The attack on the Ministry’s 
building broke down the radio transmitters. However, shortly after the 
breakdown of the official radio transmission in the country, Kuwaitis 
rushed to transmit radio broadcasts from a military camp before 
moving to a new studio in the Dasma residential area and transmitting 
their broadcasts from Failaka Island. The transmission lasted only two 
days before the Iraqi army found out about the transmission in Failaka 
and closed it down. However, Kuwaiti media did not stop at that point 
but decided to continue to broadcast from Khafji in Saudi Arabia 
and Cairo, Egypt. During the invasion, Kuwaitis also launched the 
international radio station Sawt Al-Kuwait to address Kuwaitis at home 
and in the world. Sawt Al-Kuwait station, which aired from a secret site, 
helped Kuwaitis stay connected, voice their opinions, and support the 
legitimacy of the government. 
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However, after Kuwait was liberated in 1991, a rebuilding process 
took place based on a new and modern foundation. This process required 
a lot of effort because the invading troops had taken or damaged all the 
production equipment, including cameras, studios, tape recorders, and 
the archives, resulting in damage estimated to be USD 150 million. 
Political System and Legal Framework
During the second half of the twentieth century, Kuwait faced many 
political challenges that led to an ambivalent stance towards media and 
the freedom of expression. Since its establishment in 1963, the National 
Assembly has been dissolved eight times and early elections have been 
called for due to the impasse between the legislature and the government 
(Shayji, 2009). 
The continued conflict between the executive and the legislative 
branches has led to an increase in politically active movements in the 
country. For example, activist youth groups, opposition members of the 
government, and some members of parliament joined in a broad-based 
movement named “nabeha khams” (“We Want It Five”) in 2006, which 
aimed to shrink the number of electoral districts from 25 to 5, in order 
to minimize corruption in the voting system. This campaign involved 
street demonstrations, rallies, blog posts, and text messages, leading the 
government to call for new elections within a few weeks. In 2011, the 
opposition coalition also campaigned against the prime minister and 
his cabinet to end corruption in the National Assembly. The campaign, 
known as “irhal” (“Leave”), utilized many digital media tools, including 
YouTube videos, social media tools, and text messages.
More recently, Emir Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah issued a 
decree that amended the basic electoral law and decreased the number 
of votes allowed per person from four to one in elections for the National 
Assembly. The old voting system was perceived to enforce the tribal 
system, because people were used to electing a slate rather than dividing 
their votes among a larger group of candidates. Therefore, the new 
voting system of “one person, one vote” was thought to favor the less 
well-organized and more liberal Kuwaiti families. In a reaction to the 
Emir’s voting amendment, a coalition of young people, Sunni Islamists, 
tribal activists, and some liberals staged demonstrations, rallies, political 
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speeches, and sit-ins to campaign against the new voting system (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2019). Campaigns, such as “karamat watan” (“The 
Nation’s Dignity”) or “kate’a” (“Boycott”), used Twitter, Instagram, and 
YouTube as mobilization platforms for their election boycott campaigns. 
However, the supporters of the voting amendment also ran a political 
campaign on social media to raise the public’s awareness of the importance 
of voting as a civic duty. The “s’osharek” (“I’m Going to Participate”) 
campaign, for example, was organized by pro-government activists, 
former members of parliament, political candidates, and activists. The 
main objective of this campaign was to call for participation in support of 
the government and the sovereignty of the constitution. 
This active political sphere in Kuwait and the challenging relationship 
between Kuwaitis and their government have influenced the status 
of the media in the country. On the one hand, parts of the elite and 
the public have demanded a greater role in the democratic process by 
newspaper ownership and media influence. On the other hand, the 
Kuwaiti government continuously tries to impose control over the 
media. For example, the Kuwaiti government had imposed a total ban 
on issuing licenses for new newspaper publications since the mid-
1970s, leaving only five daily newspapers (owned and managed by 
elite business families) to operate until a change of the law in 2006. The 
total ban of newspaper licenses was imposed by the government to help 
them control, deal with, and censor their content. This ban, however, has 
resulted in Kuwaiti newspaper journalists facing pressure not from direct 
government control but from newspaper owners’ personal relationships 
with government officials. The close relationship that elite families 
and newspaper owners have with the government makes it difficult to 
freely criticize the government due to shared interests and fear of losing 
economic benefits from the government. In a television interview that 
was aired on Kuwait TV 1 in 2016, Al-Qabas newspaper’s editor-in-chief, 
Waleed Al-Nusif, admitted that owning a newspaper in Kuwait brings 
significant power and influence to the families that own them. In the same 
interview, he said that newspapers do not represent the whole society, 
although they “claim” they do, but their owners’ goals and interests do 
limit them. Nevertheless, Kuwaiti newspapers criticize the government 
organizations. In fact, newspapers are free for the most part to publish 
what they want, but only in accordance with the Press and Publications 
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Law (Dashti & Fadhli, 2011). However, newspapers tend to respect and 
follow the country’s political strategies and principles and, therefore, 
support the country’s policy, especially in its international affairs and 
relations.
In 2006, the Kuwaiti government passed a revision of the Press 
and Publication Law of 1961. It provided several reforms, including 
the government’s agreement to allow the publication of new daily 
newspapers, which ended the publication ban that had lasted three 
decades. Still, newspaper publishers are required to obtain an operating 
license from the Ministry of Information. The new law no longer 
classifies press offenses as crimes to be sanctioned with imprisonment, 
yet offenders can be charged with fines. The Press and Publication 
Law has also set limits to certain types of criticism, such as criticizing 
the Emir, scrutinizing Islam, or publishing information related to the 
national security. Violating these limits can result in criminal charges 
against the author and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper. 
The Internet is considered to be a relatively free medium in Kuwait and 
is protected by freedom of expression in Articles 36 and 37 of the Kuwaiti 
Constitution. Although the Internet is a means of communication and 
information, it is not regulated by the Ministry of Information but rather 
by the Communication and Information Technology Regulatory Authority 
(CITRA) under the supervision of the Ministry of Communication. 
Internet Despite the protection of freedom of expression by the Kuwaiti 
constitution, CITRA routinely blocks websites suspected of terrorism or 
inciting political instability and monitors Internet communication for 
defamation and security threats (Freedom House, 2019). Regardless of 
some government control on social media users, most Kuwaitis have 
unfiltered access to the Internet. Unrestricted social media use makes sense 
in a country that allows for a greater degree of freedom of expression than 
other countries in the GCC.
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Ownership in Kuwait can be characterized by a mix of limited 
privatization and governmental control. As for the press, since its 
emergence in the 1920s and expansion in the 1960s, Kuwait’s newspapers 
have been entirely individually owned. This means that newspapers 
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are owned by influential individuals of elite families in the Kuwaiti 
society, family partnerships, or joint stock organizations (Abu Shanab, 
1987). Although profits are the main objective for the establishment of 
a newspaper in Kuwait, it has proven to provide other benefits to its 
owners, such as political and social influence (Abu Shanab, 1987).  
Today, there are a total of 13 Arabic daily newspapers and three 
English dailies in Kuwait (Ministry of Information, 2019). The five 
newspapers that operated before the new press law in 2006 are still 
considered to be the most influential and include Al-Rai that started 
publication 1961, Al-Seyasah founded in 1965, Al-Qabas founded in 1972, 
Al-Watan which started publication in 1974, and Al-Anbaa founded in 
1976.
When it comes to radio, Kuwaiti radio offers nine specialized English 
and Arabic stations that are owned and managed by the Ministry of 
Information, including Al-Qur’an Al-Kareem, Super-station, Kuwait Radio 
One, OFM, Traditional Station, The Old Arabic Singing, Easy, and Kuwait 
Radio Two (Ministry of Information, 2019). Private radio emerged in 2005 
after the state domination of broadcast radio and television was eased by 
a ministerial order. Radio stations, such Marina FM and Nabth Al-Kuwait 
which are owned by the private sector, have changed the game. The 
government permission of private radio stations initiated competition 
which enriched the quality of the programs and professionalism of 
their presenters. Also, the emergence of private radio has increased 
advertising spending on this platform. Before private radio stations, 
advertisers had no great interest in radio because it was considered a 
government entity whose purpose was not to generate revenue. The 
establishment of private radio stations led the government to issue an 
Audio and Visual Media Law in 2007 to control and manage the private 
stations.
Similar to radio, the Kuwaiti government removed the state ban on 
private television in 2004 and granted the first television license to Al-Rai 
TV, followed by Al-Watan TV and Funoon TV, all owned by Kuwaiti 
business families, allowing for greater freedom and diversity of choice. 
The television licenses allowed the private sector to begin commercial 
broadcasting. The first private television, Al-Rai TV, followed by 
Al-Watan, offered daily news, documentaries, popular movies, talk 
shows, and late-night shows that gained huge popularity in the Kuwaiti 
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society. Although the government permitted the establishment of 
private television, new private operators needed to obtain media licenses 
from the Ministry of Information and sign a consent form agreeing to 
obey the law and abstain from shows that would “undermine public 
modesty.” Yet, state-owned television remains dominant, and the 
Ministry of Information broadcasts eight diversified satellite television 
channels, which also stream live on its website as well as through an 
Internet application that enables live television streaming on mobile 
phones (Ministry of Information, 2019). The eight channels are KTV1, 
KTV2, KTV Sports, KTV Ethra, KTV Arabe, Al-Qurain, KTV Sports Plus, 
and KTV Al-Majlis.
Technology and Infrastructure
Kuwait ranks first in terms of Internet penetration in the Middle East 
(followed by United Arab Emirates) with 100% of the population having 
access to the Internet. There are various economic and political reasons 
for such a high level of Internet penetration in Kuwait. In addition 
to bilingual education, which allows Kuwaitis to easily navigate the 
Internet, Kuwait’s gross domestic product per capita is very high, and as 
a result, most Kuwaitis can easily afford to buy the latest Internet-enabled 
communication technologies and maintain Internet subscriptions. 
The Kuwaiti government has taken serious steps towards the 
development of its e-government services and social media presence. 
The government has implemented laws and strategies to manage and 
control Internet service providers’ prices and the quality of their service. 
In 2012, for example, the Ministry of Communication issued a regulation 
that limited the maximum cost of an Internet subscription, reducing the 
fees of some providers by at least 40%. The main objective of the law was 
to maintain high quality and efficient services.
Another factor for the high Internet penetration in Kuwait is the high 
degree of mobile phone penetration in the country. Kuwaitis’ ability 
to purchase smartphones enhances their Internet accessibility and use 
of social media. A study of university students in Kuwait concluded 
that nearly 100% of participants already had Internet access at home in 
2010, while more than 75% had Internet access on their mobile phones 
(Wheeler & Mintz, 2010). Statistics also show that Kuwait’s mobile 
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phone penetration had reached 179% as of 2018, indicating that nearly 
every Kuwaiti has two mobile phones. A report also determined that 
100% of land area and population is covered by mobile networks, while 
the 4G LTE network has a 97% coverage according to the Consolidated 
Kuwait national ICT indicators report of 2016. Thus, the high mobile 
phone penetration in Kuwait fosters Internet usage as many Kuwaitis 
access the Internet and social media sites through their smartphones.
Statistics show that local Kuwaiti social media users prefer Twitter 
(73% of Internet users) over Facebook (41%). As for the expat community, 
figures differ with 88% of the Asian expats and 97% of the Arab expats 
using Facebook. Twitter is only used by 52% of the Arab expats and 35% 
of Asian expats living in Kuwait based on figures from the Consolidated 
Kuwait national ICT indicators report of 2016. Twitter gained great 
popularity in Kuwait and became an integral platform for political 
discussions and debate. Although Kuwait led the world in terms of 
Twitter penetration rate in 2014 (Saleh, 2016), it has been affected by 
government restrictions and electronic criminal laws which made users 
more aware of and practice self-censorship when engaging in political 
debate and criticism. Still, Twitter has been an important outlet for public 
opinion in Kuwait and political campaigning, and many government 
officials use Twitter for their press releases and as a tool for crisis 
management.
Instagram had 1.7 million users as of September 2018, and statistics 
show that nearly 93% of Kuwaitis were using the platform, while 
approximately 70% of Arab expats used it (CAIT, 2016). Instagram has 
gained great popularity in Kuwait and changed the way people shop 
for and advertise their products. People use it as an electronic storefront 
where they advertise their businesses, selling anything and everything 
(Greenfield, 2013). Also, Instagram’s boom in Kuwait is linked to social 
media influencers who use this site for their daily life by blogging and 
having live chats with their followers. 
Social media created a new media reality in Kuwait, one that offers 
a greater space for public debate and discussions of political events. 
Few can deny that social media have become an essential political tool 
in Kuwait and that Kuwaitis’ use of social networking sites has been 
described as the most “intriguing” in the Gulf region (Al-Qassemi, 
2011). This is because of the effective use of social networking sites for 
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participating in political discussions, grilling parliament members, and 
holding heated political debates. Scholars such as Wheeler and Mintz 
(2010) have argued that the citizens in Kuwait see a potential for political 
change through the Internet, and some recent usage trends indicate that 
social media are contributing effectively to the latest political movements 
in the country by enabling political mobilization and discussion. 
Interestingly, a tradition that materialized in the so-called diwaniyas, 
and stimulated high levels of interpersonal communication among 
citizens, offers one explanation for the political implications of social 
media. Traditionally, diwaniyas have been male social clubs, which also 
provided their members with an opportunity for political organization 
and mobilization. Diwaniyas were usually held in either halls attached 
to Kuwaiti houses or a separate building with a hall to receive guests, 
neighbors, and friends to discuss current events and exchange views. 
Even today, diwaniyas have preserved their importance and remain an 
essential part of the social, political, and economic life in Kuwait. 
However, contemporary diwaniyas have become more like political 
salons and cultural clubs; they are more organized and often feature 
planned events, specific topics of discussions, and guest speakers. 
However, it is still not widely accepted for women to join diwaniyas. A 
member of the ruling family, Rasha Al-Sabah, has held mixed diwaniyas 
where men and women sit together to discuss politics and several other 
issues. Similarly, Rula Dashti, a former minister and a former member of 
parliament in the Kuwaiti government, held female-only diwaniyas before 
her official appointment and, as a consequence, normalized the diwaniya 
culture for women (Tétreault, 2012). Najla Al-Naqi (lawyer) and Ghadeer 
Asiri (professor and social activist) also frequently hold mixed cultural 
gatherings, which are similar to the diwaniya concept, to discuss political 
and social issues and to invite guest speakers and the press.
At the same time, the emergence of social media is supplementing 
the traditional role of the diwaniyas. Studies have shown that the 
introduction of the Internet has affected diwaniya attendance negatively 
and that many young people would rather use the Internet than visit 
diwaniyas (Wheeler, 2003). However, it could be argued that the use 
of social media in Kuwait has become an extension of the diwaniyas, 
where people can interact with politicians and opinion leaders online, 
discuss politics among themselves, or simply express their opinions. 
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Thus, Kuwaitis’ high level of engagement on social media might be 
described as “virtual” diwaniyas, where public opinion is formed, news 
and political information are exchanged, and political opinions are 
expressed. 
Although the social media sphere is active in Kuwait and is seen as a 
hub for political participation and expression in the Gulf, it faces many 
challenges and hurdles. In 2016, the government issued Cyber Crimes 
Law No. 63 which was approved by the National Assembly and contains 
21 articles that aim to regulate online activities in Kuwait. Articles 4, 6, 
and 7 of the Cyber Crimes Law have concerned many activists and human 
rights advocates around the world. These articles could be used to limit 
freedom of expression on social media and could as well target online 
activists and online journalists. The law imposes severe restrictions on 
freedom of speech and allows the government to police online activities 
due to its vague and unclear terms. Therefore, this law can be described 
as a black point in Kuwait’s history of freedom of speech. 
Challenges
Since Kuwait’s independence in 1961 and the subsequent establishment of 
the constitution, Kuwaiti media have enjoyed a great amount of freedom 
unlike the media in many other Arab countries. The press, for example, 
has never been owned by the government, but is instead censored and 
regulated by laws. Therefore, the government has to go to court if it wants 
to take an action or revoke a license. However, critics have argued that 
going to court causes a lot of trouble for the government and provides 
extra publicity for the publication. Thus, Kuwaiti media, to some extent, 
criticize the government, and most newspapers publish opinion articles 
and editorials that encourage public dialogue and provide topics for 
discussion in the diwaniyas. There is no doubt that tight censorship and 
government control of the media would lead to resistance and political 
unrest, and as control is less tight than in other countries, Kuwait remained 
relatively calm during the Arab uprisings in 2011 because opposition 
views were absorbed rather than silenced. The Kuwaiti media created an 
open political arena for the exchange of opinions and allowed criticism. 
However, with the exception of a few cases, the Kuwaiti press has always 
practiced a degree of self-discipline and self-censorship to avoid clashing 
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with the government. Nevertheless, this self-censorship has its price and 
has affected the quality of journalism.
Today, as in many other countries, newspaper readership is declining 
in Kuwait and many newspapers are budget cutting in their operations 
by shrinking the number of pages or by laying off their journalists and 
employees. The decline in newspaper readership cannot go unnoticed or 
be denied. Many newspapers have started to disseminate their printed 
editions for free in governmental institutions, banks, and supermarkets 
in order to gain higher numbers in their circulation and readership. Also, 
newspapers have discontinued publishing on Saturdays in order to lower 
their expenses. Furthermore, the Internet and free news accessibility via 
social media have affected advertising revenue of newspapers. Many 
advertisers (the main source of revenue for Kuwaiti newspapers) have 
redirected their newspaper spending to social media advertising and 
other outlets such as influencers’ endorsements. In addition, social 
media and online sources have provided uncensored news and publish 
more freely, which has affected journalism in Kuwait to a great degree. 
Other challenges the Kuwaiti media face are those related to the press 
law and the Ministry of Information’s direct control and management 
of broadcasting. The 2006 Press and Publication Law is seen as an 
improvement on the old law because of new press licensing and the ban 
on journalists’ imprisonment without final court orders. However, the 
new law still limits what Kuwait’s 1962 constitution guarantees, freedom 
of expression and freedom of the press. Moreover, the government 
proposed some amendments to the 2006 Press and Publication Law 
in 2010, an action that was described by legal experts as making a law 
that was somewhat strict into a very restrictive one. Some people have 
argued that the law will not necessarily stop people from writing but will 
make them lose their motivation to do so. Moreover, it is important to 
note that censorship is tolerated in Kuwait and expected as a form of civic 
responsibility. This civic responsibility makes journalists feel that they are 
protectors of the state, resulting in a culture of self-censorship to protect 
national security. On the other hand, broadcast media face tighter control 
mechanisms than print journalism in Kuwait because of their mass 
audience features, and the state has mostly continued its dominance in 
this sector. 
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In August 2020, the National Assembly approved several 
amendments to the Press and Publication Law that lifted the Ministry 
of Information’s control over and censorship of publications, mainly 
books, imported into the country. These amendments have been seen 
as an important step towards more media freedom after years of fierce 
battle and the banning of 5,000 books over the last seven years. However, 
many people argue that this end to the Ministry of Information’s control 
over publications has simply shifted the power of censorship and control 
from the executive branch to the judicial branch. 
Outlook 
The further development of Kuwaiti media will require major media 
policy reforms. Kuwaiti media need a structural independence from the 
government and the parliament so that their television professionals, 
journalists, and program producers can act more freely and express 
their creativity without government control and censorship. Although 
newspaper ownership is privately organized, papers are still bound by 
hidden government rules and regulations. Therefore, unconditional 
freedom of the press in Kuwait is necessary in order to further develop 
journalism and its practices. 
The media industry in Kuwait has been highly influenced by 
the rapid technological developments. Digital media is taking over 
traditional media, and many daily newspapers have closed down, while 
others have introduced augmented and virtual reality news stories in 
addition to their digital newspapers. Nevertheless, the media are facing 
huge challenges in terms of revenue due to the social media advertising 
boom and the dominance of influencer marketing. Moreover, media 
platforms are trying very hard to catch up with the people’s changing 
habits of media consumption and the emerging new trends in mobile 
media. In the end, technology alone cannot make a successful media 
unless it is creative and content rich. Despite the fact that Kuwaiti media 
are adopting the latest technologies, freedom of expression remains an 
essential factor for their development. Kuwait needs an independent 
regulator that can manage and regulate Kuwaiti media. In addition, 
Kuwaiti media must increase their transparency and reduce the Ministry 
of Information’s control and management of theircontent.
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11. Oman: Time for  
Fundamental Changes 
Abdullah K. Al-Kindi
This chapter examines the most prominent milestones in the 
development of mass media in the Sultanate of Oman, and the 
relationship between media and the political system as well as the 
legislative frameworks regulating media work in the Sultanate. 
At the end of this chapter, the author also discusses a number 
of challenges facing the Omani media, which are structural, 
legislative, and professional in nature. The author argues that the 
conditions and developments in the media industry globally and 
regionally seem to be conducive to bringing about fundamental 
changes in the media system in Oman, but those changes are 
totally linked to the political system’s desire and decision to make 
these changes. 
Background
On 23 July 1970, the Sultanate of Oman witnessed the beginning of a 
new political era led by Sultan Qaboos bin Said, succeeding his father, 
Sultan Said bin Taimur (1910–1972), who had ruled Oman for nearly 
38 years from 1932–1970 (Marefa, 2019). At the beginning of his reign, 
Sultan Qaboos faced a communist movement in the southern part of the 
country, which had been launched in 1965. The new political system was 
able to suppress that movement in 1975 with international support led 
by the United Kingdom and the participation of some regional powers, 
mainly Iran and Jordan. This new political era, called “contemporary 
Oman,” was characterized by comprehensive development, especially 
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in education, health, and social development, and a return to the culture 
and heritage that has always been a staple of Oman. The contemporary 
Oman is also characterized by the consolidation of the idea of a civil 
state through the implementation of laws and legislation in various 
fields, and the organization of a civil service sector, which has witnessed 
several developments in the period from 1970 until today.
Oman is located in the southeast of the Arabian Peninsula and has 
land borders with three Arab countries: the United Arab Emirates to 
the northwest, Saudi Arabia to the west, and Yemen to the southwest. It 
also has maritime borders with Iran and Pakistan. The coastline of the 
Sultanate of Oman stretches over 1,700 kilometers, and the total area of 
the Sultanate is estimated at 310 square kilometers. 
This geopolitical location led the Sultanate to establish a continuous 
interactive relationship with different countries in its neighborhood. 
One of the most important achievements of contemporary Oman was 
the signing of border agreements with the neighboring countries of 
Saudi Arabia (1991), Yemen (1992), and the UAE (1999), and maritime 
border agreements with Pakistan (2000) and Iran (2015).
The Sultanate places great emphasis on the establishment of friendly 
and equal relations with countries worldwide, noninterference in the 
internal affairs of others, and respect for international laws, covenants, 
and customs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Today, Oman has 
extensive diplomatic relations with many countries worldwide. It was 
a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and has 
maintained its membership since 1981, and it has been a member of 
the Arab League and the United Nations since 1970, as well as being 
a member of various other regional and international organizations 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).
Oman has also avoided engaging in wars or conflicts with any of its 
neighboring countries or getting involved in conflicts have taken place 
between them in the period from 1970 to the present. Perhaps the only 
exception to this was its participation in the war to liberate Kuwait after 
the Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990, as part of the joint military forces 
of the GCC. The Sultanate takes the role of a political and diplomatic 
mediator among its neighbors rather than taking sides between them 
and other countries of the world. It solidified this role by hosting the 
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signing of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries 
(USA, Russia, China, UK, France, and Germany) in 2015 (Gupta, 2015). 
Arabic is the official language of the Sultanate, used throughout 
governmental and educational institutions, and it is the language 
of social, cultural, and media discourse. English is the second most 
widely-used language, especially in the private sector and university 
education and, particularly, in the fields of science and technology. In 
addition to Arabic, the population speaks certain ethnic languages that 
reflect the sociocultural diversity of the Sultanate. In northern Oman, 
some residents speak Swahili, which they acquired and inherited from 
their ancestors during the Omani presence in East Africa, in general, 
and Zanzibar, in particular. Some people in the north also speak 
Baluchi, which was the result of the extension of Omani empire in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Asia and around the Indian 
Ocean, particularly Gwadar and Mekran, as well as other languages 
such as Zadjali and Sindhi (Al-Balushi, 2015, p. 9). Some speak Shihi, 
particularly in Musandam, located in the far north of Oman. In the south 
of the country, the population speaks Arabic as well as the languages or 
dialects of ancient South Arabic, such as Shahriyah, Jabaliya, Harsusia, 
and Btahriya. This multilingualism reflects the human and cultural 
diversity in the Sultanate (Al-Mashani, 2003). 
The latest statistics by the National Center for Statistics and 
Information show that, as of September 2019, the population of the 
Sultanate of Oman is now 4.8 million, of whom 57% are Omani nationals 
and 43% are expatriates. Notably, approximately 74% of the expatriates 
in Oman are from India and Bangladesh (36.9% from India and 36.8% 
from Bangladesh) (National Center for Statistics & Information, 2019). 
Oman consists of 11 governorates or geographic regions with 61 
local states. The features of modernity in contemporary Oman include 
attention to education, health, parliament, arts and literature, and other 
areas where the state has achieved advanced results as a modern nation. 
Historical Developments
Oman could be considered a latecomer in terms of its introduction of 
mass media in comparison with other Arab countries. The first radio 
station was established in Oman in Muscat on 30 July 1970. This radio 
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station was only one kilowatt and was transmitted to limited areas of the 
capital city (Al-Mashiaki, 2015, p. 32). 
However, several recent studies have indicated the possibility that 
Oman had established several radio stations before that time, pointing 
to the likely beginning of Radio Muscat in the 1960s. Another radio 
station was established in the southern city of Salalah in 1961, Radio 
Al-Hisen, however the transmission of this radio station and its activity 
was limited and therefore did not reach the general public (Ministry of 
Heritage and Culture, 2013, pp. 66–67). 
Printed periodicals initially appeared in Oman with the establishment 
and publication of Al-Watan for the first time on 28 January 1971, as a 
private newspaper founded by Nasr bin Mohammed Al-Taie. Al-Watan 
is still published today. 
It should be noted here that Omanis knew and practiced journalism 
as a profession before 1970, but this was done outside the borders of 
contemporary Oman. Some Omani pioneer journalists established 
newspapers on the island of Zanzibar in the early twentieth century. 
Omani presence in East Africa, specifically on the island of Zanzibar, 
dates back to the seventh century, when the first Omani families and 
individuals migrated to Zanzibar and East Africa as well. The official 
Arab Omani ruling of Zanzibar lasted for more than a century; from 
1832–1964 (Al-Kindi, 2004, p. 48). Omanis were responsible for many 
cultural and civilizational influences, journalism and newspapers being 
one example. The first of these was Al-Najah, founded by Nasser bin 
Salim bin Odeiam Al-Rawahi in 1911. Al-Falaq was founded by the Arab 
Society in Zanzibar in 1929, Al-Murshid by Ahmad bin Saif Al-Kharousi 
in 1942, and Al-Nahda by Sayyed Saif bin Hamoud Al-Said in 1951 
(Al-Kindi, 2004, pp. 71–72). 
While it is important that the founders of these newspapers were 
all Omani and most of their coverage was devoted to local Zanzibar 
events, it is also worth noting that these newspapers were interested 
in covering the news of Oman and described it as the “motherland” or 
“great homeland” (Al-Kindi, 2004, pp. 86–87). 
These newspapers ceased publication in 1964 or even earlier, as the 
AfroShirazi Party led a revolt against the regime and against the Arab 
presence in Zanzibar on 12 January 1964, a date that marked the end 
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of the Arab presence and the rule of the Omani Al-Said family on the 
island of Zanzibar (Al-Riyami, 2009, pp. 367–77). 
Television began broadcasting as a state-funded project across Oman 
on 18 November 1974 and has since witnessed several developments 
in its programs, broadcasting hours, and program quality. Oman News 
Agency (ONA) was established in 1986 as an official source of news and 
information, especially from the government. In 1997, the Internet was 
extended for public use, and in 2004, journalists and media personalities 
established their professional society, the Omani Journalists Association. 
Political System and Legal Framework 
Since 1970, the mass media in Oman have witnessed remarkable 
developments, especially in terms of increasing the number of media 
outlets, content, and policies governing media environment. Today, 
there are 12 radio and six television channels broadcasting in Oman. 
Ownership of radio and television channels in Oman is divided 
equally between the government and the private sector in an attempt 
to balance ownership and to avoid monopolization by a single sector. 
The number of radio channels outnumbers television channels by 
a 12 to 6 ratio, which is related to the higher costs of investment in 
television channels. Therefore, the financially more potent government 
is the investor and operator of four television channels through the 
Public Authority for Radio and Television versus two private television 
channels. As for the ownership of radio channels, the private sector is 
ahead of the government sector. In terms of the interests of these radio 
and television channels, most of them tend to be of general interest (13 
general radio and television channels versus five specialized channels). 
This reflects a lack of interest in specialized fields and the desire of 
these channels to reach out to different audiences and, thus, achieve 
adequate financial and advertising revenues to ensure their survival 
and continuity. As for the language used on these channels, Arabic 
dominates in 13 radio and television channels out of 18, compared with 
four in English, and one in Arabic and English. 
The dominance of the Arabic language is expected, although it 
overlooks large groups of residents in Oman who do not speak Arabic 
or English, especially those coming to work in the Sultanate from 
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the Indian subcontinent. There is no media to address them in their 
language.
Printed periodicals have witnessed many developments in Oman. 
According to the Ministry of Information (2018), there are about 84 
periodicals published in Oman, including seven dailies, the most 
important of which are Al-Watan, Oman, Al-Shabiba, and Times of Oman. 
The private sector owns more daily newspapers and is also ahead of the 
government sector in its establishment of these newspapers. The private 
sector established the first daily newspaper in Arabic in 1971, and this 
sector also founded the first daily newspaper in English in 1975. 
More than half of all Omani periodicals are owned and published 
by governmental and semi-governmental entities. These kinds of 
periodicals, however, could be described as public relations publications 
representing the concerned entities (Ministry of Information, 2018). 
Unfortunately, there are no known or reliable circulation figures 
for the printed periodicals in the Sultanate, and there is no system for 
publishing and disclosing these figures to the public. However, these 
numbers are made available to advertisers in a very limited way. 
The mass media in Oman have been an essential part of the Omani 
regime’s project to build a modern state. Therefore, the establishment 
and emergence of mass media in contemporary Oman has been linked 
to the desire of the new political system, led by Sultan Qaboos bin Said 
since 1970, to employ these means in his comprehensive development 
project. The media is therefore meant to document the achievements 
of the Omani regime in various fields, comment on them, and 
provide the audience with appropriate explanations to support these 
achievements. 
The political system in Oman is a hereditary monarchy, and the 
sultan is the head of goverment, the prime minister, and the final 
arbiter in all state affairs. The media system reflects the orientations 
of the authoritarian political system in which the mass media cannot 
violate the orientations of that regime or act contrary to its views (Abu 
Zaid, 1986). News stories sometimes note a departure from the general 
political orientation in one country or another, but such stories are 
rare, and are not representative of a mass media that is subject to an 
authoritarian political regime. 
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In Oman, the mass media are subject to direct and indirect regime 
control through specific institutions. The Public Authority for Radio 
and Television, as a governmental entity, supervises and operates five 
public radio and television channels, four of which are Oman TV, Oman 
Cultural Channel, Oman Radio, and Oman Youth Radio. The Ministry of 
Information also directly supervises and operates two daily newspapers 
in Arabic and English in addition to a quarterly cultural magazine 
and the Oman News Agency. Private broadcasting outlets are under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Information, which also regulates the 
work of these channels and gives them permission to broadcast. A special 
committee in the Ministry of Information is in charge of monitoring 
these channels. The Ministry of Information, through its publication’s 
unit, also supervises all government and private print publications 
issued in the Sultanate. According to the Press and Publications Law of 
1984, the Ministry of Information is the authority responsible for issuing 
licenses for the government and private publications. 
Online media are subject to the technical supervision of the 
Information Regulatory Authority through the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Law of 2002. However, there is no specific government body 
responsible for licensing or permitting electronic online publications or 
radio and television channels. When any individual or company opts 
to produce any media using the Internet, they need to get a special 
domain assigned from within the Sultanate through the Information 
Technology Authority or register outside internationally. Thus, regime 
entities control the content published by both government and private 
mass media through a set of laws and legislation, as well as general 
policies and practices. 
The public receives free radio and television broadcasts and buys 
daily newspapers and publications at nominal prices. A daily newspaper 
costs Bz 200 (USD 0.52), and the value of other periodicals offered for 
sale is not more than OMR 1 (USD 2.60). Many institutional publications 
are provided to ministries and companies free of charge.
Litigation procedures in case of any violation of the applicable 
laws include administrative procedures carried out by the Ministry of 
Information, as stated in the Press and Publications Law of 1984, and 
judicial procedures if the concerned people decide to take it further. 
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Economy and Ownership Patterns
Ownership of the mass media in Oman is divided between the 
government and the private sector. Private sector investments are more 
interested in radio stations, while investments in television channels 
remain limited. One potential reason for this is the relatively high 
financial cost required to invest in the establishment of a television 
channel compared with the fewer technical requirements for founding 
a radio station. Another reason is that the advertising market in the 
Sultanate remains limited compared with that in other countries in the 
region, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. 
Most of the private mass media companies in Oman can be described 
as family-owned businesses. Al-Watan, the first Omani Arabic daily 
newspaper, is owned by the Al-Taie family. Similarly, the Times of Oman 
(founded in 1975) and Al-Shabiba (founded in 1993) are owned by the 
Al-Zidjali family. The Al-Roya newspaper (founded in 2009) is owned 
by another member of the Al-Taie family, which is the case for quite a 
few of these newspapers and periodicals. These families invest mainly 
in media, but also hold certain other businesses, since they either belong 
to the business elite or maintain a strong relationship with them and 
organize their media activities through publishing houses. 
Ownership laws in the Sultanate allow a single company to own more 
than one media outlet and to exist as “multi-activity” companies. This 
has allowed some companies to publish different newspapers using both 
Arabic and English languages since the 1990s. For example, the Omani 
Institution for Press, Printing, Publishing and Distribution, which has 
published Al-Watan since 1971, started publishing the Oman Tribune, a 
free weekly newspaper, in 2004, Futon in 2005, and a free weekly sports 
newspaper, Al-Malaeb, in 2007. 
Recently, some media companies have been diversifying their media 
activities. Muscat House for Press, Publishing and Distribution—which 
has owned the Times of Oman (in English since 1975), Al-Shabiba (in 
Arabic since 1993), and a free weekly newspaper, Al-Youm Al-Sabi’, since 
2007—established a radio station, Shabiba Radio, in 2018. The same is 
true for Al-Roya Press and Publishing, which has published the Arabic 
daily newspaper Al-Roya since 2009, and launched Al-Roya Radio Voice 
in 2017. 
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Allowing media companies to engage in multiple enterprises and 
outlets and, thus, encouraging a certain diversity of the means owned by 
them is a positive and healthy phenomenon that reflects the potential of 
these companies, their desire to expand within the market, and to get a 
greater share of advertising. This trend also reflects the state’s confidence 
in these companies, their media line, and their relationships with the 
political system. But this trust may also evolve into a kind of monopoly 
or centralization of the mass media in the hands of a limited and narrow 
group of families and individuals who own these companies. 
The economic system in the Sultanate allows private companies to 
own mass media in accordance with limited rules and conditions, the 
most important of which is the existence of financial efficiency, and the 
stipulation that over 50% of the company’s capital and shares are owned 
by Omani nationals. The Sultanate has not attracted international 
investment in the media sector, perhaps due to economic laws that do 
not provide enough incentives in this regard, or because the media 
environment in the Sultanate is not encouraging enough to attract 
international media companies to operate from there in free media cities, 
as is the case in the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar, and Jordan. 
Oman is not expected to open its doors to international investment 
in the field of media, as Dubai has already done for nearly 20 years or as 
Qatar has recently begun to do. From a political point of view, opening 
up to international investments might contradict the policy of neutrality 
and noninterference in foreign affairs, and there is also a concern that 
the state would lose its control over the media sector in such a scenario. 
International investors might require greater freedom of expression to 
say what they want in their media, which could cause embarrassment to 
the Oman on the world-stage. 
Oman is classified as one of the Gulf Arab oil countries, which rely on 
oil as a main source of national income. According to the latest statistics 
and reports for 2019, the state’s revenues from oil and gas reached OMR 
7.4 billion (USD 19.7 billion), which comprises about 74% of its total 
revenue (PWC Middle East, 2019). 
However, Oman’s oil and gas revenues remain modest compared 
with those of other countries in the Gulf region, outperforming only 
Bahrain in oil revenues in the region. Since the beginning of the 
development movement in contemporary Oman, the state economic 
190 Arab Media Systems
situation has positively impacted the media. The oil revenues that have 
flowed since the 1970s have helped to establish and develop many mass 
media outlets. 
These revenues have also helped the government to support mass 
media institutions, especially in the form of donations and direct 
financial support, or advertisements, subscriptions, and tax exemptions. 
It was only in the mid-1990s that the state ended direct financial support 
of private newspapers and magazines in Oman. As the world witnessed 
a decline in oil prices beginning in 2015, the Omani regime reduced 
spending on advertising in the media and subscriptions, which affected 
many private mass media outlets, particularly newspapers, some of 
which reduced their publication frequency, number of pages, or stopped 
publishing altogether.
Technology and Infrastructure
Oman has a well-developed technical infrastructure and is categorized 
by some international reports on the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region as one of the countries that invests most heavily in 
infrastructures that enable people to continuously use and spread 
technology. One report stated that “since 2007 Oman has completed 
fifty-four infrastructure projects, which is the highest number of any 
MENA country” (Göll & Zwiers, 2018, p. 3). 
However, the problem of slow network speed should also be noted, 
especially in some remote areas or those affected by mountainous 
terrain. Calls to improve network services and reach all regions 
without exception continue to be made, as well as demands to reduce 
service pricing to enable the widest use. Regarding mobile telephony, 
the number of mobile and smart phone subscriptions is widespread. 
According to the latest statistics, there are about 6.7 million device 
subscriptions which amounts to 133% of the total population (Kemp, 
2019).
Telecommunications services were once limited to a single company, 
OmanTel. Today there are six telecommunications service providers; 
only one of them is semi-governmental (OmanTel), while the rest are 
private and owned by Omani companies. These companies are under 
the supervision of a government authority, the Telecommunications 
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Regulatory Authority (TRA), which is responsible for issuing, 
classifying, and regulating work permits. In general, the contents 
of telecommunications and the Internet are subject to unspoken 
censorship. Advanced techniques are used for sorting, categorizing, 
and blocking certain content classified by government entities as 
“unaccepted contents,” specifically those regarding political, social, or 
cultural issues, or any others considered sensitive. 
Regarding Internet reach and saturation in Oman, the latest 
statistics as of mid-2019 indicate that the number of Internet users in 
the Sultanate reached 3.7 million users, a figure representing 80% of 
the total population. The number of social network accounts in the 
Sultanate has reached about 2.5 million of Internet users, and Facebook 
is ahead of other social platforms in terms of the number of users in 
Oman, attracting about 1.8 million users (Kemp, 2019). 
Despite the many and varied options offered by state-of-the-
art technology in all fields, including the media, traditional media 
companies are still in a slow transitional phase of integrating electronic 
publishing into their activities. Some of these publishing houses still 
place more emphasis on the hard copy and have not yet improved their 
electronic versions or linked them appropriately to social networks. 
Some traditional newspapers have not yet started using electronic 
applications in smartphones. In general, traditional newspapers and 
periodicals in Oman remain reluctant to undergo digital transformation.
This reluctance may be related to the lack of financial resources to 
bring about digital transformation appropriately. Beyond the traditional 
media, there are evolving initiatives to employ technology in media work. 
Almost eight full private electronic newspapers are published in Oman, 
along with a number of news sites and applications, most notably Atheer, 
Al-Falaq, Wahag Al-Khaleej, and Wejhatt. Recently, some digital podcasts 
have emerged as private projects. The creative digital content industry is 
also evolving in Oman and is being led by small businesses and individual 
initiatives that need more support for greater success in the future.
The technology resources available today in Oman are capable of 
developing both the traditional and new media sectors, and employing 
digitization for the ultimate benefit of the media content consumer. 
Nonetheless, there remains a strong need for further encouragement 
and support of this transition. 
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Challenges 
The main challenges facing the current media system in Oman can 
be divided into three types: structural, regulatory, and professional 
challenges.
The political system in Oman deals with the media outlets—
both governmental and private—as non-independent, subordinate 
forces. Accordingly, the regime controls the media, their orientations, 
and their content through certain laws, or even through direct and 
indirect instructions for media outlets to take certain positions or 
avoid covering certain stories or events. This trend imposes a pattern 
of “government media” in which there is little room for disagreement 
or criticism, especially regarding policies of the regime. A more public 
service-oriented media could ensure more space for a freer and more 
independent media. 
One of the structural challenges facing the media system in Oman 
is the absence of a clear strategy directing media work in the country. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no written or published 
strategy for media in the Sultanate, despite the importance of strategic 
planning in this field. 
In addition to these challenges, there are several official institutions 
supervising and directing media work in Oman. This multiplicity 
is confusing, hampers media development, and leads to overlaps in 
tasks and responsibilities. For example, the Ministry of Information 
supervises all publications and private radio and television channels, 
as well as the Oman News Agency. At the same time, the Public 
Authority for Radio and Television operates and manages five radio 
stations and four television channels. Both the Ministry and the 
Authority work independently from one another and do not officially 
cooperate. The new media and its various applications are technically 
under the supervision and operation of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications through the TRA and the Information Technology 
Authority (ITA). As for the new media, there is no specific body to 
supervise or even license these types of media outlet. In 2017, the 
Communications Center for Government Services was established. 
This institution is a central public relations agency whose main 
objective is to provide positive images about the regime’s performance. 
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It is affiliated with the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers 
and operates independently of the abovementioned media institutions, 
even if it cooperates with them to accomplish its various tasks. In order 
to overcome this supervisory chaos, the author proposes that these 
separate institutions be put under the supervision of a single umbrella 
institution in the form of a national media council to oversee these 
bodies and set broader policies for media work in the Sultanate. 
Furthermore, the media legislative and regulatory frameworks in the 
Sultanate are outdated and not in line with the technical and objective 
changes witnessed in the media environment inside and outside the 
Sultanate. The Press and Publications Law, which is considered the most 
important legal document for regulating media work in the Sultanate, 
was first issued in 1984 and does not cover many of the changes in 
the media sector, especially in the area of new media and its various 
applications. 
Because of the multiplicity of institutions operating and supervising 
media institutions, there are also numerous laws relating to media 
institutions. When assessing the organization of media work in 
the Sultanate, it is not only the Press and Publications Law (1984), 
Telecommunications Regulations Law (2002), and Radio and Television 
Private Establishments Law (2004) that must be considered, but also 
some other laws which have separate legal articles related to media 
work, such as the Penal Code (1974), the Commercial Companies 
Law (1974), the Trade Law (1990), and the Law of Declaring a State of 
Emergency (2008).
The Omani media also face professional challenges. Perhaps, first 
and foremost is the human and financial inability to incorporate the 
elements of media convergence, especially in the private sector outlets. 
There are limited possibilities for the current institutions to achieve this, 
and initiatives for media convergence on the level of media institutions 
and the messages they provide are lacking, along with the multimedia 
skills of journalists and media professionals. 
Another professional challenge facing the Omani media is the 
absence of accurate indicators of public attitudes and their requirements 
from media in terms of programs and messages. There are, to the best of 
the author’s knowledge, no monitoring centers for public opinion that 
can help the media in formulating their messages in more useful and 
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influential ways. The National Center for Statistics and Information, 
established in 2012, may help to provide some information about the 
public’s preferences, but it cannot serve as a professional center for 
measuring public opinion.
On the other hand, there is no accurate information on the Omani 
media’s competitiveness, level of access and influence, circulation, 
distribution, readership, listenership, viewership, or other important 
information that might help in judging the performance of these media, 
and measuring their public presence and influence. 
Outlook
Looking to the future, two fundamental changes are required. The first 
is related to the traditional media and requires a major political decision. 
The second is being led by the new media, and could be described as a 
gradual shift that began a while ago thanks to the efforts of individual 
citizens. On the level of traditional media, the future Omani media 
scene will require major restructuring. First and foremost, a shift away 
from the government media model is necessary in order to reduce the 
regime’s control over media work and media outlets. In spite of difficulty 
of accepting this model, the Sultanate has important capabilities and 
experiences that can help in this gradual transition, which would require 
a political decision to start the process. 
On the level of new media, social networks in particular have 
given individuals the opportunity to express themselves more freely, 
present their different views and readings to governmental and 
non-governmental institutions, and critique these institutions in an 
unprecedented manner. It can be argued that new media have provided 
a more dynamic, free, and diverse public space than traditional media. 
However, the content, attitude and level of criticism of state institutions 
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12. Yemen: Unsettled Media for an 
Unsettled Country
Abdulrahman M. Al-Shami
Throughout history, successive governments in Yemen have 
realized the importance of the media. Consequently, they have 
tightened the grip on the media by imposing a monopoly on 
ownership and by selecting editors-in-chief and other leading 
positions to ensure complete media control. Thus, media have 
functioned as a voice for the government rather than a voice 
for the public. A slight change has occurred since the Yemeni 
unification in 1990 in terms of allowing limited ownership and 
freedom of expression. However, as a result of the long monopoly 
and mismanagement, media in Yemen are facing huge challenges 
at the levels of infrastructure, technology, regulation, freedom of 
expression, training, and professionalism. 
Background
Located in the southernmost portion of the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Republic of Yemen is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Arabian 
Sea and Gulf of Aden to the south, the Sultanate of Oman to the east, 
and the Red Sea to the west. In 2019, the population exceeded 29 million, 
with a growth rate estimated at more than 3% per year.
Yemen was for a long time divided in two parts. Before 1962, 
northern Yemen was under the rule of the Zaydi Imamate from 898 to 
1962 until a revolution erupted in September 1962. Southern Yemen was 
under British colonial administration from 1839 to 1967 until another 
revolution began on 14 October 1967 (Varisco, 2017). In 1990, the two 
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Yemens—the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen or South Yemen 
and the Arab Republic of Yemen or North Yemen—unified and became 
one country under the name of the Republic of Yemen.
Yemen is a traditional society that has entered the era of 
modernization only recently, where tribes and clans stand out as active 
in and determinant of social structure (Al-Salahi, 2012, p. 14). The tribes 
have had a significant impact on Yemen and its social structure since 
ancient times. Under the modern state structure, the tribes still play a 
pivotal role in Yemen’s political life (Rabe’e, 2012, p. 28). Tribal leaders 
and clans are the basis of state authority in rural areas (Al-Mawla, 2011, 
p. 121).
Most of Yemen remains religiously divided, with the Shi’a Zaydi 
school dominant in the north, and the Sunni Shafi’i School most common 
in the south and along the Red Sea Coast (Varisco, 2017). Sunnis 
represent about 70% of the population and Zaydis about 30%. There 
are also two minorities, one of which is an Ismaili sect that is classified 
as part of the Shi’ites, and the other is Jews, most of whom emigrated 
to Israel in the late 1940s as part of an organized plan to evacuate them 
from Yemen (Al-Salahi, 2012, p. 15). Some of the remaining Jews have 
migrated to Israel recently due to conflict and threats, mainly from 
the Houthis. The current state constitution defines Yemen as an Arab, 
Islamic state, and Islamic Shar’ia law is the basis for all legislation. The 
Arabic language is the official and dominant language in society and all 
aspects of life, as well as in the educational system. 
According to the Yemeni Constitution, the political system of Yemen 
is based on political and party pluralism. The authorities are divided 
into three independent entities: the executive authority, represented by 
the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, the legislative 
authority, and the judiciary. However, actual practice reflects that full 
control of the executive lies in the hands of the president, as opposed to 
the other ministers (Al-Salahi, 2012, p. 16).
The Yemeni economy in the two Yemens, both before and after 
unification, is a rent-based economy. This type of economy has led to the 
fragility of the state, a lack of power and legitimacy, encouragement of 
non-official groups to rebel against the state, and a lack of stability on the 
economic, political, and social levels (Al-Fakih, 2012, p. 31).
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Many factors have led to enduring political conflict, which has 
been ongoing over the last three decades: corruption, marginalized 
democracy, and a lack of political reform, as well as a failure to embrace 
the collective stance needed to build a modern state. This includes, but 
is not limited to, the secessionist movement in the south and the Houthi 
movement in the north, which culminated after the Arab uprisings in 
2011. One year into the uprising, then-president Ali Abdallah Saleh 
stepped down after more than three decades in power and left a political 
vacuum in the country. Yemen’s political elite acceded to the Gulf 
initiative in November 2011, which established a caretaker transitional 
government. The agreement, which was signed in Riyadh on 23 
November 2011, stipulated a two-year transitional period and created a 
National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as a forum to solve the country’s 
political problems (Schmitz, 2014). The Conference, which lasted for 
almost one year, concluded with agreement on most of the controversial 
and critical issues as well as a future road map. Thus, Yemen was 
referred to as one of the success stories of the Arab uprisings. Yet, within 
months, a rebel group, the Houthis, took over the Amran governorate 
and other important military camps and facilities. Motivated by popular 
frustrations over deteriorating living circumstances and lack of political 
reforms (Clausen, 2015), the Houthi forces and forces loyal to former 
president Saleh took control of Yemen’s capital, Sana’a and much of the 
country on 21 September 2014. Consequently, the Yemeni state nearly 
collapsed (Human Rights Watch, 2019).
In March 2015, after Saleh’s successor, President Abed Rabbo 
Mansur Hadi, who had fled to Saudi Arabia, appealed for international 
intervention, Saudi Arabia hastily assembled an international coalition 
and launched a military offensive aimed at restoring Hadi’s rule and 
evicting the Houthi fighters from the capital and other major cities. Since 
then, the war has caused the deaths of thousands of Yemenis, including 
civilians as well as combatants, and has significantly damaged the 
country’s infrastructure as well as its social fabric (Sharp, 2019).
Historical Developments 
The media in Yemen have been through different historical developments. 
These can be classified into four major phases: 1) the British and Ottoman 
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occupation, 2) revolutionary times and independence, 3) separation 
until 1990, and 4) the period after unification in 1990.
During the first phase, in 1872, the Ottomans introduced the first 
print media to Northern Yemen for official use, the Yemen newsletter, 
which was the first publication in Yemen in the Turkish language. In 1879, 
Sana’a, a weekly newspaper, was published as the first newspaper in the 
Arabian Peninsula in the Turkish language and later on in Arabic and 
Turkish languages (Al-Zain, 1995, pp. 17–32). The Al-Iman newspaper 
was published in 1926 and the Al-Hekma Al-Yamaniya magazine in 1938 
(Al-Zain, 1995, pp. 60–69).
In Southern Yemen, Aden weekly newspaper was the first official 
newspaper, which was published from 1929. Sawt Al-Jazeera Aden was 
published in 1939, followed by other newspapers. The purpose of 
these publications was to clarify Britain’s position on World War II and 
to highlight the victories of the Allied Forces against Germany. These 
publications also aimed to publish news of the colonial administration 
in Aden and its decisions. By 1960, the number of daily and weekly 
newspapers and magazines in Aden had increased to 34 publications 
issued by the government, parties, and syndicates (Mutahar, 2004, p. 
68). These journalistic activities indicate that all competing parties in 
North and South Yemen, including the Imamate, the opposition, and the 
British colonizers, had recognized the importance of print journalism in 
the conflict. 
South Yemen was first introduced to radio broadcasting in 1940 when 
the British occupation authority established a small radio station, Voice 
of the Island, in Aden. This station broadcast on short wave, targeting 
Yemenis and residents of Aden and announcing military victories of 
Britain and the Allied countries against Germany and its Axis allies. 
It also broadcast instructions to citizens on how to protect themselves 
against air strikes during World War II (Basaleem, 2003, p. 65). Radio 
Aden was established in 1954 as the first radio station to provide regular 
services in the region in the morning and evening periods. It broadcast 
programs for six hours per day and 10 hours on weekends (Mutahar, 
2004, pp. 81–82).
In North Yemen, an American delegation came to Sana’a in 1946 to 
discuss with Imam Yahya the oil extraction in Yemen. They brought 
a 13-watt wireless device with them, which they gave to the Imam. 
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This device was then used for radio broadcasting. The radio station 
broadcast its programs every Thursday and Friday for one hour and 15 
minutes only, with content limited to readings from the Holy Qur’an, 
Imam news, religious speeches, and military marches played by copper 
machines (Al-Soswa, 1998, p. 17).
The real birth of the Yemeni radio news came after the revolution of 
26 September 1962, where radio played an important role in defending 
the revolution and the Republican system. After that point, broadcast 
transmission increased to cover the entire day and devoted two hours 
for broadcasting in the English language.
In the South, Aden TV began broadcasting on 11 September 1964, 
during the British occupation of Southern Yemen. The broadcast 
duration ranged from two to four hours daily and covered the city of 
Aden (Al-Fakih, 2000, p. 3). The second phase, during the 1960s, directly 
involved the popular struggle of the Yemeni people. Press publications 
reached a total of 19 newspapers and magazines. Their positions ranged 
from those who supported the armed revolt against the colonizer, to 
those who were pro-occupation, and to others who were in between. 
However, most of these newspapers were pro-revolutionary and 
supported the armed struggle against British colonialism (Mutahar, 
2004, p. 70).
During the third phase, the separation of South Yemen, and after 
the end of British colonialism in 1967 and the establishment of the 
Socialist Party of Yemen, almost all newspapers in the south were 
suspended. During the period from 1970 to 1985, only two newspapers 
were published, Defa’a Al-Sha’ab and Al-Rayah, which was issued by the 
military in 1980. 
In North Yemen after the 1962 revolution, three official newspapers 
appeared: Al-Thawra, Al-Gomhoriah, and Al-Akhbar. Al-Thawra was the 
first newspaper for the newborn republic. Despite the different names of 
those newspapers during that period, their content was almost identical 
in terms of addressing various issues related to the revolution and the 
fledgling republic, as well as questioning the past period in all its forms 
and manifestations. They were operated based on an informally unified 
framework to help in nation-building (Mutahar, 2004, p. 67).
According to the Ministry of Information, the total publications 
in North Yemen reached 46 (daily, weekly, and monthly) during the 
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period from 1962 to 1978. This is considered the phase in which modern 
journalism was established in Yemen.
Aden News Agency was established in 1970 in South Yemen to collect 
and disseminate news, while in North Yemen, Saba’a Yemeni News was 
set up. They later merged into one news agency, the Yemeni News Agency 
(Saba’a), after 1990, which is the main source of news for Yemeni official 
media inside the country, as well as for media institutions abroad. Also, 
Sana’a TV began broadcasting on 24 September 1975, transmitting from 
a studio of 100 square meters with little equipment. 
Yemen General Corporation for Radio & Television was reorganized 
in May 1990 after the reunification through a merger of one corporation 
that was established in Sana’a in 1976 with another that was established 
in Aden in 1986. The headquarters are located in Sana’a. It comprises 
Yemen Satellite Channel and First Channel in Sana’a, Second Channel in 
Aden, Public Radio Program in Sana’a, and Second Radio Program in Aden 
as well as local radio stations in several governorates.
After 1990, Yemeni media have witnessed remarkable developments 
in terms of quantity, quality, and the level of form and content as well 
as the legislative aspect. The number of newspapers and magazines 
were doubled as more licenses were granted. However, only 191 of the 
497 licensed newspapers have continued to be published on regular 
and semi-regular bases (Abdulwase’e, 2009). In addition, television 
transmission via the ArabSat satellite started in 1996.
The widening margin of freedom granted to the media has enabled 
partisan and non-partisan newspapers to appear, allowing all political, 
partisan, and civil society organizations to express themselves through 
print media, including nongovernment newspapers (42), party 
newspapers (22), governmental newspapers (19), nongovernment 
magazines (22), party magazines (3), and 42 governmental and official 
magazines (Basaleem, 2003, pp. 175–81). 
This new free atmosphere and the evolution of satellite television 
broadcasting technology have allowed private television channels to 
appear as well. By the end of 2012, there were 13 television satellite 
channels: four of them are state-run channels and the rest are private. 
Two of the government channels are for general programming, Al-Yemen 
and Aden, and the others are specialized channels, such as Sheba, a youth 
and sports channel, and Al-Iman, a religious channel, both launched in 
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2008. Al-Saeeda TV was the first Yemeni private channel launched from 
Cairo in 2007, and it then moved its operation to Sana’a. In 2009, three 
channels were launched: Suhail, an opposition channel from inside 
the country; Al-Aqeek (Onex), which shut down after one year for 
financial reasons; and Aden Live, an opposition channel from abroad. 
Three more non-governmental channels were launched in 2011. These 
included Yemen Today (partisan channel), A’azal (belonging to one tribe 
leader), and Yemen Shabab, a youth and revolutionary channel as well 
as the Belqees channel, another youth and revolutionary channel owned 
by female Nobel Prize winner Tawakkol Karman. The channel used 
to broadcast from Yemen until 2015, when it was moved to Istanbul 
after being attacked by the Houthis. In 2012, two new channels were 
launched: Al-Maseerah (belonging to the Houthi Movement) and 
Al-Sahat (launched from Beirut in July) (Al-Shami, 2013, pp. 443–51). 
Moreover, two new channels affiliated with Houthis have launched 
and are operating from Sana’a. They are Al-Hawia TV, which officially 
launched on 15 April 2018, and Al-Lahda TV, which launched in July 
2018. In early 2020, Al-Mahriah TV was launched from Istanbul as the 
most recent channel broadcasting from outside the country. 
Political System and Legal Framework
The Yemeni Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and expression 
to all citizens. According to Article 42, every citizen has the right to 
participate in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the 
country. The state shall guarantee freedom of thought and expression of 
opinion in speech, writing, and photography within the limits of the law. 
It also guarantees citizens the right to organize themselves in different 
manners. The state shall also guarantee freedom for the political, trade, 
cultural, scientific, and social organizations.
Law No. 25 on the Press and Publication, which was issued in 1990, 
has governed the Yemeni press up to this date. According to Article 33 
of this law, the right to own and publish newspapers and magazines is 
guaranteed by the Constitution to all citizens, licensed political parties, 
individuals, public companies, popular organizations, ministries and 
government, as well as corporations. In the chapter on the rights and 
duties of journalists, Article 13 confirms that a “journalist may not be 
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interrogated on opinions which he has expressed or published, and 
which may not be used to inflict harm on him/her provided what he/
she published is not contrary to the law.” 
Despite the abovementioned constitutional guarantees, Law No. 25 
imposes several restrictions on the freedom of information and allows 
the imprisonment of journalists. Article 103 contains a list of restrictions 
that journalists must take into consideration. This list includes prohibits 
the following:
a) Criticism of the head of state, or attribution to him of declarations or 
pictures unless the declarations were made or the pictures taken during 
a public speech.
b) Anything which leads to the spread of ideas contrary to the principles 
of the Yemeni Revolution, is prejudicial to national unity or distorts the 
image of Yemeni, Arab or Islamic heritage.
c) Anything that undermines public morals or prejudices the dignity of 
individuals or the freedom of the individual by smears and defamation.
Article 104 of the law emphasizes that anyone who violates this “shall 
be subject to a fine not exceeding ten thousand riyals or a period of 
imprisonment not exceeding one year.” Moreover, they shall be tried 
before the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Press and Publications, which 
was founded in 1993. The law also includes other punishments, such as 
the closure of newspapers or suspension of their work, confiscation of 
copies, and the prevention of journalistic practice (Article 19, 2008, p. 6). 
Under this law, several violations against journalists were committed. 
These included, but were not limited to, the imprisonment of journalists, 
seizure of licenses, creation of copies of websites, threats to journalists, 
break-ins at media organizations’ premises, murders and assaults of 
journalists, and confiscation of their equipment. Therefore, this law has 
been subject to much criticism throughout the last years from different 
actors, including individual journalists, the Journalists’ Syndicate, civil 
society organizations, lawyers, and lawmakers. They have called for 
changes or at least amendments to it. In an attempt to regulate online 
journalism, which had started to play a role in influencing public 
opinion, as well as to respond to demands to allow forces other than 
the government to own broadcast channels, in 2010 the Ministry of 
Information proposed a new law for organizing broadcast and online 
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media. This law was however very controversial due to its extreme 
restrictions and conditions for owning and launching media outlets. 
For instance, the proposed new law would require those who wished to 
obtain a license to establish a television channel to pay YER 30 million 
(around USD 135,000 at the time) and YER 20 million (USD 90,000) to 
establish a radio station or online websites. In addition, the same amount 
would have to be paid every two years for a renewal of the license. The 
fees for owning a multimedia service via mobile phone was to be set at 
10 million riyals. However, the political conflicts in the years after the 
law was proposed hindered the process of finalizing and endorsing it 
by parliament. Consequently, Press Law No. 25 from 1990 still governs 
media in Yemen. 
The government’s constant attempts to legislate mass media reflect 
the importance it attributes to the media and its desire to control it. 
This has led it to adopt legal articles that reflect the interests of the 
ruling authority, not those of the press or journalists, and guarantee the 
authority complete control of the media. Consequently, this has led to 
a long conflict between the government, on one hand, and individual 
journalists, the Journalists’ Syndicate, and civil society, including NGOs, 
on the other. It is worth mentioning that in October 2017, the Minister of 
Information under the de facto authority issued a bylaw for the regulation 
of online journalism. 
It is noteworthy that the youth uprising in 2011 had pushed for more 
media freedom, including on the state-run television channels, in terms 
of providing space for different voices, particularly for opposition and 
anti-government voices. Following the uprising, talk show programs on 
the Al-Yemen, Sheba, and Al-Iman channels were dedicated to debating 
about protests, including the reasons that triggered them and their 
consequences. For several weeks, those channels hosted young people 
from the pro- and anti-government groups to openly debate on those 
issues. However, this approach lasted for only a short period of time, and 
those channels eventually returned to presenting a one-sided discourse.
After the Houthis took over Sana’a in September 2014, the media 
landscape in Yemen dramatically changed. They took control of all 
the state-run media, including television channels, radio stations, and 
print and online newspapers as well as Yemeni News Agency (Saba’a) 
and its website: Saba’a Net. They also closed down non-governmental 
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media, including television channels, print and online websites, and 
community radio stations. Moreover, they attacked media premises 
belonging to opposition media organizations, confiscated their property, 
and imprisoned many journalists. According to Human Rights Watch, a 
group of local journalists has been detained in Sana’a for more than three 
years (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Thirty-five journalists have died in 
Yemen since 2011, and eight of them were killed in 2018. In addition, 53 
kidnapping or arrest cases of journalists have been recorded since 2011, 
mostly perpetrated by the Houthis and the related government. The 
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the Yemeni Journalists’ 
Syndicate (YJS) reported that 135 cases of press freedom violations were 
registered from January to the end of September 2018. Moreover, the 
Yemeni media have become polarized along political and sectarian lines 
and have been viewed by the warring factions as the enemy (IFJ, 2018).
The Houthis also shut down offices of pan-Arab television channels 
such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya as well as other Arab channels, and 
they placed the Internet and mobile phones under censorship and 
surveillance.
The division of the country between the Houthi-controlled areas 
and the Saudi-UAE coalition-controlled areas has created two parallel 
media landscapes in Yemen that reflect the political situation. There 
are two versions of each medium, including Yemen TV, Saba’a Net, 
and the Al-Thawra website. One operates from Riyadh and the other 
from Sana’a, and each of them reflects the position of the individual 
controller. Moreover, some non-governmental television channels have 
migrated abroad. Suhail TV operates from Riyadh, and Yemen Shabab 
from Amman and Istanbul. Belqees TV operates from Istanbul, Al-Sahat 
TV from Beirut, and Yemen Today TV from Cairo. 
The main media victims after the Houthis took control over 
Sana’a were community radio stations. According to Al-Moushaki, 
director of Yemen Times radio station and chair of the Yemeni Network 
for Community Radio, the situation for community radio stations 
deteriorated after 2015 due to economic problems resulting from the 
war. In addition, the premises of many stations were raided, and their 
property was looted. Some others had been suspended, and some 
turned to commercial entertainment models (Al-Reifi, 2019). Around 
mid-2016, community radio stations began to gradually reappear in 
 20712. Yemen
the Sana’a, Hadramout, and Aden governorates, but with a new focus, 
concentrating on entertainment, social, and religious programs, and 
avoiding political issues. Currently, a few of them deal with political 
issues, but their coverage must be in line with the position of the de facto 
authority in Sana’a. This has enabled them to gain more advertisement 
revenue, especially with the disappearance of most print and online 
newspapers. On the one hand, these stations have represented a new 
venue for advertisers, and a source of profit for owners, on the other 
(Al-Reifi, 2019). 
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Despite the many changes in the media landscape in Yemen over the 
last decades, the business models of the media remain almost the 
same. Since the Houthis took over Sana’a in 2014—and as the de facto 
authority—they have directly controlled governmental broadcast, 
print, and online media and financed them from the public treasury 
as a means of propagating their revolutionary discourse and political, 
social, religious, and economic interests. They also monitor all other 
types of media and means of communication. Houthis have blocked 
several websites, especially those belonging to their opponents. Blocked 
websites also include external websites like Aljazeera.net. According 
to a recent report, Yemen has the most significant share of Internet 
shutdowns in the Middle East (KeepetON, 2019). 
An increase in the deployment of network control devices on 
YemenNet, the ISP controlled by Houthi forces, has also been observed 
(Insikt Group, 2019). On the other hand, the internationally recognized 
government has continued to finance copies of the same media operating 
from Riyadh. Moreover, the partisan and non-governmental media 
have continued to operate from abroad, mainly from Istanbul, Amman, 
Riyadh, and Beirut. 
While the main political entities still seem to invest in television, 
printed newspapers have a very limited reach, and are therefore 
not invested in heavily. The print media landscape in Yemen can be 
classified into three basic types of funding. The first is the official one, 
which lacks many conditions of vitality, freedom, and the ability to keep 
abreast of global changes in professionalism and technology. The second 
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is the partisan one, depends on the financial situation of parties in the 
public landscape, and yet their press reflects their miserable situation. 
The third is the nongovernmental press, that is, the press owned by 
private individuals (Abdulwarith, 2009). Al-Akbari (2005) concluded 
in her study that the Yemeni press, whether governmental, partisan, 
or privately-owned, is of minor interest to the public, and its impact 
is weak. The highest number of copies comes from the governmental 
newspaper Al-Thawrah, and this ranged from 5,000—12,000 copies 
during the period from 2013— to 2017. 
Community and private radio stations may be the only exception 
to these long-standing media economic models. They have doubled in 
number since 2011, from less than a handful of radio stations to more 
than 30 stations. Before 2011, the government monopolized FM radio 
signals and granted them only to governmental radio stations. After 
the youth uprising in 2011, this monopoly was broken, and accordingly, 
community radio stations started to appear. Yemen FM radio, which 
belongs to the General People’s Congress (GPC), was the first of these 
stations to be launched (in 2011). 
As a result of the political vacuum that Yemen was experiencing 
at that time, other new FM radio stations were also launched. The 
Yemen Times newspaper, which was the first Yemeni English-language 
newspaper, used this opportunity to launch Radio Yemen Times, which 
was the second station after Yemen FM, followed by Sawt Al-Yemen. The 
period from 2011 to 2014 was significant for community radio stations 
in Yemen. Their discourse was varied and critical. They tackled issues 
ranging from the political to the social. The financial sources of these 
stations were not particularly clear as, similarly to other Yemeni media, 
their financial budgets were not declared. However, advertisements 
may have represented the main source of income. Others, such as Nas 
FM, received support from businesspersons. 
As a result, there are now around eight community radio stations in 
Sana’a, and three in Hadramout. Some of them are general, and others 
are specialized. However, in Aden, there is only one community radio 
station, Lana FM radio (Studies & Economic Media Center, 2018, p. 11).
There are, moreover, 21 private radio stations. Fifteen of them are 
in Sana’a. They are either privately-owned by individuals or supported 
by political parties or religious groups. They include Yemen FM, Iram 
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FM, Yemen Music, Grand FM, Radio Yemen Times, Yemen Voice, and others. 
In Hadramout, there are five private FM radio stations, while in Aden, 
there is only one.
Technological developments—which have reduced the cost of radio 
broadcasting devices, such as transmitters and other equipment—have 
enabled the launch of small FM radio stations covering small, local areas. 
This fact, along with the granting of licenses by the de facto authority in 
Sana’a, has allowed these radio stations to flourish. However, a recent 
study on Yemeni radio stations concluded that the role of these stations 
in Yemen remains weak when it comes to essential issues. It revealed that 
social issues and basic services, such as electricity, water, road networks, 
and security problems, are represented in only a small percentage of 
radio coverage, accounting for just 20%, whereas entertainment, music, 
sports, and politics account for 80% of radio programming (Studies & 
Economic Media Center, 2018, p. 15).
Technology and Infrastructure
Over the past decades, the Yemeni government has exerted significant 
effort to keep up with technological developments, but often lagged 
behind other Arab states. This included shifting to a color television 
system in 1980 and expanding transmission to cover almost 70% of the 
total area of the country, and the whole country by 1996 via the ArabSat 
satellite. In 2001, Internet broadcasting was started through ArabSat 
(Mutahar, 2004, p. 80). However, the technological infrastructure is 
still modest. According to a recent report, the percentage of Internet 
users in Yemen is the lowest in the region, while prices are the most 
expensive in the world (Studies & Economic Media Center, 2018, 
p. 8). Internet users in Yemen were estimated to be more than 7 
million in 2018, which amounted to around 27% of the population. 
However, while television transmission via Internet is very common 
in the neighboring countries, this is not so in Yemen due to its limited 
Internet speed and high prices. This kind of transmission seems still to 
be far off in the future. 
In the era of media convergence, the country is still lagging behind. 
Many print newspapers have an online version as well as accounts on 
social media. However, videos and podcasts are notably still absent from 
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these platforms. Some websites rely on uploaded videos from other 
Arab and international media outlets, like Al-Jazeera, BBC, and YouTube. 
This is due to the slow Internet speed and lack of resources and trained 
persons for producing such materials. This type of convergence has 
deeply affected print media circulation. However, official newspapers 
are still surviving. This is due to indirect financial support from the 
government through subsidy and advertisements. All ministries 
and other governmental institutions are obliged to subscribe to these 
newspapers, as well as to post advertisments in them. 
Mobile users in Yemen amount to around 55% of the total 
population. Four main companies provide mobile services. One is a 
government company, which is Yemen Mobile, and the three others are 
private companies: Sabafon, MTN, and Y Telecom. At this point, 3G is the 
most common network used. Internet users in Yemen have significantly 
increased over the last decades, from 15,000 in 2000 to more than 7.9 
million in 2019. Internet penetration in Yemen is now around 27%.
The number of social media network users in Yemen is growing 
rapidly. They increased by 19% from April 2019 to January 2020. The 
total number of users was 2.5 million in January 2020. Social media 
penetration in Yemen stood at 8.5% in January 2020 (Kemp, 2020). 
Smartphones play a significant role in the growth of social media as the 
majority of users have mobile phones, especially in rural and remote 
areas, and can thus access these platforms. 
Facebook ranks as the top social network in Yemen. More than 8% of 
the population are using this network (NapoleonCat, 2020). According 
to Statcounter GlobalStats (2020), Facebook represents 85% of social 
media users in Yemen, followed by YouTube with 11% and Twitter with 
3%. Other social media networks, such as Instagram and Telegram, are 
used by 1% or less of social media users. 
Challenges
Yemeni media face several challenges, mainly with regard to legal, 
technological, economic and social aspects. In an attempt to keep the 
media under control, the Yemeni government has resisted legislation 
proposals to partially relinquish its control of the media. However, the 
law governing the media was implemented in 1990 and has become 
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seriously outdated. In 2010, the Ministry of Information proposed 
a new law for audiovisual media that raised a lot of controversy. In 
respect to the technological factors, the fast-paced development 
in communications technology and multimedia communication 
represents a main challenge that Yemen in its current state of war 
cannot possibly meet.
Social media play an important role in all aspects of the daily life 
of Yemeni people, particularly young people. This role goes beyond 
facilitating social interaction between people in a very traditional 
and conservative society, such as Yemen, to a full-fledged medium 
of communication by all means. Social media have gained special 
importance since the Houthis’ coup in 2014 that has led to blocking many 
online journalism websites and shutting down several newspapers, radio 
stations, and television channels. In such circumstances, these media 
have become the alternative media for the public to share information, 
publish news, and discuss and express opinions about several issues. 
Activists and journalists in particular heavily utilize social media 
for launching humanitarian relief and political campaigns as well as 
publishing breaking news. Thus, social media have become important 
players for influencing public opinion and enhancing awareness on 
political, social, and cultural levels. 
Outlook
The future of Yemeni media will be determined by the future of the 
country itself after the current war ends. This war has produced many 
changes including a polarized media landscape. New players have 
forced themselves on to the political scene in the north (mainly the 
Houthis), as well as in the south (the Southern Transitional Council). 
Even the long-ruling party, the GPC, which controlled the country 
for more than three decades, has split into two divisions, one inside 
the country and the other abroad. However, the role of the media will 
remain essential for all actors and political players as a driving force 
for social and political changes as well as mobilization. The best media 
model for Yemeni media is to be independent from the ruling authority’s 
control and to become a real public media that serves the interest of 
the people, not the ruling power. From a legislative perspective, in a 
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country like Yemen, the best approach to regulate media is to have 
partnership among all stakeholders, journalists represented by Yemeni 
Journalists’ Syndicate and other syndicates, academia, and experts. 
Joint efforts like this might lead to media laws that would achieve a 
minimum degree of consent on how media should operate in such 
a complex society. From a technology perspective, media in Yemen 
need to create a conducive environment for private investments that 
encourage the private sector to invest in the media industry and work 
in a competitive manner. Finally, freedom is the main pillar of the 
media: without freedom, the country will go nowhere, not only in the 
field of media but also in all aspects of life.
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13. Egypt: A Divided and 
Restricted Media Landscape after 
the Transformation 
Hanan Badr
Egypt’s media landscape is marked by long years of struggle. This 
is a paradox: it is one of the pioneers of media industries in the 
Arab region, yet today, it has a massively restrained media system. 
The Egyptian media is marked by an unresolved identity struggle 
between its traditional roots in Arab and Islamic culture and an 
ambivalence towards modernized, Westernized lifestyles. It is also 
contending with a highly polarized media-politics parallelism in 
an environment which does not grant the media system space 
to develop fully and freely. Despite the great potential of the 
media system, the recent crackdown on freedom of expression 
has suspended the potential for the professionalization of an 
autonomous form of journalism.
Background
Located in Africa’s northeastern corner, Egypt is the only country that 
extends into both the African and Asian continents through the Sinai 
Peninsula. Throughout its history, the deserts around the Nile Valley 
and Delta have functioned as natural geographic barriers, keeping the 
core Egyptian state intact for centuries. Egypt’s location, overlooking two 
seas—the Mediterranean to the north and the Red Sea to the east—has 
historically made it a natural geopolitical hub for intercultural exchange 
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and trade, as well as the site of colonization projects and the cradle of 
empires, as one of the world’s most ancient civilizations. 
Currently, all of Egypt’s neighbors, from the Libyans and Sudanese 
to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, are witnessing either political 
upheavals or escalations of conflict. Regional conflicts in these 
neighboring countries cast their shadows on the military and security 
roles shaping Egypt’s foreign relations. Recent major changes in 
geopolitics include the 2015 change of maritime borders with Saudi 
Arabia. That action caused a short-lived public stir, as Egypt refused to 
renounce its sovereignty over Tiran and Sanafir, the two islands, located 
near the touristic city of Sharm El-Sheikh. 
Terrorism and armed struggle against ISIS-affiliated militias, especially 
in the Sinai Peninsula, have affected the levels of freedom of expression 
and public acceptance of security institutions and their rhetoric. These 
conflicts have advanced the validity of security concerns over terrorism 
on the political agenda, which has in turn strengthened the military’s 
claim to power after Egypt’s failed uprising in 2011. 
Egypt’s primary and official language is Arabic, whereas the English 
language is an informal language employed for business communication 
in international companies centered in the capital, Cairo, and Alexandria. 
French also has a notable presence due to the enduring Francophone 
cultural influence. Editions of Egyptian print media appear in both 
French and English languages to target the limited readership of high-
income citizens, who are socioeconomically distinct from the majority of 
the public. 
The population majority is Muslim, but there is a Coptic Christian 
minority estimated to account for between 5% and 10% of the population, 
although the exact figure is unclear, as there is no official census (Pew 
Research Center, 2011). Because Egypt is a socially conservative country, 
religious media have a considerable presence whether in the form of 
specialized media issued by the Islamic Al-Azhar institution, or by the 
Coptic Church in Cairo. While Egyptian society has many marginalized 
ethnic groups, such as Sinai Bedouins, Siwa Oasis Amazigh and 
Nubians, tensions frequently erupt over religious and ideological issues. 
The rise of political Islam from the 1970s onwards—in particular, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its use of religious doctrine—constitutes 
an exclusionary ideology towards others. The Muslim Brothers offer 
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fundamentally different answers to questions regarding Egypt’s identity 
and international alliances. After a brief rise in power in the wake of 2011, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and other potentially contentious actors are now 
harshly excluded from society: since 2013, their members are tracked, 
exiled, or imprisoned under inhumane circumstances. Other ideological 
strands, such as remnants of the left wing, or progressive liberals, are 
weak and remain elitist in their constituency, outreach, and rhetoric.
With its 99 million inhabitants, Egypt has a massive youth cohort: 
those below 15 years of age constitute more than one third of the 
country’s entire population. The state faces significant challenges in 
offering education and healthcare services, as well as employment 
opportunities. Although women have received more legal rights and 
gained limited representation—for example, the right to vote and the 
right to education—over the past century there are still disadvantages 
for women in this socially conservative country, within both Muslim and 
Coptic Christian communities. Egypt faces the long-standing challenge 
of illiteracy, as, according to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization 
and Statistics (CAPMAS), almost 25% of the overall population remain 
illiterate. Trends show higher illiteracy rates in women and in rural areas. 
Women still suffer—despite gradual progress—from social practices, 
such as domestic violence, and socioeconomic disadvantages, such as 
estate inheritance or access to education.
The aftermath of the Arab uprisings still shapes the current political 
sphere and rhetoric. Caught in between the public’s fatigue and fear, the 
status quo is marked by demobilization, as those currently in power are 
clearly keen to intensify their mechanisms of authority. The polarizing 
events of 2013 are viewed by the opposition as a coup against the legally 
elected president, Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
while they are viewed by the military and its supporters as a second, 
corrective revolution against an extremist leader. This has caused massive 
fragmentation with serious repercussions for Egypt. The events of 2013 
resulted in moments of international isolation from 2013 to 2015, as Egypt 
was temporarily ejected from the African Union. In addition to intensive 
diplomacy, the state media aggressively sought to polish Egypt’s image 
during this phase. Yet amid the rise of global right-wing authoritarianism, 
and Europe’s fear of migration and instability, Egypt’s current regime 
faces neither real pressure to democratize, nor political consequences for 
violations.
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Historical Developments
Egypt is a pioneer of media industries as its media are among the oldest 
in the Arab region. Print media is more than 200 years old. It started 
in the late-eighteenth century when Egypt was still a province of the 
Ottoman Empire and France’s Napoleon started an expedition to invade 
Egypt in 1798. The invaders brought the printing press to Egypt. The first 
newspaper was Le Courrier de l’Egypte, which was published from 1798 in 
French for Napoleon’s soldiers to stay informed and in touch with their 
home country. After Mohammed Ali assumed power, he published the 
Arabic newspaper Al-Khedive Journal in 1821 to disseminate official news 
and connect the provinces to the centralized power in Cairo, the capital 
(Abdel Rahman, 2002, p. 102). 
When Khedive Ismail relaxed the licensing policies for newspapers 
in 1875, Egypt’s newspaper scene began to flourish rapidly: within only 
15 years (by 1890), more than 200 newspapers were registered. Some of 
them are leading newspapers with a long tradition of journalism which 
still exist today, such as Al-Ahram (1875). Other newspapers importantly 
expressed the country’s identity struggle and reflected the pluralism of 
Egypt’s political culture. The wide range of new newspapers included 
the pro-British Westernized Al-Mukattam (1888), the traditional 
reformist Al-Mo’ayed (1889), the critical satirical Al-Ustaz (1892), and 
the Egyptian nationalist Al-Liwa’a (1900). The Egyptian print media 
initially benefitted from the influx of Levantine immigrants escaping 
harsh Ottoman rule, as well as from the gradual diffusion of the print 
press and growing literacy rates. Historically, this phase bears striking 
similarities to the era of mass press during the same time in Europe and 
the US.
1882 marked a political rupture in Egypt, as it brought the second 
bloody confrontation with Western powers after Napoleon’s French 
expedition in 1798. Amid Britain’s aspirations to expand its north-south 
nexus on the African continent and to connect to its vast colonies in 
India by means of the trade route running through the Suez Canal, 
Britain used Egypt’s political instability and the supposed protection of 
the weak Khedive, the Ottoman governor, as a pretext to occupy Egypt. 
Egypt became an unofficial British protectorate before being formally 
designated as a protectorate with the onset of World War I, in 1913. These 
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developments imported British, French, and Ottoman influences into 
Egypt, and these shaped the media landscape accordingly. The British 
rule, which began in 1882—in conjunction with the then still official 
rule of the Khedive Palace, which was loyal to the Ottoman Empire—
tolerated the pluralized media scene, with occasional closures of overly 
critical newspapers, in the hopes of using the fragmentation of media 
voices against the other competing power. Egypt’s media system was 
affected by conflict and political parallelism. The initial propagandistic 
mobilization and media-politics parallelism instituted during this era 
has never really ended. After drafting its first constitution in 1922, the 
so-called liberal experiment in Egypt, which lasted until 1936, proved 
how parties and print media could not only coexist, but also nourish each 
other. This turbulent time, which was marked by frequent protests in the 
urban centers, saw a rise in debates over Egypt’s future and identity. 
Moreover, the expansion of education formed a new social class. This 
phase also witnessed the establishment of Egypt’s legacy media houses 
such as Al-Akhbar and Ruz Al-Youssef, which are still operating today, but 
in a state-owned form.
In 1952, fueled by grievances against a system of unfair privileges 
within the army and society in general, the Free Officers Movement 
overthrew the monarchy and forced the British military forces to leave. 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in 1954 and established 
the Egyptian Republic. Abdel Nasser pushed for full control over the 
public sphere to ensure power over the young independent state. He 
established a new media house called Al-Tahrir, which published the 
Al-Gomhouriya newspaper. In 1960, Abdel Nasser nationalized all media 
under the pretext of protecting stability and serving the interests of the 
public.
Radio had an early start in Egypt during its vibrant, cosmopolitan era 
under British rule. In the 1920s, individual radio stations were founded, 
often by foreign nationals residing in Egypt in Cairo and Alexandria, 
primarily for entertainment purposes. This is called the age of “civic 
broadcasting stations” (El-Sherif, 2015). On 31 May 1934, an official 
radio program was established in cooperation with the British Marconi 
Company. As anti-colonial and national attitudes rose, in 1947, the prime 
minister decided to fully nationalize and arabize the radio stations and 
begin Egyptian production. To this day, Egypt is keen to invest in its 
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elaborate radio program, which has 40 foreign-language radio stations 
as a part of its public diplomacy efforts, including English, French, and 
German, as well as less widely spoken languages, such as Hebrew and 
Swahili. 
Like radio, Egypt’s cinema has its roots in the cosmopolitan era of 
the late-nineteenth century. Egypt’s film industry has a long tradition 
and popularity in the region: the first film was shown in Alexandria 
in 1896, only one year after the worldwide debut of cinema. The first 
production of a fictional film was in 1927 by the Isis Film Company. 
Dubbed “The Orient’s Hollywood,” the popularity of its productions is 
one of the reasons for the widespread use of the Egyptian dialect in Arab 
countries outside of Egypt. The cinema is a pillar of Egyptian soft power. 
The 1960s constituted a golden era for Egyptian cinema in terms of the 
number of films produced and the legacies of famous and popular stars, 
and despite its political socialist one-party system under Abdel Nasser, 
the state invested heavily in arts and cinema.
Television is by far the most popular media in Egypt as it is the 
number one source for news and entertainment. Historically, Egypt 
has monopolized terrestrial broadcasting in the famous radio and 
television building, Maspero, situated in downtown Cairo. Television 
broadcasting started in 1960 under President Abdel Nasser. Building on 
strong national sentiments, he used the television as proof of Egypt’s 
new, modernized republic. His successor, Anwar El-Sadat, established 
the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), as the body 
controlling the radio and television channels aired in Egypt. It slowly 
developed its program to add more controlled pluralism, by offering the 
news-oriented Channel 1 and the lighter Channel 2. In the late 1980s, state 
television expanded its service to offer five additional regional channels, 
for the capital Cairo, Alexandria, the Suez Canal area, Upper Egypt, 
and the Nile Delta. In the 1990s, satellite channels were introduced 
into Egyptian households. They constituted a serious challenge, in that 
they bypassed the national regulative framework for broadcasting. The 
offer of competing channels to Egyptian households, as well as the 
massive brain drain from Maspero’s ERTU media workers moving to 
better-funded Arab television networks, gradually led to a loss of the 
monopoly once held by the Egyptian Radio and Television Union in 
the country. Moreover, Egyptian journalists and media personnel who 
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had left the country were instrumental in initially conceptualizing and 
managing many media that started in the Gulf countries.
The Internet was introduced in Egypt in 1993. Penetration grew 
steadily in society, with a rise from 1% of the population being Internet 
users in 2000 to 45% in 2017. The number of Facebook users alone amounts 
to 35 million in Egypt; hence, a third of the population is on Facebook. 
Political System and Legal Framework
In his book Sorrows of the Press Freedoms, veteran Egyptian journalist 
and unionist Salah El-Din Hafez (1993) sketched the enduring and 
multiple constraints over print media. The title sums up the fact that 
Egyptian journalism’s struggle for autonomy, is political, economic, 
and professional. Egyptian journalism has a long history of not being 
free, and an almost 200-year struggle for freedom (El-Gody, 2009, p. 
732). Owing to strong centralization and executive control of media 
mobilization for national development purposes, as well as control of 
media regulations and ownership, Egyptian journalism has only had 
brief periods of liberalization (Richter, 2011). These brief intermissions 
have created some dynamism among journalists to push for freedoms 
and reflect on their profession. The latest window of opportunity was 
the transformation phase of 2011–2013 after the uprisings. 
Egypt’s political system has officially been a presidential republic 
since 1952. During the past seven years, two constitutions were issued: 
the (now annulled) Egyptian Constitution of 2012, and the Egyptian 
Constitution of 2014, in addition to constitutional amendments in 2019. 
This shows two mechanisms at work: first, that the political contest in 
Egypt has traditionally been settled through legislation; and second, 
that those in power wish to emphasize the rule of law, in order to protect 
their image abroad. However, since 2014, consistent regulatory and legal 
changes have demonstrated a strong re-autocratization and legislative 
authoritarianism (Hamzawy, 2017). The long-sought abolition of the 
Ministry of Information in 2014 also did not establish more freedoms, 
as had been anticipated.
A paradox exists between formally acknowledging press freedom on 
paper in the 2014 constitution and tightening control of it in practice. 
Free expression is formally guaranteed in the current constitution, in 
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Article 65 (freedom of speech) and Article 68 (access to information and 
official documents). Yet, the creation of three regulatory bodies and media 
councils in 2017 by presidential decrees narrowed the supposed freedoms 
given by the constitution. Three councils replaced the abolished Ministry 
of Information: the Supreme Media Regulatory Council, the National 
Press Authority (founded to oversee and manage state-owned print 
media organizations), and the National Media Authority (founded to 
oversee and manage state-owned audiovisual broadcasting services). 
Members of the three regulatory councils are appointed by the president, 
and include journalists, social scientists, and media managers (such as 
editors-in-chief, etc.).
These councils increasingly exhibit a tendency for greater censorship 
by using vague ethical rules as legal boundaries. One example of this is 
Article 215, where the National Media Council, which oversees print, 
audiovisual, and digital journalism, is responsible for a broad spectrum 
of media. According to this article, the National Media Council should 
guarantee media freedoms in their various forms, maintain media 
pluralism and avoid concentration, protect the public interest, shape 
the regulations and criteria that lead to the commitment of the media 
towards the professional traditions and ethics, preserve the Arabic 
language, and observe society’s values and constructive traditions. 
Loose interpretations of this article can limit freedoms of expression, 
as demonstrated by legal prosecutions for threatening social values that 
have been brought against journalists who have published ideas and 
opinions on progressive issues such as women’s rights.
In the wake of the uprisings, Egyptian journalism went through 
political turbulence, starting with a massive rupture of the system in 2011, 
and continuing until the gradual elimination of any margin for freedom 
today. The struggle for journalists’ freedom in the post-2011 phase in 
Egypt was perceived as a window of opportunity to turn journalists’ 
hopes and demands of urgent and overdue reforms in the profession 
into reality. Right after the “Tahrir Revolution”, specific actions for 
media reform were needed in order to establish greater autonomy (Sakr, 
2013, pp. ix–x). These included more independence from executive 
control, the abolition of the detention punishment, the establishment 
of strong local and regional journalism, the transformation of state-
managed media into true public service media institutions, efforts to 
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foster pluralism in journalists’ associations, and finally, maintenance of 
good governance in media organizations.
The turbulent years of transformation from 2011 to 2019 can be 
categorized in four phases:
1. Phase I took place from 2011–2012, directly after Mubarak’s 
resignation when the Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
(SCAF) took over power and led the initial stabilization 
maneuvers; 
2. Phase II continued from May 2012 to June 2013 while 
President Mohammed Morsi headed a Muslim 
Brotherhood-dominated government. Both phases I and II 
represented the highest potential for a transformation of 
Egyptian journalism. The intensive euphoria and protests 
aimed at reforming the Egyptian media. Journalists 
shared critical self-reflections on the country’s journalistic 
practices. A Freedom House report captured the euphoric 
2012 moment when, for the first time in decades, it called 
the Egyptian media system “partly free.” New, pluralistic 
media outlets mushroomed and catered to those with 
previously marginalized needs. The strongest newcomers 
were the Islamist media. Yet, even under these flourishing 
conditions of freedom, the situation for journalists was 
considered “precarious” (UNESCO, 2013, p. 76). Examples 
of this professional precarity include insecure work 
conditions or poor personal safety during clashes and 
political turmoil. During the Muslim Brotherhood rule, 
the press was the target of repeated trials to intimidate 
journalists.
3. In Phase III, from July 2013 to May 2014, after the SCAF 
expelled the late President Morsi from his office and 
introduced an interim president, the negotiation processes 
to develop the media scene were suddenly interrupted. No 
genuine processes addressed the core issues of journalism’s 
professionalization, autonomy, and financial viability. 
4. Finally, Phase IV started with the election of President 
Abdelfattah Sisi as president in 2014, and has continued 
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after his reelection in 2018. Recently, Egypt slid to 
position 166 (of 180) in the Reporters Without Borders 
2020 ranking. The Cybercrime Law issued in August 
2018 targets freedom of expression on blogs and social 
media. An example of direct intimidation occurred in 
November 2019, when security forces stormed MadaMasr, 
an independent online journalistic platform. This political 
climate has affected news media coverage and made it less 
diverse in moments of crisis or security-related concern. 
Increased control of foreign correspondents, as seen in the 
revoked accreditation of BBC correspondents in 2018 and 
2019, aims at controlling non-Egyptian coverage.
One unprecedented moment of escalation between the state and the 
media occurred in May 2016, when police forces stormed the Egyptian 
Journalist’s Syndicate building to arrest two journalists only one day 
before World Press Freedom Day. 
While practicing journalism is open to all graduates from various 
disciplines, official protection is only given to members of the Journalists’ 
Syndicate as the sole trade union representing print journalists. Other 
media professionals have a separate trade union, the Media Workers 
Syndicate, which is service-oriented and not politically active. The 
exclusionary and restrictive bylaws of this syndicate’s membership 
discriminate against digital journalists who are prohibited from 
becoming members. 
Economy and Ownership Patterns
The political economy of the media in Egypt demonstrates an unresolved 
conflict of interests, which predates the Arab uprisings. Indirect state 
capitalism controls the media economy and determines ownership 
structures. After the establishment of the Egyptian Republic in 1952, 
all private media were nationalized and transformed into state-run 
institutions. Party newspapers were gradually introduced in the early 
1970s, and private media emerged in the mid-1990s. The tripartite 
ownership of Egyptian journalism (state-run, party, and private press) 
has created stark contrasts in the political economy, financial security, 
and journalistic practices. State-led print media receive full state subsidy, 
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and follow the official government line more closely, with a very low 
margin of tolerance. Editors-in-chief have adapted their approaches 
and opt for mild criticism at most as a political survival strategy, 
since they are nominated and appointed by the state. At the same 
time, within the semi-liberalization strategies under former President 
Mubarak, the modernization of print technologies in the late 1990s led 
to huge investments in print technologies in the three largest publicly-
funded, state-owned media organizations: Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar, and 
Al-Gomhouriya. 
State-run print media have low circulation, are overstaffed, and have 
accumulated significant debt, which amounted to USD 1.6 billion in 
2015 (Miri, 2015). For example, the oldest daily newspaper, Al-Ahram, 
sells only 70,000 copies daily, compared with 2013 when the numbers 
were 10 times as many. Despite the financial losses, journalists in state 
media, who have the status of civil servants, are secure against layoffs 
due to the high political cost of such a decision. Corrupt and unethical 
practices, such as nepotism and an approach of mixing editorial content 
with advertising, are common (Ghali, 2015). New regulations since 2014 
regard state media as a giant financial burden, without any real political 
benefit. In order to stop the financial drain, hiring ceased altogether. 
Media investment is not on the current political agenda; on the contrary, 
rulers view them as adversaries. Rather than make them more powerful, 
the current strategy is to weaken the media, as their loyalty and public 
influence are not guaranteed. 
Private media institutions have a history of tolerating certain freedoms 
and are run as purely profit-oriented business models. Business tycoons 
purchase media to protect their stakes in other businesses (Roll, 2013). 
Although they incur losses, these are covered by the other non-media 
businesses. Compared with those who work for the state-run media, 
private media journalists earn more for high workloads. But major 
layoffs and shutdowns of enterprises have shaped the private media 
landscape since 2014. After a short-lived surge in sales from 2011–2012 
where, for example, the private daily Al-Masry Al-Youm reached 650,000 
copies per day, today it struggles to sell 60,000 copies per day. Moreover, 
party newspapers are well past their golden years of the 1990s and are 
struggling to survive. 
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The journalism crisis is severe: in terms of sales, print papers went 
from three million daily copies in 2000 and 1.5 million daily copies in 
2010 to less than 200,000 daily sold copies nationwide in 2018 (personal 
communication with Al-Ahram distribution network officer, August 2019). 
In a country of 100 million people, this amounts to two sold copies per 
1,000 inhabitants. Widespread poverty and illiteracy rates do not suffice 
to explain the decline in newspaper sales. In fact, young readers have 
increasingly drifted away from classic media. According to Baseera 
Think Tank polls, 65% of young Egyptians do not read newspapers, and 
only 7% “always” do (Egypt Independent, 2015). 
Observation of recent media developments has shown nontransparent 
acquisitions and monopolistic practices in the media industry. At the 
same time, new private media companies have established strong ties 
with various state security and intelligence organizations through 
favored loyalist frontmen, who have acquired majority shares in all 
the private print media institutions (Reporters Without Borders, 
2019b). Horizontal and vertical conglomerates in media enterprises 
are characterized by this kind of oligarchy. One example is the 
Egyptian Media Group (EMG), which is closely linked to President 
Sisi’s supporters and intelligence agencies. It not only owns the three 
biggest private television networks (Al-Hayah, On E, Extra News) and 
holds major shares in private newspapers (Al-Youm Al-Sabea, and Sout 
Al-Omma), but also controls the cinema production landscape (50% of 
shares of Misr Cinema Company and 50% of Synergy Production) and 
has large shares of numerous advertising industry companies (Reporters 
Without Borders, 2019b).
60% of the television sector, which is regulated by the National Media 
Authority, is either owned by the state ERTU (Channels 1 and 2) or the 
Egyptian Media Group. Other players include former Mubarak loyalist 
cronies, who own Dream TV and Sada El-Balad TV, and businesspersons 
who closely cooperate in the advertising industry (Al-Nahar TV). In 
addition, there is the Saudi-financed media group MBC, which operates 
from Dubai and launched MBC Misr (Reporters Without Borders, 
2019b). As a result, the television sector has become increasingly 
de-politicized after a vibrant era of intensive political talk-shows prior 
to mid-2013. At this point, entertainment content accounts for most of 
the airtime.
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Digital journalism is still heavily regulated in Egypt: in October 
2018, the Supreme Media Regulatory Council demanded that all native 
online newspapers legalize their status within two weeks. This was a 
manifestation of the highly controversial media regulatory laws passed 
in July 2018 by the Egyptian Parliament (Mamdouh, 2018). Regulation 
and surveillance of the digital space to curb online freedom of speech 
have increased, as the Egyptian government cooperates with numerous 
international tech giants like Google (Ryan, 2019).
Media usage in Egypt can be summarized as follows: almost the 
whole population—more than 97%—watch television, only 33% use the 
radio, and 16% of people read newspapers (Reporters Without Borders, 
2019b). Social media is increasingly becoming a strong competitor of 
the established professional media. As in other countries, old media 
find this new competition with the free and not yet fact-checked social 
media, challenging.
Technology and Infrastructure
Egypt has been a pioneer in media and communication technologies in 
the Arab world. Having invested early in national television, it aimed 
at further securing its position as a regional leader in media. Under 
President Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011), Egypt worked to secure its 
technological leadership in the Arab region. Competing with the newly 
launched, Gulf-funded television networks and media cities, Egypt 
launched its first Arab satellite channel, the Egyptian Satellite Channel 
in 1990. It launched its first satellite, NileSat in 1998 to consolidate its 
position as a leader in news and entertainment in the Middle East. 
However, the project of launching more than 15 specialized channels 
did not hold up economically and caused extreme financial pressures on 
the publicly-funded ERTU. At the same time, the government invested 
in the Media City complex, located in the 6th October suburb of Cairo, to 
bolster Egypt’s regional position and accommodate the ambitious film 
and drama productions. Media City hosts several studios for privately-
owned satellite television stations, such as DMC, Dream, and El-Mehwar.
The relevance of new digital media in Egypt has increased over 
the past 15 years. In line with the modernization plans under former 
President Mubarak’s rule, during the early 2000s, the state announced 
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and invested in an ambitious Internet and communication technologies 
(ICTs) plan. It aimed to connect a PC in every Egyptian home to 
the Internet by 2008, a goal which was regulated by the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology (est. 1999) and the 
National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (est. 2003). A 
partnership with Microsoft was set up to launch incentives to market 
PCs and 512 ADSL connections. These investments in the technology 
infrastructure made Egypt an attractive spot for foreign investments 
and industries. Despite Internet censorship and limited speed, these 
investments in ICTs paved the way for the evolving blogging and citizen 
journalism activities that contributed to the 2011 uprisings.
Many scholars and commentators have attributed the Arab uprisings 
directly to the rise of the Internet, as they are widely referred to as the 
“Facebook Revolution.” However, this is a simplified view of the events 
and interactions between media and politics (Badr, 2019). Nonetheless, 
the prelude of the Egyptian uprisings was indeed marked by a rise in 
citizen journalism and efforts from the blogger scene to push counter-
issues of dissent into the mainstream media and thereby create a 
“trickle-down effect” (Badr & Richter, 2018).
Rapid and massive progress in ICTs before the Arab uprisings 
shifted political communication towards less deterministic patterns, so a 
complete state monopoly on media was no longer possible. For example, 
political blogging expanded the prospects of dialogue, offering vibrant 
networks for individuals with similar perspectives (Pole, 2010, p. 1). 
However, while this describes the state of affairs just before the 
uprisings, recently there have increasingly been signs of expanded 
control over the public spheres. Since 2013, and after the presidential 
elections of 2014 and 2018, zero-tolerance policies towards dissent 
and criticism have been applied through increased police control and 
imprisonment of journalists, takeovers of all semi-independent media 
outlets, and the use of surveillance technologies. In addition to blocking 
more than 500 websites and media, the authorities issued a law against 
cyberterrorism in 2018, which tightened restrictions on the overlooked 
Internet public sphere, for example by incriminating Facebook group 
administrators (Reporters Without Borders, 2019a).
In the telecommunications sector, Egypt has four mobile phone 
companies: three private companies with shares from the governmental 
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Egypt Telecom, and a fourth, the government owned We. Due to strict 
antiterrorism laws and state scrutiny of mobile service owners, the 
mobile phone penetration rate dropped from an oversaturated 112% in 
2012–2013 to 95% in 2018, according to ITU data. Ownership follows 
the state doctrine of licensing telecommunications companies to trusted 
business tycoons, and has headed towards increased state regulation 
in recent years. Orange Telecom (formerly Mobinil) is 99% in the hands 
of Orange S.A., and Vodafone Egypt (formerly Click GSM) is divided 
as follows: Vodafone Group (54.93%), Egypt Telecom (44.94%), and free 
float (0.13%). Etisalat Telecom is owned by the Emirati company Etisalat 
(76%), Egypt Post (20%), and other investors (4%). Finally, there is the 
most recent addition, the state-owned We by Egypt Telecom, where the 
Egyptian government owns 80%, and 20% of the shares are free float. 
Challenges 
Put simply, the current media system is not sustainable. Amid persistent 
power asymmetries and a highly repressive environment, the media 
system reflects an extremely constrained political system, from which 
any prior pluralism has been removed. Even the tolerated, semi-
liberalized pockets of free expression under former President Mubarak 
seem luxurious when compared with the situation today. However, 
the massive restrictions have led to a flourishing of free expression 
outside the country. Exiled Egyptian journalism is rapidly expanding, 
as many independent journalists are prevented from working inside the 
country. Yet, the political economy of these exiled journalism initiatives 
is often dependent on competing regional powers, such as Qatar and 
Turkey (Al-Sharq TV in Istanbul or Al-Araby Al-Jadeed TV in London). In 
addition, other media with limited professional experience depend on 
media assistance programs, such as the critically acclaimed investigative 
MadaMasr, which is banned within Egypt. 
Contextualizing the Egyptian media system within its political 
determinants is important, as it depends on possible freedoms. The latest 
rare and short-lived protests in September 2019 erupted after disclosures 
of corruption were aired on YouTube by a self-exiled whistleblower, and 
resulted in a massive crackdown in the fall of 2019. Those connections 
between critical voices in exile and those within the country are facilitated 
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by new media and transnationalization. Situated within the context of the 
ongoing socioeconomic problems that caused the Arab uprisings, and 
encouraged by the current global rise of right-wing authoritarianism, the 
political system has attempted to achieve stability at any cost. 
In addition, the professional media scene faces numerous crises, such 
as erosion of the economic viability of media, declining professionalism, 
reproduction of loyalist and propagandistic practices, and clientelist 
patronage within a restrictive environment. The fragmented professional 
community of journalists has moreover weakened efforts to unionize. 
Outlook
Egyptian media are heading into the unknown: the “death of journalism,” 
extreme de-politicization of the public sphere, and the restrictive 
media environment have all weakened the media system. Under the 
current circumstances, no political will is pushing for progress or open 
investments in the media sector. Although the Supreme Media Regulatory 
Council announced an ambitious digitization plan for the media, no clear 
agenda is visible, except tightening control and advancing loyalist media. 
Official governmental rhetoric is using modernization and innovation 
discourses to pass collaborations for digitizing randomly selected 
archives. Massive financial problems and a dependent political economy 
hinder any serious attempts to give the media a societal relevance when 
compared with social media. Egyptian media remains oblivious to this 
convergence. At the same time, the current, globally interconnected 
world still poses a serious challenge to those in power, as illustrated by 
the exiled, transnational media landscape. However, these reflect regional 
alliances that are volatile. The weakened and stifled Egyptian media 
system has immense potential if given the chance to grow autonomously: 
a strong legacy, unused economic assets, talented journalists, and a big 
market that constitutes one-third of the population of Arab countries. Yet, 
these unused resources still make it unlikely for Egypt’s media system to 
witness better times anytime soon. Despite these recommendations, the 
situation is extremely unpredictable in the long term. Therefore, in case 
of a political opening, whether through reforms from above or the regime 
was forced to respond by a renewed public upheaval or international 
pressure, the potential for transformation of the media system is there.
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14. Sudan: Media under the 
Military–Democratic Pendulum
Mahmoud M. Galander
This chapter describes the impact of the incessant political changes 
that have taken place in Sudan and highlights the impact of the 
country’s shifts from democratic to military governments since 
independence on the performance of the media. In particular, the 
chapter describes the role of newspapers in the development of 
nationalism in the early 1920s, and in the development of partisan 
politics after independence. The chapter explores how, as radio 
and television remained public in their early years, they served 
as government propaganda and education tools, but later with 
the advent of satellite transmission and reception, how private 
entertainment radio and television services prevailed. The chapter 
discusses the impact of the numerous political systems that have 
shaped the media-politics relationship and, in particular, the 
effect of the various media laws that were promulgated in the 
country by the different political regimes. 
Background
Until the secession of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan was one of the largest 
African and Arab countries in terms of area. The country borders Chad 
and the Central African Republic to the west, Ethiopia and Eritrea to 
the east, Egypt and Libya to the north and, since 2011, the Republic of 
South Sudan to the south. Although Sudan’s culture is predominantly 
Muslim Arab, its ethnic constitution is a mixture of African, Nilotic, 
and Arabic. The history of the land is closely tied to the Pharaohs, as 
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several indigenous “Mereoitic” and “Kushite” kingdoms had links to 
them. Christianity dominated in northern Sudan for several centuries 
before Islam and Arabism “migrated” to the country, around the twelfth 
century, through two corridors: Egypt in the north and the Grand 
Maghreb in the west. 
The traditional nature of Sudanese society has helped in maintaining 
its homogeneity. The Islamic impact on Sudanese journalism is 
noticeable in the writings of early (and even current) Sudanese 
journalists. Arabic poetry, Qur’anic verses, and Arabic proverbs are 
widely used to create the strongest impact on the audience. Examples 
of this effect are well-documented in Sudanese archives, sermons, and 
utterances of the Mahdi, the leader of the Mahdist revolution who 
was able to win the hearts and minds of the public (Abu Salim, 1979). 
Successful political and persuasive writings rely on a mixture of modern 
analytical approaches with appropriate quotations from Qur’anic 
verses, the Hadith, and famous utterances of Islamic figures (Galander, 
2003). Although Arabic is the lingua franca, there are several vernacular 
languages that are confined to some parts of the country. For example, 
the Beja in the eastern Red Sea area speak their own “Tibdawi” language, 
whereas some tribes in the north speak the “Mahas” and “Dungulawi” 
vernaculars.
According to the latest census, the current population of the 
country is 43 million, with a median age of 19.7 (World Population 
Review, 2020). Ethnicity lines are clearly drawn and well-established; 
the famous North-South conflict, which lasted for decades until the 
secession of the South, reflects these lines of division. Major areas of 
social conflict include famous parts of the country, such as Darfur in the 
west, the Ingessana in the southeast, the Beja in the east, and the Nuba 
in the west. Most of the conflicts are related to underdevelopment, 
as many of the regions lack the basic healthcare, employment, and 
education, but they have escalated into political conflicts, thus leading 
to armed struggle. Although the majority of the population is Muslim, 
major cities in the country have several churches that reflect the 
multireligious nature of the society. 
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Historical Developments 
By the early-sixteenth century, Sudan was overwhelmingly under the 
influence of Islam, as two Muslim Sultanates, the Sinnar (or Funj) and 
the Fur Sultanates, ruled most of the land. Under these sultanates, social 
modes of communication prevailed. Religious leaders and traditional 
educators transmitted knowledge and information orally among 
members of society, and social and political news was communicated 
through traditional media, such as town criers, who traveled from 
village to village to announce major social and political news (Galander, 
2001).
In 1821, the Ottoman Empire brought Sudan under its control for the 
next 60 years before it was driven out in 1885 by Mohammed Ahmed 
Al-Mahdi, who besieged Khartoum and ended the Ottoman rule of the 
country by defeating the famous British officer, General Charles Gordon. 
The Mahdi established the first independent Islamic state, the mahdiyya 
State. During the mahdiyya period, the mosque served as the basic center 
for dissemination of political and social news. Written communication 
was used on a limited scale for political propagation during the early 
days of the Mahdist movement, but when the movement developed 
into a revolution, and later into a state, both written and oral forms 
of communication were used. However, written communication was 
confined to formal messages exchanged among state officials. 
After the occupation of the Sudan in 1898, the British colonial power 
sought to modernize the country by educating an elite that would help 
in the administration of the country, but would also remain loyal to it 
(Galander, 2003). As such, the sons of loyal tribal leaders were sent to 
schools and brought up to populate the administration. This educated 
elite was, however, ultimately behind the rise of a local press that became 
the vanguard of the call for independence. 
Print journalism dates back to 1903, when a non-Sudanese publisher 
began publishing the newspaper Al-Sudan with the permission, but 
also under the watchful eye, of the British administration (Salih, 1971). 
A few years later, several newspapers began to sprout up, and by the 
1920s as a nationalist movement swept the country, several Sudanese 
published newspapers and used the press as a political platform for 
calls for independence. In response to these developments the colonial 
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power introduced several restrictions to curb nationalistic enthusiasm 
by licensing the press, practicing censorship, and denying government 
employees the ability to write in the daily press (Babiker, 1985).
Born under a colonial administration, Sudan’s broadcasting service 
was to serve as the main means of disseminating propaganda for the 
Allied Forces fighting in North and East Africa during the Second World 
War (Awad, 1994). The half-hour daily radio service, which started 
in 1940, primarily broadcast news of the war to the Sudanese public, 
who followed the conflict closely because of the involvement of several 
battalions from the Sudan Defense Force (SDF).
With independence in 1956, Sudan embarked on a multiparty form 
of democracy that copied the British bicameral parliamentary system. 
However, this first democratic experience did not last long; two years 
later, the democratically elected prime minister, citing sectarian bigotry 
and senseless political wrangling, collaborated with the army and 
handed over rule to a military junta. The following six years of military 
rule were brought to an end by a popular revolution in October 1964. A 
multiparty system was thereafter restored, but it too ended only four 
years later, when another military coup in 1969 dragged the country into 
16 years of socialist and, later, Islamist rule. In its first two years, General 
Ja’afer Nimeiry’s government adopted socialism and nationalized the 
banks, international companies, and private businesses. In its last two 
years, the socialist military government adopted Islamic Shar’ia law 
and dealt harshly with its violators. In 1985, another popular revolt 
brought the second military government to an end and ushered in the 
third democratic period, which lasted from 1985 to 1989. These four 
years of democracy were mired in political wrangling that was further 
exacerbated by a raging war in South Sudan. As a result, on 30 June 1989, 
Islamist elements in the Sudanese army conspired with the National 
Islamic Front (NIF) party and engineered a coup that brought the 
Islamists—under Omar Al-Bashir—to power for 30 years (1989–2019). 
The 30 years of Islamist rule put the country under international 
scrutiny, as the government was accused of harboring international 
terrorists and rogue Islamist elements, such as Osama bin Laden, 
as well as committing crimes against humanity in the province of 
Darfur. Consequently, the country was severely sanctioned by the US 
government for almost all of the government’s 30 years, while civil wars 
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crippled the economy. Under continued external political and economic 
pressure and as a result of an incessant internal civil resistance, the 
Islamist-military government of Omar Al-Bashir was finally brought 
down by a popular revolt within the so-called second wave of the Arab 
uprisings that lasted for four months until April 2019. 
Political System and Legal Framework
Few countries have experienced anything like Sudan’s constant political 
oscillation between military and democratic forms of government. 
The country has also witnessed the replacement of three military 
dictatorships through civilian dissention, the latest of which were 
the December 2019 uprisings, which ended the longest authoritarian 
government in the history of the country. Such swings from democratic 
to military governments are important for understanding and explaining 
the dynamics of media operations in the country.
The media of the country have, no doubt, suffered from such an 
incessant oscillation between liberalism and authoritarianism. As the 
country stumbled from democratic to military rule, the media existed 
in an environment unconducive to the healthy growth of the profession. 
During the first democratic government after independence in 1956, 
the private and partisan press mushroomed, and a truly free press 
system operated for a brief period until the coup of 1958 brought the 
first military rule, which clamped down on the free press. Although the 
military did not ban the private press, it printed its own newspaper 
as the official voice of the government. In 1964, a popular revolution 
restored liberal democracy, and reinstated the free press, but several 
newspapers were banned from publishing as a result of accusations of 
collaboration with the defunct military government (Galander, 2001). 
In 1969, another coup brought the second military government to power. 
As it subscribed to leftist ideologies, the government of General Ja’afer 
Nimeiry nationalized the press, and replaced 40 private newspapers 
with two government dailies and a weekly military paper. A press 
council was also established to guide media operations in the country, 
and the first indigenous press law replaced the colonial press act of the 
1930s. The press law confined all mass media ownership to the ruling 
Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), and, consequently, the media were turned 
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into mouthpieces of the government party, and forbidden to publish 
substantive criticism. 
In 1985, the second popular revolution forced General Nimeiry to 
resign and brought back a democratic government that restored press 
freedom and lifted restrictions on private ownership of the press. This 
sudden return of the private press led to an unprecedented rise in the 
number of private media outlets, and created a situation that bordered 
on journalistic chaos, with increased violations of the basic ethics of 
journalism. Such conditions, according to some sources, helped the next 
military coup of General Omar Al-Bashir to rationalize the takeover, by 
citing unverified stories of corruption and crime that had appeared in 
the press (Galander, 2001). 
The third military government began with a scheme of publishing 
two government-owned papers, but later allowed the private press 
to publish after shackling them with a series of restrictive press laws, 
enacted in 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2004 (Galander, 2016). These laws 
provided several strategies for curbing free expression of opinion, 
including censorship, jailing of journalists, closure of papers, and 
confiscation of printed issues.
As for radio, the first military government of General Abboud (1958–
1964) began to expand radio services to the southern region of the 
country, where a civil war was flaring up and the need for a government 
voice was strong. By the time of the second military government of 
General Nimeiry, and as microwave and satellite technologies became 
available, regional radio stations were established all over the country. 
During the 30-year period of General Al-Bashir’s rule, with the advanced 
technologies of radio transmission, private radio stations were allowed, 
and as a result, several FM radio stations, such as Radio Al-Rabiaa and 
Khartoum University Radio, appeared, but most of these stations were 
non-political and confined their discussion and progamming to sports 
and music. 
Television was introduced in Sudan by the first military government. 
It was then expanded, and put to political use by the second military 
government, and was further expanded to broadcast regionally and 
internationally by the third. The government of General Abboud 
introduced television in 1962, but the service was a privilege only enjoyed 
by a small middle-class elite that lived around Greater Khartoum. 
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The government of General Nimeiry expanded television coverage to 
almost all regions of the country and utilized the service for political 
mobilization (Galander, 2003). The government of General Al-Bashir 
considered television a strategic resource for the propagation of its 
self-declared embodiment of the “civilized Islamic orientation” form of 
government.1 Today, several television channels such as Al-Shurooq, Blue 
Nile, and Sudaniya 24 are in operation.
With respect to the legal dimension, the first press law of the land 
was the 1930 Press Act passed by the British administration, which 
served at the time as an important restraining factor against the 
involvement of the local population in newspaper publishing by placing 
heavy financial burdens on any media venture. After independence, 
the first postcolonial government (1956–1958) did not abolish the press 
law of the colonialists, as there was little need to use the law against 
the press, especially as it was not adversarial or irresponsible (Sa’id, 
1989). However, the first military government that succeeded the British 
in 1958 amended some articles of the colonial law and used it to deal 
with the press from a security perspective (Galander & Starosta, 1997, 
p. 216). Though no new press laws were initiated after the return of 
democracy in October 1964, the governments of the period had a 
record of violations of the basics of press freedom as they suspended 
newspapers, dragged some journalists to court, and planned to publish a 
government-owned newspaper (Galander & Starosta, 1997, p. 216). The 
second military government, led by General Nimeiry, introduced the 
1973 Press and Publication Act, which established complete state control 
of the mass media, and introduced a press council that became, and has 
remained, the mainstay of Sudan’s media ever since. The council served 
as the watchful eyes, and the iron fist, of the government with respect 
to journals and journalists: all publications were to be approved and 
licensed, and all journalists were to be vetted by the council (Galander 
& Starosta, 1997, p. 225). With the downfall of General Nimeiry’s 
government and the return to democracy, a new press law was put into 
effect, which, “though couched in liberal terms suited to the prevailing 
democratic spirit, […] retained some of the articles of the previous 1973 
Press Act” (Galander & Starosta, 1997, p. 231). 
1  The Arabic term used to describe the system was Al-Tawajjuh Al-Hadari Al-Islami.
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The third military government of Omar Al-Bashir depended, at 
first, on “revolutionary” decrees to organize press activity. By 1993, the 
blowing winds of global change obliged the government to introduce 
amendments to the media; hence, it promulgated what became the first 
of many laws, the 1993 Press and Publication Act, which legalized the 
independent press under strict conditions. The law banned individual 
or family ownership of newspapers, and it outlined several punitive 
measures to be used against violators of the law. The law established 
a press council as the regulatory agency of the press and as a tool for 
curbing the enthusiasm of the economically unable and the politically 
undesirable investors. Three years later, the government abolished the 
1993 Act and introduced a new 1996 Press Act that was no different from 
the previous one in its treatment of the press, except for a few “liberal” 
articles, such as one that allowed the press council members to elect the 
president of their council (Mahjoub, 2003). 
With the political developments that signaled a probable return 
to liberal democracy, a new 1999 Press Law repealed the 1996 Press 
and Publication Act (Press Law, 1999). The law legalized the partisan 
press as it stipulated that any legally registered political organization 
could publish a newspaper. However, the increased pressure on the 
government in 2000, as a direct result of the liberal environment that 
prevailed, led them to introduce more punitive articles to the law; the 
most notorious of these sought the establishment of a “press court” by 
the chief justice “to deal with violations to this law” (Press Law, 1999). 
Other amendments included an assortment of punishments that the 
council and the press court could impose on journalists.
By 2004, a process of national reconciliation brought several 
political opposition groups back into the country, and a new political 
atmosphere conducive to democratic practices developed. Responding 
to the blowing winds of change, the government took the initiative of 
repealing the 1999 Press Law, and it introduced a new 2004 Press and 
Press Publications Law. The law gave more attention to the political role 
of the press council by including in its membership representatives of 
the political groups that signed the peace agreement. Despite the liberal 
atmosphere, the 2004 law did not only give the press council all the 
punitive measures of the previous laws but added a new one: the ability 
to cancel a journalist’s license (Galander, 2017).
 24114. Sudan
In 2009, a new press law replaced the 2004 law, with only minor 
changes to the extent of punishment or prerogatives of the press council. 
The new law came into effect during a critical political period in the 
country, as legal wrangling mired any progress and resulted in increased 
penalties against the press. A notable feature of the 2009 law was the 
inclusion of three sources of punishment, which an article on the issue 
labeled “the tripartite sources of press punishment” (Galander, 2017, 
p. 375). The article named these three sources as the Press Council, the 
National Security Bureau, and the Press Court. Each of these institutions 
had, from 2009 to the end of the third military government, imposed 
numerous penalties that created a crippling environment for the 
Sudanese press. 
Currently, since the 2019 uprisings, the country is now engaged in 
the process of overhauling the public media. The interim government 
has, for example, closed down the media outlets that were owned or 
operated by the security apparatus. The administration of the state-
owned Radio and Television Corporation has also been changed. As 
for the private media, the government has opted for this sector to be 
regulated by a press council. It must be mentioned that radio stations 
and television channels were operated and/or licensed during the last 
military government of Al-Bashir by the ministries of information in the 
capital and in individual states. 
Economy and Ownership Patterns
As the country has swung between the two extremes of liberal and 
authoritarian rule, the ownership of media has been much affected 
by the existing political and economic system. Although the private 
press existed during the early years of independence (even under the 
first military government), the second military government of Nimeiry 
adopted socialist policies and, hence, nationalized or confiscated the 
press, including publishing houses and printing presses. Under the 
socialist government, the media were owned and operated by the single 
government party, which sought to mobilize the Sudanese masses 
towards the implementation of a socialist state.
The end of General Nimeiry’s government signaled the return of the 
private press, but as the economic conditions were not conducive to this 
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shift, newspapers did not perform well, and many were closed down. 
The situation had political consequences, as some outlets fell prey to 
foreign and local political exploitation (Galander, 2001). A leader from 
the NIF told this author that they were ready to give financial aid to 
newspapers that would support the party’s cause, whereas an inquiry 
into feature articles in favor of Ethiopia and Libya in a private newspaper 
revealed that they were adverts in disguise (Galander, 2016).
The third military government of General Omar Al-Bashir 
demonstrated an extreme distrust of the media by denying private 
ownership at the beginning of its rule and, later, by controlling the 
media with restrictive laws. A clandestine scheme of media acquisition 
and control by the government was also adopted (Galander, 2017). The 
government’s security apparatus established its own printing press 
and an advertising agency that distributed government adverts to 
favored newspapers, and developed a plan for the gradual takeover of 
financially troubled newspapers. In this way, the government crippled 
unfavorable newspapers and forced them either to stop publishing or 
to fall for the Security Bureau’s scheme of forced acquisition under an 
arrangement that would leave the owners as ineffectual shadow owners 
(Galander, 2017). Before the demise of the last military government 
of Al-Bashir, historically famous newspapers such as Al-Ayyam, 
Al-Sahafa, and Al-Khartoum were unable to continue publishing, while 
only government-supported (or government-supporting) papers such 
as Al-Sudani, Al-Watan, Al-Intibaha, and Al-Ahram were abundantly 
available in kiosks. The number of newspapers published in Khartoum, 
during the last days of the government, was estimated at 41 political and 
sports papers.
For many years, radio and television control remained in the hands of 
the different governments, democratic or military, hence less emphasis 
was placed on the economic sustainability of radio and television 
operations. However, with the advent of FM facilities, several private 
radio stations sprang up in the country. Improved satellite equipment 
has also allowed television channels to expand out of the country, and 
as a result, few privately-owned television channels currently exist. 
Today, private ownership of television channels in Sudan is a reality 
and, with the advent of Internet services, several of Sudan’s private and 
government television channels, and some radio stations, are available 
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online. However, similarly to what is presently the case in some Arab 
countries, the new trend of private ownership of radio and television has 
also been clouded by government attempts at intrusion. For example, it 
is well-known that the Al-Shurooq TV channel is owned by the Islamist 
Party through a close confidant of the Al-Bashir government, while 
another television and radio station (Taiba TV) was mentioned during 
the trial of General Al-Bashir as having received millions of dollars from 
him. 
Technology and Infrastructure
The role of Nimeiry’s government in laying down the foundation of a 
strong communications-related infrastructure cannot be denied. His 
government is credited with the expansion of television broadcasting as 
it built the first satellite reception station in the country, and used both 
this and the microwave network to expand service to regions and areas 
far from Khartoum. 
General Al-Bashir’s government put even more emphasis on 
television as a medium for the propagation of political views, not only 
nationally, but also regionally and internationally. The government 
invested heavily in modern communication technology, such as satellite 
transmission, reception equipment, and modern television production 
facilities. The plans for extending the range of transmission materialized 
in the late 1990s as Sudan TV, according to several government sources 
(Center for Strategic Studies, 1999, p. 404), could be watched in several 
neighboring African and Middle Eastern countries. As satellite and 
Internet technologies expanded transmission globally, Sudan TV’s 
channels were then made available on several satellites. On the national 
level, the number of local or regional television channels increased 
dramatically due to the fact that 25 regional radio stations and television 
channels were established as the public property of the 25 states that 
comprised the individual regions of the country (Center for Strategic 
Studies, 1999).
Advances in Internet and mobile telephony in Sudan have 
become more rapid and robust. MTN, Zain, and Kanar are the current 
international service providers of the service in the country. The 
establishment of a government-based telecommunications authority 
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in 1995, accompanied by the installation of new satellite equipment 
and the building of 36 reception stations, increased the capacity of 
reception and transmission more than tenfold (Galander, 2003). These 
new technological developments, as well as the shift to fiber optics 
in 1995, constituted the basis for the country’s rapid advancement in 
communications, which was manifested in the spread, as in the 1990s, 
of Internet cafés and increased public use of mobile telephony, including 
smartphones. The latest data on Internet services in the Sudan indicate 
that Internet users total around 31% of the population. 
With the expansion of the use of mobile phones in the new 
millennium, the use of social media in Sudan has risen to a remarkable 
level. Analyzing the situation, The Guardian wrote that as the press has 
been adversely affected by the clampdown on freedom of speech, the 
young generation has been left with only social media to exchange news 
and views (Albaih, 2015). According to 2017 data, mobile phone use 
had surged to include 72% of the population. Although Facebook is most 
popular among the population, WhatsApp use has recently risen to an 
extent that The Guardian prophesied it as “fueling a sharing revolution” 
(Albaih, 2015). The newspaper remarked that “the app has become a 
major source of news to Sudanese people, thanks to the ease of sharing 
that it offers and the wide reach of the group chat option, which has also 
helped connect the large diaspora to the latest wedding pictures and 
local gossip” (Albaih, 2015).
The recent December 2018–April 2019 uprisings confirmed The 
Guardian’s prophecy as they emphasized the role that WhatsApp (and, 
to a degree, Facebook) played in the dissemination of the opposition’s 
public mobilization tactics. An article on the situation during the last 
years of Al-Bashir described the resort to social media in search of 
political information as so overwhelmingly unprecedented that the 
government’s security bureau had to establish an “electronic Jihad 
brigade” to counter the barrage of anti-government sentiments that 
filled social media sites (Galander, 2017). 
No better confirmation of the impact of social media on public 
opinion can be found than in the developments in the aftermath of the 
fall of General Al-Bashir’s government. The opposition cleverly utilized 
social media and successfully mobilized the masses in the streets of 
cities to demand the handover of power to a civil government. Reluctant 
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to hand over power to civilians, the ruling Military Council became 
frustrated by the political strength endowed to the opposition by social 
media and, eventually, took an unprecedented drastic decision of 
enforcing a country-wide Internet blackout. To emphasize the impact of 
social media on political developments in the country, a member of the 
Transitional Military Council (TMA) considered the Internet “a threat 
to national security.” This move to deprive the public of access to social 
media was meant to disable the public revolt by denying the opposition 
communication with the masses and preventing the organization of the 
planned civil disobedience. 
Challenges 
The major challenges faced by the media are the result of the unstable 
nature of Sudanese politics. Throughout its history, the press has suffered 
from continued pressure, not only from the military governments, but 
also from rival elements in the different democratic governments. 
During the last three decades, Sudan’s mass media have been 
under all sorts of pressures, political, legal, and economic, while global 
technological advances keep challenging the industry and putting 
these media at an extreme disadvantage. Local economic conditions 
are unfavourable for both the printed press and broadcasting, despite 
the newly-gained liberal atmosphere that is promising for a free press 
system in the future. As such, a new approach to the country’s “classic” 
mass media may be needed.
As this chapter is being written in 2019, an interim government is in 
power, and in three years’ time (in 2022) a full democratic government 
is anticipated. Although the prospects of a full-fledged free press are on 
the rise, the most daunting issues are the current realities surrounding 
the future of the printed press, not only in Sudan, but worldwide, and 
the rising costs of newspaper production. At least for the time being, the 
economic realities in the country make it very difficult for the private 
press to prosper, unless the government lends a helping hand. As seen 
in some European countries, press subsidies may have to be put into 
effect. For instance, as in Sweden, there may be a need for platform-
neutral media subsidy schemes that could provide a more stable press 
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capable of rising to the responsibilities expected of it as a watchdog of a 
new democracy.
Despite these realities, the Sudanese media, particularly the printed 
press, have played an important role in national politics. Since Sudanese 
independence from the British, rulers have been aware that the press 
is a major tool of political education and can be used for enlightening 
the masses. This perhaps explains the continued harassment that the 
several military juntas which ruled the country exerted against the 
Sudanese press.
Outlook
As the country enters into a new era in which the power of the people 
has brought down military governments three times, the role and place 
of media in the new era should receive close attention from concerned 
scholars and authorities. As the country, whose economy was left 
in disarray by the previous government, is entering into a new era of 
liberal democracy, the large number of daily newspapers would need to 
be brought down through a scheme of mergers and/or acquisitions that 
would strengthen the financial conditions for many of these papers. The 
same may also apply to private broadcasting ventures, some of which 
have been closed down because of lack of funds. Such steps need to 
supersede the shift to a multiparty democracy that has been planned to 
occur within the next three years.
Internet-based media are in a better position than other media, 
as many of them rely on the advantages offered by the nature of the 
technology. The obvious popularity in the use of the net in the country 
must be followed by developing profit-making schemes to benefit the 
media that use the Internet for broadcasting their programs. The current 
overwhelming and obvious impact of social media demonstrates the 
future of modern communication technology as fundamental to the 
development of communication policies everywhere. As Sudan is 
approaching a new phase of democratic rule, policymakers must take 
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15. Libya: From Jamahirization to 
Post-Revolutionary Chaos
Carola Richter
“From house to house, from apartment to apartment, from alley 
to alley”, he would “cleanse Libya of dirt and filth.” With this 
statement, Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi threatened rebels during the 
Arab uprisings in a thunderous speech delivered on 22 February 
2011 on Libyan state television. As he had so often done, he 
tried to use ‘his’ medium to explain, justify, and mobilize. The 
media—and television, in particular—were understood by the 
self-proclaimed “Brother Leader” to be a direct channel to the 
masses since he had come to power in 1969. 
William Rugh (1987) classified the Libyan media system 
as a mobilization system. Mobilization media intend to shake 
people up, make them good citizens, and, at best, educate them. 
In practice, however, this approach involved disseminating 
regime propaganda through media, which, in a simple sender-
receiver model, the regime assumed to have immediate effects 
on the audience. This conception of the media as instruments for 
disseminating ideology to a supposedly receptive audience is still 
prevalent in the Libyan media system today even after the fall of 
the Qadhafi regime. 
Background
Libya is, in principle, a rich country with the largest oil reserves in 
Africa. In 2012, its 6.7 million inhabitants yielded a GDP of USD 15,597 
per capita. However, this had dropped to below USD 8,000 by 2018. 
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Libya had already previously faced economic difficulties, particularly 
during the era of UN-imposed sanctions from 1992 to 2003 that caused 
a low GDP of USD 4,120 per capita to be recorded in 2002. Import 
bans on many technical products such as computers also slowed down 
consumption and modernization of infrastructure until the mid-2000s. 
Prior to this period, in the 1970s and 1980s, Qadhafi’s modernization 
policy, which was financed by oil rents, strongly developed the country 
and brought benefits to citizens such as free basic education for all. 
Whereas 90% of the population was illiterate at the time of independence 
in 1951, today, almost all inhabitants can read and write. The population 
of Libya is young despite significantly declining birth rates: 28% are 
under 15 years of age.
The country consists of three historically distinct regions, namely 
Tripolitania with Tripoli as the capital in the west, the Cyrenaica with 
the metropolis of Benghazi in the east, and the Fezzan, the desert region 
with the city of Sabha in the south. Most people live in Tripoli and 
Benghazi as well as in other coastal cities along the Mediterranean Sea. 
The vastness of the country has always created challenges for media 
infrastructure. Transporting newspapers to the desert regions has been 
a major problem—even in the 2000s, they arrived in the cities of the 
hinterland two to three days after publication. Even national radio and 
television did not reach many of the country’s regions before the arrival 
of satellite technology. 
In such a huge country, there are several factors that influence 
identity formation. Despite Qadhafi’s attempt to impose a revolutionary 
transformation on society and his focus on “Arabness” (Smith, 2013, 
p. 176), traditional tribal identities remain strong. Ethnic affiliations, 
such as the Imazighen (or Berbers) in the west, and the Tuareg in the 
south, who make up about 10% of the population and maintain their 
own language, also constitute potential areas of conflict. Until 2011, the 
media were banned from using Amazigh, the Berber language, but now 
it is present on local radio stations and in newspapers. Being a native of 
western Tripolitania or eastern Cyrenaica around Benghazi also plays a 
major role in identity formation. Since Italian colonial rule, the East has 
been regarded as a stronghold of resistance against the authorities. In 
2011, the fall of Qadhafi was also heralded there. Both traditional tribal 
loyalties as well as modern political affiliations are partly responsible for 
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the country’s current power struggles and formation of militias (Lacher, 
2013). 
However, there are no significant religious minorities; 97% of 
the population are Sunni Muslims. In general, Libyan society can be 
described as moderately conservative. The dissolution of state structures 
after 2011 and the resulting migration of Islamist fighters from Syria to 
Libya, Mali, and Nigeria has led to radicalization among some groups 
in Libya. For some time, the Islamic State (IS) had strongholds in some 
regions in Libya. 
Under Qadhafi, women were legally equal to men. In everyday life 
they could pursue a variety of professions but did not have and still do 
not have the same public presence as men.
Historical Developments
Libya’s modern media development can be divided into four major 
stages, all of which have been characterized by an authoritarian state 
approach. This style of approach provided a clear orientation of the 
media within the context of a regime policy: under the brutal colonial 
rule of the Italians from 1911–1943, the British Mandate from 1943–1951, 
the rule of conservative King Idris from 1951–1969, and that of Qadhafi 
from 1969–2011. Even after the fall of Qadhafi, the media have found it 
difficult to break away from this legacy.
Compared with its Arab neighbors, Libya was a laggard in terms of 
press development. It was not until 1866 that the first Turkish-Arabic 
weekly, Tarabulus Al-Gharb, appeared as an official organ of the Ottoman 
Sultan. From then until 1929, only 13 newspapers were published within 
Libya. With the Treaty of Lausanne, the Ottomans handed over Libya to 
the Italians in 1912, and before the end of that year, all newspapers were 
discontinued and replaced by government-owned propaganda papers 
such as Barid Barqa. Even the first developments in radio brought nothing 
but Italian propaganda for the Libyans. Italian shortwave stations from 
Rome were transmitted via loudspeakers to many Libyan cities from 
1937 onwards (Al-Zilitni, 1981, p. 114). In contrast to other colonized 
states in the region, Libya underwent no modernization whatsoever 
during the occupation. On the contrary, Italian colonizers exterminated 
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one-eighth of the Libyan population in concentration camps between 
1922 and 1939. 
After an interim period under the British Mandate, Libya gained 
formal independence through the UN on 24 December 1951. The anti-
Italian resistance movement of the Sanussiya Brotherhood subsequently 
placed its leader Idris Al-Sanussi on the newly created throne of a federal 
Libyan kingdom. After the discovery of oil in 1959, a period of cautious 
modernization began which transformed the media sector. A Ministry 
of Information and National Leadership was established, which was 
responsible for all official press and broadcasting. The private and official 
press coexisted. The spirit of optimism that many Libyans returning from 
exile in neighboring countries brought with them to their homeland led to 
a rapid resurgence of the press (Mattes, 1986, p. 42). For Libyan writers, 
the press represented the only possibility of publication, since book 
production only began in the late 1950s. As a result, most newspapers 
were more concerned with literary, cultural, and social problems. For 
this reason, the press was seen as a “public university” (Al-Zilitni, 1981, 
p. 104) with a strong educational function. However, Press Law No. 
11 of 1959 imposed severe restrictions on the media. The royal house 
felt pressure from the burgeoning Arab nationalist movement, which 
emanated from Egypt and grew with the struggles for independence 
within the still colonized neighboring states (Richter, 2004). Under Idris, 
the inhabitants of Tripoli were able to receive radio programs from the 
nearby Wheelus Air Base of the US forces. In 1956, the Americans and 
British handed over the newly developed radio program Voice of Libya to 
the Ministry of Information. The first national television station, set up 
in 1968, was also financed to a large extent by the US. 
1 September 1969 marked a great turning point in Libya’s history. 
Riding on the wave of anti-colonial sentiment, Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi 
and a group of young military men carried out a bloodless coup against 
King Idris. Following the example of Egypt’s president Nasser, who 
had turned radio into a revolutionary medium, “the very first act” 
(Al-Zilitni, 1981, p. 121) after taking over power was to put the radio 
facilities into the hands of Libyan revolutionaries. Qadhafi’s speeches, 
which often lasted hours, were henceforth broadcast completely live 
on radio and television. The radio was directly subordinate to the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and private newspapers were 
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systematically forced out of the market from February 1970 onwards 
as state advertisements were withdrawn from their pages. In addition, 
all foreign language media closed down for lack of an audience after 
the American and British bases were evacuated and Italian settlers were 
expelled from the country. 
From 1972 onwards, a complete restructuring of the press landscape 
took place. Competition was seen as a useless function of the media 
system. After the ban on all private newspapers in October 1973, all 
media became part of state institutions. The so-called Green Book, 
a 100-page manifesto written by Qadhafi himself in 1975, drew up a 
“Third Universal Theory” alongside capitalism and communism, and 
was henceforth regarded as a kind of state constitution. The media 
system played a key role in transforming Libya into the “people’s 
mass state” (jamahiriya) that Qadhafi had envisaged. As a result of this 
“Jamahirization”, a tripartite media system was installed. It consisted of 
a one-dimensional press of the respective syndicates, in which doctors, 
policemen, peasants, etc. had to organize themselves into syndicates, 
revolutionary corrective media with the Al-Zahf Al-Akhdar newspaper 
as the leading force, and centrally controlled national media. Over the 
course of this restructuring process, salary payments to writers were 
stopped as journalism was perceived only as an activity to make money. 
However, the result was unsatisfactory for Qadhafi. Therefore, 
in a “cultural revolution” in 1980, the central press organization was 
completely abolished, and the revolutionary committees took over the 
radio and news agency JANA. The prisons were filled with intellectuals, 
including many journalists. This so-called cultural revolution was 
accompanied by a devastating economic and armament policy and a 
grueling war with Chad, and by the mid-1980s, these events had almost 
led Libya into bankruptcy. Therefore, Qadhafi initiated yet another 
radical change of policy related to domestic and economic liberalization. 
In March 1988, Qadhafi even announced that the borders would be 
completely opened and introduced a human rights charter and freedom 
of the press. The imposition of UN sanctions in 1992 because of Libyan 
involvement in the airplane attack over Lockerbie led, however, to new 
economic difficulties, including a newsprint crisis that lasted until the 
mid-2000s. It was not until 2003 that the sanctions were completely 
lifted.
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Thereafter, and in the course of the attempted enthronement of 
Mu’ammar’s second oldest son, Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi, there was a 
brief period that saw a kind of pseudo-critical media flourish (Richter, 
2013). Saif Al-Islam propagated a reform program called “Libya of 
Tomorrow” (libya al-ghad) in 2006. Although this program remained 
politically overoptimistic, Saif Al-Islam succeeded in launching two new 
newspapers (Oea in Tripoli and Quryna in Benghazi), a radio station, 
several news websites, a new news agency, and two satellite television 
channels (Al-Libiya and Al-Shababiya) and thereby significantly expanded 
the Libyan media system. These newspapers and programs appeared 
much more professional than the rest of the media. Foreign press was 
also suddenly accessible and international press agencies were allowed 
to open offices. A member of the exiled opposition called this phenomenon 
“Al-Ghad journalism”, highlighting the fact that this was by no means 
an expression of general liberalization under Qadhafi, but merely a very 
limited freedom (Al-Mohair, 2009). Criticism of Qadhafi himself was 
absolutely inadmissible. As a result of increased resentment from the 
Revolutionary Committees, all of these media organs were reinstated 
in 2009, and Al-Libiya was taken over as the second state television 
channel. Although this put an end to the pseudo-liberalization, libya 
al-ghad remained a good school for Libyan journalists who went on to 
successfully establish their own media after the fall of the regime in 2011 
(Wollenberg & Pack, 2013, p. 204).
Political System and Legal Framework
The uprising of Qadhafi’s opponents, which began on 17 February 
2011 in Benghazi and was supported by NATO, became a triumphal 
procession for rebels, and put an end to Mu’ammar Al-Qadhafi’s 42-year 
rule in August 2011. The political and legal frameworks that had been in 
place until then were completely suspended. 
The Libyan media had experienced 80 years of strong dependence 
on ruling elites and tight control of all media outlets. Thus, in 2011, 
during the early phase of the transition period and after rigid control 
mechanisms had vanished, one could observe a “media stampede” 
in Benghazi and later in Tripoli. In Benghazi alone—a city with a 
population of roughly 600,000 people—120 new newspapers, five radio 
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stations, and five television stations were launched (Wollenberg & 
Recker, 2012, p. 6). The breakdown of state control over mass media 
and public communication allowed long-oppressed ethnic minorities, 
dissidents, and other formally marginalized groups in society to finally 
voice their opinions. To participate in public debate on the future of their 
country was an opportunity that many had been longing for and, in 
the sudden absence of restrictions, this unprecedented freedom allowed 
media outlets to blossom (Wollenberg & Pack, 2013). Although most of 
the newly emerging channels eventually failed due to a lack of funding 
in the years following their establishment, the importance of public 
articulation in a formerly repressed society became clear.
Still, the new era provided many challenges. The so-called National 
Transitional Council (NTC) ran all political operations until a regular 
government under Prime Minister Ali Zaidan was finally formed after 
the first elections in November 2012. However, the government remained 
weak in the face of the de facto power of the still existing militias, which 
had legitimized themselves as combat troops against Qadhafi. In the 
summer of 2014, a war between rival militias plunged Libya into an 
unresolved leadership crisis that threatened to gradually divide the 
country into regions under the rule of different groups (Watanabe, 
2016). 
Since that time, Libya has been both geographically divided and 
politically fragmented. In the east of Libya, including the city of Benghazi, 
one main political entity emerged: an alliance called the Libyan National 
Army (LNA), which included remnants of the old regime and was 
led by former general Khalifa Haftar. This alliance also comprised the 
2014 elected and displaced House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk 
and the interim government in Al-Bayda. In 2014, the LNA launched 
a military campaign called “Operation Dignity,” claiming its mission 
was to rid Libya of Islamist forces, and succeeded in conquering mainly 
the eastern cities of the country. In reaction to this campaign, several 
changing coalitions were set up in the western part of the country, 
including Islamist forces. The unifying umbrella was their opposition 
to the LNA, and they formed what came to be known as “Operation 
Dawn.” In particular, the Dawn coalition consisted of dozens of rival 
networks built on tribal interests and local loyalties (Lacher, 2015). All of 
these actors were also competing for international support, for example, 
256 Arab Media Systems
from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, which 
considered Libya as a battleground within which they could enlarge 
their spheres of influence. Daraghi (2015) concluded that “Libya’s 
conflict has become more than ideological; it is also about the interest 
and relative power of different groups—and a fear of losing that power” 
(p. 50). This fear is also reflected in more recent developments. After 
the 17 December 2015 Skhirat Agreement was negotiated by the UN, 
the Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Fayaz Al-Sarraj, 
was established in Tripoli to follow up on the intermittent transition 
process. Observers have argued, however, that instead of unifying the 
country, the GNA has become the political arm of an alliance of militias 
that exploits state resources (Lacher, 2018). The de facto separation of the 
state remains in place, with two main players—the LNA in the east and 
the GNA in the west—but there are also many local militias that exist 
and function within and between these players. 
The resulting political confusion has had a massive impact on the 
organization of the media sector, which is now completely unregulated 
and governed by arbitrariness instead of law. Although the NTC had 
immediately appointed a media commission in 2011 to consider 
media regulation, the latter was abolished by the end of the year, and 
a newly established Ministry of Culture was entrusted with this task 
(Wollenberg & Pack, 2013, p. 201). In May 2012, the NTC attempted 
to establish a High Media Council (HMC) appointed by the NTC to 
oversee the media and draw up media policy guidelines. Immediately 
after the formation of the government, the parliament rejected the idea 
of the council in November 2012 and installed a Ministry of Information, 
as in authoritarian times, because, as one member of parliament put 
it, “Freedom is not equal to chaos—and that is what we have at the 
moment” (Grant, 2012).
In December 2011, with decree 7/2011, the decision was made to 
continue to operate state media and to transfer pre-existing staff into 
new institutions. Starting in May 2012, the government operated three 
television stations through the state-owned Libyan Radio and Television 
Network (LRT): Libya Al-Wataniya TV (the former Al-Jamahiriya TV) 
with a 24-hour program, Libya Al-Rasmiya TV (the former Al-Libiya TV 
founded by Saif Al-Islam), and a sports channel. After the arrival of the 
GNA, all three channels were placed under its control. 
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Some local terrestrial stations, such as Misrata TV or the Benghazi 
Broadcasting Network, had also received state funding until 2014. 
In addition, the news agency LANA (formerly JANA) remained a 
governmental body after the replacement of its executive board. 
Moreover, a press support committee (CESP) was set up to publish the 
daily newspaper Febrayer and several weekly newspapers and to provide 
other support for publications (El Issawi, 2013, p. 24). 
Several radio and television stations have been licensed since 2011, 
increasing the number of broadcasting outlets to more than 50 by 2012 
alone. Press and online organs were able to publish without a license, 
and dozens were founded and often disappeared just as quickly 
(Wollenberg & Recker, 2012). With the outbreak of fighting in mid-2014, 
many media ceased publishing or changed their political orientation or 
formats. For example, the popular Al-Assema TV in Tripoli was stormed 
by militias and had to close down completely. After the militias took over 
power, new channels emerged. These were either instruments of or, at 
least, loyal to the new rulers, such as February TV or Libya 24 (Fhelboom, 
2014). Currently, there is no regulatory body that oversees and governs 
Libyan media in either the East or West of the country. 
Today’s situation has resulted in journalism once again becoming 
an instrument of particular interest groups. Thus far, there has been no 
move to establish a new press or media law to replace the one from 
the 1970s. Although the interim constitution of August 2011 guarantees 
freedom of opinion and the press in Article 14, influential warlords 
generally define what may be said and written. 
In this climate, the media and journalists have become frequent 
targets of militant attacks. Human Rights Watch counted 91 attacks 
or threats against journalists from 2012 to November 2014, including 
30 cases of kidnapping and eight murders. There were also 26 armed 
attacks on television and radio stations (Human Rights Watch, 2015, pp. 
1–2). At the same time, ever since the factual partition of the country, the 
media have been forced to take sides or refrain from politics altogether. 
This has resulted in less violent attacks against journalists because 
many now practice self-censorship for the sake of protection against 
reprisals. In fact, even before the war of militias, journalists had begun 
to form their own professional associations in order to organize their 
interests and to agree on journalistic ethical standards. In June 2012, 
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the representatives of the General Media Union (GMU) were elected 
in Jadu (Legatum Institute, 2012), but due to the fragmentation of the 
country these efforts fizzled out. 
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Media ownership under Qadhafi was clearly regulated, and only public 
corporations were allowed to publish media outlets. The underlying 
credo that Libyan people would acquire control over the media 
remained an ideological construction. In reality, it was a nationalization 
of the media. Media production was largely financed by the country’s 
oil rents. Libya also currently has the third-largest share (11.2%) in the 
USD 500 million ArabSat satellite system, which is jointly operated by 
the states of the Arab League, after Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
Under Qadhafi, broadcasting was financed entirely by state funds 
without costs for the population. Until 2007, there was only one television 
station; nevertheless, Libyan national television and radio employed 
about 5,000 people, the press 1,200, and the national news agency about 
240. Although many of these employees worked in administrative or 
technical departments, media institutions were overstaffed. Until 2011, 
the entire press operation of the country had an extremely low combined 
distribution total of only a couple of thousand copies. As a rule, the 
authorities and embassies ordered large amounts of quotas, even paid a 
surcharge on the normal price and then distributed the newspapers to 
their employees free of charge. In addition to direct state subsidies and 
advertisements by state companies, these indirect subsidies ensured the 
survival of print products (Richter, 2004, p. 55). However, as a result 
of the lack of professionalism and quality of the Libyan media, no 
real reading culture had yet developed. For this reason alone, it was 
extremely difficult for new press outlets established after 2011 to find 
a permanent sales market. Privately financed newspapers still struggle 
to develop strong business models given the problems associated with 
print media. Hardly any national daily newspapers exist today; most of 
the 200 newspapers that still existed in 2012 were local papers with only 
a small circulation of a few hundred or thousand copies (Wollenberg & 
Recker, 2012). 
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In contrast to the dying print media, broadcasting is thriving. A 
media mapping of 2018 revealed that there are now 14 Libyan television 
stations and 122 local radio stations throughout Libya in both urban 
and rural areas, as well as some transmitting from outside Libya 
(Wollenberg & Richter, 2020). These are significant numbers, given the 
small size of the population, which is estimated to be around only 6.7 
million inhabitants. According to the media mapping, each of the three 
strong and adversarial camps that dominate Libya’s political landscape 
has their own media wing. One camp is supported by the LNA and its 
allies in the east of the country. All broadcasters in this sector are fully 
or partly funded by the respective government authorities. An equally 
strong camp is supportive of the GNA in the area of Tripolitania, and 
six broadcasters within this territory are directly funded by the GNA. 
Finally, there is a variety of media outlets operated or supported 
by different Islamist movements in Libya, namely the rather 
moderate Muslim Brotherhood and Jihadist groups such as the 
Islamic Fighting Group and the Saudi-backed ultraconservative 
Salafi Madkhali movement (Luck, 2018). With 35 affiliated outlets, 
Islamist groups control a significant proportion of media outlets 
with diverse political interests and agendas. The Salafi Madkhali 
movement operates 17 radio stations throughout the country, which 
all broadcast Qur’an recitations, sermons, and seminars that are in line 
with their school of thought. 
A substantial number of television channels (6 out of 14) are broadcast 
from abroad, eight of which receive funding from sources outside 
Libya. Libya 24 has been operating from London since 2014, allegedly 
with funding from Libyans in the UAE. Likewise, the channels TV218 
and Libya’s Channel, both with headquarters in Amman, purportedly 
receive funding from sources in the UAE. Libya’s Channel was founded 
in Jordan in March 2015 by the brother of the Libyan ambassador to the 
UAE (Libya Herald, 2015). Libyan benefactors who live abroad provide 
funding for Libya Al-Watan, which has operated from Tunisia since 
2017. Another example of this external media production and funding 
model is Al-Nabaa, an outlet affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which relocated from Tripoli to Istanbul in 2017 and is known to receive 
funding from the state of Qatar. Moreover, Libya Al-Ahrar, which is also 
closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, similarly receives funding 
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from Qatar, although its headquarters are in Istanbul. In fact, Libya 
Al-Ahrar was founded by long-term Libyan exile Mahmud Shammam 
on 30 March 2011 in Doha, Qatar before it moved to Istanbul. Many 
media outlets also switch sides, according to the respective situation. For 
example, the defunct Libya Dawliya TV, which was founded in Tripoli 
in 2012, had connections to the pro-government Alliance of National 
Forces until it was “turned around” by the Dawn Coalition in Tripoli 
and filled with new journalists (Fhelboom, 2014).
The ownership structure and available financial resources of private 
broadcasters are largely non-transparent, which means that any 
discussion surrounding the business models of these companies is often 
only speculative. However, content and ownership in the television 
sector is characterized by severe polarization. 
The situation with the radio sector, on the other hand, is different 
and goes beyond polarized instrumentalization. There are 122 locally 
broadcasting radio stations in the country. What appears to be a 
surprisingly high number of radio stations is, indeed, unusually high 
compared to neighboring countries. The BBC Media Action of 2014 
reported that 47% of the Libyan male and 25% of the female population 
listen to the radio every day (Dowson-Zeidan, Eaton, & Wespieser, 2014). 
The radio is therefore as important to Libyans as the Internet, which is 
used by 32% of the interviewees on a “regular” basis (weekly or daily). 
However, these numbers definitely lag behind television, which is used 
by 76% of the population every day (Dowson-Zeidan et al., 2014). 
After the collapse of the Qadhafi regime in 2011, local radio stations 
continued operating, mostly with volunteer workers and activists who 
could use and maintain the equipment at much lower costs compared 
with that of centralized TV infrastructure. In terms of the ownership and 
funding of all local radio stations, 71 of these 122 are still connected to 
public bodies; 34 are directly related to government institutions, such as 
ministries, and 37 are related to municipalities and publicly funded local 
organizations, such as universities. Nevertheless, editorial autonomy of 
local media entities is fairly high, as most outlets experience minimal 
control from governmental institutions and tend to follow public opinion 
on the community level. The remaining stations are operated by private 
entrepreneurs; 34 are based particularly in the Tripoli area, and 17 are 
clearly affiliated with the Madkhali Salafists (Wollenberg & Richter, 2020).
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Technology and Infrastructure
Qadhafi announced in 2001 that he was an avid Internet surfer and 
that every Libyan should own a PC and a mobile phone. However, the 
expansion of digital infrastructure was and continues to be a very slow 
process, and “the underdeveloped state of the telecommunications 
network, which suffered from a lack of expertise and competition, 
was especially significant” (St. John, 2013, p. 95). As sanctions were 
lifted in 2003, communications technology was slowly upgraded. It 
was only after the political problems with the US had been resolved 
that the Libyan authorities were able to obtain the country’s own 
top-level domain of.ly (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, 2004). 
Until 2011, technological infrastructure was operated centrally by 
Libya Telecom and Technology (LTT) and the mobile phone providers 
Libya and Al-Madar, which were under the control of Qadhafi’ oldest 
son Mohammed. For a long time, Qadhafi saw no reason to block the 
Internet or even satellite television, although the Internet in particular 
promoted a hotbed of political opposition. The portals akhbar-libya.com, 
almanara.org, and nfsl-libya.com were operated by exiles in the US and 
UK, and these shaped international perspectives on Libya. However, 
as the increase in networking opportunities was perceived as a threat 
to the regime, sites owned by the Libyan opposition abroad and all 
social media sites were blocked from 2010 onwards (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2011). In March 2011, Qadhafi completely disconnected the 
Internet and mobile communications from international data traffic. 
Despite these official restrictions, rebels secured channels to the outside 
world via proxy servers and satellite telephones.
While only around 14% of Libyans had access to the Internet in 2010, 
this number jumped to 22% in 2017, which was still very low. However, 
the situation seems to have changed very rapidly since then. Recent 
social media statistics, for example, show that 60% of all Libyans use 
Facebook and stream television programs either through media websites 
such as TV218 or through Facebook pages (Democracy Reporting, 2019). 
In respect to communications technology, mobile phones are 
particularly well distributed, with 92% of the population being 
connected. They also serve as the main gateway to the Internet. Three 
state-owned operators, Libiyana, LibyaPhone, and Al-Madar provide 
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services and mainly cover the country’s two big cities and some of the 
coastal areas. However, due to Libya’s ongoing military conflict, Internet 
connectivity is often disrupted, and outside Tripoli and Benghazi, 
technological infrastructure is still insufficient. 
Challenges
The Qadhafi era has left behind a media structure and culture of 
journalistic production that is inadequate for today’s requirements. 
After 2011, reforms were started only hesitantly and did not change 
the premises of the system. In the context of political fragmentation, 
the media system has fallen back into the old pattern of political 
instrumentalization. As expected, the legacy of the Qadhafi era and 
the country’s inexperience with any other legal and organizational 
framework means that the process of redesigning state institutions, 
including the media, poses an enormous challenge. Questions of media 
ethics, as well as the institutionalization and regulation of media are still 
completely unresolved. 
For the time being, a culture of mutual accusation prevails in the 
television sector, which strongly reflects the partition of the country 
into two opposing political camps. This instrumentalization not only 
presents a challenge from an ethical point of view, in terms of journalistic 
autonomy, but might also have significant effects on the population 
and hinder future efforts for reconciliation after the war ends. At the 
same time, the public seems to be aware of biased reporting. People are 
frustrated by the “lack of useful and relevant information on television 
about issues that matter to them” (Dowson-Zeidan et al., 2014, p. 
16), and they mostly trust friends and family as their main sources of 
information (Dowson-Zeidan et al., 2014, p. 36). Indeed, the UN-led 
consultations with 7,000 Libyans indicated that the population seems 
to be tired of political polarization and reported that “[t]he Libyans 
consulted requested an end to the transition period. They highlighted 
the need to unify State institutions” (UN Security Council, 2018, p. 2). 
Therefore, the existing culture of media instrumentalization needs to be 
overcome. 
Another challenge is to provide an independent regulation for the 
media. As of now, no adequate media laws exist, and the ruling bodies 
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either do not regulate at all or do so arbitrarily. In most parts of the 
country, media production is allowed as long as content creators align 
with the ideological orientation of the ruling entity or stay completely 
away from politics. This situation has brought about two trends. On 
the one hand, media production has been largely deterritorialized, and 
major players and financial support come from abroad—which keeps 
any regulation of licenses and content out of the hands of a potential 
national regulator. On the other hand, a considerable number of local 
initiatives have started their own media production, mainly radio, to 
serve the local communities. However, they are forced to refrain from 
political reporting to avoid any trouble. 
Outlook 
Both institutionally and socially, a new media system has yet to develop. 
This seems very problematic at the moment as military conflict continues 
to contribute to the increasing disintegration of state structures. The 
fact that many local initiatives produce content to serve the community 
offers a ray of hope, as this could provide a breeding ground for more 
independent non-instrumentalized journalism in the future. However, 
at the moment, these initiatives are vulnerable to any changes in the 
political situation and have no legal protection. Before Libya’s media 
system can be reformed, the country’s current political situation needs 
to be consolidated and the wars between militias need to be brought to 
an end. Only then will the existing challenges to the media system be 
overcome. 
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16. Tunisia: The Transformative 
Media Landscape after the 
Revolution
Noureddine Miladi
The media landscape in Tunisia has witnessed significant 
transformations since the revolution of 14 January 2011. After 
decades of being direct controlled and tightly monitored by the 
dictatorial regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the country has 
shifted to a new era of a diverse media market. Public service 
media have been consolidated and made independent from 
government interference. Newly established television and radio 
channels have been thriving and stand in competition with the 
public service broadcasters. This diversity in the media market 
has also been accompanied by regulatory frameworks which 
guarantee free speech and the independence of journalists. In spite 
of its slow development, the independent television and radio 
regulator Haute Autorité Indépendante de la Communication 
Audiovisuelle (High Independent Authority of the Audiovisual 
Commission, or HAICA), has been integral in transforming the 
nature of the audio-visual market to meet international standards. 
However, despite these recent advances in media development, 
I argue in this chapter that, similar to any other transitional 
democracy, in the case of Tunisia, ideological forces, the power 
of business magnates, and overseas influences remain key factors 
which affect the operation of various media outlets. 
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Background
The Arab uprisings, which were triggered in Tunisia by ousting Zain 
El-Abidin Ben Ali from power on 14 January 2011, have set a landmark 
for change in all aspects of the locals’ lives. The one-party ruling regimes 
of Ben Ali and his predecessor Habib Bourguiba came to an end and 
gave way to a new democratic era. As a result, Tunisia, after living 
through decades of dictatorships, has been undergoing significant 
transformations regarding democratic governance, freedom of speech, 
and empowerment of civil society organizations. This transformative 
scene has evidently reinvigorated and changed the shape of the media 
market in terms of ownership, governance, editorial policies, and 
regulations. 
Situated in the north of Africa and overlooking the Mediterranean 
Sea, Tunisia is bordered by Algeria on the northwest and Libya on the 
south. The population reached 11.8 million in 2020, and its GDP dropped 
compared with that of 2014 from USD 47.6 billion to USD 39.9 billion in 
2020. Although a sizeable portion of its southern region is located in the 
Sahara Desert, Tunisia has a rich farming landscape and self-sufficient 
agricultural production. 
Tunisia’s official religion is Islam. The Maliki school of thought 
represents a key source for jurisprudence. There exists a small minority 
of Jews in the north as well as in the southern part of the country on the 
island of Djerba. Arabic is the official language, and French is the second 
most spoken language and, to some extent, the language of the elites. 
Many business enterprises as well as educational institutions still use 
French as their main language for communication. 
Tunisia’s past reveals a rich antiquity that spans across three 
thousand years of successive civilizations. Although Islamic culture 
overwhelmingly constitutes the country’s identity, Tunisia’s long history 
has always included a multiethnic, cross-cultural character influenced 
by the Carthaginian, Roman, Arab, Islamic, Berber, European, and 
Ottoman civilizations. As the site of the Phoenician city of Carthage, 
and later, as the Africa Province, Tunisia was of strategic significance in 
connecting Africa and Europe during the Roman times and was known 
as the breadbasket of the Roman Empire.
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Tunisia’s economic divide can be readily seen in the marked 
differences between the North and coastal cities when compared with 
the rural and southern parts of the country. The regimes of Bourguiba 
and Ben Ali had heavily invested in infrastructure, education, health, 
and tourism in the main coastal cities of Tunis, Nabeul, Bizerte, Monastir, 
Sousse, and Sfax. By contrast, most of the southern regions of Elkaf, 
Gafsa, Jandouba, Kairouan, Sidi Bouzid, and Mednine, among others, 
still suffer from poor infrastructure, lack of investments, and high rates 
of unemployment. The resentment that arose from this regional divide 
constituted one of the key reasons for the outbreak of the Tunisian 
revolution in the marginalized city of Sidi Bouzid. This regional divide 
is also evident in the distribution of media organizations across the 
country, as both state and private television channels and radio stations, 
in addition to major newspapers, are still primarily based in the wealthy 
coastal cities. 
 Historical Developments
In the modern era, Tunisia was under colonial rule by France from 
1881 until its independence in 1956. Soon after the French invasion, 
the Tunisian Bey (ruler) representing the Ottoman Sultan was 
deposed. As a consequence, the beylic system was replaced after the 
treaty of Bardo and the Convention of Al-Marsa in 1883 by a new 
French authority called the French Resident General. Immediately 
after assuming power, the new governor embarked on changing the 
political, economic, and social order of Tunisia. These measures affected 
all aspects of everyday life including changes in communication and 
culture, which were persistently resisted by the locals. Similar to its 
neighboring country Algeria, the Tunisian anti-colonization movement 
led a long and unremittent struggle for independence. The resistance 
movement gathered momentum especially after dramatic changes in 
the international geopolitical scene after World War II. That momentum 
had been partly aided by the circulation of newspapers and newsletters 
among the activists and emerging educated elite.
During the French colonization, print publishing thrived in both 
the Arabic and French languages. During the French occupation from 
1881 to 1956, there were more than 100 newspapers and periodicals 
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published in Arabic, in addition to tens of newspapers published in 
French. Newspapers served as significant platforms for the struggle 
against the French occupation (Instance Vérité & Dignité, 2018). 
Prominent newspapers at the time, such as Sawt Attalib Al-Zaytouni, 
Al-Tunisi, Al-Hadirah, Azzahra, Al-Talia’, Sabilurashad, Al-Fajr, Assurour, 
and Al-Dustour, were crucial in sustaining the anti-colonial movement 
and challenging the communication strategy of the occupation power. 
Immediately after taking control of the country, the French colonial 
power confiscated some newspapers, including the Al-Raid Al-Tunisi 
and Al-Tunisi newspapers, among others, and turned them into 
mouthpieces of the colonial administration. In 1911, the French colonial 
power censored every Arabic language newspaper except for one which 
was the official organ of the French colonials. Additionally, as a new 
measure to regulate and control the newspaper market, a Communication 
Control Council was set up after WWII and was headed by a general from 
the colonial council. Part of its mission was to issue new licenses and 
regulatory laws, and control content.
However, the post-independence era was not free of media repression. 
Up to the eve of the 14 January 2011 revolution, Tunisia had been ruled by 
only two presidents: Habib Bourguiba (1956–1987) and Zain El-Abidin 
Ben Ali (1987–2011). Both had led dictatorial regimes and held control 
of every branch of the Tunisian state including the media sector. Both 
eras witnessed dark times as well as instances in which restrictions 
on free speech were slightly loosened (Zran & Ben Messaoud, 2018). 
Soon after the country’s independence, the self-appointed president 
Habib Bourguiba not only prevented pluralism in radio and television 
broadcasting and the press but also monopolized the management and 
decision-making process in key media outlets. On 31 May 1966, the first 
television network began broadcasting and later became the Tunisian 
Radio and Television Corporation. This Tunisian broadcaster emerged 
as an official government body, which did not have the sovereignty of 
public service broadcasting institutions. Senior and middle managers 
were directly appointed by the presidential palace. Leadership positions 
were also allocated on the basis of strict allegiance to the ruling party, 
the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique or Constitutional 
Democratic Assembly (RCD) (Zran & Ben Messaoud, 2018).
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As for the printed press, Bourguiba allowed, in the early years of 
his rule, the publication of only four newspapers: Al-Amal (in Arabic) 
and L’Action Tunisienne, which both functioned as organs of his political 
party (Free and Constitutional Party), as well as La Press, which was 
the mouthpiece of the government, and its Arabic version Al-Sabah. 
Although the two latter publications were declared as independent, they 
followed strict editorial guidelines set by the Ministry of Interior. Tight 
legislations governing the press and broadcasting first appeared within 
Article 8 of the 1 June 1959 Constitution. The document stipulated that 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press were guaranteed, but the 
specific legislation governing the field of media and communication 
was repressive and arbitrary.
In 1961, the Tunisian and African Press Agency (TAP) was launched. 
For decades, it remained the main and official source of news, focusing 
mainly on the regime and serving its agenda. During this period, the 
propaganda machine employed every possible means of state media 
and communication in order to establish political legitimacy and 
hegemonic influence in the public sphere. Through the Office of State 
Media, established on 31 May 1956, Bourguiba directly monitored and 
controlled all media outlets. In the mid-1960s, Tunisia witnessed further 
setbacks on civil liberties and free speech, which included closing down 
several media outlets and often forcing their owners to leave the country. 
This period coincided with the incarceration of the leaders of the Yousfi 
movement (named after its leader Ahmed ben Yousuf) and banning the 
activity of the Tunisian Communist Party.
Journalism education was yet another component of Bourguiba’s 
regime. With the aim of breeding new generations of journalists, on 
30 December 1967, he inaugurated the first college of journalism in 
the country and the region, the Institut de Presse et des Sciences de 
l’Information (IPSI). The institute served as an incubator for future 
generations of qualified journalists who fed both press and broadcast 
journalism institutions over the years.
Bourguiba dominated the content of daily news bulletins on state 
television and national radio, as well as on official and pro-government 
newspapers. These platforms repeatedly reported on his daily 
presidential engagements such speeches, meetings, and visits to various 
places. Due to this controlled discourse, broadcasting outlets seriously 
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lacked depth and diversity and were characterized by a top-down 
indoctrinatory style of communication that was well orchestrated by the 
head of state (Hajji, 2004).
During this period, Tunisia witnessed its darkest epoch in media 
censorship and the repression of free speech. Total control of the media 
and self-censorship were the norm. Human rights and political activists 
rarely dared to openly criticize the ruling regimes. Those who crossed 
the line even at small gatherings, seminars, or academic symposia 
were arrested and subsequently given prison sentences. Scores of 
journalists fell victim to Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s media censorship. 
Bashir ben Ahmed, one of the early diplomats who headed the Ministry 
of Information, could not tolerate Bourguiba’s dominant persona and 
founded Jeune Afrique magazine in 1961 after resigning from office. 
After he settled in Paris in 1962, Jeune Afrique continued to operate as a 
significant platform for news and current affairs analysis about Tunisia 
and the African region, attracting not only a large readership among 
the Tunisian diaspora but also among the Tunisian elites back home. It 
remains to this day an influential publication.
Th state’s tight control over media outlets did not change during 
the mandate of Ben Ali (1987–2011). However, a key feature of this era 
was that Ben Ali’s family members became influential in every sphere 
of public life including the media. His political party, RCD, was the tool 
through which the Ben Ali regime managed to infiltrate every media 
institution.
The Ministry of Information and the External Communication 
Agency (ATCE) were two official bodies employed by the Ben Ali regime 
as instruments to control the media (Ben Letaif, 2018). The ATCE was 
in charge of out-of-state propaganda campaigns for the regime. Mainly 
through bribing journalists and media companies, the ATCE generously 
paid writers and PR organizations in Europe and the US to report fake 
economic successes of the regime and falsified claims about stability, 
freedom, and respect for human rights at a time when Tunisia witnessed 
one of the darkest episodes of its modern history. The ATCE, argued Ben 
Letaif (2018), “paid mercenaries and foreign political figures to promote 
the image of Ben Ali in their respective countries” (p. 3).
A further measure employed by the Bourguiba regime and later 
maintained during Ben Ali’s rule was the 1975 Press Code that aimed 
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to censor information and exercise tight control over free speech. The 
“legal deposit” requirement compelled all publishers to submit a copy of 
their publications before distribution. This gatekeeping policy allowed 
regime regulators to censor every form of media content and punish 
every journalist critical of the regime, such as through heavy fines and 
sometimes prison sentences Under such a regime defamation was a 
politically manipulated legislative tool used to accuse and imprison 
political dissidents and independent journalists. Tailor-made court 
sentences for attempting to jeopardize state security and public order 
or causing offence to the head of the state and other government figures 
were always in place (Human Rights Watch, 2005).
Among the notorious cases documented by international human 
rights organizations were those related to the ordeals faced by various 
journalists, political as well as human rights activists. Um Ziyad, a 
Tunisian female journalist, was imprisoned and tortured for a month 
in 2003 after using her blog to highlight problems within the country’s 
education system and calling for proper reform of this sector. Hamadi 
Jebali, former editor of the Al-Fajr newspaper in the 1980s, and later a 
prime minister in the coalition government (2012–2013), was imprisoned 
for over 15 years under Ben Ali’s rule for spearheading a newspaper that 
heavily criticized the regime’s corruption. Because Internet platforms 
posed another challenge for the Ben Ali regime from 2000 onwards, 
systematic blocking of activists’ homepages, Facebook, and YouTube 
was common practice. For over 10 years, the websites of Al-Nahdah 
Net, Al-Kalima, Tunis News, and Al-Bawwaba, among other critical news 
sources, were censored in Tunisia. However, such news sites continued 
to function as thriving platforms for discussions and news reporting 
about Tunisian politics in the diaspora. This struggle for freedom of 
speech among oppositional media, in addition to ongoing political 
changes in the country, has meant that Tunisia has set a benchmark in 
terms of democratic governance and media freedoms for other Arab 
uprising countries 
Political System and Legal Framework
On 23 October 2011, Tunisia witnessed its first free democratic general 
elections that brought Ennahda, an Islamist political party headed by 
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Rashid Ghannouchi, to power for the first time. Moncef Marzouki, a 
former exiled political activist and founder of the Congress for the 
Republic party was proposed as their preferred presidential candidate. 
As a result, the country announced its first democratically elected 
government after over 60 years of dictatorship. A three-party coalition 
was formed among Ennahda, the secular party Ettakatol, and the 
Congress for the Republic (CPR) which ruled in Tunisia after the 2011 
Constituent Assembly election.
Social and political instability kept mounting due to increasing 
unemployment, economic uncertainties, and shrinking foreign 
investment in the country. Political tension between the troika-led 
government and opposition parties, specifically from the extreme left, 
continued to simmer and took a dangerous turn after the assassination 
of two political activists, Chokri Belaïd in February 2013 and 
Mohammed Brahmi in July 2013. The political deadlock worsened as a 
result of hundreds of strikes organized by the General Labour Union in 
various parts of the country, which led the Ennahda Party to withdraw 
from power and opened the way for a general election. The legislative 
election held on 26 October 2014 and the presidential elections of 23 
November 2014 brought the newly formed Nidaa Tounis (headed by 
Beji Caid Essebsi, a career minister from the Bourguiba era) to power. 
This guaranteed the success of a democratic and peaceful political 
transition and saved the country from falling into the same scenario 
as Egypt, Libya, or Syria which led either to the return of dictatorship 
or civil war. 
The abovementioned challenges have impacted the media scene 
in terms of its operation and development. For instance, tension 
among various political parties has found its way to the front pages of 
newspapers and heated discussion programs on television and radio 
stations. As Tunisia has lived through decades of government media 
control, it will take time for a culture of free speech and free media to 
mature and develop. Nonetheless, this process is gradually taking place 
in Tunisia through the development of public service broadcasting, 
which is empowering independent and community media and 
strengthening the role of independent regulatory bodies. In fact, the 
biggest achievements of the Ennahda-led troika government were 
arguably the writing of the Tunisian constitution and the establishment 
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of the independent council for media, HAICA. The HAICA was set 
up in May 2013 as the new regulatory body for monitoring television 
and radio content, issuing new licenses for both the public and private 
sectors. The establishment of this new independent regulatory body 
was preceded by the dissolution of the Ministry of Information and the 
ATCE, which had been used as the strong arms of the Ben Ali regime in 
controlling information. 
It can be argued that the Tunisian media market has been significantly 
transformed because of the historical shift in the political scene. Its 
unprecedented growth has encompassed not only satellite television, 
but also radio stations, newspapers, and Internet platforms. From 
a handful of media outlets mainly controlled by the former Ben Ali 
regime, dozens of radio stations, television channels, and online news 
platforms, in addition to a plethora of newspapers and magazines, 
have been launched since 2011. The Decree-Law No. 115 (on the Press, 
Printing and Publishing) passed in February 2011 concerns both print 
and electronic media. This new law repealed the 1975 Press Code and 
paved the way for freedom of the press and organization of the market, 
and regulated ownership and control of newspapers and magazines. 
However, unlike the audiovisual market, the printed press is not yet 
under the umbrella of an independent regulatory authority.
Compared with the Ben Ali era, the post-revolutionary period 
witnessed a dramatic expansion of the broadcasting market. Today, 
there are 12 television channels and over 21 radio stations transmitting 
from various parts of the country. These channels and stations are now 
licensed and regulated under Decree-Law No. 116 by the Broadcasting 
Authority, that is, the HAICA. The analogue television market is currently 
dominated by three television channels, Al-Watania 1 (known as Tunis7 
before the revolution) and Al-Watania 2 (known as Tunis21 before the 
revolution), both of which cover almost all of the Tunisian territory, 
while Hannibal TV covers only 45% (Office National de la Télédiffusion, 
2014). The digital market currently includes the abovementioned two 
channels (Al-Watania 1+2), in addition to nine private channels: Hannibal, 
Nessma, Ezzitouna, Attounissia, El-Hiwar Ettounsi, Attessia TV, M Tunisia, 
Tunisna TV, Al-Insen, Telvsa TV, Al-Janoubia, and Carthage+ (Office 
National de la Télédiffusion, 2014). In September 2020, the Press Council 
was set up as a culmination of collaborative efforts between various civil 
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society organizations. The council functions as an independent, not-
for-profit body that works to establish self-regulation for the media in 
order to protect freedom of the press, and to defend Tunisian citizens’ 
right to obtain quality information. Its key roles are to assist media 
institutions in establishing mechanisms that abide by the ethics of the 
profession, to mediate between the profession and the public, and to 
improve legislation related to the media sector, especially in the written 
and electronic press.
This new environment has significantly widened the scope of free 
speech to a level not experienced before. The global freedom index 
of Freedom House, for instance, rated Tunisia “very high” in terms 
of freedom of expression. Although blasphemy remains illegal, the 
new constitution stipulates that freedom of belief and conscience 
should be guaranteed for all citizens. It also “bans campaigns against 
apostasy and incitement to hatred and violence on religious grounds” 
(Freedom House, 2020). Article 31 states that “Freedom of opinion, 
thought, expression, media and publication shall be guaranteed. 
These freedoms shall not be subject to prior censorship.” Also, Article 
32 confirms that “The state shall guarantee the right to information 
and the right to access information. The state seeks to guarantee the 
right to access to information networks.” As a reflection of the new 
free media environment, television and radio stations now host shows 
and discuss issues that would have been impossible to air before the 
revolution. Talk shows about political reform, corruption, education, 
the role of the police, civil society, human rights, culture, and sports 
have become the digest of scores of channels. This has provided 
a critical space for members of the public to express their views 
regarding the shape of the new democracy in the country. The public 
service network is rapidly adapting to the challenge of finding its role 
in light of the competition from private channels. However, the public 
television network is caught in the middle of ideological tensions. 
These tensions exist partly among a few influential key players from 
various political parties who have infiltrated these media institutions 
and, to some extent, the regulatory body, HAICA, and the National 
Journalism Syndicate. 
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Economy and Ownership Patterns
Ownership and control of Tunisia’s media organizations has also been 
subject to transformations. After decades of total control under the 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, ownership of television channels, 
radio stations, newspapers, and magazines has taken a dramatic 
turn since January 2011. This boom has brought new players into the 
market, many of whom are state funded, while others are privately 
funded or receive support from external bodies. Although private 
media organizations claim independence, direct links between media 
proprietors and political affiliation are highly visible. Nabil El Karoui, 
founder of Nessma TV, for instance, was also one of the founders of 
the political party Nidaa Tounis, later a founder of Kalb Tounis, and 
eventually a presidential candidate in the elections of October 2019. 
Tahar ben Hassine, the founder of Al-Hiwar Ettounsi, was also one of the 
founders of Nidaa Tounis and an influential member of the previous 
regime of Ben Ali. Larbi Nasra, founder of Hannibal TV, is a key figure 
in the party Voice of Tunisia People. Oussama ben Salem, founder of 
Zitouna TV, is a member of Ennahda, and his father was also one of the 
founders of Ennahda. Mohammed Ayachi Ajroudi, owner of Janoubia 
TV, is a key figure in the Tunisian Movement for Liberty and Dignity. 
Although a few of the abovementioned media owners/founders sold 
their shares before entering politics (namely Oussama ben Salem and 
Tahar ben Hassine) to comply with the HAICA regulations, political 
influence over various channels during election campaigns openly 
continued. Nessma TV was accused by the regulatory body HAICA 
of blatantly promoting the presidential candidate Nabil Karoui and 
his party Kalb Tounis during the legislative elections of September 
2019 and presidential elections of October 2019 (HAICA, 2019). 
According to the same report, Nessma TV dedicated 24 hours and half 
of its airtime during the legislative election campaign to promote Kalb 
Tounis and its leader: six hours were direct propaganda and about 18 
hours were various other political promotions such as advertising the 
humanitarian campaign of Nabil Karoui and his relief organization 
Khalil Tounis. 
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Technology and Infrastructure
Compared with other African countries, Tunisia has one of the most 
“sophisticated telecommunications and broadband infrastructures 
in North Africa,” according to Lancaster (2020). Mobile and Internet 
technologies were also rated among the highest in the region in terms of 
coverage and penetration. Governance of the Internet has been relaxed 
since 2011 following a liberal turn (de la Ferrière & Vallina-Rodriguez, 
2014). The Telecommunications Act of 2013 put an end to Internet 
censorship and encouraged competition between online platforms. 
Also, the laws supporting e-commerce have boosted online marketing 
and digital business activities. ADSL service is primarily provided by 
Tunis Telecom, a state-owned telecommunications company. Other main 
players in the market include the Qatari-based Ooredoo and Orange 
Tunisie. Both are licensed as fixed-line operators and have launched DSL 
and fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) services. The Digital Tunisia 2020 
program launched by the government aims to boost Internet connectivity 
and improve service in underserved areas all over the country. 
Tunisia is reasonably developed when it comes to mobile phone 
technology. In 2016, the state issued three licenses to major networks 
in order to provide 4G technology, which enabled faster services and 
telecommunications coverage in every part of the country. These licenses 
came with a commitment from each service provider to reach 98% of the 
country by 2031 (Instance Nationale des Télécommunication, 2016, p. 
37). Looking ahead, the regulatory body has also confirmed that 5G 
licenses are expected to be released in 2021.
These developments in telecommunications technologies have also 
been reflected by Tunisians’ increasing Internet and social media use 
even before the revolution of 2011. In early 2020, Internet users reached 
7.55 million (64% of the population) and active social media users 
constituted 62% of the population (7.3 million). Facebook remains the 
most popular social media platform among Tunisians. The number of 
total users of Facebook reached 6.9 million, which constitutes 75% of 
the population over 13 years of age. Although Twitter is a very popular 
platform in other Arab countries such as those the Gulf region, those 
who prefer this social media platform in Tunisia do not exceed 272,500, 
whereas Snapchat attracts 765,000 users, Instagram 1.9 million (21% 
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of the population), and LinkedIn 1.2 million (14% of the population) 
(Hootsuite, 2020). 
Much has been said about social media networks as platforms for 
promoting social activism and resistance. Facebook and Twitter were 
considered instrumental in the Tunisian uprisings, operating as tools 
with which protesters challenged the brutality and censorship of the Ben 
Ali regime. Although it is hard to measure such influence, it was evident 
that social networks became alternative platforms for news. As argued 
by various studies on the Tunisian uprisings (Castells, 2012; Chomiak, 
2011; Karolak, 2018; Miladi, 2016; Zayani, 2015), thanks to these digital 
platforms, protesters managed to get their voices heard by and stories 
out to the world. Marginalized youth proved that they were not mere 
observers or followers of news but could become shapers of mainstream 
media’s news agenda. Most noteworthy was that they gained influence 
in disrupting the Tunisian regime’s information management and its 
political communication channels both locally and internationally. Ben 
Ali’s External Communications Unit, for instance, faced challenges 
in controlling the barrage of information spreading via social media 
and reaching out to an international audience via satellite television. 
Constant monitoring and partial blocking of Facebook in December 2010 
was the last resort of the failed regime’s attempt at containment and 
control.
The post-revolutionary period in Tunisia has witnessed the growing 
influence of social media platforms. For instance, with reference to the 
Tunisian elections of 26 October 2014, social media, it can be argued, 
assumed an effective watchdog role. For example, the youth-led civil 
society organizations of I-Watch and ATID harnessed social media 
platforms during the presidential and legislative elections of 2019 to 
monitor the election campaigns as well as the voting process. Thus, 
they not only monitored occurrences of possible corruption among 
candidates, but also checked media coverage against any possible 
ideological influences. At the same time, an analysis of the candidates’ 
online activism during that election period revealed that contenders 
learned from the lessons of previous years and understood that social 
media was equally as important as traditional media, especially for 
reaching out to young voters (Miladi, 2016). Activities in the online 
sphere indicated that Facebook and Twitter had become battlegrounds 
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for ideological fights, which the contestants and their supporters had to 
navigate skillfully. Yet again, Facebook pages became critical platforms 
for a thriving citizen journalism (Zayani, 2015). 
It is evident that social media networks have become indispensable 
tools for communication, news sharing, and political campaigning 
in Tunisia. Whether employed by activists and opposition groups 
or political leaders, such networks have increasingly advanced 
communication and information sharing in various situations, such as 
political or social campaigns.
Challenges 
The media scene in Tunisia has dramatically changed since the 2011 
revolution. A new era of media plurality has not only seen a plethora of 
television channels, radio stations, and newspapers emerge across the 
country, which reflects a diverse political and cultural spectrum, but has 
also freed public broadcasting from government control. However, these 
changes have not come without challenges in terms of media ownership 
and regulation. The road to democracy in Tunisia still seems rough 
given the various obstacles that continue to crop up (Richter, 2017). 
The current government of Hisham Al-Mishishi, which came to power 
in August 2020, still needs to radically improve three main areas: 1) 
sustainability of media’s business model, 2) ideological manipulation, 
and 3) elitist orientation. 
Regarding the issue of sustainability, the print market witnessed the 
closure of hundreds of newspapers and magazines soon after the boom 
in newspapers and the audiovisual media market from 2011 to 2015. By 
2017, the number of printed papers had dropped to 50 after reaching 
250 in the post-revolutionary period. For instance, Akhbar Al-Jumhuriyah 
was suspended on 11 October 2017 after 25 years of operation. The 
broadcasting market has also faced similar challenges. For instance, First 
TV closed down in October 2017 because it was not financially viable. 
Restructuring, however, has been taking place for a few channels such as 
Al-Mutawasit TV and others. 
In respect to manipulation of the media, the growth of the media 
market has meant increased challenges for regulatory bodies and has 
caused genuine concerns regarding the influence of new online media 
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outlets. As such, this post-revolutionary period has also witnessed 
unremitting tensions between influential media enterprises and 
Tunisia’s first democratically elected government. This is partly due 
to the conflicting understanding of the media’s role in a transitional 
democracy and attempts to manipulate the media by rich entrepreneurs 
and ideological lobbies. This raises the question of media independence 
under the liberal consensus of the market (Johnson & Jacobs, 2004). In 
this context, concerns about external influences in the Tunisian media 
market are becoming more prevalent. Many of the challenges faced by 
the media are directly related to external funding, which has been given 
to certain media outlets arguably to promote certain political interests. 
In terms of the issue of elitist orientation, the class base for the 
broadcasting and newspaper markets has remained mostly the same 
even though the state media in Tunisia has dramatically shifted from 
being government-controlled to a public service media and the regime 
change has brought new political players to the forefront of politics in the 
country. The national television broadcaster Al-Watania TV1 can be seen 
as part of a divisive process that was firmly established in the decades of 
dictatorship under Ben Ali and Bourguiba and has continued to shape 
and strengthen its influence after the revolution. In this post-revolutionary 
period, particularly during election campaigns, a large number of media 
outlets are split along ideological and elitist lines rather than adhering to 
professional norms of journalism practice which, at their core, intend to 
serve public interests (Miladi, 2019). Public service media are expected to 
raise awareness about corruption rather than attempt to eliminate it, and 
are required to bring the public’s attention to social problems rather than 
endeavor to force change in society. The power struggle that has surfaced 
during the last few years has revealed how a few ideological and elitist 
groups have attempted to set the agenda for public opinion by using 
media platforms such as television and radio. 
Outlook
Changes to the telecommunications market, although significant, do 
not “change how the elements which constitute the deep state govern 
on a daily basis. Nor does such a change reform the political culture of 
submissiveness and bullying that allows the repressive state apparatus 
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to coerce cooperation on behalf of ISPs without any independent 
oversight” (de la Ferrière & Vallina-Rodriguez, 2014, p. 652). Applying 
this to the whole media system, one could argue that, during this 
transitional period that Tunisia has been witnessing, the media remain 
a sophisticated space of manipulation and power struggle among the 
emerging power structures in the country. This power struggle is taking 
place primarily in public spaces, although evidence of it can also be 
found on television screens and radio airwaves as well as social media 
networks.
Extensive debates have been taking place across platforms on how 
to consolidate freedom of speech and strong, diverse, and independent 
media. These debates have also discussed the best model for regulating 
the media in Tunisia, and have been supported by various initiatives 
such as the decree-laws and the establishment of HAICA. In spite 
of these achievements, more attention needs to be directed towards 
preventing political influences and overseas infiltration of certain 
media outlets in Tunisia, and setting up a regulatory body for the 
newspaper market. 
Lastly, the future of the broadcasting market looks bright if the 
public service broadcaster Al-Watania Network steps up and adheres 
to its professional standards. The new editorial policy aims to reflect 
a politically, culturally, and economically diverse society. Yet, its news 
values, documented in the revamped editorial guidelines, are yet to 
materialize. Among Tunisians, public service media have been upheld 
as a cornerstone for consolidating a democratic climate in the country’s 
emerging democracy. Tunisia’s transition to democracy cannot happen 
without an ideologically neutral media that will constructively observe 
its role as a watchdog against the corrupt activities of certain politicians 
and influential power elites in society. Academics and media critics have 
stated that, although Al-Watania television network is an important 
public service broadcaster, it needs structural reform in its editorial 
policy, journalism practice, and professionalism standards before it can 
serve this crucial role of watchdog.
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17. Algeria: The Costs of 
Clientelism
Nacer-Eddine Layadi  
Translated by Abdelhak Bouifer
This chapter highlights Algeria’s media development, which 
is shaped by trajectories of French colonialism and a socialist-
clientelist regime of governance since the 1960s. The rich history 
of its media is contrasted by major challenges on the political, 
economic, and professional levels.
Background
Algeria is located in the northwestern part of Africa. It shares borders 
with six countries: Morocco and Mauritania to the west, Mali and Niger 
to the south, and Libya and Tunisia to the east. With a 1,644-kilometer 
coastline along the Mediterranean Sea to the north and a land area of 
2,400,000 square kilometers, Algeria is the largest country in Africa, the 
Arab world, and among the Mediterranean countries.
According to the latest calculations of January 2019, the Algerian 
population is 43,000,000, of which young people from 15 to 24 years of 
age make up 16%. The majority of Algerians are Muslims. Christians, on 
the other hand, represent a tiny percentage, which was estimated to be 
below 1% in 2009.
Algeria’s history goes back thousands of years during which various 
tribal communities fought many wars on its territory. Despite these 
ongoing conflicts the country was put under Turkish protectorate rule 
in 1615, which was ended only by the French invasion of 1830. The 
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Algerians began to retaliate against French colonialism in multiple 
ways, starting with the popular revolts (1830–1871), expanding into 
political and cultural resistance (1900–1954), and finally culminating in 
a war for independence (November 1954–July 1962). The heavy colonial 
heritage had a huge impact on political and media system in Algeria’s 
post-independence period.
Facing a high level of illiteracy among children following the colonial 
era, Algeria put an enormous effort into eradicating this phenomenon 
by increasing the number of learners over the age of 15 from 15% in 1962 
to 75% between 2005 and 2016. The two official languages are Arabic, 
the language of the majority of Algerians, and Tamazight, spoken 
by the indigenous Imazighen (Berbers). The latter was declared an 
official language in 2016 after a long and fierce struggle, following the 
events of the Amazigh Spring in 1980 and the uprising in the Kabyle 
region in 2001. As a result, the Tamazight language has been taught at 
various levels of education since 1995. Similarly, the Arabic language in 
Algeria has faced difficulties in expanding into other sectors, as French 
is still used in the financial, economic, and education sectors as well as 
in the scientific fields. 
The amendment of the Family Code in 2005 reflected the Algerian 
legislators’ desire to build bridges between the principles of Islamic 
law and the requirements of contemporary life. Thus, Algerian women 
obtained additional rights after amendments to the nationality law, 
including the right to grant Algerian citizenship to their children if their 
husband is a foreigner. The most significant gain for Algerian women 
has been their increased presence in elected councils; for example, 
their representation in parliament jumped from 5% in 1962 to 31% in 
2012. However, this statistic does not reflect the everyday reality of 
Algerian women. According to data provided by the National Centre for 
Statistics for 2015, women workers did not exceed 18% of all 11,000,000 
Algerian workers. The rate of women with a university degree who are 
unemployed is estimated at about 9% compared with almost 52% of 
men with a university degree.
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Historical Developments 
After the conquest of Algeria, the French colonial army brought a 
printing press to print the first newspaper, L’Estafette d’Alger, to promote 
the expansion of the colonial army’s control across Algerian territory. It 
was replaced in 1932 by another weekly newspaper, Le Moniteur Algérien, 
which was regarded as the official voice of colonialism in Algeria. 
The French authorities encouraged settlers to launch their own 
newspapers in Algeria’s largest cities to preserve their interests, and set 
up other newspapers that targeted the local population, for instance, Le 
Messager (1848–1928), which was published bi-monthly in two versions: 
French and Arabic. It was the third newspaper published in the Arab 
world at that time. 
The French Press Law of 1881 abolished the system of prior 
authorization and financial guarantee. It established a system which 
repressed the crime of defamation without any possibility of prior 
censorship. This enabled French newspaper publishers to thrive. 
However, Algerian publishers were not entitled to benefit from this law 
because they did not enjoy their civil rights. The system imposed by 
this law partly explains why Algerians delayed launching their own 
newspapers until the end of the last decade of the nineteenth century. 
They were also subject to indigenous laws (1865) which stripped them 
of their identity and their civil rights.
Newspapers published by Algerians, notably in Arabic, were 
characterized by their short life due to a lack of funding, but more 
importantly, as a result of the 1895 law that prohibited the publication 
of any foreign language newspaper, since the 1838 law defined Arabic 
as a foreign language. 
The historian Ali Merad (1964) argued that the Islamic press (or the 
indigenous press) in Algeria symbolized the formation of a civil society 
(p. 9). It partially replaced the absence of political parties, spreading 
reformist ideas within the local community. The emergence of this 
press can be seen to reflect the change in Algerian society’s social and 
cultural structure under French colonial rule, which established a new 
elite consisting of two categories. First was that of the urban youth 
loyal to the French culture, who were employed as administrative 
agents or employees in sectors such as education, medicine, judiciary, 
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and translation. The second category was the Arabized elite, who were 
teachers at religious schools, Imams, and judges who believed in the 
Arabic culture. They played a pivotal role in the rise of the indigenous 
press. In fact, the two categories were not actually separated, and both 
helped to launch the indigenous press, but the fear of its impact led the 
colonial authorities blocking its expansion and development.
The national movement parties, which were formed at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, used newspapers to promote their reformist 
ideas for equal rights between the Algerians and French and to revive 
the cultural, linguistic, and religious components of the Algerian nation 
as well as to claim national independence. The National Liberation 
Front (FLN) relied on the media in its liberation struggle, creating the 
El-Moudjahid newspaper on 22 June 1956 as the official voice of the FLN. 
On the radio, the FLN launched the Voice of Fighting Algeria on 16 
December 1956. This station changed Algerians’ relationship with radio 
broadcasting. As Frantz Fanon (1972) noted, the radio in the colonial 
era was initially intended for Europeans and was perceived as a tool 
through which they imposed cultural pressure on people under colonial 
domination (p. 52). Therefore, its audience among the Algerians was 
very limited. Nevertheless, the armed revolution transformed the radio 
into a tool of liberation that helped to turn Algerian audiences into one 
nation.
After independence in 1962, Algeria established its Radio and 
Television Company by taking advantage of what was inherited from 
the French Radio and Television Company in Algeria. Radio and 
television were the best means to mobilize Algerians around the goals of 
the revolution due to the country’s high percentage of illiteracy, which 
sat at 85% during this period. The public radio company launched 50 
local stations, in addition to its three national Arabic, Tamazight, and 
French-language stations. It also established an international station 
(broadcasting in Arabic, French, English, and Spanish) and other 
stations dedicated to culture, religion, and youth.
Algeria had only one television channel prior to 1994 when the 
French-language channel Canal Algérie was established and began 
broadcasting to the Algerian community in Europe and North America. 
In 2001, Algeria 3 channel launched programs for Algerian audiences 
living in Arab countries. On 18 March 2009, two other channels, a 
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Tamazight-language channel and the Holy Qur’an channel, were 
introduced to ‘protect’ Algerian viewers from religious extremist 
discourse promoted by some foreign satellite channels.
The rising number of public radio stations and television channels 
was encouraged by competition from foreign television channels and 
radio stations, and was financially supported by the increase in oil 
revenues that constituted the backbone of Algeria’s national economy. 
Fearing that the events of the Arab uprisings would spread to Algeria 
and promote Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika’s election campaign for a fourth 
presidential term, a branch of the Algerian regime set up television 
channels in 2012 that only broadcasted from outside Algeria. Within 
three years, the number of these “hybrid legal” channels jumped to 45. 
Private television has been broadcasting in this informal manner since 
2012. In 2013, the Algerian authorities granted only five of these channels 
(Ennahar TV, Echourouk TV, Dzaïr TV, El Djazairia One, and Hogar TV) 
licenses to operate for a yearly renewable term. Even today, these five 
channels continue to function as offices of foreign channels and not as 
Algerian channels, and are consequently referred to by the Algerian 
media as “Offshore Channels”. Moreover, the government has turned 
a blind eye to the activity of other television channels broadcasting 
from abroad. However, if any channel opposes the political regime, its 
equipment will be confiscated and all activity will be banned under the 
pretext that the channel does not have a legal license, which is what 
happened to Atlas TV in 2014 and Al Watan TV in 2015. 
After all colonial printed media became nationalized after 
independence, the Algerian authorities began to build their own press 
system. They initiated this process by launching the Arabic-language 
newspaper El-Chaab, on 11 December 1962, Le Peuple newspaper on 
19 December, 1962, which was the country’s first French-language 
newspaper, and El-Moudjahid newspaper on 5 July 1965.
In the west of the country, the French-speaking newspaper La 
République began publication on 29 March 1963, and the French-speaking 
newspaper El-Nasr was established on 28 September 1963 in eastern 
Algeria. The historical newspaper El-Moudjahid, the official voice of the 
FLN, was transformed from a daily newspaper to a weekly paper in July 
1964, and only the Arabic version of this publication was retained. The 
African Revolution magazine was published in French in November 1962 
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to express Algeria’s solidarity with other liberation movements around 
the world. 
After independence in 1962, Algeria abolished regional and local 
media in favor of centralizing the media system. This was done because 
the idea of “regional”, which in the official Algerian political dictionary 
refers to the division and dispersion of Algerian people, is assumed to 
hamper the national effort to build a strong central state that unites the 
aspirations of the people and underpins the construction of socialism. 
This is why Algeria’s newspaper market maintained its national character 
and included only two newspapers outside the capital, Algiers.
The fusion of political and ideological streams in the FLN during 
the liberation war became a reference for political and media practices 
in the post-independence era. These practices were fed by populist 
ideologies that betrayed the political opposition and eventually led to 
the abolishment of political and media pluralism. 
In 1990, a major change occurred following the deadly protests of 5 
October 1988 (Rahal, 2017), and before the approval of the Information 
Law in 1990 which ended the state’s media monopoly. On 19 March 
1990, the government of Mouloud Hamrouche instructed all journalists 
working in public media to either join newspapers belonging to 
political parties or to create groups to publish their own newspapers 
and magazines. Pursuant to this order, 150 journalists left their media 
organizations to launch their own companies, most of which were 
printed media that enjoyed partial freedom of expression. The regime 
used these publications as a democratic interface with the political 
system, a cover for the transition to a market economy, and a forum for 
readers to express their anger over poor living conditions as well as the 
abuse of power.
The press in Algeria has remained an urban phenomenon, despite 
significant changes in its quantitative and linguistic dimensions. The 
number of daily newspapers jumped from six in 1989, with nearly 
670,450 copies per day, to 140 in 2014, with 2,469,616 copies per day 
(Ministry of Communication, 2014). The numbers of newspapers in 
2016 increased significantly to 150 editions, but only 21 of these ran 
10,000 or more copies per day.
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Political and Legal Framework 
Since its independence in 1962, Algeria has chosen the socialist system 
for its development. It adopted a single-party political system that 
dominated the political and media landscapes. The proclaimed “unity 
of perception and socialist thought” framed the structure of media 
organizations and regulated journalistic activity. This was supported by 
the first Information Law in 1982, which entrenched state monopoly of 
the media. This law granted the authority to direct media companiesby 
means of the political leadership represented by the Ministry of 
Information and Culture and the ruling party information officer. It also 
made media managers merely an operational means. As an example, 
Article 35 states that a professional journalist is a combatant who 
“practices his profession responsibly and with commitment in order 
to fulfill the objectives of the revolution as defined by the official texts 
of the National Liberation Front.”
Algeria’s economy is dependent on oil revenues which constitute 
97% of its total revenue. As oil prices declined in 1986 to less than USD 
15 a barrel, the authorities adopted an austerity policy on importing 
consumer products. Protests increased across the country through a 
series of demonstrations, with the most notable on 5 October 1988, 
leading the regime to promulgate a new liberal constitution in 1989 
that recognized the right to private property, and freedom of belief, 
expression, and the press. Furthermore, it recognized the freedom to 
establish political parties, which led Algeria to reach a total of almost 
60 parties. At the same time, a new Information Law was passed in 
1990 to divide up the media management methods that had prevailed 
over the previous 28 years. This law opened the door to media 
pluralism in the press and audiovisual sector; it also put an end to the 
state’s monopoly of the media. To be more specific, its fourth article 
highlighted the right of political parties and natural persons, subject 
to Algerian law, to establish newspapers and magazines and to own a 
media company.
The years 1990–1992 were exceptional in the history of Algerian media. 
In addition to the publication of private newspapers, which openly 
discussed societal issues and political trends in the country, the public 
media, especially television, offered a platform for opposition parties to 
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take part in political debates about Algeria’s future. Nevertheless, the 
democratic transition in Algeria has not been achieved because the state 
has systematically rejected the idea of a rotation of power. Although the 
ruling authority sought to renew itself by establishing a “monitored” 
political pluralism and allowing the FLN to assume a dominant position 
over other political forces, it ultimately failed in its mission. The 1992 
legislative elections resulted in the victory of another dominant party, 
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which threatened Algeria’s political 
system and its adherents and alarmed Western countries (Addi, 2006, 
pp. 139–62).
Ultimately, the electoral process was cancelled, and a High State 
Council (HSC) was created to assume presidential powers after the 
resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid. Parliament was dissolved 
and replaced by an “advisory council,” followed by a transitional council 
made up of appointed members. A state of emergency was declared on 
9 February 1992. The High Media Council, which had seized control 
of part of the Authority of the Ministry of Information, was abolished, 
even though its role had been more consultative than regulatory in 
terms of media practice. Public freedoms and freedom of the press 
declined following the establishment of special anti-terrorism courts 
and the circulation of a decree issued on 14 June 1994 to direct press 
managers on how to deal with security news. As a consequence, print 
media were pressured to reproduce the official discourse of the ruling 
authority, leading to the impoverishment of the media. The number of 
newspapers multiplied, but without producing real media pluralism. 
In addition, journalists who sought to oppose the official government line 
were prosecuted and their newspapers were suspended or even banned. 
In the aftermath of 1992, Algeria fell into a cycle of violence that claimed 
the lives of thousands of Algerians, including 103 journalists.
Following the events of the Arab uprisings in 2012, a new Information 
Law was passed to emphasize the general principles of freedom of 
expression and media pluralism. However, in reality, nothing changed. 
This new law intended to establish the Print Press Regulatory Authority, 
which was to have more of a censorship role than a regulating one for 
journalistic activity. Yet, after five years, this body still had not begun 
functioning.
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The Audiovisual Law of 2014 tightened restrictions on the creation 
of private television channels permitting only thematic channels to be 
launched. The Audiovisual Regulatory Authority (ARAV) was stripped 
of its role to control audiovisual activity. Since then, this body has not 
carried out any activity beyond issuing occasional statements that 
remind certain television channels to respect the principles and ethics of 
journalistic work. The abovementioned Information Law did not allow 
journalists to be imprisoned for various misdemeanors, including libel, 
defamation, and insulting others. Nevertheless, a review of the Criminal 
Procedure Code in July 2015 made temporary detention an exceptional 
measure, and this did not exclude journalists from being subject to 
detention.
The impact of the Information Law on media practices in 
Algeria has been very limited, perhaps even nonexistent, because 
its implementation is subject to political and special interest 
considerations. Many of its articles have remained meaningless, while 
some are applied selectively. For example, the authority allowed Ali 
Haddad, president of the Business Leaders Forum (FCE), to publish the 
newspapers Le Temps d’Algérie in French and Time of Algeria in Arabic, 
although Article 25 of the Media Law of 2012 prohibits owning both 
a French and an Arabic newspaper. Under this same law the contract 
for purchasing the businessman Issad Rabrab’s El-Khabar newspaper 
was dissolved in 2017 as Rabrab also owned the newspaper Liberté. In 
2014, it allowed Ali Haddad1 to own both Dzaïr TV and Dzaïr News, 
and permitted other oligarchs who financed the election campaign of 
the president, Bouteflika, to create private television channels. This 
practice promotes “neo-patrimonialism,” which indicates the unusual 
marriage between the autocratic system and modern state institutions. 
It is manifested through a “customerism” character (Roudakova, 2008, 
p. 42) that is seen as a structural factor in societies where there are few 
or no borders between public and personal interests, or between public 
and private property. This type of clientelism can also be understood 
as a cultural feature of the idea that systemic and universal rules are 
less important than personal connections.
1  Ali Haddad’s media empire began to collapse after President Bouteflika was 
removed from power on 2 April 2019, and since then, he has been in prison with 
other figures of the regime charged with unlawful accumulation of wealth.
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Economy and Ownership Patterns
The state monopolized the ownership of newspapers from 1962 to 
1990. Today, however, it owns only six newspapers, compared with 
144 privately-owned newspapers in Algeria. These private newspapers 
consist predominantly of journalists who have left public media. As a first 
step, they launched their own newspapers with their previous salaries 
received over a three-year period. As a second step, the government 
provided them with a wide range of indirect subsidies, such as interest-
free bank loans, tax exemptions, and share of advertising proceeds, 
and headquarters for their newspapers. Finally, the government eased 
the payment procedure for printing costs at state printing companies 
by either subsidizing the price of paper or erasing the debts of some 
newspapers. The 1991 Finance Act established a special fund of USD 
22,000,000 as an additional form of support for private newspapers. This 
fund existed until 2015. However, it was distributed in an unfair and 
unequal method. 
Transparency in the funding of private newspapers is a constant 
demand of publishers and readers. L’Expression, for example, a 
newspaper which publishes 20,000 copies per day, barely sells 50% of 
its copies on average, and has no influence on national political life, 
generated significant annual profits during the period of 2009–2016 
through government advertising evaluated to be between USD 506,000 
and USD 1,500,000. It became the most cost-effective newspaper in 
the press sector. This is one example that has led to the call for more 
transparency in the newspaper market. 
The two largest private newspapers, El-Watan (a French-language 
newspaper) and El-Khabar (an Arabic-language newspaper), were 
exempt from the monopoly exercised by authorities on printing 
companies. Although they set up their own printing companies, which 
have reduced their expenses, the financial situation of these publications 
has not substantially improved. For example, El-Khabar’s sales contributed 
only 50% of its total income, while El-Watan’s sales only generated 30% 
of its overall revenue despite the fact that these two newspapers have 
consistently raised the price of their issues. Advertising remains the 
main income source for newspapers in Algeria, contributing anywhere 
between USD 25,000 and USD 50,000 to the proceeds of a single issue of 
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a newspaper. However, the state controls almost 85% of the advertising 
market through the National Publishing and Advertising Company 
(ANEP). Private companies and public institutions have been banned 
from purchasing advertising pages directly from newspapers. Thus, the 
distribution of advertising to newspapers and the rest of the media is 
still not subject to market logic, and for that reason, media pluralism in 
Algeria has not been strengthened.
Powerful and dominant media groups have been forming in Algeria 
since 2012. One of these is led by Mohammed Moukaddam, who owns 
two newspapers, Ennahar El-Djadid and the sports newspaper El-Chibak, 
as well as other news websites, such as Algérie 24 and Algérie Confidentiel, 
published in the French language. There is also the group owned by the 
businessman Ali Haddad, the owner of one of the largest construction 
companies (ETRHB) and publisher of the newspaper Le Temps d’Algérie 
in Arabic and French. Ali Fodil leads another group and is the owner 
of the El-Chourouk Daily and the weekly magazine El-Chourouk El-Arabi, 
in addition to other websites, including El-Chourouk Sport, Jawaher 
El-Chourouk, and El-Chourouk Markets. These three newspaper owners 
also own television channels. Moukaddam has one channel, Haddad 
has two channels, and Fodil has three channels: El-Chourouk TV, 
El-Chourouk News, and El-Echourouk Bana (a cooking channel). Other 
examples of oligarch media investors are Mahieddine Tahkout, owner 
of the Car Installation Company and the Student Bus Company, and 
Bachir Ould Zamirli, an “investor” in the field of real estate promotion. 
The owners of these channels dominate Algeria’s television viewing 
market. However, the ownership of these channels is a debatable point; 
it is contrary to the Organic Audiovisual Law which affirms in Article 23 
that “a natural person or a private person subject to Algerian law cannot 
be a contributor to more than one service of audiovisual communication.”
Moreover, Article 45 states that the same shareholder of a television 
channel may not hold, directly or through the intermediary of other 
persons, including ascendants and descendants of the 4th degree, more 
than 40% of its share capital.
In addition to their legal status, the economy of private television 
channels in Algeria has attracted significant attention from researchers 
(Cherif, 2014; Djaballah, 2019; Mostefaoui, 2019; Dimitrakis, 2019; 
Djaballah, 2018). 
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Considering the practices of clientelism, which control the 
relationship of power and the media, can explain how channels 
belonging to Algerian oligarchs are funded. First and foremost, they 
took advantage of the state advertising windfall. Second, the price of 
one minute of advertising at peak time on private channels is estimated 
between USD 109 and USD 181 (Belfarag, 2016). This relatively low cost 
negatively affected the public media, for which the price of one minute 
of advertising at the same peak time is estimated between USD 2,000 
and USD 4,500. Such practices have not only undermined the economic 
framework of public television channels, but have undermined all forms 
of media, such as one minute of prime time on radio is priced at USD 
346, newspapers that sell the color pages to advertisers for USD 3,500, 
half colored page for USD 1,756, and a quarter page for USD 920.2
There are no laws that organize or regulate unfair competition among 
the media in Algeria’s booming advertising market, which jumped 
from EUR 19,000,000 in 1999 to EUR 200,000,000 in 2016 due to high oil 
revenues. The budget of any one private television channel cannot be 
compared with that of the public television system with its five channels. 
In 2012, the public system’s revenues came from the license fee imposed 
on citizens, which was estimated at USD 9,000,000, and advertising 
revenues and rebroadcast rights exceeding USD 18,000,000. However, 
these two amounts were not enough to cover its expenses, especially the 
salaries of 3,447 workers. This forced the state to award the company 
more than USD 90,000,000 to meet the public service requirements and 
pay for its satellite broadcasting (Ali, 2014).
Most of Algeria’s online newspapers belong to the private sector. 
Their economic situation is more complex than that of the print media. 
Each online newspaper pays nearly USD 2,630 a month for hosting and 
maintaining its sites, which is in addition to Internet subscription and 
phone connectivity costs. Some online newspapers, such as Maghreb 
Emergent, have tried to get their users to contribute to their crowd 
funding, but to no avail. Alternatively, many online publications provide 
training course and other services for companies to gain revenues.
For its part, Radio M appealed to the French Agency for Media 
Cooperation for a subsidy to ensure its survival. From 2006 onwards, 
2  According to the prices supplied by the daily newspaper Liberté on 13 July 2019.
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the state’s monopoly on radio broadcasting and the low cost of Internet 
broadcasting encouraged companies to create web broadcasts to provide 
different content from government radio stations This trend began with 
Radio Algiers and was then reinforced by radio stations with music 
content and associations’ radio stations, such as The Voice of Women, 
a subsidiary of an association called Women in Communication. It is 
crucial to note that it is difficult to limit the number of web television 
programs in Algeria, which have a different legal status to radio. There 
is a variety of news, music, and sports television broadcasts online, 
including those of state-owned companies, such as the Algeria Press 
Agency (APS) and other private entities.
Technology and Infrastructure
Eight satellites, including Alcomsat-1, which was the latest satellite 
launched by Algeria in cooperation with China on 10 December 2017, 
broadcast the country’s five public television channels and programs 
from 50 public radio stations, including local, national, and thematic 
ones. To modernize technological infrastructure, Algerian authorities 
have completed 7,000 km of digital microwave networks as well as 14 
medium and large networks for television broadcasting, and have built 
400 stations for rebroadcasting to cover the shadow regions and the 
Algerian Sahara, and four stations for powerful broadcasting on micro- 
and medium waves.
Algeria began building digital terrestrial television in 2010 and was 
able to cover 85% of the national territory by 2013. This figure rose to 95% 
by the end of 2019. Algeria was on the verge of completely abandoning 
analog technology in June 2020. During the mid-1980s, Algerians turned 
to French and Arabic satellite television programs to avoid watching the 
only public television channel that existed at the time. Today, 97% of 
Algerian homes own a satellite dish.
Although computers were first introduced in major companies in 
Algeria in 1980, the computer system has remained on the sidelines of 
industrial activity. One explanation for Algeria’s delay in developing its 
digital economy can be attributed to the fact that the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications developed modern communication technologies 
instead of the Ministry of Industry (Khelfaoui, 2007, pp. 71–90. To be 
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more specific, the development of the Internet in Algeria has been 
influenced by ongoing struggles for power between those advocating 
urgent socioeconomic claims and the political forces that fear losing 
control over the use of the Internet. This explains the slow development 
of the Internet and the continued monopoly of Algerian Telecom’s fixed 
and mobile Internet for the last 17 years. Furthermore, the license to use 
3G networks was delayed until 2013, and the mobile phone and Internet 
market is currently exclusively shared by three economic operators 
(Algérie Télécom, Algeria’s public communications company Djezzy, 
which owns 51% of its shares, and Qatar’s Ooredoo).
According to the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, the 
number of mobile subscribers (GSM, 3G, 4G) of the three operators 
jumped from 33,000,000 in 2010 to 51,000,000 in 2018. The number of 
mobile Internet subscribers (3G, 4G) increased from 300,000 subscribers 
in 2013 to 40,000,000 subscribers in 2018. Despite this, Internet speed 
remains slow, with an average estimated at 9 Mbps. Algerians who 
actively use social media platforms constituted 54% of the total 
population (i.e., 23,000,000 people) as of January 2019. More than half 
of all Algerians (22,000,000) use the social platform Facebook (Kemp, 
2019).
El-Watan was the first Algerian newspaper to have a website (1997). 
Today, all Algerian newspapers have their own websites; some of them 
are hosted abroad, in countries such as France and Switzerland to avoid 
possible censorship. Some newspapers have set up electronic editions, 
television channels and news websites, such as El-Chourouk and El-Nahar, 
however, they cannot live up to the expected level of convergence, in 
the sense of producing content suitable for presentation on a variety of 
platforms.
Challenges
The media system faces a number of major challenges, which can be 
summarized in terms of the following overlapping levels.
On the political level, the “neo-patrimonial” political system that 
is hampering Algeria’s democratic transition represents the biggest 
challenge for the media system in Algeria. Although the state’s 
monopoly on print and audiovisual media and the establishment of 
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private media was extinguished, this did not guarantee freedom of 
expression and media pluralism because these institutions were not 
based upon transparent and fair media competition. This was potentially 
due to the fact that the state failed to apply many of the laws’ provisions 
relating to the organization of media companies (some of which are 
mentioned above), as well as those relating to financial transparency, 
and thus allowed private television companies to operate in a hybrid 
legal situation. The failure to announce the criteria based upon which 
the government granted authorization to only four private television 
channels as foreign television channels in Algeria is also one of the 
factors that confirms the logic of clientelism that frames the Algerian 
media landscape. 
On the economic level, the financial situation of media companies has 
become fragile and more difficult in the absence of a clear and transparent 
national policy, which has forced some broadcasters such as KBC Television, 
as well as dozens of newspapers, such as La Tribune, to declare bankruptcy. 
The newspaper crisis has been amplified by its turbulent relationship with 
printing companies, which is not based strictly on commercial interests 
but is also subject to political considerations. It is difficult to ascertain the 
size of the debts of private newspapers owed to state printing companies. 
The Ministry of Communication intentionally pays no attention to some 
oligarchs’ newspapers that have set up television channels without 
paying their debts, such as El-Adjwa, El-Nahar, and El-Chourouk, whose 
debts alone amounted to about USD 5,000,000 (Djaafer, 2017).
The Algerian authorities use printing houses to exert pressure on 
refractory newspapers in several ways. For instance, they may reduce 
the number of copies printed temporarily or permanently suspend 
printing if a company fails to pay their debts, as was the case with La 
Nation in 1997 and Algeria News in 2014. In addition, the state still has a 
monopoly on the advertising market, and its revenues are distributed 
to newspapers outside market logic and not in keeping with the 
requirements of public service and freedom of expression.
For more than a decade, publicity has not been used to defend the 
directions of the ruling power as originally intended but has deviated 
from its economic and political role. Its proceeds have been turned into 
rents shared by those who have the power to distribute those without 
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control or accountability. In this way, advertising—the key financier of 
the media—has become an obstacle to media pluralism. 
On the professional level, the historical context in which the Algerian 
media were formed and developed has pushed the media to play a 
propaganda role. It has led them to violate their professional and 
ethical commitment by frequently publishing anonymous news without 
justification, resorting to slander and insulting others, and preventing the 
legally recognized right of reply. These practices have been reinforced by 
the predominance of the commercial character in the activities of many 
private media companies that have violated journalists’ professional 
rights and taken advantage of their deteriorating social conditions and 
professional instability. They have also benefited from their failure to 
organize themselves in order to issue a code of ethics and to hold their 
activities accountable to the rules. 
Outlook 
As in many countries, the Algerian press is in a major state of decline. For 
example, the largest Arabic language newspaper El-Khabar dropped from 
1,200,000 copies per day in 2000 to 200,000 copies in 2017. The French-
language newspaper El-Watan also experienced a declinine from 160,000 
copies per day in 2012 to 90,000 copies in 2017. The future of Algeria’s 
press will be dominated by online newspapers whose increased demand 
has resulted from the development of basic technological infrastructure. 
This has required the state to develop a national policy that will assist 
the media in their necessary transition to the digital environment and 
help them to establish their economic strategy.
The increasing number of Algerians using the Internet and social 
networks, as well as the establishment of 15 web radio sites and ten 
web television sites, have prompted the state to monopolize radio and 
television broadcasting, exercise censorship over media content, shut 
down newspapers and television channels, prevent new radio stations 
and television channels from broadcasting from Algeria, and implement 
other practices that restrict freedom of expression. However, new 
developments might lie ahead; when Ammar Belhimer took office as 
Minister of Communication and spokesman of the government on 13 
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January 2020, he promised to hold workshops and engage in dialogue 
with journalists before launching a media reform.
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18. Morocco: Competitive 
Authoritarianism in  
Media Reforms 
Bouziane Zaid and Mohammed Ibahrine
The chapter provides an account of why the media structure in 
Morocco is an uneven playing field with the state having the 
advantage. It argues that observable configurations of power over 
media are mainly tied to a repressive media culture and heritage 
that can be fairly described as a competitive authoritarian regime. 
Argumentation is supported by an analysis of Morocco’s history 
and the political economy of media. 
Background
Located in northwest Africa, Morocco borders the Mediterranean Sea 
to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Algeria to the east, and 
Mauritania to the south. The Strait of Gibraltar spans 14 kilometers of 
water that separate Spain from Morocco, which makes the country a 
gateway for illegal immigration to Europe. As a result, Morocco became 
a key European ally in the effort to contain the flow of illegal immigration 
from sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of demographics, according to the 
2017 government census bureau, the population was at 35.5 million, 
27% of which were under the age of 15, 61% urban, 51% females, and 
49% males. The unemployment rate was at 10.2%, and the illiteracy rate 
was high at 30%. Life expectancy at birth is currently 76. The official 
languages, as stated in the 2011 Constitution, are Arabic and Amazigh. 
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Amazigh is a branch of the Afroasiatic language family and is spoken by 
the Imazighen (Berbers), who are indigenous to North Africa. 
The majority of Moroccans today are Muslims, but an influential 
minority of Moroccan Jews remains in the country. Christians and other 
religious groups make up 1% of the populace, consisting mainly of 
foreign residents.
Although the 2011 constitution guarantees equal gender rights, real 
equality is still a long way off. In 2004, Morocco adopted a family code 
known as the mudawana, which was hailed by women’s rights groups 
in Morocco and abroad as a major step forward. Civil society groups, 
which are fighting for women’s rights, are dynamic and have managed 
to introduce major changes in Morocco’s laws. In addition to the 
mudawana, these groups mobilized the political elite in 2006 to change 
equal nationality rights, allowing Moroccan women to pass on their 
citizenship to their children the same way Moroccan men can. More 
recently, they led a national debate on Article 475 of the Moroccan Penal 
Code, which allows rapists to avoid prosecution if they agree to marry 
their victims. Street and online protests were sparked in March 2012 
when 16-year-old Amina Filali took her own life after a seven-month 
ordeal in which she was forced to wed her alleged rapist. Women’s 
rights activists successfully used street demonstrations and social media 
platforms to rally popular support for changes to the law. In January 
2014, the parliament unanimously amended Article 475.
The Western Sahara represents an ongoing major conflict involving 
Morocco, the Polisario, and Algeria. It was annexed by Morocco after 
Spain left in 1975. The legal status of the southern territory and the 
question of its sovereignty remain unresolved. The threat of terrorism 
continues to be another important issue. On 16 May 2003 Morocco 
was subject to the deadliest terrorist attacks in the country’s history. 
Five explosions killed 43 people and injured more than 100 people 
in suicide bomb attacks in Morocco’s largest city, Casablanca. The 14 
suicide bombers all originated from a poor suburban neighborhood in 
the outskirts of Casablanca. A public debate ensued in the print and 
broadcast media, questioning the relationship between poverty and 
extremism.
In the context of the Arab uprisings, a protest movement known 
as the February 20 Movement held rallies and marches throughout 
 30518. Morocco
the country in 2011 to demand democratic reforms, a parliamentary 
monarchy, social justice, the end of absolutism, and the abolition of 
corruption. The movement triggered a series of reforms initiated by 
the monarchy. Two weeks after the first demonstration on 20 February, 
King Mohammed VI responded by introducing constitutional reforms. 
He promised to relinquish some of his administrative powers and to 
devolve some of his executive powers to the head of government and 
the parliament. 
The promises made in the “9 March speech” did not materialize in 
the contents of the new constitution. A study (Madani, Maghraoui, & 
Zerhouni, 2012) of the new constitution found that the King remained 
“at the center of political and constitutional life” (p. 4). The study added 
that, in contradiction to the “9 March speech,” in which the King insisted 
on the notion of accountability, the King had maintained executive 
powers without accountability to the Moroccan public (Madani et al., 
2012, p. 50).
Despite these issues, Morocco’s civil society is dynamic. Activists 
use their constitutional rights to protest and take advantage of various 
social media tools to educate, organize, and mobilize people on a wide 
range of issues. In April 2018, a group of activists launched a campaign 
to boycott products from three major companies to protest increases 
in the cost of living. The boycott targeted Centrale Danone (dairy 
products), Sidi Ali (mineral water), and Afriquia (gas stations). The 
economic impact of the boycott was evident ten days after it started 
when Afriquia and Centrale Danone recorded major drops in market 
value on the Casablanca Stock Exchange, with shares of each falling 
by nearly 6%.
In terms of media consumption, television remains the primary 
media of information and entertainment given Morocco’s high rates 
of illiteracy, lack of local digital content creation, and shortage of 
digital literacy skills. In a recent survey, 68% of youths stated they 
watch television and 54.5% listen to the radio, spending on average 
two hours and 14 minutes watching television and two hours and 52 
minutes listening to the radio (Morocco World News, 2019). Satellite 
broadcasting is the dominant form of transmitting television signals, 
and access to television and satellite dishes is almost universal. The 
most remarkable change in Internet use continues to be the growing 
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interest in domestic portals (Zaid, 2017). In 2010, the country’s top 
10 most visited websites did not include any Moroccan news sites. By 
2018, the list included six Moroccan websites—three news sites, two 
classified ad platforms (Avito and Jumia), and one sports site. In 2019, 
the country’s top ten most visited websites included seven Moroccan 
websites, three news sites, one classified ad platforms (Avito), and two 
sports news websites. The remaining three are Google, Facebook, and 
YouTube. Chouftv surpassed YouTube to rank second, and Hespress and 
2M surpassed Facebook to rank third and fourth, respectively (Ibahrine, 
2020). 
For print newspapers, circulation is estimated at 350,000; less than 
one percent of the population reads a newspaper every day. These 
numbers are likely to decrease, given the easy access to online news 
(Ibahrine, 2020).
Historical Developments
Moroccan media roots can be traced back to the colonial period when 
Morocco was a protectorate of France and Spain from 1912 to 1956 
(Ibahrine, 2009; Zaid, 2010). The colonial powers introduced the 
print press in its modern form, and Spain played an essential role 
in establishing several publications in the northern cities of Ceuta, 
Tangiers, and Tetouan. As early as 1820, the Spanish periodical El 
Liberal Africano was published in Ceuta (Ibahrine, 2009; Zaid, 2017). 
Unlike radio, which was controlled by foreign powers from 1928 
until independence in 1956, print media represented a site of political 
struggle. Moroccan nationalists published their first Arabic papers, 
Lisan Al-Maghreb and Sinan Al-Qalam, in 1907 to promote nationalist 
ideas among educated Moroccan elites as tools of liberation. The 
French colonialists responded by introducing several Press Codes to 
administer and regulate the nationalist print press. The first legislation 
was the Dahir (Decree) of April 1912, followed by a series of decrees 
that demanded prior authorizations and allowed the colonial powers 
to shut down publications deemed too critical. After independence 
in 1956, the print press remained a tool that was used widely in the 
struggle between the state and the opposition parties.
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The French were the first to start broadcasting in Morocco in 
February 1928, when radio signals were sent from the city of Rabat. The 
first television station, Telma, also in French, began airing its programs in 
1952. After independence, the government launched the Radiodiffusion 
et Télévision Marocaine (RTM) in 1962, which consisted of four 
radio stations and one television station. In 1989, the first terrestrial 
pay-television channel in the Arab world, 2M International, began 
transmission from Casablanca (Ibahrine, 2009; Zaid, 2010).
A brief look at the history of the Internet shows that it has been 
available to the public since November 1995. Research universities were 
the first to adopt and use it. Morocco’s first Internet café opened in 
1996 in Rabat. In 1996, there were about 50 websites, but in July 2019, 
there were 100,618 registered domain names, with 74,717 with the.ma 
extension.
Until the mid-1990s, the culture of media in Morocco was 
authoritarian, administrative, and partisan (Zaid & Ibahrine, 2011). It 
was authoritarian and administrative in that the state controlled the 
financing, regulation, production, and distribution of broadcast media, 
which was considered the most influential media. It was partisan in that 
print media were mainly controlled by political parties. Given the low 
literacy rates, print media was not seen as a great threat to the regime; 
instead, maintaining complete state control over broadcasting was seen 
as essential. Print media became, after independence, a site of political 
tension between the opposition political parties and the monarchy 
(Zaid, El Kaddoussi, & Ibahrine, 2020).
Opposition leaders used newspapers and magazines as their chief 
weapons of political contestation. The era from 1961 to 1997 under the 
rule of King Hassan II has been labeled the “Years of Lead” because 
of the rampant repression, injustice, corruption, and media censorship, 
and the widespread imprisonment, murder, and “disappearance” of 
journalists and political opponents of the regime (Zaid, El Kaddoussi, 
& Ibahrine, 2020).
Like many countries in the early postcolonial era, Morocco 
perceived the role of media as a nation-building instrument (Zaid, 
2017). Morocco was a proponent of the modernization theory which 
conceived development in terms of industrialization, transfer of 
technology and innovation, and economic growth. According to a study 
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by the Moroccan Ministry of Social Development (2006), development 
programs and policy in Morocco during the 1950s and 1960s were in 
line with the modernization paradigm and consisted of investments 
in economic infrastructure and technology. In this paradigm, the mass 
media, or what Lerner (1958) called the mobility multiplier, represents 
the main tool and transmitter of modern values and information, and 
could even function as a surrogate for travel. Morocco’s state-controlled 
media system was therefore mandated at the outset with the role of 
modernizing the economy and serving as an instrument for education 
and social change (El Kadoussi, 2016). It was argued that privately-
owned media would be motivated to seek profits, and this would 
deprive the Moroccan population of content that fulfilled educational 
and informational values. For instance, in the 1960s, King Hassan II 
(1961–1999) mobilized radio and television for political awareness 
and education, including preparations for the country’s first general 
elections and a constitutional referendum in 1962 (Ibahrine, 2007). The 
primary purpose was to modernize; human rights were of secondary 
consideration.
The major improvements in the relationship between the political 
establishment and mass media occurred when the oppositional socialist 
government was elected in 1997, a process consolidated under the 
reign of King Mohammed VI. After he succeeded his father Hassan 
II in July 1999, Mohammed VI instantly became a symbol of hope 
for a more democratic and freer Morocco (El Kadoussi, 2016). The 
mission of the 1997 government was to enact political reforms aimed at 
promoting human rights, civil liberties, and an open, pluralist media, 
and to establish the rule of law. One of the first major pro-human rights 
measures under the young King Mohammed VI was the 2003 creation 
of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (ERC), which investigated 
human rights violations from the “Years of Lead” to establish the truth. 
The Commission organized public forums in 2004 in which victims 
voiced their pain and suffering under the old regime. These forums were 
broadcast live on television—a very important moment in Moroccan 
television history. Another major initiative was the Family Status Law, or 
mudawana, decreed in 2004 to protect the rights of women. To safeguard 
and promote Amazigh language and culture, Mohammed VI created 
the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (L’Institut Royal de la Culture 
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Amazighe [IRCAM]). The Imazighen constituted a large ethnic group 
whose culture had been undermined for decades. These positive reforms 
earned the new king political capital and furthered his legitimacy.
The media benefited from this political opening. All sectors—print, 
broadcast, and digital—witnessed significant growth during the 
period. The High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (Haute 
Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle [HACA]) was established 
under the Dahir (Royal Decree) of 31 August 2002 as an independent 
administrative body in charge of regulating audiovisual communication. 
The partial liberalization and modernization of the audiovisual sector 
allowed new commercial radio and television stations to emerge. The 
new private radio stations, which grew from two in 2005 to 16 in 2009, 
reinvigorated the broadcast landscape, especially through their live 
debate shows and news programs. They introduced the impetus and 
space to create possibilities for national debates on a variety of social, 
educational, and health-related issues. Government restrictions on print 
media also eased.
During this period, a new generation of young journalists pushed 
the boundaries of the comfort zone of mainstream media and society 
at large. Many taboos were broken, from discussing the king’s salary to 
reporting on the arrest of high officials close to the palace. Morocco was 
also spared the draconian measures used in other authoritarian countries 
against the Internet, such as the blocking of social media platforms or 
web content. Moroccan citizens can, to this day, create websites and 
write for blogs without any registration requirements imposed by the 
government (Zaid, El Kaddoussi, & Ibahrine, 2020).
However, while the ERC, the mudawana, and the IRCAM have been 
positive developments, they have not constituted serious opportunities 
for challenging the status quo in Morocco. The state continues to use 
legal and financial penalties to keep the most critical voices in line. A 
record number of libel and defamation suits were filed against print 
media in the years following these reforms. Broadcasts remained under 
close state supervision via HACA. Internet use was and remains closely 
monitored through state surveillance. These setbacks led to the 2011 
protest movement during the Arab uprisings, leading to constitutional 
reforms.
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Political System and Legal Framework
Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, but 
the King maintains executive powers without accountability to the 
Moroccan public (Madani et al., 2012). Morocco’s political regime can 
be best characterized as a competitive authoritarian regime.
Competitive authoritarian regimes use elements of democracy to 
ensure domination over the other opposition forces in the country. 
Levitsky and Way (2002) defined competitive authoritarianism as 
civilian regimes in which “formal democratic institutions are widely 
viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which fraud, civil 
liberties violations, and abuse of state and media resources so skew the 
playing field that the regime cannot be labeled democratic” (p. 4). These 
regimes are competitive in the sense that the democratic institutions 
are real and that “opposition forces can use legal channels to seriously 
contest for (and occasionally win) power; but they are authoritarian in 
that opposition forces are handicapped by a highly uneven—and even 
dangerous—playing field. Competition is thus real but unfair” (p. 4). 
Competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by the presence 
of some democratic institutions and some democratic practices such 
as elections, a multiparty system, and, in this case, a self-proclaimed 
independent media regulator and a new press law. We argue that 
Morocco’s media reforms are in line with this vision of governance, 
whereby the state creates democratic institutions to use as a site of 
struggle with opposition forces while steadfastly maintaining control 
by establishing an uneven playing field.
Morocco’s media system offers a good illustration of the complex 
process of media reform during political transitions. As a competitive 
authoritarian regime, the state uses democratic institutions to reform 
its media system, while entrenching these institutions via authoritarian 
laws. Morocco has witnessed periods of tight authoritarian control and 
periods of reformist tendencies. This cyclical fluctuation has resulted 
in significant progress in media structure and performance and, at the 
same time, in the state maintaining its control over the media landscape 
through various mechanisms of repression.
A case in point is the public service sector. The legal framework 
and institutional structure provide the conditions for public service to 
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materialize but do not guarantee its performance. The nondemocratic 
culture of the country is the main deterrent for public service media. A 
competitive authoritarian regime has stifled the attempt to transform 
broadcasting from a state-controlled institution into a public service 
entity. The 2005 Audiovisual Communication Law put an end to the 
state’s monopoly over broadcasting management. The most positive 
development has been the establishment of a legal framework for private 
ownership. However, the law contains provisions that allow the state to 
interfere with program content and to put limits on private ownership. 
In addition to HACA, Moroccan Radio and Television (Radiodiffusion 
et Télévision Marocaine), the institution that earlier managed state 
television and radio, was transformed from a subsidiary of the Ministry 
of Communication to a public entity, the National Company of Radio 
and Television (La Société Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision 
[SNRT]) in April 2005. Self-proclaimed as independent, the SNRT 
manages nine public television stations and six public radio stations and 
is not subject to administrative control and supervision by the Ministry. 
However, HACA’s High Council consists of nine members, five of 
whom are appointed by the king, including the president. The king also 
appoints the president of the SNRT. The state, therefore, assimilated 
the broadcast regulator into authoritarian strategies of governance, 
using them to upgrade their capacity to control broadcasting by 
entrenching them in a multilayered architecture of control, namely the 
unrepresentative appointment process of its decision-making bodies and 
the repressive media laws. State control over the appointment process of 
the regulatory bodies is not an uncommon practice in most democracies. 
But, in mature democracies, systems of checks and balances exist 
whereby political power is not concentrated in the hands of a few, and 
one governance entity cannot hold too much power (Zaid, 2018). This 
is not the case for Morocco, which failed to transform state broadcasting 
into public media and continues its history of state broadcasting as an 
instrument of propaganda and political control.
The 2011 constitution entails provisions that guarantee freedom of 
expression, as well as caveats limiting this freedom. Article 25 guarantees 
Moroccan citizens “freedoms of thought, opinion, and expression 
in all their forms,” and Article 28 states that “freedom of the press is 
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guaranteed and may not be limited by any form of prior censorship.” 
(El Kadoussi, 2020).
However, Article 19 puts limits on Morocco’s adherence to 
international conventions on human rights, which has direct implications 
for the media by introducing two constraining phrases “with respect for 
the provisions of the constitution’s permanent characteristics and the 
laws of the kingdom.” Although the 2011 constitution strengthened the 
judiciary as a separate branch of government, it is far from independent 
in Morocco, leaving the media without adequate protection by the law 
(El Kadoussi, 2018). 
The 2016 Press Code brought about many positive advances, but 
a close look at the text shows that the oppressive nature of the legal 
environment in the country has not significantly changed. The positive 
adjustments include the elimination of jail sentences for journalists 
and the establishment of a self-regulatory body, the National Press 
Council. The law also carries specific provisions to regulate digital 
media. However, the three taboo topics—monarchy, Western Sahara, 
and Islam—were preserved in the new code, and jail sentences were 
replaced by steep fines. Failure to pay the fines can lead to jail terms, 
and at the same time, the Penal Law, which stipulates jail sentences for 
any offense against taboo topics, can be used to prosecute journalists. 
The Anti-Terrorism Law, passed in 2003 after the terrorist attacks in 
Casablanca on 16 May, gave the government sweeping legal powers 
to control any media content that is deemed to “disrupt public order 
by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror.” Ostensibly intended to 
combat terrorism, the authorities have wide latitude in defining vague 
terms such as “national security” and “public order,” opening the door 
for abuse. 
Moroccan authorities use nuanced means to limit online content and 
violate users’ rights. For example, while websites are rarely blocked, 
problematic press and anti-terrorism laws place heavy burdens on 
intermediaries and result in the closure of news sites.
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (2019) ranked Morocco 135th of 
180 countries in its annual press freedom index primarily due to the 
prosecutions of journalists. Media watchdog organizations such as 
RSF and Freedom House include in their annual reports the number 
and names of jailed journalists each year. Moreover, many prominent 
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publication directors and editors such as Aboubakr Jamai, Ahmed 
Benchemsi, and Ali Lemrabet have resigned from their positions and 
live in self-imposed exile in Western countries (Zaid, 2017).
Economy and Ownership Patterns
Morocco’s media system consists of a mix of public and private 
ownership and allows the government’s intervention to ensure public 
service. Moroccan media outlets use two main financing models. The 
first is advertising. The media firms expose audiences to advertising 
messages in exchange for free content. This is the dominant business 
model in Morocco’s media which permeates both public service and 
non-public service media content providers. The second is subsidy. The 
government pays media firms in return for public service. This applies to 
public service television and radio, as well as political party newspapers. 
The aim, as stated by the government, is to help these media firms be 
more independent and distanced from all vested economic interests. 
Whereas neither public service television nor political party 
newspapers are free of advertising, public service radio is advertising-
free and offers a wide range of publicly relevant news and information 
programming. Against this backdrop, the advertising industry 
cannot support sustainable media business models. In addition to the 
deteriorating advertising market, an estimated 70% to 80% of Moroccan 
advertisers use global online platforms such as Google and Facebook, 
whose market share will continue to grow at the expense of local 
websites. According to the Group of Moroccan Advertisers, the total 
advertising market stood at USD 596 million in 2017, USD 18 million 
more than in 2016. In 2018, the big advertisers, the telecom operators, 
banks, and the food sector lowered their advertising budgets by 14.6%, 
14.7%, and 10%, respectively (Hespress, 2019).
The advertising budget is distributed not based on professional, 
standardized, and transparent criteria, but on who is close to the center of 
power. Advertising revenue provided by the government or government-
linked companies is not split equitably between independent and pro-
government publications. In a recent example, the Office Chérifien des 
Phosphates (OCP) and Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG), two state-
owned companies that do not offer any particular products to Moroccan 
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consumers, bought advertising time and space. This move was meant to 
secure advertising funding the state can use to reward obedience.
Current regulatory practices aim to reduce media ownership 
concentration, but they fail to encourage pluralism in media ownership. 
In Morocco, the absence of concentration does not necessarily imply an 
increase in pluralism. According to the Press and Publications Code, 
any media organization in the broadcast industry cannot hold an 
investment in the capital of more than one print media company. Any 
person owning 30% or more of a newspaper company has to declare it to 
the National Press Council. Any newspaper or magazine that owns 10% 
or more of the capital of another newspaper or magazine has to declare 
it to the National Press Council. Internet service providers (ISPs) cannot 
own part of the capital of another ISP (Le Desk & Reporters Without 
Borders, 2017). Article 21 of the Audiovisual Communication Law 
limits the concentration of ownership in broadcasting except for state-
controlled television and radio. In the first and second waves of licensing 
in 2006 and 2009, HACA granted licenses only to state-owned television 
stations and to a mix of state and private radio stations (18 of the latter). 
Television stations such as Arriadiya for sports and Al-Maghribia for the 
Moroccan diaspora, and private radio stations such as Hitradio and Aswat 
were all licensed during this phase. Ownership of private radio reflects 
closeness to the regime power structure (Le Desk & Reporters Without 
Borders, 2017), hence, the lack of pluralism. The list includes owners 
of pro-government print media organizations, such as Abdelmounaim 
Dilami and Moulay Hafid El-Alami; members of the administrative (pro-
government) political party, such as Abdelaziz Akhenouch and Mouncif 
Belkhayat; and former employees of the state-owned television and 
radio stations, such as Kamal Lahlou. In the second wave of licensing in 
2009, HACA declined five private television license applications on the 
grounds of a “deteriorating situation in the advertising market,” and the 
need to “maintain the stability and viability of existing public and private 
operators.” It exclusively justified these decisions on a financial basis. 
Article 21 stipulates that any broadcasting company or shareholder can 
own shares in another broadcasting company up to a maximum of 30% 
of its holdings. This was intended to prevent any individual or company 
from controlling more than one media outlet. Aside from state control 
over broadcasting, only a handful of media companies owned by key 
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pro-government political players, such as the Caractères Media Group, 
EcoMédias Group, and Maroc Soir Group, control a few media outlets 
in print, online, and broadcasting. No single company has control over a 
significant audience share. 
Some of Morocco’s billionaires, such as Moulay Hafid El-Alami, Aziz 
Akhannouch, Othman Benjelloun, and Meriem Bensaleh Chaqroun, 
have stakes in five of the nine French-language publications including 
Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, La Vie Eco, Les Inspirations Eco, La Nouvelle Tribune, 
and L’Economiste. Currently, two of them are also ministers (Le Desk 
& Reporters Without Borders, 2017). The publications are editorially 
pro-government, and they benefit from advertising despite their 
limited circulation. This close relationship between economic power 
and the French-language media has created an unhealthy media 
market because these newspapers receive an advertising budget 
regardless of their primary circulation and readership. This promotes 
a culture of clientelism, which is harmful to media transparency and 
professionalism. Ostensibly, media in Morocco have been strongly 
controlled by political and economic clientelism. These political leaders 
need these publications for reputation management and to play down 
corruption scandals and ensure electoral campaign success (Benchenna, 
Ksikes, & Marchetti, 2017). This clientelism is also a manifestation of the 
rentier state in Morocco. If the freedom of the press is to be respected, 
independence from government interference and big money are vital.
Technology and Infrastructure
In the context of the liberalization of the ICT sector in the 1990s, the 
1996 Law 24–96 ended the monopoly of state-owned Maroc Télécom. 
Morocco set up a regulatory body to come up with the country’s vision 
for ICT. Three companies provide telecom services in Morocco. Initially 
owned by the state, Maroc Télécom became private in 1998. The French 
firm Vivendi acquired 35% of its shares in the company in 2001. In 2013, 
Etisalat, an Emirati telecom operator, acquired 53% of Vivendi’s stake 
for USD 5.6 billion (Oxford Business Group, 2019). Orange Morocco 
became the first fully private operator to enter the Moroccan market in 
2000 (known then as Médi-Télécom, a private consortium led by Spain’s 
Telefonica). It is now the market’s second largest telecom operator. In 
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2007, Inwi (formerly Maroc Connect) became the third largest telecom 
company in Morocco. Inwi is a subsidiary of the SNI group, the leading 
Moroccan industrial, financial, and services conglomerate owned by 
the monarch. Telecommunications is the most dynamic sector in the 
industry, with mobile data services leading the way.
In 2009, the government launched the national strategy “Digital 
Morocco 2013” to consolidate ICT industries, to support the automation 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to boost e-government 
services, and to foster the dissemination of ICT usage among Moroccan 
households. Subsequent to Digital Morocco 2013, Morocco launched 
“Digital Morocco 2020,” which relies on three main pillars: 1) adopting 
smart government services and facilitating the adoption of digital devices 
among Moroccan households; 2) positioning Morocco as a strategic 
digital hub in French-speaking Africa and enabling the development of 
business process outsourcing services with high added values; and 3) 
upskilling human capital to increase the competitiveness of the economy 
(Oxford Business Group, 2019). The government invested USD 750 
million to reduce the digital divide by 50% through the digitization 
of administrative services, improved access to the Internet through 
free Wi-Fi in public spaces, and digital literacy programs (Ministry of 
Industry, Investment, Commerce, and Digital Economy, 2019). 
One of the results of Digital Morocco 2020 is the expansion of 
e-commerce platforms. In 2015, Morocco managed to reach a total of 
11.7 million credit cards (Oxford Business Group, 2019). The rise of 
e-commerce is supported by electronic payment. Out of a total of 18.3 
million Internet users, 900,000 are considered regular e-consumers 
(Oxford Business Group, 2019). In 2019, e-commerce growth was 
mainly driven by increased smartphone penetration and the rollout of 
the 4G network.
The development of IT services has been supported by the many 
technology parks that host more than 100 IT companies, including 
Dell, IBM, Accenture, Atos, HP, and Logica and more than 1,000 start-
ups. Over the last few years, Morocco has created four technoparks 
in the four largest Moroccan cities Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers, and 
Agadir. The mission of these technoparks, which facilitate importing 
and exporting IT-related services, is to assist in the creation and 
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development of companies in ICT and to promote innovation, training, 
and technological support. 
Morocco is now among the top ten African nations in terms of 
digital development (Oxford Business Group, 2019). The government 
efforts have resulted in high proportions of households with Internet 
access. According to the Agence Nationale de Réglementation des 
Télécommunications (2019), 74.2% of Moroccan households are now 
equipped with Internet, 99.8% have mobile phones, and of these, 
75.7% have smartphones. The leading motivation for the adoption of 
the Internet and mobile phones is to enjoy entertainment content, such 
as games and social media platforms (95.2%), and to access the news 
(86.1%). Despite significant efforts by the government to integrate ICTs 
properly into the country’s development agenda, the ICT Development 
Index ranked Morocco 100 out of a total of 176 countries (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2017).
Challenges
Three main areas represent challenges to the current system: quality 
media content, economic sustainability, and disrupting technologies. 
The rise of sponsored content, misinformation, sensationalism, and 
poor-quality journalism, particularly in online media, have raised 
serious concerns about the quality of information Moroccan audiences 
receive. Entertainment and celebrity stories have increased at the 
expense of news on national affairs. This dismal picture is the result 
of several factors, including the fierce competition over audience 
attention, the logic of algorithm-driven platforms, and the integration 
of the editorial, marketing, and analytics functions in the digital news 
industry. The value of news stories is no longer based on the standard 
quality but on a range of metrics, including the number of visits, hits, 
and views. 
Another factor that negatively affects the quality of content is the 
journalists’ education and training. Journalism seems to have become 
the profession of those who have no profession. In November 2016 and 
on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, the 2M TV show Sabahiyat featured a tutorial to show 
women how to cover domestic violence facial bruises with makeup. 
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In January 2019, a journalist at Al-Ayam newspaper interviewed an 
orphaned seven-year-old girl about her experience of her mother’s 
murder. Both events triggered a vast wave of criticism from social 
media users and activists who denounced the unethical practices of the 
journalists.
In terms of economic sustainability, clientelism and the unfair 
distribution of advertising money continue to represent a threat to 
media business models. In January 2018, the government placed an 
additional financial burden on the fragile media sector by imposing a 
5% tax on digital advertising. 
In terms of technology, disruptive technologies are aggravating the 
fragility of the business models of the print media, despite government 
subsidies. Moroccan websites depend on revenue streams built on the 
commercialization of media platforms such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, 
and other global tech companies. Reliance on social media platforms 
has created a major structural shift in news production, distribution, 
and monetization. The tech giants deprive local news websites of vital 
revenue streams and sources. A local business in Casablanca will 
achieve a higher yield return on investment when it advertises with 
Google and Facebook than with a local news organization. The former 
will deliver local customers to the local business in a more efficient 
way than a local news organization serving the local news needs of the 
same local customers. This situation has had severe consequences for 
the revenue streams of news websites. Digitalization has been making 
the profession of a journalist in Morocco more volatile and insecure. 
In line with competitive authoritarianism, Morocco failed to liberalize 
the media and has continued its history of state-controlled media as 
instruments of political control. As a competitive authoritarian regime, 
the state created democratic institutions such as HACA and SNRT 
to reform its media system while entrenching these institutions via 
authoritarian laws. The locus of power over the media includes licensing 
and policy formulation, but it also reaches into editorial decisions. 
Without the sincere political will to reform the media ecosystem, 
positive change in the quality of content and revenue streams is likely to 
remain a long-term proposition.
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Outlook
As elsewhere, news and content providers should improve their 
competitiveness and ensure that more readers browse their media 
platforms. However, to further enhance the level of attractiveness 
in a highly competitive media content market, these news content 
providers such as print media, broadcast media, and digital platforms 
are called to personalize their news content over multi-cross platforms 
and different devices. Rather than targeting readers as a whole, news 
and content providers (media organizations) will realize that real 
value is in the market of one reader/consumer. The emerging world 
of media has become more personal than ever before, where readers 
access their news and media content through their personal and mobile 
devices. The personalization of news and media content is likely to 
take another dimension when the superfast 5G enters the Moroccan 
telecom market. Huawei, a global provider of ICT infrastructure, has 
been closely working with the Moroccan government and the three 
Moroccan telecoms operators to launch 5G and will make Morocco the 
first country in Africa to do so.
Over the next five years, digital advertising will continue to thrive 
and become strong and mature due to factors such as the high levels 
of connectivity, social media usage, digital platforms penetration, and 
mobile device adoption. Moroccan policymakers are well-advised to 
design flexible regulatory frameworks to protect Moroccan readers and 
their data. At the center of any regulatory framework, the critical issues 
at hand should include business models, disruptive technologies, trust, 
and regulation.
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Carola Richter and Claudia Kozman
What do we learn from comparing the individual media systems 
of Arab countries? We consciously refrained from building a 
typology for the eighteen Arab countries that are examined in 
this book. Instead, we have opted for highlighting major themes 
that we detected when carefully reviewing the seven dimensions 
that each author used in the analysis of the respective countries. 
These themes comprise 1) the state’s approach to media, 2) media 
ownership, 3) fragmentation and polarization, 4) technological 
advancement and innovation, and 5) transnational mobility and 
connection. We explain how the media systems examined differ 
or concur with regard to these five themes.
Deconstructing Typologies, Reconstructing Themes
Comparing Arab media systems can lead to paradoxical results, given 
their ambivalent developments. A shared history has left its marks, 
albeit in different ways. Ongoing changes distiniguish several dynamic 
fields, while at the same time a strong authoritarianism persists in other 
fields. What conclusions, then, can we draw for the present and future 
of Arab media?
Throughout its chapters, this book has confirmed that Siebert, 
Peterson, and Schramm’s (1963) indication that the “press always takes 
on the form and coloration of the political and social structures within 
which it operates” still holds true today (p. 1). Nonetheless, these 
political and social structures change over time and, depending on other 
factors such as the economic power or the embeddedness of a country 
in transnational settings, may play out differently. Moreover, while this 
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deterministic view seems to have allowed Siebert and his colleagues 
to assign the different political and social structures of all countries 
worldwide to only four distinct types, we have found it impossible to 
identify an appropriate typology for Arab media systems. Thus, we 
consciously refrained from building such a typology for the 18 Arab 
countries that are examined in this book. 
Instead, we have opted to highlight the major themes we detected 
when carefully reviewing the seven dimensions that each author used 
in the analysis of their country. These themes will enable us to create 
new perspectives that could lead to more detailed discussions about the 
notion of state and business power, the role of transnational influences, 
and the impact of the particular social settings of Arab countries on 
the media. Which major themes, then, are characteristic of Arab media 
systems from a comparative perspective?
In the extant media system typologies, the nature of the state or the 
government is analyzed along with the kinds of intervention they apply 
to the media. In her chapter in this book, Sarah El-Richani, however, 
contends it is “important to take stock of the de facto situation... in addition 
to that which is de jure.” This implies that the media in general might 
reflect the political and social structures of a given country, but there 
are still manifold ways in which these structures affect actual practices. 
While the legal written rules and regulations are often the focus of a 
media systems analysis, the chapters on the respective countries urge us 
to take a more general perspective that also reviews typical practices of 
control and influence beyond the written rules and regulations. Instead 
of considering only the legal framework, we consider the government 
or the state’s general approach to media as an important theme. This 
includes the ways in which journalism and the performance of media 
workers are affected by red lines, unwritten rules, and the kinds of self-
censorship resulting from the state’s overarching approach to media 
being incorporated into its work practices.
Another major dimension in the extant global media system 
typologies is the ownership of media. While this has often been analyzed 
as a simple distinction between state-owned and private, or “public” 
and “independent” media, we instead consider the patterns that shape 
media ownership and their impact on content. Here, William Rugh’s 
(2004) notion of “loyalist” media in the MENA region is important 
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because it hints at the fact that media privatization does not necessarily 
result in pluralistic media landscapes or regime-challenging media. 
Additionally, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) idea of analyzing political 
parallelism in the media is to be taken into consideration when assessing 
ownership patterns because of the typical interwovenness of politics 
and business, and how this is mirrored in the media scene. 
The notion of political parallelism reappears in audiences’ preferences 
and journalists’ performances. In all of the countries analyzed, we 
find strong patterns of both societal and political fragmentation and 
polarization. Arab media systems seem to be characterized by a division 
of audiences, journalists, and content owing to conflict driven by ethnic, 
religious, or political differences, which often come to light during 
times of crisis and war. We thus consider the nature and effects of 
fragmentation and polarization of the media system as another theme. 
An aspect that is not reflected strongly—or at all—in existing 
typologies is technological advancement and innovation. Media 
systems are converging throughout the world; therefore, the traditional 
distinction between print, audio, and visual media is not very helpful 
in an era of pervasive Internet, since it fails to provide us with in-depth 
knowledge about the realities of media production, usage, and control. 
Thus, we need to take a critical look at a media system’s achievements 
and performance in terms of technology and infrastructure. The country 
chapters indicate that this theme is of major importance, even when some 
states simply do not have the wherewithal to engage in technological 
advancement and innovation. 
Finally, the MENA region has been characterized for centuries by a 
tradition of transnational mobility and connection, which is also evident 
in the realm of media and journalism. On the one hand, and due to a 
common language, the potential outreach of media to publics beyond 
national borders enables content and production to travel in a way that 
is not even imaginable in other regions of the world. On the other hand, 
transnational connectedness raises its own unique problems, such as the 
asymmetry between the civilian experiences on either side of wars or 
conflicts, as in those between Yemen and Saudi Arabia or Palestine and 
Israel. With regard to outreach, mobility, and ownership the theme of 
transnationalism has been highlighted in several country chapters and 
thus requires further attention. 
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In the following section, we examine these themes more closely by 
comparing and contrasting the findings of the 18 country chapters. 
Arab Media Systems: A Comparative Perspective
1. The State’s Approach to Media
Reflecting on the state’s approach to media allows us to understand 
the ability and means of ruling elites to control the media, or influence 
its production and content to shape public opinion. Indeed, the most 
common feature of almost all Arab political regimes is their continuous 
effort to make the media suit their immediate policies. Ehab Galal, 
for example, argues in his chapter on Qatar that the state “carefully 
navigate[s] a balance... between liberalization and control” and 
Bouziane Zaid and Mohammed Ibahrine detect a “cyclical fluctuation” 
of liberalization and repression in Morocco. 
In most of the Arab countries, constitutions or other guiding legal 
texts guarantee freedom of media and expression—but almost always 
within the limits of vague concepts such as “national security” and 
“public morals.” It thus remains within the jurisdiction of the regimes to 
execute what is meant by freedom of expression or, more generally, what 
they want the media to be and do in society. We identified mobilization 
and modernization purposes as the two main goals regimes typically 
use to justify the instrumentalization of the media. In addition to this 
line of comparison, we found varying degrees of enforcement of laws 
and (unwritten) regulations, which prompted us to include a second 
dimension of comparison: the contrast between a laissez-faire approach 
and strong control of media (see Figure 1). 
Mobilization, in this context, is often framed as an educational effort 
by self-proclaimed elites to enlighten the masses who seem to be “not 
there yet,” that is, not yet in the state of mind the regime wants them to be. 
More often than not, mobilization has turned out to be propaganda used 
extensively by socialist—or those claiming to be socialist—republics, 
such as Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Yet, mobilization 
in the sense outlined above is a vanishing characteristic of Arab media 
systems. As seen in their respective chapters, only Algeria and Sudan 
still appear to be aiming to mobilize the “uneducated masses,” although 
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Sudan’s approach is apt to change due to revolutionary transformation, 
and in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, a unified state approach is completely 
lacking, due to the de facto fragmentation of these countries. In the 
latter three cases, militias or opposing elites today instrumentalize 
the media using propagandistic means to mobilize it for their causes 
and to delegitimize opposition, therewith constructing a new kind of 
mobilization media that is not likely to vanish if the wars finally end. 
In Iraq, the situation has changed since the US invasion in 2003, 
throwing out the idea of mobilization as a main feature to describe the 
state’s approach to media. Similarly, in Lebanon and Palestine, state 
structures are weak and thus a kind of laissez-faire approach towards the 
media exists, with restrictive laws in place but rarely applied. In these 
cases, the state is not in a position to dictate a specific media policy, 
neither can it mobilize for its causes. In a way, this makes these media 
systems freer than others. The problem, however, lies in the inability 
of the state to provide legal security to media outlets and physical 
security to media workers, making them vulnerable to any kind of 
attacks. Tunisia is a special case here: it has created laws to guarantee a 
more autonomous media system, balancing protection and control and 
avoiding instrumentalization of the media. However, the actual practices 
resulting from this approach have yet to be observed more closely. 
On the other side of the spectrum, Egypt and Bahrain exercise strict 
control over the media, often under the pretext of stabilizing national 
security and the modern state. Due to the political turmoil these 
countries have faced since 2011, their governments view the media as 
potential enemies that need to be controlled through restrictive laws, 
intimidation of media workers, and ownership. 
In between these two extremes—the laissez-faire and the strong 
control approaches—many countries oscillate between control and 
liberalization under the pretext of modernization and development. With 
the exception of Bahrain, all of the Gulf states, as well as the kingdoms 
of Morocco and Jordan, legitimize control of the media as a means to 
foster national stability and unity, while at the same time somehow 
conceding to private (foreign) investors in order to bring to life their 
visions of media as revenue creators. These governments also invest 
strongly in building a high-end digital infrastructure in order to keep 
their promises of modernization with regard to digital media. In this 
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context, media content often is not directly censored; instead, journalists 
commonly revert to self-censorship in order to avoid jeopardizing their 
own position in a media industry that these governments view as a 
must-have in creating a modern society. 
Fig. 1: The state’s approach to media
2. Media Ownership 
Media ownership reveals much about the distribution of power in the 
context of financial viability. It also raises questions about who is at 
the center or the margins of power, in addition to which role external 
donors play. 
In the Arab world, state-owned and privately-owned media coexist, 
but to varying degrees. In some countries, such as Lebanon and Kuwait, 
print media have always been set up as entirely privately financed 
outlets without any state-ownership, while in most other countries, the 
print media market was at least liberalized in the 1990s or early 2000s, 
leading to the coexistence of state-owned, privately-owned, and party-
owned press. The much wider reach of the broadcasting sector meant 
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that regimes attributed much greater significance to it. Television, in 
particular, remained in the hands of governments and their ministries of 
information (or similar institutions) well into the mid-2000s. Lebanon 
is the only exception to this rule. One media type that is absent in the 
MENA is up-to-date public service broadcasting (PSB) that aims to 
represent all segments of society without governmental interference 
and commercial interests, although there have been some attempts 
to establish a PSB model similar to that of the BBC in Iraq. Currently, 
Tunisia faces the task of reorganizing state-owned broadcasting and 
turning it into a real PSB. 
However, the simple facts of public or private ownership do not help 
us understand either the underlying patterns of media ownership or 
their effect on content. First, we must therefore glean patterns that shape 
ownership structures by taking into consideration the state’s general 
approach to media as well as the availability of financial means by certain 
actors. Second, we have to consider Rugh’s idea of “loyalist” media and 
pit it against its very opposite, which we term “confrontational” media 
(see Figure 2). 
With regard to “loyalist” media, we find three distinct ownership 
patterns in our sample with one common characteristic: ownership 
of key media sectors, such as broadcasting and telecommunications, 
is almost exclusively in the hands of cronies or extended family 
members of the regimes. In countries such as Egypt, Sudan, and 
Algeria, the security apparatuses and the military play a huge role in 
the ownership of “privatized” media. In countries like Jordan, Kuwait, 
Morocco, Bahrain, or Oman, private ownership extends to influential 
businesspeople who have become successful due to their close links to 
the ruling family. These relationships allow them to make cross-sector 
investments in the media, for example to advertise their products. A 
third pattern is primarily linked to what we call “pan-Arab outsourcing” 
and applies mainly to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. While these 
countries still operate rather banal national state-owned television 
outlets, the main investments of the royal families and their allies go into 
pan-Arab consortia, such as Rotana, Al-Jazeera, and MBC, which provide 
professional journalism and high-end entertainment, but are entirely 
loyal to the political ideologies of their sponsors. None of these three 
ownership patterns is exclusive in any media system, rather they often 
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greatly overlap within a single system. Here, we highlight the prevailing 
pattern for each country.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, “confrontational” media 
are prevalent in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where media ownership is 
completely unregulated, at least from a national perspective. In these 
cases, media almost exclusively belong to actors involved in the conflict 
and consequently disagree with one another. At the same time, media 
loyalty is enforced in areas where one side dominates, such as in the 
Houthi-dominated north of Yemen or in east Libya, which is under the 
control of General Haftar. Here, media are typically owned by those 
who have the financial means to operate them and who are most often 
the conflicting parties themselves. 
However, in the realms of both loyalist and confrontational media, 
a new development concerning small media has occurred. In some 
countries, small media, such as local radio stations or websites, are 
operated by local actors and provide a true alternative to the “big” 
national media, whereas in others, as in the cases of Libya and Iraq, they 
pop up unregulated, and often get support from external donors, such 
as European media development organizations. Still, in other countries, 
such as Tunisia, community media are part of the official new media 
scene. These examples indicate that small or alternative media could be 
a breeding ground for new media ownership models in the foreseeable 
future.
In addition to the patterns of enforced and unregulated media 
ownership, there exists another, more regulated kind of pattern on the 
“confrontationalist” side. In Lebanon, Tunisia, Iraq, and Palestine, media 
are owned by a variety of political and/or confessional actors, creating 
a rather pluralistic media landscape. While, in Iraq and Palestine, this 
can easily turn into the conflict model described above, in the cases of 
Lebanon and Tunisia, there seems to be a stable and healthy external 
pluralism.
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Fig. 2: Media ownership
3. Fragmentation and Polarization
This theme identifies fragmentation and polarization as a result of lines 
of conflict driven by ethnic, religious, social, or political differences. It 
reflects the supremacy of power and control in dictating how social 
structures and divisions are represented. We identified two dimensions 
through which to compare the countries: how the political system deals 
with conflicts, and how the media represent conflicts. On the political 
level, the country cases indicate two opposing ways in which these 
phenomena are treated: either the lines of conflict materialize to such 
a degree that they are omnipresent in society and shape all societal 
discourse, or they are strongly suppressed so as to mimic political and 
social homogeneity for the sake of creating national stability. Different 
ways of representing these conflicts can be found on the media level, 
ranging from “conscious inclusion” to “conscious exclusion” of the 
voices of others (see Figure 3). 
On one side of the political spectrum, in which strong political, 
religious, and/or ethnic divisions openly shape society, are post- and 
current-conflict countries that are mired in civil wars, including Libya, 
Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, or those that are shaken by major 
political rifts, such as that between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine. In 
all of these cases, media performance oscillates between providing 
an external pluralism of opinions and perspectives, on the one hand, 
and hate speech and denunciation of the opponent, on the other. With 
regard to each of Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where wars are still ongoing, 
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a completely unregulated, polarized media is dominant, and there are 
only minor tangible efforts to overcome this polarization, such as small, 
local reconciliatory initiatives. This means a conscious exclusion of and 
fight against other actors’ voices takes place in the respective media, 
thus reinforcing polarization through media discourse. 
In the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, where the fragmentation 
of the media landscape along political and confessional lines has long 
been the case, more signs of professionalization, such as the use of less 
aggressive language or more objective reporting, can be observed. Thus, 
we can detect that some learning has taken place, perhaps due to the 
perceived necessity of including opposing voices of in different media 
in order to mimic openness and reduce polarization. 
There is yet another way of dealing with conflict on the political 
level, as seen in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan, each of which 
faces societal rifts in different spheres. Egypt has a large Coptic 
minority; Morocco comprises substantial Imazighen communities; 
Tunisia faces political rifts, severe problems with Islamists and an 
unresolved urban-rural divide; and Jordan’s population is made up of 
many Palestinians and other refugee populations. These countries have 
found ways of responding to the demands of the various segments 
of society by providing better representation, either through special-
language programs on radio and television, as in the case of Morocco, or 
by a quasi-natural inclusion, such as with the Palestinians in Jordanian 
society and its media landscape. In these cases—sometimes only after 
strong political pressures from the respective organized minorities—a 
gradual and closely monitored inclusion in the media system has taken 
place. Yet socioeconomic divisions, such as an urban-rural or class 
division, are not adequately addressed in most of the media systems 
that were observed here. 
In other countries, societal conflict lines are strong, but their 
articulation remains suppressed, as in the case of tribal minorities in 
remote areas of Algeria and Sudan, such as Darfur, or in the cases of 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain with religious minorities of other Islamic 
faiths. So far, no efforts have been made to provide a more inclusionary 
media landscape.
As for the small Gulf states of Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE, 
indigenous citizens represent only a minority of the population, with the 
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majority of the population comprising individuals originally from other 
Arab countries or South Asia, and typically dwelling only temporarily in 
these countries. It is worth noting that expatriates are oftentimes those 
behind media production both in the Arabic language (as in the case 
of Al-Jazeera), or the English-language newspapers, news agencies, and 
transnationally operating media. Although the foreign workers are not 
naturalized and therefore often lack political rights, the chapters on those 
countries paint a picture of harmonious coexistence, emphasizing the 
tolerance towards foreign religions, confessions, and ethnicities. Indeed, 
given the dependency on foreign staff, their inclusion in everyday life 
and the media scene is crucial for these regimes. It remains to be seen 
whether an adequate representation of the non-naturalized inhabitants’ 
problems, needs, and demands—which revolve around human rights 
issues—is actually reflected in media production, or whether it is 
glossed over. 
Fig. 3: Fragmentation and polarization
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4. Technological Advancement and Innovation
Technological advancement reflects both the political ideology and 
economic power of a given state. We therefore approached this theme 
from two perspectives: first, the state of the infrastructure regarding 
Internet connectivity and telecommunications, and second, specific 
policies behind building a high-end infrastructure or the lack thereof—
for example, whether a state makes it a priority to invest in the Internet, 
liberalizes the telecommunications market, or not. Taking these two 
aspects into consideration, we observe a spectrum with highly developed 
technological systems at one end, and poorly developed systems—due 
to a lack of prioritization—at the other (see Figure 4). 
The rich Gulf countries, with their high-end infrastructure enabling 
literally everyone to be connected through the Internet and mobile 
phones, are positioned at one end of the spectrum. Statistics indicate an 
almost total connectivity amongst the populations in the small emirates 
of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. For instance, mobile phone 
penetration sometimes hits the 200% mark, meaning that statistically 
every citizen has two mobile phone contracts. The geographically 
larger and more populated countries of Saudi Arabia and Oman 
follow a similar trend, although their penetration does not reach the 
same figure. In all of these countries, the regimes heavily invest in 
infrastructure and facilitate the establishment of international and 
leading technology companies in the region. The regimes regard these 
ventures as investments in their futures, actions that could diversify 
their economies and build a competitive infrastructure for businesses in 
general, as well as satisfying their citizens by providing state-of-the-art 
communications and a ‘modern’ lifestyle. At the same time, this state-
of-the-art infrastructure comes with new forms of restriction. In order 
to keep their control of the online sphere, the incumbent elites have 
released a plethora of cybercrime laws and have invested, with the help 
of globally operating tech giants, in Internet security that not only aims 
to prevent financial fraud online, but in many cases is also used to limit 
freedom of speech on the Internet. 
There are, of course, other countries in the region that have long 
realized how investing in Internet infrastructure in particular, and 
media infrastructure more broadly, can help to advance the countries’ 
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modernization and economic development. The governments that 
most strongly advocated for the distribution of computers and the 
development of an Internet infrastructure in the early 2000s were Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Morocco and, after some delay, Algeria. These countries 
started from a very low level of connectivity, and—due to their limited 
financial means, vast geographies, and still substantial illiteracy rates 
among the population—have reached only modest levels of Internet 
penetration (from 48% in Algeria to 64% in Tunisia). The early and 
controlled liberalization of the telecommunications market, however, 
has stimulated comparatively high levels of mobile phone penetration 
among citizens (which exceeds 100% in all countries but Egypt). 
By contrast, in countries such as Lebanon and Jordan Internet 
penetration is comparatively better, but mobile phone use has for a long 
time been considered rather expensive and therefore has remained less 
common. In Lebanon, for example, regulation of the telecom market has 
favored cronies of the confessional regime, preventing a competitive 
environment that would push forward technological advancement. 
Then, there are countries with an ambivalent record, such as 
Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, where a significant portion of the population 
is familiar with digital media due to advanced levels of education. While 
all three of these countries have witnessed major investments in Internet 
infrastructure and, in particular, in the telecommunications market, 
these investments continue to face major setbacks and destruction due 
to occupation, war, or violent conflict. 
Yemen, Libya, and Sudan are situated at the opposite end of the 
spectrum of technological advancement, with the lowest rates of Internet 
connectivity. In these cases, the lag is the product of a mixture of general 
underdevelopment, war and conflict, and a severe lack of governmental 
determination to build an infrastructure until the 2010s. 
Depending on the degree of state stability and investment security, 
technological advancement could develop rapidly in the two end 
groups. Regarding the two groups in the middle, policy directions and 
lack of financial means of investment seem to be the main problematic 
factors causing delays in development. 
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Fig. 4: Technological advancement and innovation
5. Transnational Mobility and Connection
The fifth and last theme indicates how aspects of transnational 
connections mirror the multiple and changing relations between the 
different countries and their media systems. Aspects of transnationalism 
have featured strongly in most of the individual countries investigated 
here. They manifest in unique but overlapping ways. The main aspects 
to consider are: 1) the transnational circulation of media content, 
2) the transnational circulation of media workers, 3) the role of the 
diaspora or those in exile in the media scene, and 4) the space that is 
provided to foreign or pan-Arab media in a given country (e.g. through 
hosting foreign channels). If we concentrate on the level of trans-Arab 
connections only, and exclude non-Arab mobility, we can identify five 
major groups of countries that can be distinguished in terms of these 
aspects (see Figure 5). 
Oman represents the media system with the fewest transnational 
connections: it neither invests in pan-Arab content, nor hires large 
numbers of non-Omani Arab media workers. It also does not have a 
strong and active diaspora involved in media production, and does not 
host foreign media. But this is actually rather atypical for the region, as 
we can observe by examining the other countries. 
A second group, comprising Bahrain, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen, 
boasts substantial and active diasporas that produce a sizeable volume 
of media content from abroad. Libyan and Yemeni political actors, for 
example, operate entire systems of television channels from abroad, 
while Sudan and Bahrain have active exile communities that are highly 
present online. The content these online spaces or channels produce 
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is aimed at target audiences in the given home countries. Therefore, 
the transnational element in question here is the diasporic media 
production and transmission back to the country of origin, rather than 
the transnational circulation of content or media workers outside their 
home countries in general.
A third, very large group, including the Maghreb’s Morocco, Algeria, 
and Tunisia, in addition to Iraq and Palestine, accounts for the countries 
of origin of many media workers who operate the pan-Arab television 
stations in the Gulf, such as Al-Jazeera or MBC. Moreover, these states 
also enjoy substantial diasporas spread over the MENA region and 
throughout Europe, in particular in France. These diasporas often 
consume the media of their home countries as well as adding to media 
production through a set of (mainly online) diaspora media outlets. Yet 
again, the content produced on these platforms is not directed beyond 
the respective national communities at home or abroad. 
A fourth group consists of the Gulf countries Qatar, the UAE, and 
Saudi Arabia. These states dedicate their media investments to pan-
Arab outlets, producing content that primarily targets transnational 
audiences. As the recipients of media workforces from other Arab 
countries, they have succeeded in building real pan-Arab working 
hubs. All three countries also provide platforms and financial support 
to other Arab political actors, enabling them to set up media abroad 
and directly target their own national audiences. All three have, for 
example, supported Libyan political actors and their media activities, 
and Saudi Arabia has provided media space for Yemeni political groups 
that have fled their country. Although Jordan does not fit seamlessly 
in this group, it does to a certain extent provide space for foreign 
media production, and hosts many international media producers in 
its Jordan Media City. Ultimately, however, it cannot compete with 
the Gulf states as a new pan-Arab media hub. Finally, until the 1980s 
Kuwait had been a major hub for pan-Arab content and workforce, but 
it has since lost this position to the Gulf states on the other side of the 
shore. 
A fifth and final group includes the traditional hubs of pan-Arab 
transnationalism, Lebanon and Egypt, with their transnationally-
oriented television, serial and cinema production, strong diasporas, and 
circulating workforce. Both countries have shaped the transnational 
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flows of Arab media for decades. Before the current war, Syria had also 
played a strong role in pan-Arab serial production and the circulating 
workforce, but its transnationalism has since shifted towards the 
diaspora model, due to a significant decline in media production.
Fig. 5: Transnational mobility and connection
By identifying recurrent themes in the separate country chapters, and 
applying a comparative perspective when examining these themes, 
we tried to determine the similarities and differences among the 18 
Arab media systems and thus provide an in-depth view of the current 
status quo regarding political, economic, societal, technological, and 
transnational dimensions. However, our analysis of different types of 
media systems should not be interpreted as suggesting that these types 
are set in stone. Developments in the region are so dynamic that the 
current situations displayed in our analysis and the figures included 
above should be understood as snapshots of a certain moment in time. 
The frequent lack of more accurate data in the MENA region still leaves 
us with uncertainty regarding many aspects. As a result, comparisons 
can only be tentative. 
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The Road Ahead: Challenges for Arab Media Systems 
Finally, we will refer to some of the dynamic developments characteristic 
of the region, which also shape media landscapes globally, and whose 
directions and results cannot yet be predicted. 
From the beginning, media in the MENA region have been tools 
for mobilization and modernization, and correspond to ownership 
patterns that reflect these approaches. Rarely in their history have they 
been considered as independent entities that exist to watch over the 
government and other ruling elites. Many of the Arab countries lack 
sustainable funding models for media beyond instrumental ownership 
by privileged actors. This has led to what the literature calls “media 
capture” (Schiffrin, 2018), that is, a state of affairs in which media 
outlets become a trading product of political or other actors who 
ensure an economic grip on it in order to remain in power. This kind 
of approach is no longer exclusively the domain of the state or its elites, 
but is also adopted by the business sector, security apparatuses, militias, 
and other political actors. The problem of media capture is certainly not 
limited to the MENA region, and has become a global phenomenon, as 
evident in European countries and the US. In some areas of the MENA 
region, community media, such as small radio stations or local online 
newspapers, which are in particular facilitated by the Internet, could 
evolve as alternatives to media capture on the national and transnational 
levels. Our authors highlight two main solutions to allow for a more 
autonomous and sustainable media environment: an accountable rule 
of law needs to be established for individuals inclined to invest time and 
money into media, and a real advertising market needs to be set up. 
Another major challenge that will not be easily overcome is the 
fragmentation of societies that could ultimately result in the disintegration 
of entire countries, such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya, or in rising political 
and economic tensions, as in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and Algeria. 
The fragmentation of societies and the concurrent instrumentalization 
of media by the various fragments are clear outcomes of these crises. 
Taking into consideration the historical developments and the colonial 
trajectories as well as the current (international) political interests in the 
Middle East and North Africa, we realize that crises are a common feature 
of the region, with only a few exceptions. The manifold transnational 
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connections between the countries and the media systems, for example, 
investments in a joint ArabSat system or the pan-Arab workforce in many 
media channels, have not saved the region from infighting carried out 
via media. The recent outlawing of Qatar’s Al-Jazeera by Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, and Egypt is perhaps the most prominent example. Such 
infighting within or among states and the instrumentalization of media 
within them result in serious security risks for media workers, making 
journalism a dangerous occupation. 
The digital transformation of the media is a major challenge globally, 
as well as regionally. Some Arab countries, in particular the wealthy 
Gulf states, seem to be well-placed to meet this challenge, thanks to 
their advanced infrastructure. They have the means to invest heavily in 
the latest technology and do so intentionally to respond to the pressing 
need to transform their economy from crude oil production to a more 
knowledge-based economy. Other MENA countries are lagging behind, 
which has created a digital divide in the region. Regardless of their 
progress, all these countries are faced with the question of Internet 
control and regulation, and what to permit and what to ban. In this 
context, several problems that are being discussed on a global level, 
such as data security, privacy, and prevention of disinformation and hate 
speech, present challenges that are crucial to authoritarian regimes in 
respect to their control of opinions and marginalizing the opposition. So 
far, it is not clear what the trend will be, considering that some regimes 
do not hesitate to slow or cut off Internet connections completely, as has 
been done in Iraq, or monitor content closely and impose cybercrime 
laws as in Egypt or Qatar and many other countries in the region. 
The above challenges are critical and will affect all Arab media 
systems for the foreseeable future. Yet, the region has always shown 
strong dynamics and has even pioneered media-related developments. 
In Egypt, radio has long been exploited as a means of reaching out to the 
masses and creating stars, such as the singer Umm Kulthum and President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s. The immense role of satellite television 
in accessing not only national but transnational audiences has been 
largely driven by developments in the MENA region that had already 
started in the early 1990s. The Arab uprisings are ultimately connected 
to specific uses of social media that were unprecedented before 2010 or 
2011 and that showed how savvy people could incorporate technologies 
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into their political strategies. This inspired many movements all over 
the planet. 
Arab media, the structures and systems behind the practices of their 
producers and users, and their impact and effects, will thus be of interest 
and relevance for many years to come. 
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